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Time is an illusion that helps things make sense 
So we are always living in the present tense 
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What role do new, networked and pervasive technologies play in changing individual and 
collective memory processes? Many recent debates have focused on whether we are in 
the online era remembering ‘less’ or ‘more’ – informed, perhaps, by a tendency to think 
of memory spatially and quantifiably as working like an archive. Drawing on the 
philosophical theorising of Henri Bergson and its development through Gilbert 
Simondon, this thesis makes two interventions into the field. Firstly, conceptually, it 
establishes a process-based approach to perception, memory and consciousness in a shift 
away from the archive metaphor – thinking memory not as informing ‘knowledge of the 
past’ but ‘action in duration’. It situates the conscious, living being as transindividual – 
affectively relational to its perceived bodily and social environments, through psychic 
and collective individuation respectively. Moreover, it considers technologies as forms 
of transindividual extension of consciousness. Furthermore, it proposes the ‘anti-
metaphor’ of the anarchive as a conceptual tool with which to understand these duration-
based, bodily and technological, action-oriented processes. Secondly, methodologically, 
it advocates a rephrasing of the question from how much we are remembering to how we 
are remembering differently. Armed now with a developed theoretical position and 
methodological approach, the thesis explores through three case-study chapters how 
personal and more historical pasts may be remembered, individually and more 
collectively, through new, prevalent technologies of memory such as search engines, 
forums and social-media sites. Analysing the material experiences of remembering, as 
well as examining the economic drives of the platforms and wider actors, and the resulting 
socio-political implications, the thesis sets out the original argument of a contemporary 
struggle for memory: a complex negotiation of tensions between agencies of the body, 
the social, and the multifarious and interconnected socio-political and economic interests 
of the technological platforms and hybridised media systems through which 
contemporary remembering increasingly takes place.   
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In the present era, what role may new, online and pervasive technologies be playing in 
changing individual and collective memory processes?  
Many prevailing and popular debates around this question in recent years have tended to 
focus on a quantified perceived problem of whether we are today, in the Western, 
developed and internet-connected world, remembering ‘less’ or ‘more’ – informed, this 
thesis argues, by the European-historical assumption that memory acts quantifiably like 
a kind of archive (Rosenfield, 1988; Brockmeier, 2015), “storehouse of ideas” (Bennett 
& Hacker, 2013, pp. 103-112), or, moving into the computer-brain metaphors of the 
twenty-first century, like a database or hard drive.  
Taking a novel, alternative approach to the question, this cross-disciplinary, theoretical 
research draws on the thinking of late-nineteenth-early-twentieth-century French 
philosopher Henri Bergson – and its arguable development (Hansen, 2006, p. 8)1 in the 
work of mid-twentieth-century French philosopher Gilbert Simondon – to make two 
significant interventions into existing debates. On the one hand, in a theoretical shift away 
from the power of the archive metaphor, it attempts to reconceptualise remembering as a 
phenomenon not concerned with individual recall of knowledge of the past, but with 
realisation of potential for useful action (Bergson, 2004) in the lived present – in duration 
(Bergson, 2001). Moreover, since such potential is realised with and through sensorial 
 
1 In New Philosophy for New Media (2006), media theorist Mark B. N. Hansen puts forward a Bergsonian 
view of affectivity as “the capacity of the body to experience itself as ‘more than itself’ and thus to 
deploy its sensorimotor power to create the unpredictable, the experimental, the new” (p. 7). It is this 
“broadly Bergsonist theme” (p. 8) of affectivity as being ‘more than’, Hansen goes on to argue, that “is 




perception,2 it argues that, rather than a kind of faculty of the individual, remembering 
ought to be considered an affective, ‘more-than-individual’ or transindividual process of 
inter-relational, socially- and technologically-mediated movements within the present 
moment(s). On the other hand, methodologically, highlighting the popularly-supposed 
problem of whether we are remembering less or more as an example of an unhelpful 
Bergsonian ‘false problem’ (Deleuze, 2011, p. 17), the thesis crucially orients the ensuing 
research investigation to be concerned qualitatively with how we are remembering 
differently in the online era. This acknowledged, it reasserts the investigation to be one 
concerned not with the supposed amount we are remembering, but rather with the wider 
individual-social-technological ecologies through which processes of ‘personal’ and 
‘collective’ remembering take place through new, online and networked technologies, 
and the various cultural, political and economic agencies that may be inherent within 
them. 
It has been noted that, since the so-called ‘memory boom’ of the late-twentieth century, 
there has developed a certain disjuncture in the wider fields of ‘memory studies’ – not 
least in more recent years between more humanities- and more scientific-based 
approaches (van Dijck, 2007; Brown, 2008). Indeed, addressing the question of what role 
new technologies may play in changing memory processes involves a disciplinarily wide-
reaching approach, encompassing academic commentary across at least (but surely not 
limited to) neuroscience, psychology, sociology, philosophy, cultural studies and media 
studies. This thesis contributes to ongoing efforts to forge more ‘joined-up’ disciplinary 
approaches to thinking memory, the social and the digital. Indeed, its focus on memory 
not as ‘knowledge’ but as process helps to ground it critically from the outset in yearnings 
from the likes of media and cultural studies and psychology to conceptually adopt a notion 
of mediation as path toward an “interdisciplinary approach” to memory (van Dijck, 2007, 
p. 182), or indeed toward a “more adequate footing for a ‘science of memory’” (Brown, 
2008, p. 70).  
Such a contribution is made possible through a twenty-first-century combined reading of 
the philosophy of modernist thinkers Bergson and Simondon, each of whose (as we shall 
see) inter-relatable approaches – crucially seeing the human, the social and the 
technological in terms of relational, inter-affective processes in duration – offers answers 
 
2 Bergson argues that “memory can only become actual by means of the perception that attracts it. 





from the past to the contemporary call for interdisciplinarity. It has been noted that the 
usefulness of thinking with Bergson on wide-ranging subject matter lies not necessarily 
only in its detail, but in its approach – in applying his attitude, or the personality of his 
thinking, to new problems. Thus, as social scientists Alexandre Lefebvre and Melanie 
White argue: 
In fact all of Bergson’s great political readers—such as Charles Péguy, Karl 
Popper, John Humphrey, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, and William 
Connolly—could be similarly categorized: they are Bergsonians in the spirit 
of extending Bergson to new problems, rather than adhering to the letter of his 
text. (Lefebvre & White, 2012, pp. 4-5) 
So too have others noted the proclivity of an affective, transindividual, Simondonian 
approach toward cross-disciplinary subject-matter.3 As philosopher Muriel Combes 
notes:  
Simondon turns to individuation as process in order to address what he sees 
as another dangerous tendency of modern knowledge: the isolation of 
disciplines from one another on the basis of their construction of different 
individuals (society, psyche, medium, organism, species, machine) that are 
not allowed to communicate with one another, whose relationality becomes 
unthinkable … This is why Simondon works so intently within and across 
different domains of knowledge: he aims for a truly concerned 
multidisciplinarity. (Combes, 2013, p. 89) 
Philosophy scholar Keith Ansell-Pearson argues that we are in the midst of a 
contemporary ‘renaissance’ – indeed ‘revolution’ – of Bergsonism (2018). Signposting 
to numerous thinkers, cultural theorist James Burton notes in 2008 that Bergson’s 
influence has – particularly through a renewed interest after Deleuze – been “firmly re-
established” (Burton, 2008, p. 323) in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries 
across a breadth of fields, including philosophy, new media theory, art, modernism and 
cultural theory (Burton, 2008, p. 323). However, he notes that Bergson’s theorising in 
Matter and Memory (2004) “is still waiting for a full appreciation of its potential 
significance for fields in which memory is a central category, such as (social) psychology, 
 
3 Indeed, as we will discuss later in the thesis, while not necessarily rooted in Simondonian theory, there 
seemingly is developing a minor groundswell of support across multiple scientific and more humanities-




cultural history and memory studies” (Burton, 2008, p. 323). In recent years, 
psychologists Steven D. Brown and Paula Reavey have made a forceful contribution to 
extending Bergson’s affective theory into these areas – and indeed the everyday –  
through their 2015 book, Vital Memories, approaching clinical-psychology case-studies 
of those dealing with a difficult past from a Bergsonian social-relational perspective on 
remembering. This thesis hopes to further this push to greater breadths of 
multidisciplinarity, extending the reach of Bergson’s theory beyond the biological and 
the social and into the mediated realm of the cultural-technological.  
Taking an attempted theoretically more ‘joined-up’ approach of multidisciplinarity, then, 
and considering the subject matter through a twenty-first-century Bergsonian-
Sinmondonian philosophical lens, this thesis aims through a series of case-study analyses 
to find what, if any, ‘problem’ may exist for memory in the online era. We here use the 
word ‘find’, since, through a Bergsonian approach we may think the work of 
philosophical investigation not in terms of ‘solving’ already-stated problems. Rather, for 
Bergson, and indicative of the more joined-up approach he may offer, the work of 
philosophy is in finding problems themselves:  
But the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding 
the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it … 
Already in mathematics and still more in metaphysics, the effort of invention 
consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it 
will be stated. The stating and solving of the problem are here very close to 
being equivalent; the truly great problems are set forth only when they are 
solved. (Bergson, 1946, pp. 58-59) 
Thus, this original thesis strives, through an investigation of how we may be remembering 
differently through new, online technologies to find what new problem may exist for 
memory in the online era. Considering philosophically and materially the reasons for 
these differences in how we remember, as well as discussing the resulting philosophical 
and more socio-political implications, it arrives at a formulation of an original and 
complex contemporary problem for memory, that we for the sake of brevity and 
forcefulness call a contemporary ‘struggle to remember’.  
Such a problem, as we shall see, is bound up within the tensions between different 
agencies of transindividual drives – biological, cultural and technological – and their 




predominantly, the thesis argues, the problem may be found in scrutinising the economic 
model of “surveillance capitalist” technologies (Zuboff, 2019), and the implications of 
their automated “feed-forward” mechanisms, which bring forward data about the user’s 
past online behaviour to secure engagement in the present (Hansen, 2015). Such 
technologies, in their economic modus operandi, connect users not so much with the 
potential for personal or collective ‘remembrances’ of the past – toward the bodily and 
social drives of psychic and collective individuation – as with opportunities to ensure 
continued, monetisable user-engagement. Action is encouraged less in terms of 
usefulness for the transindividual and more in terms of usefulness for the platform. On 
the other hand, inter-related in these technologies, across complex on- and off-line 
techno-cultural media systems, there exist multiple manifestations (and their inherent 
agencies) of wider bodily, cultural and technological drives with which the 
transindividual must equally struggle, encompassing legislative, cultural, commercial and 
economic factors. For example (though certainly neither limited to these nor mutually 
exclusive): formal legislative and regulatory concerns around hate speech versus free 
speech; social questions around identity, and the constitution of the individual and ‘the 
group’ in an era of hyper-connectivity; and fears around the economic and political 
ecologies of so-called ‘fake news’, ‘filter bubbles’ and ‘echo chambers’ in informing 
perception, and indeed action. Ultimately, the thesis argues that the problem for memory 
may be found in the shifting imbalance of conscious agency in technologically-facilitated 
personal and collective remembering. In turn, this problem is produced in part through a 
two-fold, inter-related lack of awareness. Firstly, a lack of awareness of the function of 
memory as informing action rather than knowledge – which feeds directly into the 
monetisable conflation of media-artefact as memory. And, secondly, in the (designed) 
lack of transparency or awareness of more economic agencies and relations inherent in 
prevalent, surveillance-capitalist, techno-cultural interfaces through which remembering 








Overview of the Thesis 
The remainder of this Introduction Chapter sets out the chapter structure of the thesis, 
progressing through the Literature Review Chapter, to the Theory Chapter, and into the 
more investigatory Case-Study Chapters and subsequent Conclusion. 
Literature Review: Existing Debates, and Introduction to the Theory 
The thesis makes four initial moves through the Literature Review Chapter to lay the 
groundwork for the development of our philosophical approach in the Theory Chapter. 
Firstly, it sets out a contemporary context of the field of ‘memory studies’ – outlining 
briefly how we might understand the conceptual and methodological approaches to 
studying memory, with which popular and academic discourse may relate. Secondly, it 
thematically explores broad, popular debates around what supposed ‘problem’ may exist 
for memory in the online era. Thirdly, it takes an archaeological approach to generally 
critique these themes and positions, attempting to identify contestable tendencies of 
thought, and, drawing on philosophical, psychological and neurological research, to 
interrogate the philosophical-historical assumptions around memory ‘acting like an 
archive’ that may underpin them. And, fourthly, following the philosophical method of 
intuition, it argues for a twofold reframing of the investigation. On the one hand, shifting 
conceptually away from the quantified, archival metaphor, it argues for a methodological 
rephrasing of the investigation to focus not on how much we may be remembering but on 
how we may be remembering differently. On the other hand, it argues for a concerted 
conceptual re-orientation of empirical analysis to focus not on things in space but on 
processes in time, Thus, in anticipation of the theory chapter, it introduces Bergson’s 
thinking on duration as the enduring, experienced flow of the present.  
After attempting to adequately conceptually and historically contextualise the field of 
‘memory studies’, the Literature Review presents a succinct, cross-disciplinary thematic 
review of prevalent, popular debates around what may be ‘at stake’ for memory in the 
digital age, broadly situating them within existing (yet, as we shall see, perhaps overly-
discrete) categorisations of ‘individual’ (or personal), ‘communicative’ (or social) and 
‘cultural’ (or historical) memory (Assman, 2008). It draws on concerns around the so-
called ‘Google effect’ (Sparrow et al, 2011) and ‘digital’ amnesia (Carr, 2008; Greenfield, 
2015) and ‘hyper-attention’ (Hayles, 2010) in relation to contrasting ideas of whether 
mediatised memory technologies might represent a form of ‘extended mind’ or 




memory capabilities. Equally, ideas around the enhanced connectivity of networked 
memory (Hoskins, 2009) and the mediation of “prosthetic memory” (Landsberg, 2004), 
in relation to academic and wider concerns around so-called ‘fake news’ and the ‘post-
truth era’ (Lewandowsky et al, 2017). Or, concerns around “digital permanence” (Mayer-
Schönberger, 2011; Cohen & Schmidt, 2013) offering too much memory, in contrast to 
anticipations of a future “digital dark age” (Hillis, 1998), which sees a potential threat of 
the opposite.  
While acknowledging that exceptions of course exist, the chapter in its second part argues 
that, across multiple disciplines in which the research question is considered, we may 
identify a widespread, perhaps dominant, popular tendency toward seeing a problem of 
whether we are remembering in the online era ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ – whether, 
quantifiably, we are remembering ‘more’ or ‘less’. Taking an archaeological approach, 
the chapter argues that we may think this and other related tendencies of thought as 
emergent out of a historical-conceptual reliance on the metaphor of the archive – indeed, 
it emphasises that considerations over whether we remember less or more through 
technologies may be considered the same kinds of argument as depicted two-thousand 
years ago in Plato’s Phaedrus (1952). Engaging with this observation, it on the one hand 
briefly draws on thinking on language and metaphor to demonstrate the dangers of 
uncritical reliance on figurative concepts in analysis – “the metaphor being taken to be 
what it is merely a metaphor for” (Bennett & Hacker, 2013, p. 103). On the other hand, it 
draws on various recent and more historical neurological and psychological research to 
argue that such tendencies of thought, as popularly presented in the debate literature, 
represent precisely such an over-reliance – indeed to challenge the adequacy of the 
archive metaphor for memory at all.  
The final part of the Literature Review Chapter represents an analytic, methodological 
and conceptual intervention into the debates over what is at stake for memory in the online 
era. Acknowledging that a now non-quantified view of memory may not sensibly ‘fit’ 
within a formulated problem of ‘how much’ we are remembering in the online era, the 
chapter introduces Bergson’s method of intuition as a useful philosophical tool. On the 
one hand, analytically, this involves an interrogation of the problem as it is stated. From 
a Bergsonian perspective, as explicated by Deleuze, we can see the question of whether 
we are remembering more or less as a “badly stated problem” or “false problem” 
(Bergson, 1946), in that it is formed of “badly analysed composites” (Deleuze, 2011, p. 




degree between remembering, within the method of intuition we should be seeing it in 
terms of differences in kind – how are we remembering differently. In doing so, then, the 
investigation becomes no longer a matter of ‘uncovering’ the problem, but in finding it. 
On the other hand, methodologically, intuition requires a shift of conceptual gear, to try 
to distance ourselves from the modes of thought and conscious-perceptual and conceptual 
lenses though which we tend to view the world, and move closer toward a closer, less 
attentive understanding it within ‘the real’ – which is, to say, for Bergson, as lived in 
duration (1946, pp. 162-163). “It is reality itself, in the profoundest meaning of the word”, 
Bergson thus argues, “that we reach by the combined development of science and 
philosophy” (1925, p. 210). In anticipation of the subsequent Theory Chapter, the chapter 
ends by introducing Bergson’s theorising on duration.   
The Theory: Memory, Method and Mediation 
The Theory Chapter is split into three sequential parts. Part One, forming the substantial 
body of the chapter, aims to develop a working non-archival philosophical approach to 
individual and collective remembering and its relationship with technology – chiefly 
through readings of Bergson’s and Simondon’s theorising on memory, consciousness and 
technology. Thusly equipped, Part Two aims to shift to some degree away from the 
conceptual power of metaphors in thinking memory – attempting the proposed notion of 
the anarchive to formulate an ‘anti-metaphorical’ conceptual tool with which to apply 
this approach to remembering through empirical investigation. In Part Three, the chapter 
begins to set out how we might now apply these modes of thinking to our investigation – 
sketching out the argument around a contemporary ‘struggle to remember’ that will be 
progressed through the subsequent Case-Study Chapters.  
The theoretical basis of the thesis is chiefly grounded in Bergson’s theory of 
consciousness, memory and perception as set out in his 1896 work Matter and Memory 
(2004). Part One begins with Bergson’s crucial rejection of the shared notions of both 
idealists and realists that perception be concerned with “pure knowledge … [that] to 
perceive means to know” (Bergson, 2004, p. 17). Acknowledging Bergson’s notorious 
observation that “[t]here is no perception which is not full of memories” (2004, p. 24), 
the thesis instead develops a comprehensive understanding of his view of memory and 
perception as an evolutionarily-informed, inter-relational phenomenon of the body as an 
affective “centre for action” in duration (Bergson, 2004, p. 4). For Bergson, memory and 




present (Bergson, 2004, p. 21), in anticipation of the future.4 Latent “pure memory” is 
realised through affective movements – through and with perception of one’s 
environment – allowing beings, through recognition, to use past experiences to inform 
useful actions within present experiences (Bergson, 2004 p. 70). In higher animals, 
beyond more basic recognition and impulse-action, pure memory may be psychically 
realised into a consciously discernible “memory-image” (Bergson, 2004, pp. 93-94). And 
what we might characterise as consciousness may be mainly understood as the ability, 
through perceiving such memory-images, to choose how to act – “[T]he chief office of 
consciousness”, Bergson argues, “is to preside over action and to enlighten choice” (2004, 
p. 182).  
Here, through a reading of Simondon, the thesis attempts to develop Bergson’s thinking 
on memory into the wider social or collective realm, relating this understanding of 
remembering to two key Simondonian concepts: individuation and technics.  
Firstly, it abstracts Bergson’s notion of pure memory into the original conception of 
‘memory-potential’ – a kind of ‘always at-the-point-of-being-realised’. In doing so, it 
draws the tentative conceptual parallel between Bergson’s theorising on a kind of vital 
impetus of élan vital and Simondon’s notion of the pre-individual. This, for Simondon, 
is a condition of constant potentiality, the initial state of (almost) being that precedes the 
individual. Out of a state of potentiality, two senses of what we think of as ‘stable’ 
consciousness may relationally emerge. On the one hand, a bodily sense of self-awareness 
akin to Bergson’s thinking on consciousness may be realised through continuous, 
relational, voluntary movements of affective interaction with one’s physical environment 
– the body differentiating itself from its surroundings through psychic individuation. On 
the other hand, a sense of the individual may be realised out of an inter-affective feeling 
of ‘the social’ through movements of cultural relation – the sense of the ‘grouped 
individual’ emergent out of its perceived group through collective individuation. Both 
forms of individuation, we will see, are made possible through conceptions of historicity, 
to various degrees: psychic individuation allowing a stabilised sense of self through a 
relation of the body, in its perceived present (in duration) to its own experienced past and 
anticipated future; and collective individuation through a communicative relation of ideas 
of a groups historical past and potential future to the ‘social now’. The thesis then draws 
on Simondon’s thinking on technics, and the agencies inherent in “man-machine” 
 
4 “That which I call my present”, Bergson notes, “is my attitude with regard to the immediate future; it is 




coupling and technologically-enabled individuation (Simondon, 2017), on the one hand 
to progress our understanding of memory in relation to new technologies, and on the other 
move to situate it within a wider socio-politically relational context. It is through the 
technologically-mediated, inter-affective realisation of memory-potential that collective 
individuation may occur, the thesis argues. And affectivity, as has been noted by 
philosopher Brian Massumi, by its very inter-relational nature cannot be easily separated 
from politics (2015). Thus, the thesis suggests, it is not enough for the investigation to 
focus on differences to the experience of remembering in the online era. Rather, our 
approach to the memory-technology relationship must be contextualised firmly through 
an appreciation of the wider socio-techno-economic ecologies with and through which 
remembering takes place.  
This theoretical position established, Part Two attempts to develop a useful, concise, 
conceptual tool with which such an understanding of memory and the memory-
technology relationship might be used to approach the research question in a real-world 
context. In direct opposition to the metaphor of ‘memory as archive’, the thesis considers 
recent thinking by leading affect theorists (SenseLab, no date a) to propose the anarchive 
as an appropriate conceptual ‘anti-metaphor’ for this purpose. Within such a 
conceptualisation, it observes, the research focus plainly becomes no longer the 
differences to the content or the supposed amount of twenty-first-century remembering, 
but rather the differences for those anarchival processes and movements of remembering, 
in duration, in the online era.  
In the final section of this chapter, Part Three briefly sketches how we might use our 
anarchival approach to memory to move toward kind of political economy of 
remembering in the online era. Through such a synthesis, it anticipates, we may move 
toward finding what is at stake for remembering in the digital age. Intended as a 
foundation for the case-study investigations, the section draws attention to the various 
relational agencies of bodily, social and technological drives when remembering through 
new, online, surveillance technologies such as search engines or social media platforms. 
Remembering through these interfaces, it argues, involves a shifting imbalance toward, 
or tensions or struggles between, numerous cultural, economic or technological agencies 
in the man-machine coupling – some more clandestine and perhaps more insidious than 
others. This, it argues represents an altogether new problem for memory. In uncritically 
living through these technologies, the section speculatively suggests, we risk surrendering 




agency in the very processes of consciousness out of which a sense of bodily self or 
grouped individual may emerge.  
Case Study One – Me, Myself and iPhones 
Forming a lead-in to the subsequent Case-Study Chapters, this chapter explores from our 
anarchival perspective how processes of remembering personal pasts may be experienced 
in their extension through new, pervasive and online technologies. The chapter takes the 
form of case-study analyses of remembering personal pasts through three prominent and 
popular apps or app features, each with hundreds of millions of active users 
internationally. These are: navigation app Google Maps; ‘on this day’ reminder features 
of Google Photos’ ‘Rediscover this day’ and Facebook’s ‘Memories’; and the 
‘memorialisation’ of deceased users’ Facebook profiles. While these examples may 
appear to represent starkly different ways of engaging with personal memories, they are 
united by their common reliance on a kind of personal, online ‘archive’ of records or 
artefacts of past action, be they purposely or unintendedly logged – what media-memory 
theorist Andrew Hoskins terms “social network memory” (2009a, p. 41). Thus, with our 
anarchival perspective on remembering, the chapter approaches its analyses not through 
considering specific media as ‘memories’, but rather considering the ways in which, 
processes through which, and reasons why these archives or ‘digital footprints’ may be 
engaged with in the present – indeed created as records of “present events … archived 
into the future” (Coleman, 2018, p. 68). What is the experience of remembering through 
such archives? How are perceptions of the past – indeed the remembering present – 
structured through these platform architectures?  How is memory-potential being realised, 
and for what reasons? What action is informed through such memory-potential 
realisation, and for whose benefit?  
The chapter proposes that, rather than being seen mainly spatially – archivally capturing 
quantified knowledge of supposed personal ‘memories’ of the past – such technologies 
might be better understood through a greater emphasis on temporality – the interactive 
platforms for anarchival processes of remembering in informing action in duration, in the 
present. In doing so, it shifts the conceptual approach toward ‘archives’ and data into a 
conceptually more inter-affective and process-based understanding ahead of the chapters 
to come. Furthermore, in situating remembering as a perception-informed and action-
informing experience in the present, the chapter draws attention in each case-study 




architecture – exploring the reasons underpinning why user experiences of perception and 
memory, in the present, may be designed in these ways.  
In the first section, the chapter develops a nuanced, anarchival, process- and duration-
based analysis of the experience of using Google Maps to remember one’s personal past. 
In doing so, it employs a critique of ‘Extended Mind Theory’ (Clark & Chalmers, 1998) 
and ideas of contemporary ‘digital amnesia’, which rely on quantified ideas of ‘loss’ and 
‘gain’ of memory. Citing Google’s “surveillance capitalism” business model (Zuboff, 
2019) – through which it capitalises on encouraging as-comprehensive-as-possible, user-
generated and highly-monetisable production of personal data – it argues that the ever-
expanding archive of search-data and GPS-location-data that such usage creates may raise 
significant implications for remembering in terms of agencies within the man-machine 
coupling.  
In the second section, the chapter draws on the famous imagery of Marcel Proust’s 
‘Madeleine moment’ (1981) as a starting point to anarchivally consider the notion of 
involuntary memory in relation to Google’s and Facebook’s ‘on this day’ features. It 
again situates these experiences within the economic models of each platform, arguing 
that such artefactual ‘reminders’ act perhaps more as a way in which platforms may 
recycle existing records of previously shared ‘presents’ to stimulate profit than as a useful 
act of transindividual remembrance.  
In the third section, the chapter considers what may happen to such data-archives once 
their supposed ‘owner’ passes away. Drawing on recent legal matters and contemporary 
theory, it considers how we might approach so-called ‘digital inheritance’ from an 
anarchival perspective on remembering. Moreover, it once more asks us to consider the 
socio-economic context of the arenas in which these acts of remembrance take place, 
arguing that the likes of ‘memorialised’ Facebook accounts may be understood primarily 
as a profit-making exercise and only secondarily as sites for commemoration.  
Through these case-study analyses, the chapter makes the argument that memory-
potential is, under these circumstances of man-machine coupling, realised not just in 
relation to a conventionally transindividually-perceived present environment, but in 
relation to a more profit-making, artificially-promoted perception – the ‘pushed’, 
monetisable engagement through pervasive technologies with previously-shared media 
content – digital, somewhat-archival artefacts – presented as ‘memories’. Indeed, such 




more widely-perceived present – through affective co-individuation in duration – as with 
arbitrarily exhibited records of past presents. These connections are designed to promote 
engagement primarily with and through the platform, enabled through the ubiquity of 
online-connected smartphones and their capacity to affectively (and exploitatively) 
distract. In encouraging such a technologically-led, perception-limited engagement 
within one’s environment, the chapter proposes, these platforms engender a state of 
consciousness that is perhaps closer to Bergson’s state of ‘dreaming’ than to consciously 
‘acting’ in, on and with the present (Bergson, 2004, pp. 217-220). Nevertheless, actions 
are in these cases encouraged, and it is above all these actions of engagement with and 
participation in these platforms – indeed, perhaps the very movements of remembering – 
informed and encouraged by such archival ‘data reminders’, that we can consider to be 
captured through such interfaces.  
In recycling and pushing media records of previous ‘presents’ to hijack transindividual 
perception and realisation of memory-potential in duration, with the aim of securing or 
increasing app-engagement, the balance of agency in the affective man-machine coupling 
of remembering is compromised, creating a kind of ‘struggle’ between the co-existent 
and technologically-interdependent agencies of both the body and its techno-cultural 
extension into the social, and the more corporate-economic agencies of the platform. 
Platforms promote attention and action in the present that may serve to principally benefit 
not the remembering transindividual but the commercial interests of those corporations 
through whose technological platforms such remembering is enabled.  
Case Study Two – Error 404: Memory File Not Found 
The second Case-Study Chapter moves beyond ideas of ‘the personal’ to focus on the 
ways in which various apparently ‘open’5 contemporary online technologies such as 
social-media platforms, blogs and search engines may be used to collectively remember 
distant and more recent pasts. Through substantial theoretical discourse in a dialogue with 
case-study examples of recent ‘historical remembering’ online, it explores the ways in 
which collective remembrances might through and with new technologies be captured, 
rehearsed or brought forward as potentials for future remembering, and considers the 
wider socio-political and economic underpinnings of such acts of remembering. In doing 
 
5 As is made clear through the chapter, while the networked communication facilitated by such 
platforms may appear to be semi- or even near-fully open, it seems much more closed when one 
considers their algorithmically-driven mechanisms through which people may access or interact with 




so, it aims to develop a philosophical understanding more broadly of how collective 
remembrances in the present, of both shared pasts and more historical pasts – indeed the 
progressions of the former becoming the latter – may be changing in the digital era.  
Considering the topic from our affective, anarchival perspective on memory, the chapter 
conceptualises collectivised acts of remembering within processes of collective 
individuation out of memory-potential. Building on existing theory, the chapter argues 
that, counter to the static notion of the archive as supposedly ‘capturing’ historical pasts, 
through anarchival acts of collective historical remembrance multiplicities of socialities 
are in a constant and dynamic state of always-becoming – collectively individuated and 
reconstituted in duration through movements of transindividual, inter-relational 
realisation of memory-potential. Through this conceptualisation, it argues that we may 
think of socialities and ‘societies’ as made up not necessarily of defined individuals. 
Rather they are constituted by memory-potential-informed action within affective social 
fields or atmospheres – these actions themselves driven by perceived usefulness to the 
identified ‘in-group’, in duration, through which and out of which the sense of the 
individual, of identity, emerges. It therefore conceptualises collective remembering not 
as ‘recall’ or ‘recollection’ of knowledge of shared pasts, but as active, creative, 
anarchival movements of collective individuation, through memory-potential-realisation, 
in duration, for the needs of the always-emergent sociality in the present.  
The chapter thus approaches the investigation with a focus not on specific so-called 
‘collective memories’ remembered through online technologies, but on the mechanisms 
through and with which online-facilitated collective remembering and historicising takes 
place: In what ways are records or media of past events being used to ‘remember’ through 
the realisation of memory-potential? How can we understand these from an anarchival, 
spatiotemporal-experience and duration-based perspective, rather than an archival, more 
spatial approach to collective or historical remembering – indeed in relation to the internet 
as a supposed ‘online digital archive’? How might we understand collective identity as 
reconstituted through anarchival, dynamic acts of transindividual remembering in and for 
the needs of the present, rather than perhaps more traditional ideas of collectively 
‘owned’, structured, archival ‘pasts’? And what are the political implications of this? 
What kinds of actions are being informed through platform-facilitated, networked 
remembering, for what reasons? And for whom and to what degree are such actions 




The chapter draws on three prominent examples of collectivised remembering and 
historicising online in recent years to drive forward the investigation, as well as other 
relevant examples. These are: the 2013 ‘memeification’ of ‘unflattering’ photos of US 
popular music artist, Beyoncé, into ongoing acts of remembrance; Facebook’s 2016 
censoring of Vietnam War photograph, The Terror of War; and the 2018-present UK 
political campaign, Led by Donkeys, which aims to ‘remind’ people of politicians’ 
perhaps contemporarily incongruous historical public comments. Through each section, 
the chapter reflects on the case studies to build a more nuanced and complex 
understanding of how acts of collective remembering can be understood from an 
anarchival perspective, and the ways in which they may be affected by remembering 
through new, online and pervasive technologies. Furthermore, through relating our 
approach to remembering to existing sociological and political scholarly thinking, the 
chapter builds on theory to demonstrate how an anarchival theoretical approach can help 
inter-disciplinarily situate ‘memory studies’ within the wider techno-social and political 
context of social, political, media and communications studies.  
After initially describing the case study examples, the chapter is formed of three 
sequential sections, concerned respectively with the connectivity, temporality and 
materiality of collective remembering through new technologies.  
Firstly, reflecting from an anarchival perspective on technology and feminist theorist 
Donna Haraway’s 1985 essay, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’ (2016), the first section attempts to 
comprehensively conceptualise technologically-facilitated collective remembering as 
anarchival, arguing that, more than ‘recollecting’ or ‘preserving’ pasts, so-called ‘cultural 
remembering’ should be seen as identity-informing acts of collective individuation. It 
suggests that ‘technologies of collective remembering’, such as blogs, social media sites 
or search engines, should not be seen as archivally capturing ‘histories-as-data’ through 
increased content stored online, in cyber-space. Rather, they may be understood as 
platforms for more connected anarchival movements of collective individuation – 
affective interactions between data, in a plurality of technologically-mediated affective 
fields or atmospheres. In doing so, it conceptualises ‘culture’ itself from a Simondonian 
perspective as not a ‘thing’ of the past, but a process-oriented value, enabling social 
cohesion in the present.  
Thus, the chapter in the second section considers how collective acts of remembrance 
might be understood if records of past events are considered not as potentials in 




realisation of memory-potential into value-informed, collectively-individuating 
interaction across these fields. Reflecting now on Raymond Williams’s conception of 
“Structures of Feeling” (1977), it situates the case-study examples not solely as acts of 
identity-affirming representations of past events, but as creative, evolving, cultural, 
relational and thus political acts within and in relation to – indeed as a stabilisation of – 
the perceived ‘social present’. Furthermore, it examines the creative nature of 
remembering – conceptualising acts of cultural remembrance as necessarily creative 
practices of socio-technologically-informed ‘re-versioning’, out of which a sense of 
spatiotemporal extension of ‘more than being’ may reconstitute a sense of social identity 
in anticipation of useful action for the future.  
In the final section, the chapter moves to consider the more socio-political nature of 
perceiving, remembering and (inter)acting through specific digital-social platforms – 
examining the tensions between inter-dependent agencies and drives of users, platforms 
and political actors within these man-machine experienced affective atmospheres of 
remembering. It argues that, while these technologies may offer the possibility (perhaps 
illusion) of augmenting anarchival memory processes, some major prevalent interfaces 
for collectivised remembering may represent a radical shift toward an imbalance of user-
individual versus socio-technological agency, in the moment, in how socialities may 
(re)emerge and/or (re)constitute themselves. Taking Google search engine, the Facebook 
News Feed and the Twitter timeline as key examples, the chapter examines the ways in 
which the user’s perceptions and resulting social interactions (highly conscious or 
otherwise) may be materially guided, limited, perhaps censored through such interfaces 
beyond the agencies of the user – for example, through the likes of personalised search 
results, algorithmically socially-tailored newsfeeds, and government or platform-specific 
regulation. While social media platforms and search engines may constitute starkly 
different experiences of collectively remembering online, both operate as business 
models reliant on using user- or third-party-generated content to secure continued user-
engagement and participation. Thus, for both, the content of the media is to some extent 
less important for the platform than its ability to sustain user participation; the interaction 
informed through collectively remembering with these interfaces risks being less about 
facilitating useful action for the collectively-individuating, self-organising sociality, and 
perhaps more about ensuring the continued, monetisable user-participation.  
The chapter argues, then, that through the likes of controlled and personalised platform 




algorithmically-managed machine-interfaces in what is collectively remembered and 
why. Thus, it contends, we risk surrendering degrees of conscious agency to more ‘top-
down’ corporate concerns in how and why the always-emergent sense of sociality or “true 
society” (De Boever et al, 2013, p. 225) in the present – indeed the very sense of personal 
individuality and identity brought about through such individuations – may collectively 
(re)constitute itself through remembrances of the past. This tension around control of 
content, however, it observes, must be considered in relation to the transindividual 
agencies of the user and myriad external economic, cultural and legislative agencies 
within hybrid media systems – as evidenced by both the spread of the likes of hate speech, 
and platforms’ seeming inability to control this spread. Ultimately, then, the chapter 
reinforces the argument that new ecologies of remembering must be considered in the 
context of a contemporary ‘struggle to remember’, recognising the ongoing negotiation 
between the charges of individual, technological and cultural drives of individuation.  
Case Study Three – Facts, Fakes and Filter Bubbles 
In examining the issue from the perspective of memory informing action rather than 
knowledge, this final Case-Study Chapter explores how ‘ideas of the past’ out of which 
collectives may be emergent, or through which they re-establish themselves, need not be 
truthful representations of past events at all. Rather, abstract memory-potential may be 
realised into a memory-image of false, imagined pasts – its purpose being not to recall 
experience of specific pasts but to use their potential to facilitate useful action for the 
individuating being in the perceived present. Furthermore, in examining the technological 
mechanisms through which such ‘remembering’ takes place, the chapter argues that a 
contemporary seeming proliferation of fake news should not be seen (only) as a supposed 
‘crisis of truth’. Rather, through the management of user experience, it may be understood 
as a hijacking and encouragement of processes of remembering and individuation by, and 
for the benefit of, the social media platforms through which these processes take place.  
The chapter initially relates our anarchival approach to remembering to findings of 
psychological research on so-called ‘false memory’. It seeks to conceptualise false 
memory as a by no means new process in which movements – or the feeling – of the 
emergent memory-image being realised out of memory-potential are moulded, perhaps 
exploited, through perceptions of media content – older (e.g. language) or newer (e.g.  
online ‘fake news’). The influence of this media content may be drawn from the past or 
perceived in the present, and the resulting memory-image thus informed – perhaps 




online media technologies through which false memories may today affectively manifest 
themselves. This being the case, the investigation concerns itself not with the content or 
abundance of fake news, but rather the psycho-socially- and economically-informed 
ecologies of remembering and acting, through which fake news content may emerge, 
spread, and indeed ‘go viral’. In what ways, and for what reasons, does (false) 
remembering spread through new infrastructures of memory such as social media 
platforms? How might these look different from an anarchival rather than archival 
approach to memory? What kinds of action are informed by remembering in these ways, 
and for what reasons?  
Examining multiple examples of apparent ‘online false memory’, the chapter argues that 
– beyond a perceived usurpation of social belonging – anarchival processes of memory 
and action, indeed consciousness, are being hijacked by more neo-liberal corporate web 
platforms, and by widespread actors who seek to capitalise on such mechanisms. Through 
the management of user experience, intended or otherwise – and with content veracity, as 
we have seen in previous chapters, often seemingly as a secondary concern – not only 
perceptions may be manipulated, but choice of action may be reduced toward impulse, 
shifting the balance of agency within our man-machine-coupled participation in 
‘remembering’. Actions are encouraged within technologically-facilitated, more 
impulsive and – in Bergsonian terms – somewhat “closed” socialities (Bergson, 1935), 
principally not for usefulness to subjects-as-users themselves, but for the financial 
advantage of those platforms through which remembering takes place, and for the 
economic, cultural or political advantage of wider agential interests. 
The chapter makes its claim through four inter-related steps.  
Firstly, it contextualises the matter in considering the ways in which people may succumb 
to demonstrably false shared beliefs, and how this might be understood from our affective, 
transindividual, collectively-individuating approach to remembering. For the purposes of 
the investigation, it conceptualises personal belief as a memory-potential-informed 
process – the realisation and discernment of a memory-image being a process of ‘making 
sense’ of a present perception, based on past experience, and in trusted anticipation of 
most useful action for the perceived individuating self.  
Secondly, the chapter draws on case-study examples to situate this conception of belief 
in false pasts within a wider social framework, exploring the phenomenon of false 




synthesis on social remembering, it argues that we might see online-communicated 
beliefs in false pasts not in terms of the content of those beliefs, but in terms of the 
processes of sociality-informing collective-individuation that may (re)emerge through 
their being shared.  
Thirdly, the chapter examines how the psycho-social, sociality-informing processes 
through which memory may spread online through media content might be understood 
from an action-driven perspective on remembering. Drawing on several recent examples 
of online viral content, and considering it in relation to Bergson’s thinking on the social-
evolutionary ‘sources of morality’ (Bergson, 1935), the chapter develops a nuanced, 
novel understanding of the sharing of fake news as an often-impulsive, socialised act of 
moral obligation, amplified through increased connectivity and instantaneity of 
pervasive, online media.  
Equipped with this critical understanding, the chapter fourthly considers how these 
processes of perceiving and acting may be influenced through the affective materiality of 
new social media technologies. It draws attention to key issues around how action is 
informed, facilitated and enabled through perceptions granted by such interfaces in their 
user experience, and examines the ways that these may be more widely (ab)used, through 
misinformation, ‘fake news’ or propaganda, beyond the mere user-engagement economic 
agencies of the platforms themselves. In doing so, it furthers the argument of a ‘struggle 
to remember’ as one not only between techno-economic agencies of the platform-as-
business and techno-cultural agencies of the user and wider cultural authorities – between 
‘users and big tech’. Rather, in designing feed-forward surveillance-technology platform 
architecture to increase impulsive action in supremacy to conscious choice, the chapter 
reflects, platforms enable the anarchival processes memory-potential into sociality-
informing action to be harnessed not only for their own monetisable gain, but for socio-
political and commercial gain of those actors able to take advantage.  
Conclusion and Discussion 
Following on from the case-study investigations, the Conclusion Chapter has chapter has 
two aims. Firstly, summarising what has been discussed in the Theory Chapter and 
through philosophical inquiry into how we are remembering differently through new 
technologies in the Case-Study Chapters, it aims to now properly state what has been 
found to be the overriding ‘problem’ for memory in the online era. Secondly, it aims to 




The problem for remembering through new, online and networked technologies, the 
chapter argues, is two-fold. Firstly, through the adoption of prevalent and pervasive 
surveillance technologies, encouraging connection, engagement and participation over 
useful action for the transindividual, we risk an imbalance of transindividual agency in 
these man-machine couplings. Through the ubiquitous use of these platforms, users and 
indeed wider societies risk surrendering consciousness-informing agency of choice – in 
how they perceive, remember and act in the present – to more corporate or special-interest 
actors. Secondly, beyond the economic drives of the platform-as-corporation, and the 
cultural drives of its model’s wider socio-political-economic interdependents, this 
problem has been made possible through a lack of awareness (i.e. perception) on two 
fronts. On the one hand, a lack of awareness of the function of memory in informing 
transindividual action rather than individual knowledge (or collections of individual 
knowledge); and, on the other hand, a lack of awareness (indeed transparency) of the 
more covert mechanisms of surveillance-capitalist business models, which are otherwise 
presented as open and free-to-use technologies.  
Yet the potential cause of the problem equally suggests potential solutions. In 
acknowledging that a lack of cultural awareness on the concept of memory and the 
economics of contemporary technology may lead to one’s exploitation in these regards, 
the chapter argues, it seems straightforward to suggest that a move to increase awareness 
may shift the cultural-social and thus cultural-technological drives toward new modes of 
technological living. While acknowledging that the power of the archive metaphor may 
persist in making it difficult to shift cultural perceptions on how we conceptualise 
‘remembering’, the chapter points to several movements within technology-design ethics, 
government legislature, indeed apparent grassroots public pressure (or ‘the market’), that 
suggest stirrings toward a greater awareness of surveillance capitalist models, and thus 








Literature Review: Existing Debates and Introduction the Theory  
 
 
As outlined in the Introduction, this chapter aims to lay the groundwork for a non-archival 
approach to considering what may be at stake for memory in the online era through four 
steps – considering broadly, conceptually and academically, where have come from, 
where we are at, where we may now go, and how.  
Drawing on a range of sources, Part One aims to contextualise the research through briefly 
setting out some of the key conceptual and methodological thinking informing prevalent, 
contemporary approaches to thinking and studying memory. In Part Two – forming the 
more substantial part of the chapter – it attempts to thematically and concisely outline 
prevalent academic and more popular debates around how new, internet-enabled 
technologies may be changing processes of remembering. In Part Three, the chapter 
argues that, through the thematic analysis, we may identify a predominant supposed 
problem or question in the literature of whether we are today remembering ‘less’ or 
‘more’. It critiques the philosophical assumptions underpinning such a problem, 
suggesting that they may be uncritically reliant on a questionable European-historical 
assumption that memory operates like an archive. It then identifies and interrogates 
various disputable tendencies of thought within the literature, which it argues are 
informed through an uncritical dependence on the archival model. In Part Four, the 
chapter draws on the philosophical method of intuition to make two related interventions 
in a shift away from the creative metaphor. Firstly, to reorient the inquiry to be one not 
concerned quantifiably with whether we are through new technologies remembering less 
or more, but rather qualitatively with how we are remembering differently. And, secondly, 
to argue that, in order to properly empirically analyse the ways in which we are 
remembering through new technologies, we must put a focus on how processes of 
remembering can be considered not in terms of supposed knowledge in space, but 
experience of processes in time. Thus, it introduces Bergson’s thinking on duration as the 




Chapter of his non-archival, non-representational thinking on remembering as not 
informing knowledge, but serving action in duration.  
Before we undertake these steps, however, it is first useful to set out the contemporary 
context of the research project within the study of memory. What follows, then, represents 
an effort to briefly outline and historically contextualise conventional modes of thinking 
about memory in contemporary European-Western culture. For the benefit of the reader, 
and in order to accommodate the length of the subsequent philosophical investigation, 
this section – indeed this chapter in general – aims to keep itself comprehensive but 
concise. Thus, it seeks to provide an inclusive and broad literary and topical scope, yet 




1. Thinking Remembering: Memory Concepts and Memory Context 
This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive overview of the recent history of 
studying memory. Nor would word-count or research-focus permit such an endeavour. 
Rather, acknowledging its limitations, it draws attention to selected thinking informing 
present-day conceptualisation and study of memory, seeking to thus effectively 
historically-conceptually contextualise the contemporary debates with which we shall 
then engage, and the ensuing philosophical inquiry.  
Looking Inward 
Today, ‘memory’ is a wide-ranging field of study, encompassing subject areas across the 
sciences and humanities. Memory has been contemplated by philosophers for at least 
thousands of years (as we shall discuss later in the chapter), yet its consideration in what 
we might think the scientific era may be traced to the late-nineteenth-century German 
philosopher, Hermann Ebbinghaus (1885). “The path to the modern era was set” (2001, 
p. 13), psychologist Daniel L. Schacter claims, when Ebbinghaus conceived that 
“memory, like sensory perception, could be studied using the methods of science” (2001, 
p. 13). Ebbinghaus’s research might equally be considered a study in forgetting, focussed, 
as it is, on the rate at which a learnt list of nonsense syllables may be recalled over 




curve’. Social scientist Alan Radley characterises such an approach to conceptualising 
and studying memory as “the specific communicative context of dispassionate, accurate 
reporting, usually dealing with materials that have very little personal significance for the 
rememberer” (1990, p. 42). 
Ebbinghaus’s tradition would hold dominance within the developing field of 
experimental psychology for several decades, until the intervention of Frederic Charles 
Bartlett in his 1932-published book, Remembering. Bartlett criticises Ebbinghaus’s 
approach precisely because of its seemingly-celebrated removal of subjectivity from test 
materials. Importantly noting that Ebbinghaus’s method might be considered as 
restricting the study of memory to “a study of the establishment and maintenance of 
repetition habits” (1932, p. 4), Bartlett argues that to remove conditions of subjectivity 
from the test “is to ignore dangerously those equally important conditions of response 
which belong to the subjective attitude and to predetermined reaction tendencies” (1932, 
p. 4).Through including more subjective material into studies of remembering, Bartlett’s 
contribution to the field may be understood as demonstrating that what an individual more 
readily remembers may be attributed to its subjective meaning when perceived, and – 
perhaps more importantly – that the differences between what one perceives and later 
recollects may be affected by ‘schemata’. Bartlett showed that, through these mental 
expectations or structures out of one’s cultural background, what we perceive and what 
experience as memories are at least partly imaginatively constructed in relation to our 
present and social relation to, and conceptual understanding of, the world.  
As more systematic approaches to psychology gained traction through the later twentieth-
century, rather than a rejection of imposing de-subjectified variables, Bartlett’s work 
would be seen through a lens of simply creating a wider set of testable variables – 
creating, as psychologists David Middleton and Steven D. Brown note, “exactly the kind 
of dualism between individual and the social settings in which they act that Bartlett strove 
to resist” (2005, p. 16). Moreover, with the development of more cognitive-scientific 
approaches further into the century, rather than a Bartlettian “ongoing dynamic adaptation 
between people and their physical and social environment” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, 
p. 16), Middleton and Brown note, schemata become understood as fixed kinds of 
“knowledge structure stored in the brain or mind of the individual to assist in the 
interpretation of experience” (2005, p. 16).  
While the idea of a memory “engram” – individual ‘traces’ of information encoded in the 




the developing ‘cognitive revolution’ in neuroscience of the mid-twentieth century saw a 
shift into memories being encoded across distributions of neuron activity in the brain. For 
example, following years of research focused on the removal of brain tissue in rats, 
neuropsychologist Karl Lashley concluded that memories may be stored in distributed 
neural structures across the brain (1950). Similarly, Donald Hebb postulated that engrams 
might be understood as the groupings of multiple neurons, firing collectively, arguing 
“any two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to 
become 'associated' so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other” (1949, p. 63). 
And both theories can be considered bolstered by later research into memory 
consolidation and brain plasticity emerging out of the 1970s through to today (Bruel-
Jungerman, Davis & Laroche, 2007).  
From such a position, we may begin to understand and recognise the more systems-based, 
computer-processor-brain models of memory developed in the emergent information age 
of the following decades (and still popularly dominant today), in which memory may be 
understood as information that is encoded and stored in the brain, whence it may later be 
retrieved. Indeed, it is important to note that cognitive approaches to remembering are 
explicitly modelled around metaphors of the computer – media-memory theorist Andrew 
Hoskins (2011, p. 19) points us to psychologist Henry L. Roediger III’s observation that, 
of various historical and more recent analogies for understanding memory, “[a] number 
of the most prominent analogies … have been derived from the technology of record 
keeping and human communication” (1980, p. 244).  
In 1968, cognitive scientists Richard Atkinson and Richard Shiffrin proposed their 
‘multistore’ or ‘modal’ model of a three-stage memory system (1968). In this perhaps 
now-commonly-familiar cognitive model, information about the world perceived by the 
body enters the system through sensory memory. If attention is paid to this information, 
it then enters short-term memory (or working memory), whence, if the information is 
‘rehearsed’ or ‘repeated’, it is encoded into the long-term memory. A few years later, 
cognitive neuroscientist Engel Tulving would develop this notion of long-term memory-
storage into two different kinds of stored and categorised memory-as-information: 
episodic, as the retrieval of information about events; and semantic, as the retrieval of 
more general facts. And with the advent technologies like fMRI , new ways have been 
found to seemingly measure memory by studying changing brain processes (Shulman, 




It is important to recognise, however, that throughout the recent development of 
psychological and neuroscientific approaches to conceptualising and studying individual 
memory, parallel academic movements were being made in approaching the more social 
aspects of remembering.  
Looking Outward 
In the years before Richard Semon’s conception of the memory engram, Henri Bergson 
had forcefully argued against viewing memories as ‘things’ that may be scientifically 
measured and stored in the brain. Instead – as we shall explore in more detail further 
below and in the Theory Chapter – in Matter and Memory Bergson argues for a 
philosophical-psychological approach that sees perception, remembering and 
consciousness as processes of a physical and social body as centre for action in duration 
(2004), affecting and being affected by bodily and external stimuli. Indeed, as 
psychologist Steven D. Brown notes, following Bergson, and echoing Bartlett, the notion 
of affect is important in approaching remembering:  
[W]hilst it is undoubtedly the case that the brain is involved in some way in 
remembering (as indeed it is in all human acts!), the activity is also mediated 
in innumerable other ways (by language, by writing, by the contribution of 
others, by tools and artefacts – to list only a few). (2008, p. 269) 
A handful of years before the Bartlett’s Remembering was published, French sociologist 
Maurice Halbwachs would publish a concept of collective memory, which does not 
belong to the individual but to its associated milieu or ‘cadre’ (1925; 1950). A former 
student of Bergson, and heavily influenced by sociologist Emile Durkheim, Halbwachs 
proposed that, beyond bodily memory, groups or societies may hold their own form of 
memory, through (what we may think of as episodic) social practices of remembering 
social pasts – “[A]ll remembering relies on the dynamics of groups such as families, social 
classes, and religious communities” (Russell, 2006, p. 796) – irrespective of whether the 
individual experienced the events. As literary scholar Nicholas Russell summarises, “An 
individual's social interactions with the members of his or her group determine how one 
remembers experiences from the past and what it is that he or she remembers” (2006, p. 
796).  
Through the introduction and development of the notion of collective memory – 
particularly following the 1980-publishing of an English-language translation of 




memory in the latter half of the twentieth century as a discipline within social theory 
(Misztal, 2003). And we may see the influence of thinking in terms of collective memory, 
in combination more directly with Bartlett’s thinking, in concurrent theorising in social 
psychology (Middleton & Edwards, p. 2) – blurring the boundary between what may be 
considered the individual or the social. Furthermore, the conception of memory as social 
leant itself readily to its consideration within social anthropology (Connerton, 1989), as 
well as within the emergent field of cultural studies in the mid-late twentieth century – 
with cultural studies and what would become ‘memory studies’ seemingly sharing the 
mutual tendency toward “[going] to the heart of many of the issues at the forefront of 
contemporary political debate and struggle” (Radstone, 2008, p. 32). Halbwachs had been 
careful to distinguish between collective memory, as a kind of social-episodic memory of 
the group, and what he called history – the more semantic remembering, through 
“traditions, transmissions, and transferences” (Assman, J., 2008, p. 110), or “just a set of 
facts” (Russell, 2006, p. 800). Following the emergence and development of cultural 
memory studies over the later decades of the century, however – which places an 
emphasis on the significance of more cultural-historical aspects of collective 
remembering – cultural memory theorists Aleida and Jan Assman proposed that collective 
memory should be understood as two kinds of memory: “communicative” and “cultural” 
(Assman, A., 2006; Assman, J., 2008). In this respect, communicative memory may be 
seen as informing a kind of identity around the Halbwachsian “social self, person as 
carrier of social roles” whereas cultural memory may be seen as informing a sense 
historical or mythical cultural identity (Assman, J., 2008, p. 109). Jan Assman thus 
expresses a three-level conceptualisation of time, identity and memory – as individual 
(informing a “neuro-mental”, subjective sense of time and identity of “inner self”), 
communicative (informing a sense of social time and identity) and cultural (informing a 
sense of historical time and cultural identity) (Assman, J., 2008).  
In fact, Assman and Assman’s conceptualisation is not a million miles away from the 
conceptualisation we shall develop in the following thesis. Acknowledging that, while 
“[t]he distinction of different forms of memory looks like a structure … it works more as 
a dynamic, creating tension and transition between the various poles” (2008, p. 113), Jan 
Assman makes clear that memory should be seen neither as totally open nor totally closed. 
And it is in an embrace of the human subject, as beyond closed body or system, as what 
affect theorist Brian Massumi has called “a leaky ‘box’” (2002, p. 203) – and the 




this thesis bases its conceptualisation of memory, consciousness and identity. Yet, in 
doing so, this thesis places an emphasis not on the differences between individual, 
communicative and cultural processes and drives of remembering, but on the ways in 
which one might conceptually be seen to bleed into another, and how these processes of 
remembering may be technologically facilitated.  
We cannot here offer a comprehensive overview of the fields of collective or cultural 
memory studies.6 Rather, what this section hopes to communicate is the broadening of 
‘memory studies’, throughout the later twentieth century and into the twenty-first, to 
encompass concerns perhaps more traditionally viewed within the fields of anthropology 
and history – as well as indicating how these may relate to more philosophical 
considerations about what memory does in the first place.  
Moreover, in its relation to the cultural, we may think that memory studies finds itself 
also firmly within the study of media and technology (Garde-Hansen, 2011, pp. 28-29) – 
those vehicles through which the experience of culture is made possible. As film historian 
Miriam Bratu Hansen notes, “[W]hether we like it or not, the predominant vehicles of 
public memory are the media of technical re/production and mass consumption” (Hansen, 
1996, p. 310). Thus, in a shift from private to more publicly mediated through new, digital 
and online-networked technologies, we might begin to think memory in terms of what 
media theorist José van Dijck calls “mediated memories” (2007) – what media theorist 
Joanne Garde-Hansen and others have called “digital memories” (2009), or what for 
Hoskins can be thought as the “mediatisation” of memory (2009a).  
The conceptualisation and study of memory, then, can be understood as informing, and 
informed by, numerous modes of thinking – perhaps most significantly expressed in the 
seeming division between memory as a biological act of the body versus a communicative 
or cultural act within society. Yet the fractured or fragmented nature of such a field leads 
to fewer possibilities for more ‘joined-up’ thinking on the relationship between 
remembering and the biological, social and technological. While neuroscientific and 
some psychological approaches may perhaps necessarily privilege the role of individual 
memory, the legacy of Halbwachs’s aim “to prove that it is an illusion that our memories 
are independent” (Misztal, 2003, p. 53) can perhaps be seen in a perceived “reluctance to 
 
6 Though a thorough and useful overview may be found through Jeffrey K. Olick, Vered Vinitzky-Seroussi 
and David Levy’s The Collective Memory Reader (2011). And useful introductions may be found in Astrid 




engage with memory-in-the-head” across media studies, cultural studies and sociology 
(Hoskins, 2011, p 21). ` 
While such divisions may remain, a focus on media may offer possibilities for more 
unifying approaches. We highlighted in the Introduction Chapter that Gilbert Simondon 
resists distinct categorisations across subject areas, favouring approaches that offer more 
‘joined-up’ analysis. Hoskins argues that – precisely because of the development of new, 
online technologies, introducing new ways to analogically or metaphorically think 
memory - some of the “reliable dichotomies of memory and memory studies, the 
individual and the collective/social, the public and the private, and memory in-the-head 
and in-the-world, are increasingly insolvent” (2011, p. 29). Indeed, this thesis follows 
Brown’s argument that – while there is “certainly a renewed sense of two cultures in the 
air” (2008, p. 269) – the “distinction between ‘memory science’ and ‘memory studies’ 
seems … to be overdrawn” (2008, p. 269).  
Moreover, following Brown, we may think that it is through the very “notion of 
mediation” (2008, p. 261; italics my own) of memory that the possibility may emerge for 
a more unified approach in the memory-studies “community-to-come” (2008, p. 261).  
It is from this perspective then, that we now come to outline key, prevalent academic and 
more popular commentary on the role new technologies may be playing in changing 
memory processes.  
--o0o-- 
2. Memory and New Technologies: Commentary  
In the 1960s, Marshall McLuhan, one of the pioneers of media studies, famously observes 
that “[s]ocieties have always been shaped more by the nature of the media by which men 
communicate than by the content of the communication” (2011, p. 23), and, while such 
arguably techno-determinist thinking has been since critiqued for its tendency toward 
reductionist, cause-and-effect theorisation (Murphie & Potts, 2002), the age of networks, 
distributed communication and increasingly pervasive media has brought with it novel 
(or seemingly-novel) perceived implications as to what might be at stake for memory, 
raising significant questions concerning exactly what it now means to remember, at both 




In Part Two of this chapter, we briefly examine key, contemporary, prevalent, popular 
and academic commentary around the relationship between memory and new 
technologies. Through outlining wide-ranging discourse on the matter, the section aims 
to identify what core problems or questions may be understood to exist for memory in the 
online era. ‘Memory studies’ of course intersects with a spectrum of other fields. Thus, 
to establish a dialogue between commentary, Part Two borrows from Assman’s 
conceptual distinctions to loosely frame discussion across the overlapping classes of 
individual, communicative and cultural memory. Through a review of these 
commentaries, the thesis aims to lay the groundwork for more thorough, critical 
engagement with their emergent themes through the later Case-Study chapters. 
Changing Your Mind: Individual Memory, Extension and Amnesia 
The ways in which biological memory processes may be changing through engaging with 
new, online technologies has received much academic and more popular attention as 
online hardware-technologies have become more ubiquitous and connective media more 
pervasive in recent decades. In this section, we examine selected popular commentary on 
the matter, digging deeper to relate it to more academic, supportive literature, and 
contextualising it within conceptualisations of memory as outlined in Part One. It aims 
not to give a comprehensive overview of all commentary in the field, but rather seeks to 
assess the ‘lay of the land’ by way of prevailing debates, so that in Part Three we may 
begin to appraise such positions on their philosophical integrity.  
New, connected, mass-media-storage technologies of course are changing habits of 
personal remembering. As we have moved into increased use of high-volume or cloud-
based digital media storage, van Dijck notes that our seeming “memories” are 
increasingly mediatised in digitally stored and retrieved photos, videos (2007) – and now, 
through the “self-archiving phenomenon” of social-media technologies, more public 
(Garde-Hansen, 2011, pp. 80-83). Equally, considering the notion of traditional memory 
aids, Paul Longley Arthur, Research Fellow at the Australia Research Institute, notes:  
Where once we kept such things in handy notebooks – or in our heads – they 
are now stored and accessed digitally … We are increasingly dependent on 
memory banks that are external and separate to do the memory work for us. 
(2009, p. 56) 
And, beyond where media-objects are stored, the ways in which data is retrieved have 




engines since the 1990s, and the emergence and popular take-up of smartphone since the 
mid-late 2000s, the ways in which people access information about the world may be 
increasingly through the seeming databases of Google or Bing. Thus, memory theorist 
Anna Reading talks about the smartphone as enabling “wearable memories”, where 
“wearability … means that the phone is increasingly being used as and experienced as, 
an extension of the embodied self” (2009, p. 82). 
Popular science-technology writer Nicholas Carr made headlines in 2008 with his pop-
science article, ‘Is Google Making Us Stupid? What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains’, 
in which he speculates that internet technologies might be “tinkering with [the] brain, 
remapping the neural circuitry, reprogramming the memory” (2008). Central to Carr’s 
anxieties is the notion of plasticity of the brain, and a cognitive ‘systems-based’ approach 
to conceptualising perception and memory. Indeed, he explicitly relies on the computer-
brain metaphor to argue that:  
if … you were to set out to invent a medium that would rewire our mental 
circuits as quickly and thoroughly as possible, you would probably end up 
designing something that looks and works a lot like the Internet … the Net 
may well be the single most powerful mind-altering technology that has ever 
come into general use (2011, p. 116) 
For Carr, internet use ‘wires’ the brain into a permanent mode of distraction. And, seeing 
attention cognitively as “[t]he key to memory consolidation” (2011, p. 192), he concludes 
that we risk facilitating widespread amnesia through prolonged internet use: “If we’re 
unable to attend to the information in our working memory, the information lasts only … 
a few seconds at best. Then it’s gone, leaving little or no trace in the mind” (2011, p. 193).  
While Carr’s concerns about attention (and resulting problems for memory) we might be 
tempted to consider the stuff of popular conjecture, academic discourse is established 
around how plasticity of the brain may be affected by changing processes of attention 
through using new technologies. Postmodern theorist N. Katherine Hayles, for example, 
argues that an increase in using distracting media has led to a “shift in cognitive styles … 
between deep attention and hyper attention” (2007, p. 187). Deep attention “is 
characterized by concentrating on a single object for long periods”, Hayles notes, 
“ignoring outside stimuli while so engaged, preferring a single information stream, and 
having a high tolerance for long focus times” (2007, p. 187). Hyper attention, conversely, 




information streams, seeking a high level of stimulation, and having a low tolerance for 
boredom” (2007, p. 187). Claiming that “human beings are born with their nervous 
systems ready to be reconfigured in response to the environment” (2007, p. 192), Hayles 
claims that the distraction-value of new technologies (rather than simply time spent using 
them) on brain plasticity has led to a generational shift toward hyper attention, and thus 
to a rise in attention deficit disorder and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder. 
Accordingly, she considers how education programmes may adapt to accommodate 
increasing levels of hyper attention into the future.  
Equally drawing on the risks of new, online technologies through brain plasticity, 
neuroscientist Susan Greenfield, argues in her pop-science book Mind Change (2015) that 
we risk a kind of “source amnesia” (p. 253) through our increasing reliance on search 
engines. In a seeming conceptualisation of memories as sequential and sectionalised, 
Greenfield argues that, when caused by brain damage, source amnesia inhibits a subject’s 
ability to form narrative out of their past:  
[A]ll your memories will blur instead of being compartmentalised into 
specific incidents. You may remember a fact but not how and when you 
learned it. Your recollections would be more like the memories of a small 
child or a non-human animal. (2015, p. 254) 
Likewise, Greenfield claims, search engine use may cause unhelpful changes to the 
plasticity of the brain. “Without a personalised conceptual framework that enables us to 
use the Internet to frame and think about open-ended and difficult questions” (2015, p. 
256), Greenfield claims (with seemingly remarkably little interest in human agency and 
experience in such interactions), “we run the risk of being passively driven by isolated 
facts as we lurch from one disconnected screen experience to the other” (2015, p. 256). 
Once more, Greenfield argues that such experiences affect the brain’s structure and 
capacity for “deep thought, and thus we fail to construct the adequate conceptual 
framework that gives the world around us meaning” (2015, p. 257).  
Similarly, archivist Caroline Brown (2013, p. 86) points us to eminent heritage scholar 
David Lowenthal’s claim that “Surfing the Web … shortens attention spans, interrupts 
cognitive flow, mangles literary structure and privileges action over reflection … [which 




Others, however take a different view on the supposed “‘outsourcing’ of memory to the 
Web” (Carr, 2011, p. 191) – arguing that it may be seen not necessarily as a hindrance to 
biological memory, but a cognitive extension of memory.  
In their seminal, 1998 work on the theory of ‘The Extended Mind’, philosophers Andy 
Clark and David Chalmers propose a theory of ‘active externalism’ of the mind – arguing 
that technologies should be seen under some circumstances not just as tools but as actual 
extensions of the mind. For theorists following this approach, the practice of memory 
does not take place solely within the head but also outside of it, working through and with 
new mnemo-technologies. When engaging with particular types of technology, Clark and 
Chalmers reason:  
[T]he human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way 
interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system 
in its own right […] whether or not it is wholly in the head. (Clark and 
Chalmers, 1998, pp. 8-9)  
To support their position, Clark and Chalmers propose a thought experiment, involving 
two fictional characters, Inga and Otto, each of which wishes to visit an exhibition at the 
New York Museum of Modern Art. Inga thinks for a moment about the location of the 
museum, before recalling the address and making her way there. Otto, however, suffers 
from Alzheimer’s disease and, struggling with remembering, relies on a notebook in 
which he notes new information. Otto engages his notebook, finds the location of the 
MoMA and makes his way there. Taking a recognisably cognitive approach, the only 
difference, Clark and Chalmers contend, between Otto’s and Inga’s scenario is that Inga 
processes her memory recall in her mind, whereas Otto recalls through his notebook: 
[I]n relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous … the notebook plays 
for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the 
notebook functions just like the information constituting an ordinary non-
occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin. 
(1998)  
While Clark and Chalmers’s work was the first to propose a concept of extended 
cognition, in truth we may also see similar cognitive conceptualisations through the 
pioneering human-computer-interface (HCI) work of electronic engineer Douglas C. 
Engelbart, who established the Augmentation Research Center in the 1960s – credited, 




Engelbart’s thinking on “augmenting human intellect” is the notion of “process 
hierarchies” (1962), and the cognitive notion of HCI collaboration between human 
processes and machine processes in an “integrated system” (1962; italics my own).  
Today, perhaps sensationalised claims have equally been made around the possibilities 
for augmenting cognition through twenty-first-century technologies. Elon Musk, founder 
of human-brain-interface company Neuralink (as well as SpaceX and Tesla), told the 
World Government Summit in 2017 that he expected to see in the near future a “merger 
of biological intelligence and digital intelligence”, whereby implanted technologies inside 
the head would help humans to control the vast, high-speed capabilities of artificial 
intelligence (Khaleej Times, 2017). Similarly, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg 
announced in the same year at the F8, Facebook’s annual developer conference, that the 
company was working on brain-computer-interface technology that would “one day let 
you communicate [with others] using only your mind” (Zuckerberg, 2017).  
A much-cited 2011 cognitive psychology study into the so-called ‘Google Effect’ 
(Sparrow et al) has in recent years provided seeming support for both the Extended Mind 
Hypothesis (Wheeler, 2016) and more amnesiac approaches. While the study seems to 
demonstrate that participants were less likely to remember to information if they knew it 
was saved elsewhere (say, on a computer hard drive) (2011, p. 777), it also shows that 
participants were more likely to remember where the information was stored – the results 
suggesting that “‘where’ was prioritized in memory, with the advantage going to ‘where’ 
when ‘what’ was forgotten” (2011, p. 778). The study thus concludes that “[t]he Internet 
has become a primary form of external or transactive memory, where information is 
stored collectively outside ourselves” (2011, p. 776). In turn, the research was seized on 
by at least one personal cyber-security company in their own survey-research, coining the 
term “digital amnesia” to describe “the experience of forgetting information that you trust 
to a digital device to store and remember for you” (Kaspersky Lab, 2015, p.3). 
A point of interest in the research of Betty Sparrow et al is their own interpretation of the 
results. Rather than an entirely new kind of memory or novel outsourcing, they argue that 
such apparent outsourcing may be seen as a new way of utilising existing social or 
transactive processes of memory, in which group-members entrust various kinds of 
information to those more likely to remember it – noting: 
Storing information externally is nothing particularly novel, even before the 




or other ongoing group, people typically develop a group or transactive 
memory, a combination of memory stores held directly by individuals and the 
memory stores they can access because they know someone who knows that 
information. Like linked computers that can address each other’s memories, 
people in dyads or groups form transactive memory systems. (Sparrow et al, 
2011, p. 776) 
Sparrow et al’s pointing toward the social provides a useful avenue to now move toward 
considering discourse around how processes of more social or collective remembering 
may be changing through new technologies. And, in fact, we shall engage with such 
cognitive approaches to develop our own non-cognitive understanding of the seeming 
technological extension of biological memory through subsequent chapters. Yet, as we 
move forward, what is important to recognise in the approaches we have examined above 
is the seemingly prevalent tendency to think of memory as stored information – and the 
related notion of how much information we may remember (or not), through the increased 
use of online, connected technologies.  
Permeation and Permanence: Trans-cultural Collective Remembering 
Following Halbwachs’s notion that the past is distorted through social frameworks of 
remembering (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 182), Hoskins observes in 2004 how “[t]echnological 
advances that have transformed our experience of time and space over the centuries have 
also fundamentally altered the constitution of what has been called ‘collective memory’” 
(2004, p. 109).7 For Hoskins, the top-down, broadcast-media era had produced a kind of 
“mediated memory [that] is not only a distortion of the past, but a disconnection from it” 
(2004, p. 110). Moreover, the then-new technologies of live television news had for him 
caused a kind of ‘collapse’ of memory:  
[T]he collapse of the certainties of the past by a media that can paradoxically 
create and recreate an apparently certain past through their command of visual 
images, which are both part of the landscape of modern life and the very 
essence of human memory. Thus, although the individual remains (or appears 
as) the real, authentic or original holder of memory, there can be no doubt that 
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remembering is a process that today is increasingly media-afflicted. (Hoskins, 
2004, p. 110) 
Through their nature as always being live, yet with a combination of live, pre-recorded 
and more historical footage, scrolling news-bars, and news-team gesturing toward future 
events or implications, those televisual technologies, Hoskins argues, “serve to collapse 
memory into an overloaded and shifting present” (2004, p. 110).  
Yet, with the “connective turn” of the late 2000s (Hoskins, 2011), the spatio-temporal 
experience of remembering – and, perhaps, mediated co-remembering – takes on an 
entirely new form. Rather than an apparent disconnect or loss of memory, the 
‘mediatization” of memory (Hoskins, 2014) through social-media technologies of course 
offers opportunities for greater connections between individuals. With these new ‘media 
of memory’ social pasts become “potentially more visible, accessible and fluid … [but 
also] more easily revocable and subject to a different kind of ‘collective’ influence and 
shaping” (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 29). As such, for Hoskins: 
 [W]hereas the value of memory was seen through its relationship to a 
stability, continuity, and reverence of the past, the value of the mediatization 
of memory is in its potential for transformation. (2014, p. 676) 
In 1995, media-memory theorist Alison Landsberg proposed the much-cited notion of 
“prosthetic memory” to describe “memories that do not come from a person’s lived 
experience in any strict sense” (1995, p. 175). Such memories, she argues, “are not 
‘authentic’ or natural, but rather are derived from engagement with mediated 
representations” (2003, p. 149). Modernist technologies like broadcast-media and 
cinema, Landsberg speculates, have “opened up the potential for a progressive, even 
radical politics of memory” (2003 p. 146). In fact, she argues, through “technologies of 
mass culture”, it is “possible for anyone, regardless of race, ethnicity, or gender to share 
collective memories—to assimilate as personal experience historical events through 
which they themselves did not live” (Landsberg, 2004). This we might see in contrast to 
Carr’s cognitively-conceived insistence that it is “what is stored in the individual mind” 
that informs culture: “Culture is contained in our synapses” (2011, p. 196).  
While Hoskins notes that, as a “pre-connective turn perspective” Landsberg’s argument 
“barely touches upon the radical networking and diffusion of memory ushered in with the 
advent of digital technologies” (2011, p. 23), it nevertheless offers a useful reflection on 




perspective on remembering, which sees “memory – individual and social – … as a 
transcultural phenomenon” (Erll, 2011, p. 66). And new, networked technologies not only 
blur the boundaries between ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ in terms of culture, but the 
boundaries between individual and collective, and between public and private. When 
“everyday life is increasingly embedded in the mediascape”, the divides between public 
and private, as van Dijck notes, “have become increasingly fuzzy” (2007, p. 74). Thus, 
argues Garde-Hansen and others, we may think of online mediatisation of memory as a 
kind of “’[s]ocial network memory’ … a new hybrid form of public and private memory” 
(Garde-Hansen, Hoskins & Reading, 2009, p. 6). Or, to put it another way, as Hoskins 
suggests: 
[I]ndividuals locate their own pasts and those of their groups and societies 
through their immersion in emergent networks that blur if not transcend the 
personal and the public, the individual and the social and the particular and 
the collective. (2009a, p. 40) 
New technologies, then, offer opportunities for greater diffusion of supposed ‘authentic’ 
and ‘inauthentic’ memory across increased connective mediations. Indeed, Landsberg 
aspires politically toward “increased social responsibility and political alliances that 
transcend the essentialism and ethnic particularism of contemporary identity politics” 
(2004). Yet, the opportunities afforded by highly-connective, socially-mediated content 
– “deterritorialized, disembedded” (Bond, Craps & Vermeulen, 2016) – has led in recent 
years to the equal emergence, seemingly still popularly neglected by ‘memory studies’ 
research, of ‘fake news’ and ‘post truth’.  
Thinking with Landsberg, and in terms of transcultural remembering, the subject of fake 
news we may identify as a significant topic for memory studies – and one that we shall 
cover in depth in the final Case-Study Chapter. For, if “an environment of instant and 
extensive connectivity” (Hoskins, 2009a, p. 28) has meant that “the media- matter of 
memory are made available with increasing speed and decreasing cost” (2009a, p. 28), 
leading to increased opportunity for processes of prosthetic memory to play out into 
apparent social alliances, so too has it made available opportunities for the manipulation 
and exploitation of such alliances.  
Outside of the field, politics scholars Eric Langenbacher and Ruth Wittlinger (2018) have 
suggested that, particularly through the likes of Donald Trump, a social disconnect is 




memory, in particular the end of memory’s direct impact on political discourse and 
policy” (2018, p. 174). Given that studies have shown correlations between repeated 
exposure to media-content and participants’ belief in its truthfulness or plausibility 
(Polage, 2012), and that overt inauthenticity of fake content does not appear to yield a 
difference in its perceived credibility (Nash, 2017), it has been suggested by others that 
the only way to stem the problem of fake news might to (somehow) stop visibility in the 
first place (Lewandowsky et al, 2017).  
Yet, while online media, whatever the seeming authenticity, may be “more prolific and 
more accessible”, Arthur observes, “they are volatile” (2009, p. 57) through their highly-
real-time nature – or what Hoskins calls “[m]emory ‘on-the-fly’” (2014, p. 664). 
Similarly, Hoskins notes that the increased availability of media: 
hostages future memory to the vagaries of the digital. This includes, 
paradoxically, exposure to a potentially new scale of vulnerability to instant 
decay: corruption, disconnection and deletion (Hoskins, 2013, p. 388).  
Here we come across a key tension within memory studies in the online era: between 
notions of vulnerability of media and those of supposed digital permanence.  
In their 2013 book, The New Digital Age, the then Executive Chairman of Google Eric 
Schmidt and Director of Google Ideas Jared Cohen argue that “the option to ‘delete’ data 
is largely an illusion” (Cohen & Schmidt, 2013, p. 55), since what we understand as 
‘deletion’ tends to be only the removal of a file’s listing in the internal directory, rather 
deletion of the data itself. As we move towards “[n]ear-permanent data storage” with 
cloud computing, this, they suggest, will be the “first generation of humans to have an 
indelible record” (p. 55) – arguing, “all activity and associations, and everything added 
to the Internet will become part of a repository of permanent information” (p. 55).  
In recent years, the notion of digital permanence has become an important one in memory 
studies. Social-media platform-technologies, acting as repositories for users’ shared 
media “archived into the future” (Coleman, 2018, p. 68), Garde-Hansen notes, “may well 
forever store memories they would prefer to forget” (2009, p. 149). Indeed, alluding to 
the now-default setting of Facebook to ‘Memorialize’ users’ accounts upon their death, 
she and others suggest, “The instantaneity and temporality of social network 
environments disguise their potential as mediatised ghosts to haunt participants far 
beyond the life-stage of their online social networking” (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins & 




Indeed, in his 2008 article, ‘Seven Types of Forgetting’, social anthropologist Paul 
Connerton puts forward a concept of “forgetting as annulment” (2008, p. 64). This, he 
suggests, is a need brought about as a response to the excess of memory proliferating 
through new technologies – arguing:  
[N]ew information technologies […] have brought about such a cultural 
surfeit of information that the concept of discarding may come to occupy as 
central a role in the 21st century as the concept of production did in the 19th 
century. (2008, p. 65) 
Thus, he suggests, “Genuine skill in conducting one’s life may come to reside less and 
less in knowing how to gather information and more and more in knowing how to discard 
information” (2008, p. 66). Taking a similar if more automated approach, Viktor Mayer-
Schönberger, a professor of Internet Governance and Regulation, proposes an alternative 
solution to the perceived problem. In an attempt to “make forgetting just a tiny bit easier 
again than remembering” (2011, p. 169), he proposes implementing automatic expiration 
dates for data: 
Users, when saving a document they have created, would have to select an 
expiration date in addition to the document’s name and location on their hard 
disk. Users wouldn’t be able to save the file without specifying an expiration 
date, much like how they can’t save a file without selecting a name for it. 
Based on these preferences, the users’ computers would do the rest: managing 
expiration dates and clearing out expired files (Mayer-Schönberger, 2011, pp. 
171-72). 
Here, then – finding ourselves seemingly in discussion around choices over what should 
or should not be ‘recorded for posterity’ – it seems appropriate to move on to more 
historical processes of memory, and the commentary around how these may be changing 
through engaging with new, online technologies. 
Media-Memory and the Digital Gap: Historical Remembering in the Online Era  
In this final section of Part Two, we focus on academic and more popular commentary 
how processes of more historical collective remembering may be changing in the online 
era. In the previous section several themes were drawn out around mediatisation of 
memory practices – perhaps most pertinently around notions of permanence. Here, we 




be used in the future – considering how records of the present may be engaged with as 
future histories.   
While we have considered above how notions of digital permanence may be engaged by 
media and memory theorists, for those engaged with the preservation of ‘history’ or of 
historical records, a different set of concerns may emerge around the use of new, online 
technologies. Conceived of two decades ago (Maclean & Davis, 1998), the notion of the 
‘digital dark age’ or ‘digital gap’ has gained a renewed sense of urgency in the online era 
(Cerf, 2015; Chun, 2011, pp. 198-99).  
When first coined by computer scientist Danny Hillis, the digital gap was understood in 
terms of how archivists might choose to preserve and manage digital media-artefacts to 
ensure ‘digital continuity’ of their content. Observing that media may corrupt, and that 
rapid changes in hard- and software formats can mean digital artefacts may be quickly 
rendered unreadable and thus obsolete, Hillis reckons that “[t]he historians of the future 
will look back and there will actually be a little period of history around now where they 
won’t have the information” (in Maclean & Davis, 1998, p. 42). “We’re very fortunate 
that civilizations thousands of years ago recorded things on media like stone tablets that 
lasted for thousands of years”, he observes: 
And we’re fortunate that people hundreds of years ago recorded things on 
acid-free paper that lasted for hundreds of years … But our good fortune is 
running out … Because we’re in a period now where we are storing things 
that will not last even our own lifetimes. (in Maclean & Davis, 1998, p. 42) 
Indeed, with the continuing rapid pace of technological-format change, such concerns 
persist in their relevance through to today – with Google vice-president Vinton Cerf 
arguing in 2016:  
We digitize our images and sounds and texts in the expectation that this 
somehow provides these objects with immortality. Sadly, we may, instead, be 
creating a digital dark age in which our descendants will know nothing of our 
history and the products of our society. The physical media for digital storage 
may degrade; the ability to read the stored bits may be lost; the ability to 
correctly interpret the bits and render them or execute them may be lost. 
Operating systems, hardware and applications may no longer work for a 
variety of reasons. Companies and their proprietary software may go out of 




In fact, Cerf proposes a potential solution to digital continuity, through X-raying the 
artefact’s content, application and operating system, and including data on the machine 
on which it runs, to create a kind of “digital snapshot” (2015):  
The X-ray snapshot we are trying to capture should be transportable from one 
place to another. So, I should be able to move it from the Google cloud to 
some other cloud, or move it into a machine I have … The key here is when 
you move those bits from one place to another, that you still know how to 
unpack them to correctly interpret the different parts. That is all achievable if 
we standardise the descriptions. (Cerf, 2015) 
Yet, the supposed digital dark age of the twenty-first century we might understand as 
nuanced in its difference from the gap Hillis predicted. As well as a problem with digital 
continuity of artefacts in archives, media archaeologist Wendy Chun notes that, with data 
increasingly stored online, a future digital dark age may come about because of people’s 
conflation of media with memory, and thus not archiving at all:  
This crisis is brought about … because of the blind belief in digital media as 
memory. This belief in the Internet as cultural memory, paradoxically, 
threatens to spread this lack of memory everywhere and plunge us negatively 
into … the so-called digital dark age. (Chun, 2011, p. 199) 
Chun, following media theorist Wolfgang Ernst, reminds us of the important distinction 
that cultural memory relies not so much on the internet or media-content itself, but on 
people preserving the media-content. “[T]he Internet”, she argues, “which is in so many 
ways about memory, has … no memory – at least not without the intervention of 
[archiving and preservation initiatives]”. (Chun, 2011, p. 198-199).  
Beyond this, and forcefully questioning the idea of digital permanence, Chun rightly notes 
that “[t]he Internet may be available 24/7, but specific content may not” (2011, p. 198). 
Indeed, as Hoskins notes, the mediatisation of memory through online artefacts offers up 
“a potentially new scale of vulnerability to instant decay: corruption, disconnection and 
deletion” (2013, p. 388). So, while globalism and technology writer Thomas Friedman 
famously argued that the era of globalisation might be characterised as, among others, the 
democratisation of both technology and information (1999), Arthur notes:  
With Web 2.0 technologies and services the democratisation of history has 




occurred in association with an increasing dependence on online modes of 
communication and information storage that are temporary, vulnerable. (2009 
pp. 56-57)  
Furthermore, Arthur notes, even if data is properly preserved and maintained, it may be 
inaccessible through encryption at its production:  
[I]f there is an intention for such exchanges to be stored for the future, personal 
privacy settings routinely block access in user-defined ways […] The future 
historian may be confronted with an apparent void of information on lives that 
were in fact richly documented, but only through fleeting digital entries on 
security encrypted online services. (2009, p. 55) 
Moreover, as we have seen that Hoskins notes, there may be a variety of personal or more 
cultural reasons for the ‘revocation’ of ‘deletion’ of media artefacts. A 2015 New Yorker 
article, for example, usefully, anecdotally cites some intriguing examples of such 
alterations or deletions:  
In 2006, David Cameron [to become UK Prime Minister in 2010] gave a 
speech in which he said that Google was democratizing the world, because 
“making more information available to more people” was providing “the 
power for anyone to hold to account those who in the past might have had a 
monopoly of power.” Seven years later, Britain’s Conservative Party scrubbed 
from its Web site ten years’ worth of Tory speeches, including that one. Last 
year, BuzzFeed deleted more than four thousand of its staff writers’ early 
posts, apparently because, as time passed, they looked stupider and stupider. 
(Lepore, 2015) 
The journalist concludes, “Social media, public records, junk: in the end, everything 
goes” (Lepore, 2015). 
Indeed, as we shall emphasise throughout this thesis, in order to properly understand what 
may be at stake for memory in the online era, we must look beyond the relationship 
between the agencies and drives of human-as-user and the technology-as-interface, and 
focus also on the cultural drives toward both remembering through, and the development 
of, new technologies.  
To be sure, internet-archiving efforts exist on a determined and wide scale. For example, 




with an online interface of the Wayback Machine allowing users to explore more than 
377 billion data-crawled web pages at the time of writing (Internet Archive, no date a). 
As well as archiving websites, the non-profit organisation has at the time of writing 
archived millions of books, audio recordings, videos and images, and more than 200,000 
software programmes (Internet Archive, no date).  
Yet, here, again, we find ourselves at a (not particularly new) tension around the 
preservation of future-historical material: of what should be archived – only exacerbated 
by the explosion of media available online today. Thus, as Hillis asks in 1998, “[H]ow 
much do you store? Do you attempt … to store everything on the Internet … It’s very 
hard to guess what’s going to be interesting [for future historians] (in Maclean & Davis, 
1998, p. 42).  
Indeed, as digital humanities theorist Jane Winters argues, in seeking to preserve as much 
as possible, digital preservationists may not account for the fact that, due to the nature 
and structure of how web pages and data are created, the whole notion of web archiving 
does inherently raise numerous questions about “(in)completeness and loss” (Winters, 
2017, p.244):  
Should we be trying to keep everything, particularly as existing methods of 
selection and cataloguing are not scalable? If we do not know what future 
scholars will be interested in, should we simply collect it all? And what do we 
mean by ‘everything’, when the web archiving process is marked by patchy 
data collection and loss? (Winters, 2017, p.244) 
Yet, it is crucial to note, as we shall explore in detail through subsequent chapters, that 
remembering and preserving in an archive are not the same thing. As Brown notes: 
Just as history is not the past, archives are not memory. Neither are archives 
storehouses of memory nor keepers of identity as neither memory nor identity 
are discrete objects which can be placed, hidden or revealed. (2013) 
Indeed, communication historian André Donk critiques the anxiety around a supposed 
digital dark age for its perceived uncritical foundation in technological determinism – 
arguing that the “debate … lacks an empirical basis as well as a differentiated concept of 
interplay of media and society” (2009). Instead, echoing Chun’s reminder that the internet 




The history of memory is not at all the history of storage media – remembrance 
needs to be executed by people. A DVD or a book cannot remember on its 
own. On the whole, it is not a question of media or technology, it is a question 
of society: what and how to remember. The digitization of collective memory 
is social driven. That means, transmission into time is not at first referred to 
media but to selection: whether to keep some information for later 
generations. If a decision about selection is done, the appropriate media has 
to be chosen. Storage and transmission … no longer … owes its existence to 
coincidence. (Donk, 2009) 
The importance we may ascribe to this observation, ahead of the move into the Theory 
Chapter, is that we might think it positions archiving as a practice not only concerned 
with the future – nor even much to do with the past per se – but as a process of decision-
making and acting in the present, determining now what may be judged important or 
useful for the individual or society to remember in an imagined future.  
Indeed – as sociologist Barbara Misztal succinctly remarks – in one way or another, “It 
is society that ensures what we remember, and how and when we remember it” (2007, p. 
381). 
--o0o-- 
3. Tendencies of Thought: Memory and the Archive 
In Part Two, we examined prevalent and wider-ranging popular and academic literature 
around the relationship between new, online technologies and remembering – attempting 
to identify key supposed problems around what may be at stake for memory in the twenty-
first century. Part Three now interrogates these supposed problems from a philosophical 
perspective, through three stages.  
Firstly, it argues that, through thematic analysis, we may understand many of the 
identified problems for memory as ones phrased in terms of gain or loss – of whether we 
are remembering ‘more’ or ‘less’. And it situates this as a historically-longstanding 
supposed problem in considering the relationship between memory and various emergent 
technologies. Secondly, it argues that we might see this kind of problem-phrasing as 
reliant – perhaps uncritically or unknowingly – on a philosophical assumption that 
memory acts like a kind of archive. Taking an archaeological approach, it suggests that 




Plato, and recognisable in many of the studies of memory outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter. Correspondingly, it gestures toward thinking on how language and metaphor 
of the archive can lead to unhelpful tendencies of thought within existing debates. 
Thirdly, it draws on psychological and neuroscientific research to demonstrate how 
significant, archive-informed tendencies of thought around memory may be incongruent 
with data on the ways in which remembering takes place. Thus, it argues that such 
tendencies must be opposed, interrupted, or at least engaged more critically, if we are to 
properly consider what is at stake for memory in the online era. It therefore advocates an 
approach to memory, moving forward, that does not strictly view remembering as a 
function of the individual, nor as a specific recall of the past, nor a view of memories as 
engrams, or things.  
An Old Problem: Media and The Pharmacological Pact  
Through exploring the literature outlined in Part Two, a commonly-perceived 
contemporary problem seems to emerge for memory, individually and collectively. 
Potential problems for memory may be identified across, for example, notions of amnesia 
or extension of biological memory, ideas of digital permanence or vulnerability of 
socially-mediated memory, or concerns around the preservation or degradation of 
historical records. And we may recognise these, thematically, as holding a conceptual 
commonality in considering a problem of loss or gain: whether we are in the online era 
remembering more or remembering less, or indeed too much or too little.  
Literary theorist Andreas Huyssen reminds us that “[n]ew technologies and new media 
are … always met by anxieties and fear that later prove to have been unwarranted or even 
ridiculous” – claiming that “[o]ur age will be no exception” (2000, p. 37). And, to be sure, 
we might straightforwardly liken this contemporary debate to those opposing views 
represented more than 2,000 years ago in Plato’s Phaedrus on the technology of writing. 
In this treatment, Theuth presents King Thamus with the invention of writing, 
proclaiming, “Here, O king, is a branch of learning that will make the people of Egypt 
wiser and improve their memories; my discovery provides a recipe for memory and 
wisdom” (Plato, 1952, p. 157 [274e]), to which the king replies:   
And so it is that you, by reasons of your tender regard for the writing that is 
your offspring, have declared the very opposite of its true effect. If men learn 




memory because they rely on that which is written. (Plato, 1952, p. 157 
[275a]) 
It is worth noting that, while a simple reading of this treatise suggests a techno-phobic 
resistance to writing, more recent readings by French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, 
himself after Jacques Derrida’s nuanced analysis, point to an understanding of writing, 
and media technologies, as pharmakon (Stiegler, 2010) – “the Greek term that names both 
a poison and its remedy” (Hansen, 2015, p. 50). In this way, media theorist Mark Hansen 
notes, we may understand technologies of memory as operating “through an essential 
duplicity whereby they give back to the human a remedy for what they take away” (2015, 
p. 50). And we shall return to considering the nature of this pharmacological “pact” (2015, 
p. 71) throughout the subsequent chapters.  
However, for the moment, let us consider the more simple supposed problem of whether 
engagement with new technologies may be causing us to remember more or remember 
less. Huyssen notes that ‘amnesiac’ positions may be critiqued for their inability to 
address the seeming paradox that it is “precisely these media … that make ever more 
memory available to us” (2000, p.27). Yet, here, the chapter wants to argue that the 
proposition of thinking the mediation of apparent memories in terms of quantity is already 
a fundamental conceptual error – reliant on the equally historically-informed metaphor of 
the archive.  
Before the Problem: Metaphorical Media and the Assumed Archive 
A number of scholars have written on the persistence of the archive as a metaphor for 
memory, tracing its roots, once more, to at least Plato in his notion of the wax tablet 
(Rosenfield, 1988; Bennet and Hacker, 2013, pp. 103-112; Brockmeier, 2015), whence it 
would manifest through various forms across the centuries – perhaps contemporarily most 
recognisably in the idea of a ‘storehouse in the brain’. And, as neuroscientist Maxwell 
Bennett and philosopher Peter Hacker note, the assumption that memory behaves like an 
archive of ‘stored knowledge’ can be understood as conceptually informing much of 
European-philosophical thinking on remembering through to where we ‘picked up’ with 
Ebbinghaus at the beginning of this chapter: 
The notion of storage and the associated idea of memory traces long antedates 
neuroscience. It began life as a metaphor (of wax tablets) in Plato, and as a 
rudimentary speculative theory in Aristotle, who conceived of memory as the 




the humidity of the tissues. The idea of memory as a ‘storehouse of ideas’ runs 
through the empiricist tradition of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. (Bennett and Hacker, 2013, p. 103) 
As we noted earlier, metaphors for memory may be greatly influenced by the technologies 
of their time, yet often by the recording or archiving devices of their time (Roediger, 
1980) – leading to commonplace, systematic, cognitive theories of encoding, storage and 
retrieval dominant today. Thus, as literary theorist Jens Brockmeier argues, we may today 
recognise the power of the archive in the ‘computer brain’ metaphors, where memories 
are “conceived of as stored computer files, and remembering would seem to be an act of 
reloading them from the deep storage of the brain and reopening them” (2015, p. 56). 
Likewise, Bennett and Hacker draw a parallel between the British empiricist ideas of 
memory or knowledge as a stored “mental image or picture that represents or is a copy 
of the original experience” (2013, p. 104) and contemporary neuroscientific thinking we 
examined in Part One, in which supposed information is stored in “a pattern of synaptic 
connections with efficacies that lead to the excitation of certain neurons under certain 
conditions, which excitation represents or encodes the original experience” (2013, p. 
104). Yet, as neuroscientist Steven Rose notes, the notion that memory can be understood 
as information is not only reductionist, but seemingly untrue – “[B]rains do not work with 
information in the computer sense, but with meaning” (2003, p. 104). Moreover, the 
metaphor of memory as information lends itself readily to the converse – that information 
may be seen as memory – as profoundly dappled across much of the literature outlined in 
Part Two.  
For Rose, the problem with thinking memory as an archive of information may be 
identified as an “uncreative metaphor” (in A Picture Held Us Captive, 2017). 
“Explanation in science often proceeds by metaphor”, Rose suggests, describing the 
process of creative metaphor: “We endeavour to understand how something we don’t 
know works by comparing it to something we do know – or something we can at least 
imagine we know” (Rose, 2003, p. 79). Yet, when, as Bennett and Hacker argue is the 
case for archival memory, “the metaphor [is] being taken to be what it is merely a 
metaphor for” (2013, p. 103), it becomes uncreative: “that metaphor has become 
reductive, and it limits both the science and one’s understanding of the wider world” 
(Rose, in A Picture Held Us Captive, 2017).  
In his 2013 book, Brain Imaging: What It Can (and Cannot) Tell Us About 




G. Shulman argues that there exists a certain complacency in some scientific approaches 
that uncritically or unthinkingly adopt philosophical assumptions about the function of 
the brain. Moreover, as well as affecting the interpretation of research findings, such 
uncritical approaches may actively shape the ways in which studies are shaped in the first 
place – as Shulman argues:  
Scientific directions exploring how brain experiments can be related to 
behavior and mental activity are intricately interdependent with philosophical 
issues that influence the choice of questions addressed and the methods used 
for their study.” (2013, p. 4) 
While Shulman here talks about the implications for scientific research, he stresses that 
such approaches equally conceptually feed into wider social discourse on the way the 
brain works. Indeed, as we may argue with the persistence of the archive metaphor, so 
engrained into social normality is the notion that memory acts like an archive, that “the 
choice is not whether or not we follow a philosophical position but rather whether we do 
so knowingly or unthinkingly” (Shulman, 2013, p. 5).  
It is important to acknowledge that the archive or library is not the only Western-historical 
nor more recent creative metaphor for thinking memory. In contrast, for example, Norse 
mythology imagines ‘memory’ (Muninn) along with ‘thought’ (Huginn) as two ravens, 
seeking information across the world and relaying it to the god Odin (Simek, 1993, p. 
164). To be sure, psychologist and memory specialist Douwe Draaisma’s comprehensive 
historical study of memory metaphors charts numerous conceptualisations over the last 
two-and-a-half-thousand years. Before his student Plato’s comparison to a wax tablet, 
Socrates likened remembering to the act of catching birds in an aviary. Others have 
thought memory like the natural or more artificial landscape – as fields, woods or 
labyrinths. Memory has been conceived in terms of buildings – as palaces, theatres or 
abbeys. Perhaps more laterally, Draaisma observes, “[M]emory has been seen as a 
magnet, stomach and a honeycomb, as a phosphorous ore, an Aeolian harp and a loom … 
a succession of metaphors and metamorphoses, a true omnia in omnibus” (2000, p. 3). 
Nevertheless, a historical tendency is discernible toward spatial and storage metaphors 
(Roediger, 1980; Schacter, 1996, p. 40), in which “[m]emories are considered to be 
objects that are stored in a mind space, and the process of retrieval is conceived as a search 




Brockmeier – as we shall see, like Bergson – argues that the archive metaphor has 
persisted because “Western common sense, both in everyday life and in science, assumes 
that there is a specific material, biological, neurological, and spatial reality to memory” 
(2010, p.6).8 However, he argues that we are undergoing a cross-disciplinary “fully 
fleshed cultural paradigm shift in that it calls into question the venerable notion of 
memory as a storehouse, as an archive of the past” (2015, p. viii). For Hoskins, too, a 
paradigm shift is underway, which can be understood through an “array of emergent new 
or digital media metaphors and concepts” (2011, p. 21) out of the “connective turn” of 
new technologies (2011, p. 201) and beyond notions of the traditional, temporally more-
static archive. Indeed, he notes that this shift may have come about because of the “sudden 
misfit of many of the media metaphors of memory, especially in the face of their 
continued use” (2011, p. 24). Yet, following Bergson, in this thesis we seek to (attempt 
to) force a shift beyond the metaphor. Instead, as we shall see, through an embrace of 
intuition, and in the face of metaphorical conceptualisations, it develops an approach to 
thinking with an anti-metaphor of the ‘anarchive’ – thinking not only what memory may 
be like, but critically reminding ourselves what it is not like.  
The term ‘anti-metaphor’ as a conceptual, linguistic tool we might define quite literally 
as ‘against the metaphor’ – as a kind of active and direct attempted opposition to or 
resistance to the trappings of creative-metaphor-encouraged philosophical assumptions. 
Thus, as the creative metaphor of ‘archive’ might lead us to unthinkingly follow notions 
of remembering as storage in space, the creative anti-metaphor of ‘anarchive’ might lead 
us to actively ‘keep in check’ those archivally-informed assumptions and tendencies of 
thought when they arise – paraphrasing Shulman, to follow a philosophical position 
thinkingly rather than unthinkingly (2013, p. 5). 
In this spirit, the final section of Part Three identifies what it argues are three, key 
tendencies of thought, arising out of an uncritical reliance on the archive metaphor. 
Drawing on psychological research, it aims to demonstrate on the one hand that such 
tendencies must be critically challenged if we are to properly consider how processes of 
 
8 It is interesting in this regard to note the distinction between Bergson and his contemporary Alfred 
North Whitehead – whom we shall equally draw on in the Theory Chapter in discussing problems for 
philosophy of language and metaphor. As philosopher Didier Debaise notes, whereas Bergson and 
Whitehead agree on the tendency toward conceptual spatialisation, for Whitehead this could be 
considered a historical tendency of (at least European) human intellect, whereas for Bergson it was 




memory may be changing in the online era. On the other hand, in doing so, it aims to 
illustrate the inadequacy of the assumption that memory works like an archive in general.   
Toxic Tendencies: The Failings of the Archive 
We have established above how a key failing of uncritically relying on the archive 
metaphor in extended or collective memory may be recognised in the related tendency to 
mistakenly conflate media as memory – mistaking the artefact for the remembrance it 
may culturally signify or biologically excite.  
This section draws attention to the assumption that biological memory may operate like 
an archive, and the unthinking or uncritical tendencies of thought that such an assumption 
may engender. In doing so, ahead of the Theory Chapter, it aims to lay the foundation for 
development of an approach to thinking memory that blurs the boundaries between more 
traditional thinking of the individual and the social – both in terms of biological apparent 
recall and in terms of engaging with artefacts.  
Here, we identify three overlapping tendencies of thinking about memory that we may 
recognise both as inherently archivally-informed and as prevalent across especially, but 
not limited to, the commentary on individual remembering in Part One.  
1. Remembering is the individually-controlled (that is, bodily-controlled) recall of 
information 
2. Remembering, through this recall of information, is the (accurate) recollection of 
previous experience 
3. Memories are quantifiable things (ostensibly stored in the brain) 
In fact, there is an additional, crucial, archivally-informed tendency of thought around 
memory that relates to yet is absent from this list: the tendency to think of memory as 
knowledge. And it is through firstly interrogating the three tendencies above that we may 
establish a basis for a radical, more-Bergsonian approach, developed in the theory 
chapter, of memory not serving knowledge of the past but action in the present (toward 
the future).  
Overlapping significantly, as they do, rather than take each tendency in turn, this section 
draws on selected, significant research findings into memory that variously challenge the 
strict archival model as a whole, and thus its related tendencies of thought. In highlighting 
the conceptual failings of thinking archivally, it opens up the possibility for an approach 




as recollection of previous experience but ideas out of past experience, creatively 
constructed for the perceived needs of the present; and not as dealing with memories as 
things in space but as non-representational feelings or psychically-perceived qualities, 
experienced in time, in the present.   
Bartlett, as introduced in Part One, had already importantly demonstrated in the 1930s 
that supposed accurate memories of ‘the past’ might be better understood as psychic 
(re)constructions, influenced through the social-cultural background of the rememberer – 
showing that much of what is ‘remembered’ of a supposedly recalled past experience is 
imagined out of myriad other experiences (1932). As Brown and psychologist Paula 
Reavey note, Bartlett’s contribution to the field of memory is recognised in showing that 
“the main function of remembering is not to establish the truth of ‘what really happened’, 
but rather to bring about a novel relationship between the organism and its environment” 
(2015, p. 64). 
Bartlett noted that “the construction of psychological material and of psychological 
reactions into organised settings plays a leading part in perceiving, in recognising and in 
remembering” 1932, p. 227). And this present-moment, social influence on remembering 
– challenging the notion of memories as some sort of re-experience of a previous event – 
is perhaps most forcefully (and thus here, perhaps, most usefully) expressed through the 
various psychological research studies conducted by Elizabeth Loftus into so-called ‘false 
memory’ since the 1970s. 
In a famous study, after Bartlett, into the power of suggestion or misinformation in 
guiding witness testimony (Loftus & Palmer, 1974), participants who had been shown 
video clips of cars crashing into each other were subsequently quizzed on what they 
remembered. One question focused on the speed the cars were going when they collided 
– with different participants being asked about the collision using different verbs of 
greater or lesser strength-intensity: How fast the cars were going when they ‘contacted’ 
each other, versus ‘hit’, ‘bumped’, ‘collided’ or ‘smashed’ each other. The results 
demonstrated that the greater the intensity of strength of collision insinuated in the 
question, the greater speed participants tended to remember or believe the cars travelling. 
A second experiment showed participants a clip of a car collision – in which there was 
no smashed glass – and were similarly later asked the speed they estimated the cars to be 
travelling at when they either ‘hit’ or ‘smashed’ each other. A week later, participants 
were asked if they remembered seeing smashed glass in the video. Those originally 




more likely to remember smashed glass in the video than those asked using the word ‘hit’ 
– who experienced similar levels as a control group who had not been asked about vehicle 
speed at all.  
Loftus and colleagues were similarly able to ‘implant’ fictitious details about events 
across multiple experiments: 
People have recalled nonexistent broken glass and tape recorders, a 
cleanshaven man as having a mustache, straight hair as curly, stop signs as 
yield signs, hammers as screwdrivers, and even something as large and 
conspicuous as a barn in a bucolic scene that contained no buildings at all. In 
short, misleading post-event information can alter a person's recollection in 
powerful ways, even leading to the creation of false memories of objects that 
never in fact existed. (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995)  
Moreover, so commanding is the force of the social on remembering in the present, that 
Loftus and others were able in later experiments to produce remembrances of entirely 
fictitious events in participants’ recollections – what Loftus calls “rich false memories” 
(2005). Such an avenue of research was directly in response to, and in opposition to, the 
rise in therapy practices in re-claiming supposed repressed memories (Loftus & Ketcham, 
1994) – leading to an academic (and indeed judicially-informing) tension in the mid-
1990s known as the “memory wars” (Crews, 1995). Perhaps most well-known of such 
studies is the “Lost in a Shopping Mall” experiment (Loftus & Pickrell, 1995), in which 
participants were asked if they remembered a number of events from their childhood, 
supplied by a relative. One of the events, known not to have happened by the family 
member, centred around being lost in a supermarket. In all, around a quarter of 
participants recalled the event being truthful. 
Through experiments like these, Loftus and others were able to show that imagination 
may play a key part in engendering participants’ belief in false, or implanted memories – 
calling this “imagination inflation” (Garry et al, 1996). For example, a 1996 study 
demonstrated that participants had more confidence in the truthfulness of fictional 
childhood events that they were asked to imagine had happened to them than those not 
imagined – leading the authors to consider “implications for situations in which 
imagination is used as an aid in searching for presumably lost memories” (Garry et al, 




More recent research has shown the role media beyond language may play in shaping 
recollections of events untrue to how they occurred. In a 2017 study, psychologist Robert 
A. Nash asked participants about their memories of either the Olympic torch relay during 
the London 2012 Olympics or the 2012 British royal wedding: 
Some were shown a genuine photo of the event; others saw a doctored photo 
that depicted protesters and unrest. A third group of subjects saw a doctored 
photo whose inauthenticity had been made explicit, either by adding a written 
disclaimer … or by making the digital manipulation deliberately poor (2017, 
p. 439) 
The experiment showed that doctored photographs had a small effect on how participants 
remembered the events. Perhaps more interestingly, it showed that the effect was 
comparable whether participants were shown deceptive, doctored photos that may have 
been true or photos that were overtly inauthentic.  
What this section aims to achieve through referring to such research is not to categorically 
prove that memory ‘works’ in one way or another, but simply to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of the archive as a creative conceptual metaphor for the study of memory. 
Such studies show that, contrary to the metaphorical notion of the archive as a static recall 
of stored information, what is experienced as memory is shaped reflexively by 
experiences of the past, imaginings of potential events, as well as the social (and thus 
physical) environments in which acts of remembering take place.  
Yet what a consideration of these psychological findings also shows is the persistence 
within much academic thought of the spatialised, archive-informed idea of memories as 
things – in the face of its conceptual inadequacies.   
Loftus, for example, is rightly careful to distinguish between the implications of her 
research for understanding memory and those for, perhaps, trusting memory as accurate 
in everyday society – “Whatever the misinformation reveals about normal memory 
processes, one thing is clear: the practical implications are significant” – 2005, p. 365). 
Yet, while through misinformation and suggestion, she and others are seemingly able to 
demonstrate that memories are not experienced as recalled events, she nevertheless 
remains uncritically committed to an encode-store-retrieve conceptualisation of memory 
– considering, for example, “the fate of the original memory traces after exposure to 
misinformation appears to have made them inaccessible” (Loftus, 2005, p. 361; italics 




Likewise, Brockmeier gestures to the Schacter’s 2001 popular-science book The Seven 
Sins of Memory – arguing that, while offering a detailed literature on the various apparent 
“biases, distortions … omissions [and] mistakes” that archivally-conceived memory 
seems to make:  
Admitting such features as “sins” means once more to acknowledge the 
commandment, the normative rule, the role model of a memory that is 
supposed to work as an unfailing archive. It confirms the archival circle of 
encoding, storing and retrieving memories – even if in a flawed and defective 
manner. (2015, p. 10) 
-- 
Part Three of this chapter has attempted to interrogate firstly an apparent, prevalent, 
quantified supposed question for memory in the online era, and secondly the metaphorical 
notion of the archive, out of which the question may be seen to emerge. In doing so, the 
chapter argued that a major problem for thinking about memory lies in uncritically (either 
knowingly or unthinkingly) relying on creative (or uncreative) conceptual metaphors.  
In the final part of this chapter, we draw on Bergson to consider a methodological, 
philosophical approach might be helpful to overcome these issues. Firstly, in considering 
what kind phrasing of the question we might attempt, if not a matter of degree in 
remembering more or less. And, secondly, in what kind of critical attitude we may take 
to considering memory itself, if we are to resist the analytic pull of conceptual metaphors.  
--o0o-- 
4. Intuition: Toward an Anarchival Approach 
In Part Three, we considered the importance self-critical approaches to thinking not only 
memory but to thinking with creative concepts in general – and we emphasised the need 
to resist the conceptual framings of metaphor in understanding memory. In response, Part 
Four acts as a succinct methodological-philosophical intervention – introducing 
Bergson’s thinking on intuition as a way in which we might more philosophically-
critically approach thinking the relationship between memory and new online 
technologies beyond the power of the archive metaphor. Drawing on useful consolidatory 
contributions into Bergson’s method from French philosopher Gilles Deleuze, as well as 




it argues for a restructuring of the investigation to be one not concerned with differences 
to how much we are remembering in the online era, but how we are remembering 
differently. And, secondly, it stresses the need to think empirical analysis not (just) in 
terms of things in space, but as interactions or processes in time. Thus, it introduces 
Bergson’s notion of duration as the experience of life in the constant flow of the present. 
In doing so, Part Four sets out the basis for the development of an ‘anarchival’ method 
for considering the research question.   
Cultural and media theorists Britta Timm Knudsen and Carsten Stage note that, following 
the so-called ‘affective turn’ in cultural analysis, “[t]he [present] challenge … is how to 
develop and account for methodologies that enable cultural researchers to investigate 
affective processes in relation to a certain empirical study” (2015, p. 1). For them, an 
affective method may be defined as: 
an innovative strategy for (1) asking research questions and formulating 
research agendas relating to affective processes, for (2) collecting or 
producing embodied data and for (3) making sense of this data in order to 
produce academic knowledge. (2015, p. 1)  
The anarchival approach we shall develop through the next chapter should be understood 
as an attempt to develop such a novel, affective method, with the purpose of facilitating 
effective investigation of the subjective experience of remembering in the online era. In 
line with Knudsen and Stage’s theorising, we can recognise the development of our 
empirical method through the following three considerations. Firstly, through an attempt 
to (re)formulate the research question in sympathy with what we will argue are the 
affective processes of remembering. Secondly, through a philosophically-grounded 
collection of data through case studies – attempting, in Bergson’s terms, to consider the 
“immediate data of consciousness” (2001), the affective experience of the lived body. 
Thirdly, in attempting to analyse, contextualise and make sense of this data within a 
broader socio-political contextual framework, to produce new knowledge about what may 
be at stake for memory in the twenty-first century. 
Intuition as Method? Rephrasing the Question  
In Time and Free Will (2001) – written as his doctoral thesis – Bergson draws attention 
to the method of intuition, which he would develop throughout other works, including 




For Bergson, we may consider the experience of human consciousness and perception in 
two ways, as Guerlac summarises: 
Immediate consciousness … refers to the way something feels to us directly, 
before we stop and think about it, try to communicate it to someone, or 
represent it symbolically in any way. … [R]eflective consciousness involves 
thinking and implies the use of the tools that enable us to think and to know: 
language, logic, mathematics, and other symbols of means of representation. 
(2006, p. 62) 
For Bergson, direct experience, or immediate consciousness, can be thought of as the 
experience of qualities – “sensation, looked at in itself, is pure quality” (2001, p. 90). Yet, 
once we reflect on that experience, we surrender to the often more spatialised, conceptual 
notions of understanding experience in terms of quantity or intensity – “seen through the 
medium of extensity, this quality becomes in a certain sense quantity, and is called 
intensity” (Bergson, 2001, p. 90). As with the archival metaphor for memory, problems 
within philosophy may arise when the symbol itself is mistaken for the object being 
understood through the symbol – the metaphor being understood as being the thing it is 
supposed to reflectively stand in for. And “It is above all language that alienates us from 
direct experience” (2006, p. 69), Guerlac notes – “[W]e are almost always caught up in 
modes of symbolic representation … [that] prevents us from having intuitive knowledge 
… and a richer experience of the heterogeneous world” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 61).  
For Bergson, then, the task of philosophy becomes one in which the thinker attempts to 
detach themselves from conceptually-informed reflection on experience – to “give up 
certain habits of thinking, and even perceiving” (Bergson, 2004, p. 241), to escape “the 
ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness”, in order to reconnect with direct 
experience, or the “immediate data of consciousness” (Bergson, 2001). This, Bergson 
argues, is made possible through rigorous philosophical method of intuition.  
Deleuze, whose re-engagement with Bergson in the late-twentieth century is often 
credited as the catalyst toward a cultural revival of the thinker’s works (Lundy, 2018), 
argues that intuition as method can be understood through three key, related rules (2011, 
pp. 13-35): 
FIRST RULE: Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. 
Condemn false problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of 




SECOND RULE: Struggle against illusion, rediscover the true differences in 
kind or articulations of the real. (2011, p. 21) 
THIRD RULE: State problems and solve them in terms of time rather than of 
space. (2011, p. 31) 
Though Deleuze asserts that intuition is “the method of Bergsonism” (2011, p. 13), here 
we do not take intuition, and thus Deleuze’s discerned ‘rules’, as a strict method in itself 
– rather, in its focus on thinking in time, and its insistence on considering differences in 
kind, an intuitive approach is here adopted as a kind of philosophical ‘attitude’ that may 
inform an empirical ‘anarchival’ method developed over the next chapter. Thus, a 
philosophical embrace of intuition is not intended to set up a perhaps false opposition 
between thinking in terms of time versus space, and between considering differences in 
kind versus differences in degree. Instead, it serves to encourage a methodological 
approach toward thinking in terms of processes in time and space, and toward considering 
differences in kind as well as differences in degree. 
The third rule we will come to in the next section of Part Four, but let us firstly consider 
how we may think the first two rules in relation to our investigation into the role new 
technologies play in changing memory processes.  
We saw in the Introduction Chapter how Bergson considers the nature of philosophy to 
be a “question of finding the problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of 
solving it” (1946, pp. 58-59). Through the first rule of intuition, then, we may now 
recognise the supposed problem of whether we are remembering more or less in the online 
era as a ‘false problem’, in that it is “badly stated” (Deleuze, 2011, p. 17). In thinking 
memory like an archive, a question is framed in terms that “represent badly analysed 
composites” (2011, p. 17), in that they engender an investigation around measuring 
quantities of memory, rather than considering the qualities of memory. Yet, this problem, 
we may argue in relation to the second rule, can be overcome through a re-phrasing of 
the research question – in order to ‘rediscover the articulations of the real’, we may 
consider the ‘the true differences in kind’ between how we experience memory through 
new, online technologies. Deleuze claims that “what Bergson is condemning in 
nonexistent problems is the obsession … with thinking in terms of more and less” (2011, 
p. 19). In fact, Deleuze argues:  
[C]onceiving of everything in terms of more or less, seeing nothing but 




perhaps the most general error of thought, the error common to science and 
metaphysics. (2011, p. 20) 
Thus, this thesis proposes a methodological resistance to considering the problem in terms 
of whether we are remembering more or less – rather, proposing that we consider the 
differences in kind: how are we remembering differently in the online era. Indeed, as we 
shall see through the Theory Chapter, in such a rephrasing of the research question, the 
pharmacological pact when remembering through new media-technologies may be 
approached not with a focus on whether technologies allow us to remember more or less, 
but on the agential nature of the relationship enjoyed between the human and 
technological.  
Intuition and the Conception of Time: Escaping the Archive 
It should be noted that various thinkers, with whose work we have engaged in Part Two, 
we might think have rightly placed a focus not solely on how much we are remembering, 
but also on how we may be experiencing remembering differently – in particular van 
Dijck (2007), Garden-Hansen (2009) and Hoskins (2009a; 2009b; 2011; 2013). However, 
it is the third rule of intuition that sets aside the Bergsonian approach, and that brings us 
to the heart of the philosophy of both Bergson and Simondon: thinking not solely in terms 
of objects in space, but of processes in time.  
For Bergson, life is experienced through the ongoing force of duration – or the affective, 
relational experience of the flow of the constant present – and it is with a sympathy to the 
direct experience of duration that philosophical work must be undertaken. What we think 
of time, Bergson argues, is in fact a reflexively-perceived conceptual, linear spatialisation 
of the experience of duration: 
For if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which 
our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and 
if on the other hand out conception of number ends in spreading out space 
everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, 
understood in the sense of the medium in which we make distinctions and 
count, is nothing but space. (Bergson, 2001, p, 91) 
Guerlac notes that the cognitive approach to thinking “represents things in space … which 
is why it cannot think duration, but only time” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 63). Time, she notes, 




tool or synthesis for considering the experience of duration, yet, in reflectively-
consciously spatialising duration as linear, sequential time, we: 
immobilize what we [immediately-consciously] experience as occurring in 
temporal flow … these modes of symbolic representation interfere with our 
ability to grasp the temporal nature of reality. They crush our sense of 
duration. (Guerlac, 2006, p. 19) 
Deleuze’s thirdly-identified rule of intuition, then, we may understand through Bergson’s 
insistence that “[w]e must return to the direct perception of change and mobility” (1946, 
p. 167). And this is only made possible if we are able, through intellectual effort, to set 
aside “the obsession with space that haunts Western thought, and the structure of 
language, which infuses space into concepts and immobilizes thought” (Guerlac, 2006, 
p. 71).  
Thus, if we are to properly find what problem may exist for memory in the online era – 
through empirically considering how we may be remembering differently through and 
with new technologies – we must approach the investigation from a perspective on 
memory that does not (only) think of objects in space, but of movements in the flow of 
duration.  
Consequently, and in anticipation of the following Theory Chapter, the final section of 
this chapter now briefly introduces Bergson’s thinking on duration.  
Thinking in Duration: Experience as Flow  
As we shall see in the following chapter, Bergson’s philosophy rests somewhere in 
between realism and idealism, seeking neither to think things objectively in the world nor 
subjectively in the mind – but somewhere in between, as a world of affective, and 
affectively perceived, images (Bergson, 2004, p. 1).  
For Bergson, to consciously live is to experience an ongoing, affective relation of the 
body-image to its surroundings, as a “centre of action … [that] receives and returns 
movements” (Bergson, 2004, p. 4).  
Thinking in terms of the body as movements is made possible because Bergson 
philosophically approaches existence as taking place not as an object in spatio-temporal 
linear time, but as processes in duration. Duration, we might think of as the direct, 
qualitative experience of the world, before any reflective, conscious interpretation is 




which melt into and permeate one another, without any affiliation with number: it would 
be pure heterogeneity” (Bergson, 2001, p. 104). We might think of it in terms of what 
sociologist and philosopher Patricia Ticinento Clough calls the enduring “Recent Past and 
the Near Future of the Present” (2018, p. xxxiv). Indeed, as Brown and Reavey note, 
Bergson’s duration may be understood as “the flow of experience … without division, 
but with continuous qualitative transformation” (2015, p. 5) – or, following Middleton 
and Brown, as “a ‘living’ version of time … against a reduction of time to space in which 
time is treated as a series of instants” (2005, p. 8).  
By contrast, the experienced sense of existing in time as a conscious, stable being with a 
distant-past, present and long-term future we shall see in the following chapter Bergson 
understands as a kind of conceptual “temporal synthesis” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 117), that 
helps the conscious human body to “cope” with existing in duration (Guerlac, 2006, 
p.122). Time, we saw Guerlac observes, is “what duration becomes when we think and 
speak of it” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 69). And we might see this as a kind of conceptual trade-
off (a pharmacological pact, if you will), in that it at once offers opportunities to 
consciously think beyond the immediate moment of the present – allowing for greater 
choice of bodily and, as we shall see, social action – yet requires a distancing from the 
actual, lived experience in its temporal form. “Our lives flow”, note Brown and Reavey, 
“only subsequently do we add in the breaks and punctuations” (Brown and Reavey, 2015, 
p. 5). Indeed, time – like all symbolic representation – “crush[es] our sense of duration” 
(Guerlac, 2006, p. 19).  
In fact, “We shift between virtual and actual states all of the time, never completely virtual 
or completely actual”, Ansell-Pearson observes (2010, p. 68) – we might “go from the 
physical existence which is merely ‘acted,’ to that which is exclusively ‘dreamed’” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 218). As we outlined above, while we might never enter the realm of 
the purely actual, through intellectual effort of intuition we may critically draw ourselves 
away from the symbolic modes of thinking that hide direct experience from us.   
As we shall argue in the next chapter, such a synthesis is made possible through processes 
of remembering, in parallel with processes of perception, acting – more strongly in higher 
conscious beings – as a kind of hesitational force that allows virtual distance from the 
actual, lived, direct experience of duration. Yet, since all life is lived through the enduring 
force of duration, we should not think of memory as spatially, linearly in the past, but as 
“the preservation or prolongation of the past, entailing the coexistence of past and 




We have established that, when thinking with Bergson, we must think all experience as 
temporal processes in duration. Thus, ahead of its exploration in the following Theory 
Chapter, we might now begin to appreciate the context of Bergson’s crucial argument: 
that memory does not serve quantitative knowledge of past events, but informs 




In this chapter, we introduced key prevalent debates around what is at stake for memory 
in the online era. The chapter outlined ideas around how seeming augmentation of 
remembering through new technologies may be viewed as extending memory or 
conversely as reducing our capacity to remember. It considered how increased access to, 
and saving of, media may be considered a kind of overload or even collapse of memory, 
and it examined concerns about the rise of the post-truth era in terms of a supposed excess 
of ‘fake news’. And it engaged with wider more cultural-historical concerns about how 
contemporary media represents ideas of history in the present – as well as how the 
vulnerability of media-formats in which contemporary data is stored may render them 
inaccessible in the future, leading to a so-called Digital Dark Age.  
Considering the wide-ranging literature from a thematic perspective, the chapter argued 
that we may recognise a contemporary, prevailing, perceived question for memory, as 
one of whether we are remembering more (or too much) or less (or too little). Such a 
perceived question around the relationship between memory and media-technologies, the 
chapter demonstrated, is an old one – traceable to at least the time of Plato. Equally old, 
it argued, is the philosophical assumption on which it may be thought founded: that 
memory works like an archive. Highlighting how language and metaphors may shape the 
way in which we conceive of and analyse memory, the chapter showed that numerous 
tendencies of thought in popular thinking on memory may be understood as emerging 
from an uncritical reliance on this likening of memory to an archive. Furthermore, it 
argued that three significant, yet highly-questionable tendencies in particular must be 
challenged in our attitude toward memory if we are to properly analyse its relationship 
with new technologies: the idea that memory is a function of the individual; that memories 
represent (accurate) recall of past experiences; and that memories are ‘things’ that are 




At this point, the chapter introduced Bergson’s thinking on intuition as a useful 
conceptual tool to re-think both our methodological approach to framing the question for 
remembering and our philosophical approach to exploring this question. On the one hand, 
it argued for a rephrasing of the research problem to be one around not solely on whether 
we are remembering less or more, but rather the ways in which we are remembering 
differently through new technologies. On the other hand, it emphasised a need to think 
remembering not in terms of things in space but in terms of the experience of processes 
in time – in the present, or in what Bergson calls duration. To this end, and in anticipation 












The Theory: Memory, Method and the Man-Machine 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we explored key popular and academic debates around what 
might be at stake for memory in the online era, with a significant and recurring theme 
emerging of whether we are remembering – or at risk of remembering – ‘too much’ or 
‘too little’. This, the chapter argued, can be understood as a kind of Bergsonian false 
problem (Deleuze, 2011, p. 17), brought about through a historical, and historically-
contested, conceptual ‘spatialising’ of memory. Such a spatialising is manifest through a 
popular reliance on the metaphor of the archive as a conceptual framework within which 
to think about memory – which, in turn, has led to various contested tendencies of thought 
around memory’s nature. If we are to properly examine the role of new technologies in 
changing memory processes, it argued, we must on the one hand move away from a 
concept of memory as a kind of static, spatial recall of the past (and toward one of 
memory as a dynamic actualisation of experience-informed potential in the present), and 
on the other rephrase the problem as one not concerned quantitatively with whether we 
are remembering more or less, but qualitatively with how we are remembering differently.  
This chapter attempts these moves through three sections. In Part One, forming the 
substantial part of the chapter, it draws comprehensively on the thinking of Henri Bergson 
and other theorists to propose a theoretical understanding of memory as a transindividual, 
techno-social and inter-affective process – developing a notion of memory as a crucial-
for-life, inter-relational realisation of potential for action in the present, rather than a 
‘recall’ of knowledge of past experience. Furthermore, through a reading of Gilbert 
Simondon, it conceptualises remembering in terms of the constitution of a conscious 
sense of self and the individual through processes of psychic and collective individuation, 
and it emphasises the shared relation between the human and the technological in 
engendering such processes. Part Two, in a philosophical attempt to overcome the use 
metaphor as a conceptual tool for thinking memory in wider contexts, proposes the 




usefulness of recent thinking on the concept of the anarchive, as developed through the 
SenseLab in Montreal (SenseLab, no date), it develops the term as a useful conceptual 
tool with which this expanded, potential-oriented view of remembering might be applied 
in a real-world discursive context. Thusly equipped, Part Three lays the groundwork for 
explication in subsequent chapters an argument for a contemporary socio-political 
‘struggle’ for memory – in terms of the competing transindividual drives of processes of 
psychic and collective individuation, and the socio-economic agencies inherent in the 
contemporary technologies through which such processes take place. Enabled in part by 
its tendency to be viewed as an archive, the experience of memory has, the chapter argues, 
been quantified, packaged and monetised for the purposes of neo-liberal capitalist, 
corporate economic gain. Thus, the section argues, through the case-study examinations 
we must explore not just the experiences of remembering through new technologies, but 
also examine drives of the biological, the cultural and the technological transindividual 
underlying these experiences, and their inherent, inter-related agencies, as well as 




1. Thinking Memory: A Non-Archival Perspective 
The primary focus of this thesis is the role new, online technologies may be playing in 
changing human memory processes, and the resulting implications. In light of the critique 
of the archive metaphor presented in the previous chapter, there are two major conceptual 
matters that it is necessary to critically unpack before we are able to properly address this 
question.  
Firstly, forming the major part of this section, we must consider in what way ‘memory 
processes’ might be understood if we are to move away from an attitude informed by or 
overly sympathetic to the archive metaphor. This established, if we are to consider the 
role new technologies play in changing memory processes, we need secondly to consider 
how we might now understand the relationship between such memory processes and these 
technologies. To this end, the chapter engages in a reading of relevant thinking of Bergson 
and Simondon as important philosophical contributions to challenging the kind of 




develops a working theoretical approach that conceives of memory not as a recall of 
knowledge of past experience, but as a socio-technologically inter-relational, process-led 
realisation of potential, in duration – that is, above all, for the purposes of useful action.  
The section begins with an in-depth exploration of Bergson’s thinking on memory in 
relation to perception and consciousness. Drawing heavily on his 1896 work, Matter and 
Memory (Bergson, 2004), it outlines a view of remembering as “actualised” memory 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 181), as relational to the situation in which an individual finds 
themselves, in order to effect action, and as actualisable only through and with perception. 
In this way, it destabilises the subjectivity of a view of memory as the individual’s discrete 
‘knowledge’ acting on the present. Instead it sees memory as an affective, relational call-
to-action in and with the present, and it begins to describe a way of thinking about 
remembering as a kind of relational realisation of potential for action. The section thus 
puts forward the original notion that we should think remembering not so much in terms 
of ‘memory’ as ‘memory-potential’, realised through and with perception. 
Consciousness, within this Bergsonian perspective, can be seen as rooted in the voluntary 
choice of action that developed senses of memory and perception inform. We might think 
of consciousness as emerging, then, through voluntary actions that inform the sense 
body’s self-awareness or ‘otherness’ in relation to the wider world - what Simondon will 
call ‘individuation’. Through then exploring Simondon’s arguable development of 
Bergson’s thinking on affectivity, potentiality and action (Hansen, 2006, p. 8; Piatti, 
2016) in his theorising on ‘pyschic’ and more ‘collective’ individuation and technics, the 
section broadens the context within which we may think about memory into a wider, 
socio-technological framework of affective inter-relationality. It enlarges the scope of 
memory-potential-informed action into ideas around how ‘the social’ or ‘society’ is 
produced through ‘collective individuation’, out of which a grouped sense of the 
individual may emerge. At the same time, it conceptually positions technologies as 
extensions of perception and action, and thus of consciousness, through which such 
movements of individuation may take place. In doing so, it seeks to argue for a 
repositioning of ‘memory’ into the heart of both contemporary affect and media theory.   
Perception Serves Action 
Here I am in the presence of images, in the vaguest sense of the word, images 
that are perceived when my senses are opened to them, unperceived when 




These words are drawn from the opening paragraph to Bergson’s 1896 work, Matter and 
Memory, in which he attempts to put forward a theory of consciousness that contests, or 
perhaps seeks to reconcile, the dualism in contemporary views on consciousness of both 
idealists, which thinks of the world as constructed by the quality of mind (Bergson, 2004, 
pp. 235-236) and realists, which derives the quality of the mind through quantitative 
measurement, and which Bergson considered to reduce the idea of ‘mind’ simply to 
‘brain’ (Bergson, 2004, pp. 235-236). In Bergson’s theorising, what we call 
‘consciousness’ is not discrete. Rather, it is bound up in his thinking on the relationships 
between matter, perception, action, duration (and concepts of time) and memory – an 
understanding of consciousness being drawn out through an attempted global or ‘joined-
up’ view of these. It is therefore key, if we are to properly develop his thinking on memory 
for the purposes of our own argument, to consider these relationships in relation to one 
another. 
In simplified terms, when Bergson talks of being in “the presence of images” (2004, p. 
1), he is referring to the mental representations of the matter around him as he perceives 
it in his mind. These images, it is worth reminding ourselves as we have seen in the 
previous chapter, should be thought of as matter perceived within the flow of duration 
rather than time – time being for Bergson, as literary scholar Susan Guerlac notes, a 
‘stand-in’ for duration in reflective consciousness: “it is what duration becomes when we 
think and speak of it” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 69). And it is important to emphasise right from 
the outset that, in following Bergsonian reasoning, we must remind ourselves continually 
to think time in terms duration.  
Bergson purposely chooses the word ‘image’ so as to depart from the language of 
idealism or realism – and he importantly allows the term to refer to both matter and 
perceptions of matter, blurring the boundaries between concepts of the outer ‘real’ world 
and the inner ‘imagined’ world.9 He defines an ‘image’ as “a certain existence which is 
more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist 
calls a thing; an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’” 
(Bergson, 2004, pp. vii-viii). 
 
9 While Bergson maintains, that “[t]his conception of matter [as image] is simply that of common sense.” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. viii), Guerlac suggests that his use of the word ‘image’ is to intentionally disrupt our 
“usual habits of thought” (Guerlac, 2006. 112). In line with the method of intuition, such a phrasing may 





Yet it is Bergson’s thinking on the function of these images that sets him even more firmly 
apart from the idealist and realist thinking on perception that he seeks to challenge, in part 
enabled by this refusal of more traditional terminologies. Bergson proposes that, while 
the position of the idealist and the realist might be considered diametrically opposed, they 
in fact share the fundamental mistake of thinking perception as ‘knowledge’. In essence, 
I perceive, therefore I know: 
If we now look closely at the two doctrines, we shall discover in them a 
common postulate, which we may formulate this: perception has a wholly 
speculative interest; it is pure knowledge … for both parties, to perceive 
means to know. (Bergson, 2004, p. 17) 
For both the idealist and the realist, then, as Guerlac puts it, “perception occurs in the 
pursuit of truth or knowledge about the empirical world” (2006, p. 107). Bergson crucially 
rejects this synthesis, however, strikingly asserting that perception is not about knowledge 
at all. Rather, Bergson claims that perception is about action: I perceive, therefore I act. 
Moreover, perception is about action in relation to the movements of other images: I 
perceive, therefore I react.  
[T]he material world is made up of objects, or, if you prefer it, of images, of 
which all the parts react upon each other by movements. And that which 
constitutes our pure perception is our dawning action, in so far as it is 
prefigured in those images. The actuality of our perception thus lies in its 
activity, in the movements which prolong it (Bergson, 2004, p. 74) 
The significance of this claim cannot be understated – seeming to turn, as it does, 
European-historical convention on its head. Indeed, philosopher Keith Ansell-Pearson 
notes late-nineteenth-century philosopher and psychologist William James’s assertion of 
Bergson’s reasoning as “effecting a revolution in thought comparable in significance to 
Kant’s Copernican revolution in the Critique of Pure Reason” (quoted in Ansell-Pearson, 
2010, p.61). To argue this radical philosophical position, Bergson adopts an evolutionary 
perspective, reorienting perception not as a given faculty of knowing one’s environment, 
as it is accepted in one way or the other for the idealist or realist, but as a developed 
evolutionary trait, bound up through the nervous system, which, he posits, allows an 
animal to act on the necessity afforded by its immediate situation and surroundings. In 




Bergson argues that one can think of a necessary and shared fundamental model of 
perception, in its function, between lower and higher organisms: “to receive stimulation, 
to provide motor apparatus and to present the largest possible number of these apparatuses 
to a given stimulus” (Bergson, 2004, pp. 20-21). Through his reasoning, we can see 
perception on the one hand, at its evolutionary base, as a mode of enabling reaction (or, 
at a level of stimulus-response, as a mode of reaction itself) to the conditions of the present 
moment, for the purposes of usefulness or survival. On the other, we can see that that, as 
the ability to perceive has developed through evolution, it is not transformed into 
something ‘new’ in a sense of ‘knowledge’. Rather, its development has facilitated an 
enlargement of the ‘number of these apparatuses’ through which we may act. The 
difference between perception in lower and higher organisms is not a matter of difference 
in kind (knowledge over impulse-action), but difference in degree (enlarged ability to 
act).  
[I]f the nervous system is thus constructed, from one end of the animal series 
to the other, in view of an action which is less and less necessary [moving 
from lower animals to higher animals], must we not think that perception … 
is entirely directed towards action, and not towards pure knowledge? 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 21) 
Body as Centre of Action 
The body, is, for Bergson, a “centre of action; it receives and returns movements” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 4), and the ability to perceive is the very ability to (re)act – as one of 
Bergson’s contemporary commentators notes, “It is concerned with action, not 
knowledge; it is practical, not speculative” (Clark Barr, 1913, p. 642). Once we grasp this 
central tenet that perception serves action rather than knowledge, we can begin to think 
about the conscious state of mind and body as always being geared toward (re)action in 
response to its surroundings – as Guerlac notes, “The brain is no longer a knowledge 
center, a machine that produces representations of the world. It becomes a center of 
action” (2006, p. 111).  
Indeed, Bergson characterises the brain in this sense as a “kind of central telephonic 
exchange: its office is to allow communication, or to delay it” (Bergson, 2004, p. 19). 
These almost-telephonic ‘communications’, which represent underpin all of what we 
experience as perception, we might best understand as ‘affections’, the movements of 




Perception is inter-relational, the representation of a relationship between the extant and 
seemingly impending movements of both the body and its surroundings, acting upon each 
other. Indeed, media theorist Mark Hansen notes that “the core principle of Bergson’s 
theory of perception … [is] that there can be no perception without affection” (Hansen, 
2006, p. 100). “My body”, Bergson notes, “acts like an image which reflects others, and 
which, in doing so, analyses them along lines corresponding to the different actions which 
it can exercise upon them.” (2004, p. 46). All perception involves an interactive process 
by which the human is affected by an image, which in turn may be affected by human 
action.  
Here are external images, then my body, and, lastly, the changes brought 
about by my body in the surrounding images. I see plainly how external 
images influence the image that I call my body: they transmit movement to 
it. And I also see how this body influences external images: it gives back 
movement to them. My body is, then, in the aggregate of the material world, 
an image which acts like other images, receiving and giving back movement, 
with, perhaps, this difference only, that my body appears to choose, within 
certain limits, the manner in which it shall restore what it receives. (Bergson, 
2004, pp. 4-5) 
“[T]here is no perception without affection”, Bergson re-affirms, “Affection is, then, that 
part or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external bodies” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 60). Hansen makes the reasoned, ‘neo-Bergsonist’ claim, then, that 
perception is “necessarily anchored in the activity of the body via the modality of affect” 
(2006, p. 266): perception is to be (consciously or otherwise) aware of being affected, and 
of one’s ability to affect.  
This is not, however, to suggest that all action is reducible to determinate mechanisms. 
As Bergson notes, “[M]y body appears to choose” (2004, p. 5) – and his likening of the 
brain to a telephone exchange is useful for understanding this, in speaking of “an action 
which is less and less necessary” (2004, p. 21) as we move from lower to higher 
organisms. In lower animals, perception is based on necessity for action, and what is 
perceived – the stimulus – is ‘communicated’ into action immediately, leading only to 
impulse actions. In higher animals, such as humans, an enlarged sense of perception 
allows for a greater number of potential actions to given stimuli, as well as the opportunity 




affording humans a sense of choice, and leading to the ability make voluntary actions 
(Bergson, 2004, pp. 20-23): 
And, if this be so, is not the growing richness of this perception [i.e. for 
humans] likely to symbolize the wider range of indetermination left to the 
choice of the living being in its conduct with regard to things? (Bergson, 2004, 
p.21) 
This has significant implications for perhaps more traditional binary views of the 
conscious versus unconscious. Rather than a difference in kind between conscious and 
unconscious, we might instead see a difference in degree between lesser conscious drives 
toward action – which we might call instinct – and greater conscious ones – which we 
might call intelligence. This is true of both the difference in degree between lower animals 
and humans, and of the human condition itself – the bodily drives toward impulse-action 
in duration being the ‘default’ state, and, we shall see below, the ability to choose being 
a kind of hesitation or interruption that can be imposed onto duration.  
Through Bergson, then, we can understand perception as a kind of representation of the 
world as images, whose primary function is to inform action, impulsive or reasoned. 
Perception is an affective function, offering the ability to respond to immediate situations, 
or stimuli, around us; a lower level of perception serves impulse, while a higher level of 
perception allows hesitation, enabling choice. But how does one go about making that 
choice? To deal with a multiplicity of options for action? Here we need to move into 
Bergson’s thinking on consciousness itself, and, as we will see, the necessity of memory 
in consciousness and conscious perception as what we will frame as the potential or force 
that guides these hesitations.  
Consciousness: Memory in Perception 
Our representation of matter is the measure of our possible action upon 
bodies: it results from the discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or 
more generally for our functions. In one sense we might say that the 
perception of any unconscious material point whatever … is infinitely greater 
and more complete than ours, since this point gathers and transmits the 
influences of all the points of the material universe, whereas our 
consciousness only attains to certain parts and to certain aspects of those 




To have a more enlarged sense of perception, Bergson makes explicit, should not be 
understood as having a more ‘complete’ perception of the present moment. Indeed, since 
perception is driven toward action, to possess an enlarged sense of perception is not so 
much to perceive ‘more’ – though more is available for one to perceive. Rather, it is to 
have a greater selection over what is perceived, which acts of course in the service of 
action, thereby enabling a greater choice of action for the living body. Indeed, following 
Bergson, Ansell-Pearson observes that memory and perception must be thought of “in the 
context of the lived body” (2010, p. 63). And the physical and psychical processes of the 
lived body must in turn be thought of in terms of selection and limitation of perception 
and memory: 
The body is indeed for us a means of action, but it is also an obstacle to 
perception. Its rôle is to perform the appropriate gesture on any and every 
occasion; for this very reason it must keep consciousness clear both of such 
memories as would not throw any light on the present situation, together with 
the perception of objects over which we have no control. It is, as you like to 
take it, a filter or a screen. It maintains in a virtual state anything likely to 
hamper the action by becoming actual. It helps us to see straight in front of us 
in the interests of what we have to do; and, on the other hand, it prevents us 
from looking to right and left for the mere sake of looking. It plucks for us a 
real psychical life out of the immense field of dreams. In a word, our brain is 
intended neither to create our mental images nor to treasure them up; it merely 
limits them, so as to make them effective. It is the organ of attention to life. 
(Bergson, 1935, pp. 314-415) 
As we will see in this section, Bergson shows that it is the in the relational dealing with 
this choice of perception and action, as lived in duration, that what we may think of as 
greater or lesser degrees of ‘consciousness’ emerge, and out of which a sense of 
awareness of the self may arise. Furthermore, this is arrived at through the always-
entangled processes of perceiving, remembering and acting.  
“There is no perception which is not full of memories” (Bergson, 2004, p. 24), Bergson 
notoriously observes. Memory permeates all of our perceptions of the world, he says, 
allowing us to exploit the usefulness of previous experiences to inform appropriate 




We assert at the outset, that if there be memory, that is, the survival of past 
images, these images must constantly mingle with our perceptions of the 
present, and may even take its place. For if they have survived it is with a 
view to utility; at every moment they complete out present experience, 
enriching it with experience already acquired; and, as the latter is ever 
increasing, it must end by covering up and submerging the former. (Bergson, 
2004, p. 70) 
The qualitative experience of remembering in perception, Bergson wants to show, allows 
us to make use of past experience in the present to inform action. So, while, speaking in 
terms of our experience within duration, “[n]othing is less than the present moment … 
the indivisible limit which divides the past from the future” (Bergson, 2004, p. 193), 
perceptions of the present are in fact “merely an occasion for remembering … [since] we 
measure … the degree of reality by the degree of utility” (Bergson, 2004, p. 71).  
“The mistake” that we tend to make when thinking about memory, Bergson reminds us, 
“is due to our believing that perception and memory are pure knowledge, whereas they 
point to action” (Bergson, 2004, p. 302). Memory is not in the first instance at all about 
‘knowledge’ of the past, but about how previous experiences can inform the potential 
usefulness of action in the present. And since, perception is inter-relational, so too is 
memory: “[P]erception does not consist of a subject sensing an object, but exists as a 
circuit in which ‘subject’ and ‘object’ are bound together as a system of perception and 
memory” (Bollmer, 2011, p. 456). 
Furthermore, the qualitative experience of remembering through conscious perception, 
Bergson will show, allows us to make use of past experience to inform voluntary action. 
Memory projects itself onto perception – and consciousness, we will see, can in a very 
simple sense be thought of as the felt experience of being able to use memory, through 
and with perception, to inform a voluntary choice of action. 
Pure Perception 
Bergson once again takes an evolutionary approach to demonstrating this position, asking 
us to imagine a strictly theoretical (and theoretically impossible) notion of “pure 
perception” (2004, p. 26). While what we seem to experience as perception in our 
existence is related to a sense of time – of past and future – to experience pure perception 
would be to exist in a world of lived duration, as an always-immediate present, without 




[P]ure perception … would be possessed by a being placed where I am, living 
as I live, but absorbed in the present and capable, by giving up every form of 
memory, of obtaining a vision of matter both immediate and instantaneous 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 26) 
What would such an experience of the world be like? We would have no conception or 
drive for the need for action. Nor would we be able to recognise other matter, nor to 
appreciate our affections with it. We would see all objects in terms of the present moment 
rather than their transition, through movements and actions, from a past and into a future. 
In fact, to be able to indiscriminately perceive all matter in the present at once would be 
tantamount to not being able to perceive at all, reducing us to inert matter: “To perceive 
all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of 
a material object“ (Bergson, 2004, p. 46). And to perceive yet be unable to temporally 
conceive of existence in relation to the past and to the present-as-immanent-future – as 
“to eliminate all memory” (Bergson, 2004, p. 77) – would equally result in an inability to 
produce action and, essentially, a reduction to material object:  
If we were only to divide, ideally, this undivided depth of time [passing 
moments of time in duration], to distinguish it in the necessary multiplicity of 
movements, in a word to eliminate all memory, we should pass thereby from 
perception to matter, from the subject to the object. (Bergson, 2004, p. 77) 
Returning now to the ‘actual’ experience of perception, we can now see how a kind of 
selective perception would need to develop to serve useful action, based on some 
awareness – whether or not perhaps traditionally viewed as ‘conscious’ – of the past 
moving into the future. And a sense of what we call ‘memory’ would be that which affords 
perception such a selectivity based on previous experience. A sense of conscious 
perception, as we shall see Bergson argues, is what emerges on the one hand to make 
sense of a world in which past is always flowing in the moment into the future, in order 
to, on the other hand, allow us the ability to make voluntary actions rather than impulsive 
ones, to choose how to act.  
Consciousness is the Note of the Present 
Bergson calls consciousness “the note of the present” (Bergson, 2004, p. 181). And in 
one sense, then, we can understand consciousness as helping the human body to “cope” 




interaction between perceiving and remembering – “threading on the continuous string of 
memory an uninterrupted series of instantaneous visions” (Bergson, 2004, p. 69): 
In short, memory … covering as it does with a cloak of recollections a core 
of immediate perception, and also contracting a number of external moments 
into a single internal movement, constitutes the principal share of individual 
consciousness in perception. (Bergson, 2004, p. 25) 
In doing so, these processes of consciousness afford a dual sense of living in both the 
actual and the virtual – allowing an experience of the perceived actual present that is at 
the same time experienced in relation to the virtual in its awareness of its own immediate 
and more distant past and immediate and more distantly-approaching future. 
Perception is not possible without some sense of memory – think the concept of 
recognition, for example, as an essential pairing of the two. In fact, perceptions are so 
“interlaced with memories” (Bergson, 2004, p. 72) that our experience of the world is at 
all times coloured by memory: “[T]he basis of real, and so to speak instantaneous, 
intuition, on which our perception of the external world is developed, is a small matter 
compared with all that memory adds to it” (Bergson, 2004, p. 70). Indeed, Bergson goes 
so far as to argue that in one sense “every perception is already memory”, given the nature 
of duration, with “the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into 
the future” (2004, p. 194).  
Yet it is important to remind ourselves that this should all be understood in relation to 
Bergson’s “fundamental law of physical life”: the “orientation of consciousness towards 
action” (Bergson, 2004, p. 233); that our bodies are first and foremost centres of action. 
As Ansell-Pearson puts, it: 
“[T]he accumulation of memory-images is rendered subservient to praxis, 
making sure that only those past images come into operation that can be 
coordinated with a present perception, and so enabling a useful combination 
to emerge between past and present images. (2010, p. 67) 
“We pass”, Bergson says, “by imperceptible changes, from recollections hung out along 
the course of time to the movements which indicate their nascent or possible action in 
space” (Bergson, 2004, p. 88). How human perception of the present is experienced, then, 




That which I call my present is my attitude with regard to the immediate 
future; it is my impending action. My present is, then, sensori-motor. Of my 
past, that alone becomes image and consequently sensation, at least nascent, 
which can collaborate in that action, insert itself in that attitude, in a word 
make itself useful (Bergson, 2004, p. 180-181; italics my own) 
“A lived body”, for Bergson, Ansell-Pearson explains, “is one embedded in a flux of time, 
but one whose constant movement within the dimension of the past and along the horizon 
of the future is informed by the requirements of the present” (2010, p. 66). Moreover, 
consciousness allows us, within its “temporal synthesis” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 117), stitching 
together the constant flow of passing moments into a single, ongoing movement, to make 
use of past experience, through memory, to inform not just action, but voluntary action. 
Consciousness, then, is that which allows us, through the force of memory in perception, 
to move beyond the immediacy of impulsive reactions and toward hesitation, and 
voluntary actions: “Conscious perception signifies choice, and consciousness mainly 
consists in this practical discernment” (Bergson, 2004, p. 46). Put bluntly, as Bergson 
puts it, “the chief office of consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 82).  
Perception as Limitation: Consciousness as Free Will 
In this sense, we can see that it is through the hesitational force of memory in 
consciousness – “This consciousness [that] retains the past, enrolls what time unrolls, and 
with it prepares a future which it will itself help to create” (Bergson, 1920, p. 38) – that 
we experience a sense of free will, freedom of action. The virtual force of memory, in 
‘delaying impulsive communications’, allows us the relative freedom to break away from 
automatic, affective, impulse reactions to the actual world in the flow of duration, and 
instead (or indeed additionally) make somewhat independent actions:  
If there are actions that are really free, or at least partly indeterminate, they 
can only belong to beings able to fix, at long periods, that becoming to which 
their own becoming clings, able to solidify it into distinct moments, and so to 
condense matter … to digest it into movements of reaction which will pass 
through the meshes of natural necessity … The independence of their action 
upon surrounding matter becomes more and more assured in the degree that 
they free themselves from the particular rhythm which governs the flow of 




Memory is an interruption to the flow of perception-response in duration, through which 
a relational sense of ‘otherness’ may emerge, which we may in turn understand as the 
feeling of consciousness.   
It is worth noting the similarity here with Simondon’s thinking (with which we shall 
engage more properly further below) on memory and consciousness. As philosopher 
David Scott highlights, Simondon argues that memory drives a sense of doubt within 
duration – “simultaneously an operation of distance and reattachment” (Scott, 2014, p. 
118) – out of which the sense of conscious self emerges: 
Memory is the realization of distance, gaining of objectivity without 
alienation. It is an extension of the limits of the subjective system, which gains 
an internal duality without cutting or separation: it is alterity and identity 
progressing together forming themselves, and distinguishing themselves in 
the same movement. The memory’s content becomes symbol of the present 
“I” (Simondon, translated in Scott, 2014, pp. 118-119). 
Furthermore, an enlarged sense of memory allows us to not just dwell, in a sense of our 
“mental life” (Bergson, 2004, p. 218), within the state of impending action of the actual 
instantaneous present, but to, with intellectual effort, move through our own virtual 
environments to call on recollections not immediately contiguous to the present situation 
– “go from the physical existence which is merely ‘acted,’ to that which is exclusively 
‘dreamed’” (Bergson, 2004, p. 218). “We shift between virtual and actual states all of the 
time, never completely virtual or completely actual”, Ansell-Pearson observes (2010, p. 
68). And this constant oscillation between two different “planes of consciousness” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 223) allows us an ability to experience in the present both a sense of 
immediate, in-the-moment connection with past experiences and a sense of being able to 
relate these to other past experiences – an ability, we can surmise, to stitch together a 
sense of self. Psychologists Steven D. Brown and Paula Reavey explain:   
 What is called autobiographical memory is this reshuffling of past 
experiences to create an orderly present and coherent life trajectory – or ‘long-
term self’ – where what we are doing now appears entirely congruent with 
what we have done before. (Brown and Reavey, 2015, p. 26) 
Yet as Brown and Reavey, following Bergson, make clear, despite this sense of self, of 




affectively – as psychic movements related to the affections of the present situation. As 
they argue:  
[R]emembering is a site-specific operation. An implication of this is that what 
a given individual can remember depends upon the settings in which they 
participate … It makes little sense to say that we carry with us a set of 
memories of the past that are recollected when we encounter the right cues. It 
would be better to say that participating across a range of settings (families, 
groups, institutions, media) gives us access to the specific remembered 
accomplishments of those settings, out of which we reconstruct a personal life 
… [Memory] only becomes relevant to us when it is engaged with the setting-
specific processes that deliver ‘remembering’. (Brown and Reavey, 2015, p. 
43) 
The key points to emphasise at this stage are twofold.  
Firstly, through a Bergsonian approach, we can understand both perception and memory 
as relational to the actual present, and their enlargement being just as much about 
potential for greater limitation as about potential for greater inclusion. Consciousness for 
Bergson is at all times framed by the particular affections of surrounding stimuli and of 
previous experience, in service of useful action for the organism, leaving out that which 
is not useful – leading Hansen to characterise his theorising as a “subtraction theory of 
consciousness” (Hansen, 2006, p. 79). Similarly, through this process of limitation and 
selection, as others have noted, one might just as easily think of remembering from a 
Bergsonian perspective as an active process of forgetting as one of remembering (Cariou, 
1999; Burton, 2008). “[O]ur nervous system … set[s] aside all those among the past 
images which cannot be coordinated with the present perception and are unable to form 
with it a useful combination”, Bergson tells us (2004, p. 97). Forgetting, then, Brown and 
Reavey describe as “protection against the dominance of the past over the present” (2015, 
p. 69), filtering out one’s awareness of one’s previous experience into a partial idea of 
one’s past. One might in many ways call it a ‘subtraction theory’ of memory.  
Secondly, as we shall see in the next section, the virtual experience of remembering is 
not one of ‘quantified’, archival knowledge, but of somewhat imaginatively relating the 
experienced past to the needs of the perceived present. To remember, in the sense of 
experiencing a memory, is not to recollect – nor even to ‘remember’ in a traditional, 




Bergson says, “No doubt a recollection, as it becomes actual, tends to live in an image; 
but the converse is not true” (Bergson, 2004, pp. 173-174). Rather, as we shall see in the 
next section, when we remember, we go through a process of drawing memory into mind 
in an actualised, experienceable memory-image, useful for understanding the relevance 
of previous experiences in the present situations, but not necessarily representative of 
what happened in the past, nor of the experience itself.  
Keeping in mind the fundamental law that consciousness is oriented toward action, 
moving further away from the idea of memory as ‘knowledge of the past’, the thesis will 
now draw on a reading of Bergson’s theorising on ‘actualisation’ of ‘pure memory’ (2004, 
pp. 86-169) to argue for a view of memory as potential for action.  
Actualisation: Memory as Potential 
Perception is never a mere contact of the mind with the object present; it is 
impregnated with memory-images which complete it as they interpret it. The 
memory-image, in its turn, partakes of the ‘pure memory’ which it begins to 
materialize, and of the perception in which it tends to embody itself: regarded 
from the latter point of view, it might be regarded as a nascent perception. 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 170; italics my own) 
We have seen through a reading of Bergson’s theory of consciousness that the experience 
of perception and memory can be understood chiefly in relation to useful action for the 
organism. We perceive the world in the present moment through affectively constructed 
images that at once represent external stimuli and are imbued with memory of past 
experience. Through an evolutionary augmentation of perceptive ability, we are able to 
perceive a potentially larger number of images, yet the conscious ability to choose, to 
make voluntary actions, relies on a highly selective representation of these images.  
Embracing Bergson’s rejection of traditional notions of memory as ‘knowledge’ or 
‘recalled experiences’ of the past, through a reading of Bergson’s ‘pure’ and ‘actualised’ 
memory, and drawing tentatively on more recent findings in psychology, this section 
argues for a conceptual re-orienting of ‘memory’ as ‘memory-potential’, and of 
‘remembering’ as principally a realisation of this potential, for the purposes of action. 
Through this, it aims to demonstrate that remembering is less to do with a static, 
conceptually-spatialised, archivally-informed recall of the past ‘as it happened’, which 
can be regarded in many ways as illusion, and more to do with how memory acts to 




(re)imagining of our past experiences in order to choose, indeed to justify, action in 
duration.  
Pure Memory and Actualised Memory 
Let us begin by noting Bergson’s important distinction between ‘pure memory’ and 
‘actualised memory’ (Bergson, 2004, p. 163). Paraphrasing French philosopher Jean 
Hyppolite (2003), Ansell-Pearson claims that what Bergson brings to memory through 
his thinking is a conception of the nature of memory as “a synthesis of past and present 
and with a view to the future” (2010, p. 62). Bergsonist thinking on memory, Ansell-
Pearson notes, refuses a conception memory as a “faculty of repetition or reproduction” 
rather than something more to do with “invention and creation” (2010, p. 62). And it is 
this sense of invention and creation in actualised memory that this section seeks to 
emphasise through a reading of Bergson’s theory.  
Thus far, we have considered remembering as a function, as it relates to consciousness 
and perception. Yet for Bergson there is an important distinction between what we think 
of when we talk about ‘memory’ – or “pure memory”, the “recollection” – and about 
‘remembering’ – or the “memory-image”, the “actualized” memory (Bergson, 2004, p. 
163). Bergson contends that, as each moment of perception passes, and every image is 
experienced, so too are recollections formed as pure memory, but that these are hidden 
from consciousness:  
I hold that the formation of memory is never posterior to the formation of 
perception; it is contemporaneous with it. Step by step, as perception is 
created, the memory of it is projected beside it, as the shadow falls beside the 
body. But, in the normal condition, there is no consciousness of it, just as we 
should be unconscious of our shadow were our eyes to throw light on it each 
time they turn in that direction. (Bergson, 1920, pp. 157-158) 
Pure memory, as it is formed, “is ordinarily concealed” (Bergson, 1920, p.175) by the 
necessity of perception and consciousness, since it is of no use to action in the present 
moment: 
[T]he present … is twofold at every moment, its very up-rush being in two 
jets exactly symmetrical, one of which falls back towards the past whilst the 




which we call perception, is that alone which interests us. (Bergson, 1920, p. 
160) 
Pure memory, then, is inaccessible to the conscious mind. And yet it is out of pure 
memory, and into perception, through which memory-images are drawn. For ordinary or 
‘mechanical’ day-to-day action, as we have seen, this realisation of a memory-image is 
instantaneous, coming in the form of recognition and impulse action through perception. 
Such a realisation “need not show itself” (Bergson, 1920, p. 176), Bergson says: invisibly 
within perception, it is enough if it “recall the circumstances which have been given in 
contiguity with it, what has preceded and what has followed, what in short it is important 
to know in order to understand the present and anticipate the future” (Bergson, 1920, p. 
176). Yet to consciously access a recollection requires intellectual effort through a process 
of ‘actualisation’, as it is transformed out of an inaccessible recollection and into a 
perceptible memory-image. Bergson describes this familiar process as “something like 
the focussing of a camera” (Bergson, 2004, p. 171)  
[O]ur recollection still remains virtual [by which Bergson here means ‘latent’, 
‘inaccessible’ or ‘imperceptible’]; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it 
by adopting the appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a 
condensing cloud; from the virtual state it passes into the actual; and as its 
outlines become more distinct and its surface takes on colour, it tends to 
imitate perception. But it remains attached to the past by its deepest roots. 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 171) 
Yet “[m]emory actualised in an image in an image differs … profoundly from pure 
memory” (Bergson, 2004, p. 181), Bergson tells us, since it is a selective and experienced 
through perception. Moreover, conscious recollections are always reliant on the needs for 
action of the present moment for their formation, rendering pure memory “powerless as 
long as it remains without utility” (Bergson, 2004, p. 181). Memory is “pure idea or 
intention, pure virtuality”, explains Guerlac (again, here suggesting ‘inaccessible’, latent 
or imperceptible), “It only actualizes itself as it comes into contact with perception (which 
serves action) through the intermediary of the motor schematism” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 139). 
For a conscious memory to “reappear in consciousness”, observes Bergson:  
[I]t is necessary that it should descend from the heights of pure memory down 
to the precise point where action is taking place. In other words, it is from the 




sensori-motor elements of present action that a memory borrows the warmth 
which gives it life. (2004, p. 194) 
Memory as Potential for Action 
Memory is “fugitive, ever on the point of escaping”, Bergson says, as if “backward 
turning memory were thwarted by the other, more natural, memory, of which the forward 
movement bears him on to action and to life”. (Bergson, 2004, 94). Memory images are 
affectively, relationally produced, drawn into perception by a consciousness that “set[s] 
aside all those among the past images which cannot be coordinated with the present 
perception and are unable to form with it a useful combination” (Bergson, 2004, p. 97). 
What is perceived through such a memory-image is not the recollection itself, then, but a 
kind of (re)imagining of the events out of pure memory, through and intermingled with 
the need of perception, oriented toward useful action in the present. We have seen that 
memory in a Bergsonian sense might be approached just as much in terms of forgetting 
as remembering, since it is by its nature affectively selective, and while we may be able 
to call memories to mind, this may only be “in the measure in which it can aid us to 
understand the present and to foresee the future” (Bergson, 1920, p. 175), since the lived 
body is oriented always toward action. For Bergson, “[R]emembering and forgetting are 
caught up in an endless dynamic of the spatialisation of experience, the actualisation of 
the virtual” (2005, p. 232), psychologists David Middleton and Steven D. Brown note – 
thus, “It makes no sense, then, to choose between these terms – they are necessary 
partners” (2005, p. 232). “To picture”, Bergson makes clear, “is not to remember” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 173). What we experience when we picture our past in a memory-
image – or seemingly ‘retrieve a memory’, in archival terms – is not a representation of 
our pasts, but a quasi-accurate re-imagining of the past (or previously perceived presents), 
insofar as it may be useful for present action.  
We can understand memory, then, through a whole combination of interactions between 
itself, perception and consciousness, not so much as a direct relation with the past or with 
past experience, but as an ability to make sense of the present through past experience, 
for the purposes of action, in anticipation of the organism’s future. This leads Bergson, 






Here, then, we might pause to illustrate a significant two of the wider philosophical 
implications of viewing memory as serving action, rather than knowledge.  
Firstly, let us return to the concept of knowledge and its nuanced distinction from 
remembering, both to emphasise that memory’s function is to serve action, and to 
understand how a sense of ‘knowledge’ can be understood within such a conceptual 
framework. While function of memory is not to do with “repetition or reproduction” 
(Ansell-Pearson, 2010, p. 62), through the purposeful or reflexive repetition of the same 
or similar experiences of perception (say, working in the same environment each day, or 
learning historical dates at school) we can come to ‘know’ details or information, 
seemingly ‘recalling information’ or ‘facts’ or ‘knowledge’ about them at will. Here, we 
must think again about the notion of ‘habit memory’. Like the active training of the 
muscular body to perform a particular task (learning a dance, for example, or learning to 
ride a bike), we can think of ‘knowledge’ as a psychic form of habit memory: 
The memory of the lesson, which is remembered in the sense of learnt by 
heart, has all the marks of a habit. Like a habit, it is acquired by the repetition 
of the same effort. Like a habit, it demands first a decomposition and then a 
recomposition of the whole action. Lastly, like every habitual bodily exercise, 
it is stored up in a mechanism which is set in motion as a whole by an initial 
impulse, in a closed system of automatic movements which succeed each 
other in the same order and, together, take the same length of time. (Bergson, 
2004, pp.89-90) 
Knowledge is the accident of memory. From a Bergsonian perspective, we might think 
of what we think of as knowledge as a kind of conceptual ‘training’ of memory processes, 
to create a perhaps conceptual artefact. “Habits formed by the repeated actions are 
amassed in the body ; these do not represent the past, they merely act it” (Bergson, 2004, 
p. 91). Thus, what we call ‘knowledge’ is a kind of way of bodily carrying acts of the past 
into the present, through repetition. Here, then, becomes clear the importance of not 
conflating ‘memory’ – as relationally and reflexively geared toward action in the present 
– with ‘knowledge’. Though this conflation may historically have been “generally studied 
by psychologists”, we may better think of knowledge as “habit interpreted by memory 
rather than memory itself” (Bergson, 2004, p. 95). As we shall see below, this 
technological ‘training’ of memory into knowledge might be extended out of bodily habit 
and into physical and now digital and online artefacts of the social – the prolonging of a 




artefactual extension of habit. And, as we shall see, the continuing conflation of these 
new kinds of ‘habit-memory artefact’ with true memory pose interesting questions for 
how we may think about remembering in the online era.  
Secondly, it is worth noting, tentatively, that, when interpreted within this reoriented 
perspective on memory, some of the psychological findings of the twentieth-century that 
appear challenging from a popular, archivally-informed view on memory, such as those 
covered in the Literature Review chapter, might become somewhat less problematic. Let 
us, for example, consider the seemingly major problem for the archive model of ‘false 
memory’ and the ‘misinformation effect’ (Loftus, 2005). Elizabeth Loftus and others 
have shown through fascinating and significant research over several decades that 
individuals may be, intentionally or unintentionally, led to “come to believe falsely that 
they experienced rich complex events that never, in fact, occurred” (Loftus, 2005, p. 361), 
through being exposed to (mis)information after the event, or that people might remember 
events differently if answering ‘suggestive’ or ‘leading’ questions about them. From an 
archival, memory-retrieval interpretation of the research findings, the idea is that memory 
‘engrams’ might be either rendered inaccessible or are “susceptible to decay or damage 
or alteration” through the passing of time and exposure to new memories (Loftus, 2005, 
p. 363). While Bergson’s theorising on memory, formulated the better part of a century 
earlier, does not encapsulate the later-twentieth-century topic of false memory, he does 
acknowledge the theoretical potential of pure memories, drawn down from an imaginative 
plane of consciousness and into conscious perception, to “distort the practical character 
of life, mingling dream with reality” (2004, p. 96). Interpreting the phenomenon of false 
memory from within this developing Bergsonian perspective, then, might we conjecture 
that a mis-remembering of an event, indeed a total ‘re-imagining’ of non-existent past 
events, based on a combination of the realisation of feeling about previous experience 
and of the affective, present-moment cues, would in fact be an expected reaction for an 
organism whose orientation is toward action in anticipation of the future? For such an 
organism, the events of past would be important only insofar as they could inform action 
in the affectively-perceived present. Indeed, we might say that it is not the ‘past’ here that 
must be remembered at all, so much as the ‘lessons learned’ from past experience, 
packaged semi- or wholly-fictionally into an imagined history – an idea of the past – that 
is useful for the needs of the perceived present situation. The question of how to deal with 
the issue of false memory, from a perspective that treats memory not as knowledge but 




suggested, of how, and for the sake of what purposes, one interprets conceptions of ‘true’ 
or ‘false’ (2015, p. 88). In numerous senses, then, we might say that it is not about 
truthfulness but about usefulness.10  
Furthermore, how might we speculate on the implications that a more Bergsonian-
empathetic attitude toward memory might have for interpretations of research findings 
around phenomena such as confirmation bias, in which individuals and groups tend to 
take actions that conform to their existing views over actions that would challenge them? 
Or hindsight bias, in which individuals and groups remember events differently from how 
they happened, in light of outcomes have encountered later on? Indeed, issues such as 
false memory, confirmation bias and hindsight bias are all prime areas for consideration 
and debate in terms of the ways in which we are remembering through new, online and 
pervasive technologies – and, as such, will be unpacked and explored in greater detail 
through the case-study chapters.  
“Where are Memories Preserved?” 
For now, let us return to one more seemingly logical consequential question around the 
notion of pure memory, or memory-potential, which, while it has previously been tackled 
– by Bergson (2004) and notably by Gilles Deleuze (2011) – should be covered for the 
sake of both clarity of idea and for emphasis of approach. That is: if memory is actualised 
through a process of conscious perception, through the brain, and if these memories are 
drawn out of pure memory – and yet we are to embrace a view of memory as non-archival 
– then where exactly ‘is’ memory? This question, Bergson observes can be understood as 
arising from a spatialised (archival) view of memory, since, being “strongly obsessed by 
images drawn from space” (2004, p. 191), when conscious memories become actualised 
in perception they give the illusion of necessarily coming forth from somewhere: “[W]e 
 
10 Here, as an aside, we might think too of traumatic memory. Brown and Reavey’s investigation in Vital 
Memory focuses on autobiographical remembrances of difficult pasts, whose nature as difficult-to-
forget means they come to play a significant part in the individual’s sense of identity (2015). They point 
to various role different relations between the individual and its social environments may play in how 
these memories are ‘managed’ (or not). An interesting relation might speculatively be drawn between 
the emphasis on the vitality of these pasts, and the growing body of research into ‘Virtual Reality 
Exposure Therapy’ to treat post-traumatic stress disorder (Rothbaum et al, 2010), in which re-
presentations of traumatic events are lived out through virtual-reality environments, reportedly leading 
to a gradual lessening of the intensity of the effects of PTSD. From a Bergsonian perspective, we might 
think of such an effect as a kind of ‘training’ of remembrances of difficult, fear-inducing pasts through 
managed perceptions of similar representations made ‘safer’. In doing so, the memory-image realised 
from memory-potential may draw on numerous, ‘safer’ experiences of the past to inform a less 




cannot hinder ourselves from asking where memories are stored up” (Bergson, 2004, p. 
191). As cultural theorist James Burton, following Bergson, notes:  
[T]he recollection once actualized can only exist as something like an 
imagined set of stimuli, parallel to those real objects that normally produce 
our perceptions. Just as in the description of perception, whereby the body-
image’s reflection of the world around it results in the mirage of an inner, 
perception-creating faculty, so the appearance of memory-images gives the 
impression of having been drawn from some physical place of storage. (2008, 
p. 326) 
Bergson, as we saw in the Literature Review chapter, is vehemently opposed to the 
archival, ‘locationist’ model of memory (2004, pp. 191-194), in which individual memory 
‘traces’ or ‘engrams’ are stored in and retrieved from some part of the brain. However, 
he does not outright refute the idea that ‘pure memories’ may be localised somehow in 
the brain. Rather, he suggests that the brain “possesses … a special contrivance whose 
purpose is to convert the pure memory into a nascent perception or image” (Bergson, 
1920, p. 157). The important point that Bergson makes is that, if we go further than this 
to suppose that every recollection itself is stored, individually, in the brain, “we are simply 
translating undoubted psychical facts into very questionable anatomical language, and we 
end in consequences which are contradicted by observation” (1920, p. 157). Memories, 
experienced, are subjective, qualitative movements in the lived body – in a sense, we 
might think of them as in-the-moment affective and affectively-realised states of 
consciousness (Bergson, 2004, pp. 217-225). To attempt therefore to understand them as 
matter would be, in the words of Deleuze, “absurd” (2011, p. 54). For this reason, to even 
ask the question, “Where are recollections preserved?”, Deleuze reminds us, is to 
formulate a false problem, in that it is a badly analysed composite (Deleuze, 2011, p. 54).  
Indeed, we might think of it as a question that occurs out of precisely the same mindset 
that formulates a problem of whether new technologies are causing us to remember 
‘more’ or ‘less’ – a tendency to spatialise a view of the world rather than consider the 
qualitative experience of memory, in duration; to give in to “the invincible tendency 
which impels us to think on all occasions of things rather than of movements” (Bergson, 
2004, p. 154). Thus, Middleton and Brown observe that “to search for a way to catch hold 
of memories themselves within the brain” (2005, p. 232) may understood through 




philosophers so often see the object they would grasp fly before them” (Bergson, 1912, 
p. 55).   
The “[f]allacy [is] involved in the question” (Bergson, 2004, p. 191). 
When we properly consider memories as subjective experience, in movement, Deleuze 
argues, we realise that “recollections do not have to be preserved anywhere other than 
‘in’ duration. Recollection is therefore preserved in itself.” (Deleuze, 2011, p. 54). 
Memory is not archivable knowledge that can be encoded, stored somewhere and later 
retrieved. Rather, we might understand remembering as the (re)imagined past experience 
(the actualisation of pure memory into a perceivable memory-image), informed by past 
experience within duration; remembering is thus a process of movement within duration, 
for the purpose of present action; and memory is a force of this movement: it is the 
potential from which remembering and perception draws itself forth in duration. 
Similarly, Burton has described Bergson’s whole conception of pure memory as “the 
continuous movement of the body-image within its perpetually changing environment, 
the past and present forming a continuous whole” (Burton, 2008, p. 327). Much like with 
the necessity for pure perception to be limited by consciousness, Burton describes the 
process of forming memory-images out of pure memory as “the filtering-out in 
accordance with the exigencies of present interests (whose horizon and permanent 
ultimate aim is the ongoing survival of the body-image) of most of the past” (Burton, 
2008, p. 327).  
We can see once more that Bergson’s observation that pure memory is ‘the forerunner of 
action’ is a crucial one. The fundamental law of physical life, we remind ourselves, is the 
“orientation of consciousness towards action” in duration (Bergson, 2004, p. 233). While 
the body may be a centre of action, enabled through perception; while pure memory may 
be consciously actualised through the formation of memory-images for voluntary action, 
or have its shadow cast invisibly onto images of non-conscious perception for impulse 
action; what precedes all of these is the latent potential for action that is pure memory.  
By way of emphasis, and for the purposes of further development, this thesis argues, then, 
for a conceptual reorientation of the ways in which we talk about memory, to encourage 
a move away from thinking about memories as things (i.e. matter), and toward 
experiencing memories as relational processes in duration. To this end, it proposes a 
critical emphasis on ‘memory’ now as memory-potential, and on ‘remembering’ as an 




that is always looking principally more to the future than to the past. Furthermore, we 
need to understand memory as an evolutionarily-informed function of the progressing 
body toward action, rather than a kind of ‘faculty of knowledge’. In order to emphasise 
this conception of memory-potential – of memory as latent potential for action – the thesis 
now shifts briefly (yet, as we shall see, necessarily) away from ‘memory’ per se, to 
consider Bergson’s wider thinking on evolution as creative, vital and affective process 
(indeed multiplicities of affective processes).  
Vital Impetus: Life as Process 
Previous sections sought to emphasise the idea of memory as potential for action, and of 
remembering as an inter-relational realisation of this potential for useful action in the 
present. This section aims lay the groundwork to expand and develop how we can think 
about memory-potential and its inter-relational actualisation within a broader psycho-
social scope, using Bergson’s hitherto undiscussed thinking on élan vital within duration 
(Bergson, 1911) to emphasise the importance of thinking in terms of process in duration, 
and in terms of attempting to see memory as part of a bigger ‘whole’.  
We now have a working conception of memory as memory-potential and of remembering 
as a realisation of this potential. We can understand that this realisation takes place in the 
service of useful action, in the present, and that it is a necessarily affective realisation, 
realised consciously or otherwise through and with the affections experienced through 
perceptions of other images, within a lived body. Remembering, then, is an inter-
relational act, constituted through multiplicities of affections, driving toward the future.  
In this section, we seemingly (though, as will become apparent, necessarily) draw back 
briefly from the subject of memory per se to examine Bergson’s concept of élan vital. In 
doing so, we establish a foundation from which we might in the subsequent section relate 
Bergsonian thinking on affectivity to its arguable development (Hansen, 2006, p. 8; Piatti, 
2016) in the theorising of Simondon.  
Élan vital, or “vital impetus” as translated in the English edition of the work (Bergson, 
1911, pp. 87-97), is a perhaps contentious conception presented in in his 1907 work 
Creative Evolution to describe a creative force that is driven through, or drives, or simply 
is the evolution of all life.  
[The idea we start from is] that of an original impetus of life, passing from 




along the lines of evolution among which it gets divided, is the fundamental 
cause of variations, at least of those that are regularly passed on, that 
accumulate and create new species. (Bergson, 1911, p. 87) 
If each (or every) species has evolved from a single common ancestor, Bergson reckons, 
then it is reasonable to assume that, whatever drove the force of life into emergence, is 
passed along each subsequent generation as a “common impetus” (1911, p. 87). Bergson 
suggests, by way of demonstrating his point, that, while it tends to push toward diversity, 
this creative force is what leads to the separate, convergent evolution of the eye in both 
molluscs and vertebrates when similar needs had to be met (1911, pp. 87-88).11 Élan vital 
is a kind of vital energy “that precedes every actual entity, a truly metaphysical force that 
continues to guide the evolution of reality, actualising itself in multiple ways” (Piatti, 
2016, p. 53); it “designates the vitality of matter itself, its organization, its growth, its 
indeterminacy, unpredictability and creativity” (Vaughan, 2007, p. 16). “There is no 
doubt that life as a whole is an evolution, that is, an unceasing transformation”, Bergson 
tells us: 
But life can progress only by means of the living, which are its depositaries. 
Innumerable living beings, almost alike, have to repeat each other in space 
and in time for the novelty that they are working out to grow and mature. It is 
like a book that advances toward a new edition by going through thousands 
of reprints with thousands of copies.” (Bergson, 1911, pp. 243-244) 
It is not so much that Bergson is attempting to refute Darwinist evolution in principle, as 
he is trying to reorient interpretation of evolution to encompass a view wider 
understanding of life in terms of creativity and invention, which is missing from the 
determinism of “radical mechanism” (Bergson, 1911, p. 37) and “radical finalism” (1911, 
p. 39). What he calls ‘mechanistic’ approaches “hold good for the systems that our 
thought artificially detaches from the whole”, Bergson (now familiarly) argues, “But of 
the whole itself and of the systems which, within this whole, seem to take after it, we 
cannot admit a priori that they are mechanically explicable” (1911, p. 37). Bergson is 
attempting to not just understand what evolution looks like as to understand how and why 
 
11 While a scientific rather than philosophical text, this evolutionary convergence out of species’ 
relationality to the offerings and requirements of similar environments is covered excellently in science 




it is driven. As Ansell-Pearson notes, it is this “appeal to the whole” which the 
conceptualisation of élan vital, as a vital driving force, represents: 
[O]n the level of life there is only actualization and differentiation but to make 
adequate sense of this we need to appeal to a conception of the whole, and 
what matters is the conception we evince of it. For Bergson it is the élan vital 
conceived as a “virtual” power of self-differentiation … Without a conception 
of the whole we can only posit what comes into existence in mysterious and 
inexplicable terms of so many brute eruptions of being.” (Ansell-Pearson, 
2010a, p. 409) 
The point to be laboured here is the appeal, on a philosophical or interpretive level, that 
Bergson makes toward understanding life not just in terms of objectivity and 
measurements, but in terms of creativity, affectivity and invention – of seeing, in a very 
real sense, more than the sum of the (mechanical) parts. “For Darwin life is the 
consequence of actions and passions”, observes philosopher Elizabeth Grosz; “For 
Bergson, life is that which dynamizes, within and beyond itself” (Grosz, 2007, p. 287).  
What Bergson sets out, then, is a principle of a creative driving force, through which 
action, interaction, he suggests, is guided through time. He makes clear that this is not to 
suggest a belief in a predetermined ‘plan’ for how life and evolution takes their course 
(1911, p. 96) as in vitalist philosophies. Rather, he is seeking to interpret evolutionary 
theory in a way that does not reduce all life to mechanistic automata, but that appreciates 
the qualitative nature of existence and life, indeed evolution, as a process, always in 
duration, in the service of useful action.  
[Evolution of a particular feature] required the conscious or unconscious idea 
of an end to be attained. But it is really effected in virtue of the original 
impetus of life; it is implied in this movement itself, and that is just why it is 
found in independent lines of evolution. If now we are asked why and how it 
is implied therein, we reply that life is, more than anything else, a tendency 
to act on inert matter. The direction of this action is not predetermined; hence 
the unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sows along its path. 
But this action always presents, to some extent, the character of contingency; 
it implies at least a rudiment of choice. Now a choice involves the anticipatory 
idea of several possible actions. Possibilities of action must therefore be 




In short, we might speculate, when Bergson conceives of élan vital, he is attempting to 
describe a kind of collective, or collectivised, or indeed collectivising kinds of ‘will’ – a 
common or shared will that goes through all life. Yet this is not, as we have mentioned, 
to be confused with vitalist beliefs, where élan vital would represent some sort of tangible 
‘lifeforce’ that separates what is living from what is not. “Life is not unified because it 
has its own special impetus”, Grosz notes: 
[B]ut because it cleaves to materiality, because all of life has a common 
interest both in mimicking/harnessing materiality and in seeking those sites 
of material indetermination which it can exploit in order to ‘invent’ new forms 
and new practices, to evolve and become other. (Grosz, 2007, p. 294) 
This impetus, then, we might consider is not imposed on life, rather is deposed to life. 
Élan vital is not in being directed toward an action, so much as in having the common 
realisable potential to act, to drive itself forward – indeed, it is only in the act that we 
recognise it. Grosz suggests that “[f]or Bergson life must be understood as that which 
both exceeds itself, and which enables matter to unleash its endless virtualities” (2007, p. 
288). 
The crucial nuance that we might draw out, in such a reading, is that élan vital should not 
be understood as an agency that manifests itself through the common action of all life, 
but rather that it is a common potential toward agency, or at least what we might call 
agency. Élan vital is not a force that affectively organises life, from its pasts and into its 
futures. Rather it is what we call the agency-potential through which life affectively finds 
itself able to organise itself.  
Élan vital is not so much ‘lifeforce’, as lifeforce is élan vital.  
In short, through this reading we can understand élan vital as that potential through which 
life, through shared nature, might commonly insist on the constant pulling-forward of 
itself out of the past, through affections, (inter)actions and adaptations, in anticipation of 
the always-oncoming future. And it is from this reading of élan vital that it is useful to 
now relate to Bergson’s thinking on affectivity, and its development through Simondon’s 
theorising on the conception of the pre-individual and of individuation.  
Influenced by Bergson, it has been noted that Simondon’s philosophical concerns around 
affect, action, interaction and the realisation of potential, of becoming, share much in 




individuation is the “most forceful expression” (Hansen, 2006, p. 8) of precisely 
Bergson’s theme of affectivity. Equally, Scott argues for a recognition of 
‘correspondences’ between the two philosophers in relation to duration (2014, pp. 56-58) 
and draws attention to what he thinks of as ‘negotiations’ between Simondon’s thinking 
on collective individuation and Bergson’s earlier theorising on social morality (2014, pp. 
127-129).  
It would be impossible in this chapter to give a comprehensive and nuanced reading of 
Simondon’s contribution to philosophy – both in scope of volume and in the (thankfully, 
increasingly less) limited translation of key texts into English.12 What follows, then, is an 
attempt to sketch Simondon’s key thinking on two fronts, that they might equip us in 
tackling our research question with an expansion of our thinking on memory into both the 
social and the technological. Firstly, on individuation – as a drive toward the social. 
Secondly, on technics – as a mode of human-technological co-existence. 
Correspondingly, it aims to develop and expand our Bergsonian approach to remembering 
in two ways. Firstly, to synthesise a move in terms of affectivity from the body in relation 
to its environment into the individual in relation to the social. And secondly, to develop 
an understanding of the relationship between the biological, the technological and the 
social (which we will continue to develop in subsequent chapters).  
Process as Individuation 
[O]ne cannot, even with the highest rigour, speak of an individual, but only 
of individuation; one must go back to the activity, the genesis, instead of 
trying to apprehend the being as entirely made in order to discover the criteria 
by which one will know whether it is an individual or not. The individual is 
not a being but an act. (Simondon, 2005, p. 191, translated in De Boever et 
al, p. 213; italics my own) 
Thus far, we have developed an understanding of memory-potential as a kind of latent 
force for action, and of remembering as an affective, inter-relational realisation of this 
potential. This section aims to philosophically situate and develop this understanding 
within a broader social-theoretical framework. If remembering acts as a way of 
recognising (consciously or otherwise) one’s self in the present, for the purposes of action, 
 
12 Two excellent texts on Simondon’s works include David Scott’s introduction and guide to psychic and 
collective individuation (2014) and Anne De Boever, Alex Murray, Jon Roffe and Ashley Woodward’s 




yet is always, always, as we have seen, an active, inter-relational process, responsive to 
and with the environment of the lived body, how can we start to understand the 
relationship between memory and the social? Indeed, how might we think about the 
distinction between the individual and the social at all?  Grounded in Bergsonian thinking 
on affectivity, and borrowing from some of the key thinking of Gilbert Simondon into 
individuation the concept of the pre-human and the conception of the transindividual, this 
section aims to contextualise remembering within a theory of socially inter-relational 
process.13 In further destabilising the binaries between the subject and object, between 
individual and collective, it aims to lay the groundwork for thinking remembering as a 
trans-individual action, always co-constituted in relation to human and non-human, and 
virtual and actual, inter-relationalities.  
Before the Individual: Bodies as Movements 
“Life is a double orientation”, notes Grosz, following Bergson (2007, p. 288): 
[Firstly] out to matter, as that which responds to, resolves or addresses the 
problems and provocations matter imposes through the evolutionary 
dispersion and proliferation of bodily forms, through morphology, speciation, 
individual variation; and [secondly] in to its own past, through the cohesion 
and continuity of consciousness in its immersion in the richness of memory, 
virtuality, the past. (Grosz, 2007, p. 288) 
Lived experience, for Bergson, takes place in duration, through a multiplicity of affective, 
interactive movements between images and the lived body, itself an image. The feeling 
of conscious life, as we have seen, may be understood as that experience of a self, a way 
of coping with and making sense of this always-in-duration mode of existing, for the 
purposes of useful action for the organism. What constitutes a sense of self we might 
understand to be the constant, in-the-moment ‘binding up’ of a co-existence of different 
multiplicities of perceived affections within that present, actualising and affected by 
memory-images out of past experience, yet geared toward an anticipated future.  
Much of the theorising of both Bergson and Simondon may be understood as an attempt 
to dig beneath this veneer of the what appears to be the individual, to consider in one way 
or another that potential that comes before the individual, out of which the individual 
 
13 With much of Simondon’s work yet to be translated into English, including L’Individuation psychique et 
collective, this section owes gratitude for the helpful secondary readings of his work by Elizabeth Grosz 




becomes. Like Bergson, Simondon attempts to think the problem of consciousness from 
its beginning rather than start with an end-result of the individual and attempt a 
‘deconstruction’. Hence, Simondon conceives of a notion of the pre-individual, the 
potential not-yet-self, out of which the individual might be formed through individuation 
(Scott, 2014, p. 6). Scott explains that Simondon’s thought “hinges on a simple strategy 
of reversal” (2014, p. 6):  
[T]o attain full knowledge of the individual we begin not with a return to the 
individual … but with a return to individuation, considering it the 
“primordial” operation by which the individual becomes, and of which 
individuals are “modalities.” It is not being that conditions becoming, it is 
becoming that conditions being. Being is becoming; becoming has being … 
The individual is grasped then as only a relative reality, a certain phase of 
being in the midst of bringing into realities the potentialities of pre-individual 
identity that precede it and conditions its becoming actual. (Scott, 2014, p. 6) 
The individual, if it exists at all, is for Simondon what becomes out of the process of 
individuation, through ‘transduction’, and within a constantly metastable environment. 
Simondon conceives of the existence of the pre-individual within a world made up of 
pure interactions in duration. As with Bergson, life should not be thought about in terms 
of things but in terms of affectivity, relationality and action. At an abstracted level, Scott 
suggests: 
Instead of seeing elements (particles or clouds of particles) as starting points, 
might we see each starting point only as a singularity, as only already a 
relation-to another starting, which is then another relation-to, potentially, ad 
infinitum? (Scott, 2014, p. 42) 
Individuation as Ongoing (Onto)genesis 
Like with Bergson, then, it is important to think of Simondon’s thinking on individuation 
as rooted firmly in a sense of duration and affection. The sense of individual as a constant 
state process of becoming, in the constant re-establishing present moment, through 
multiplicities of affective interactions. And, as with Bergson, it is out of the choice of 
action, out of individualising ourselves through relational action, a sense of conscious self 
may emerge. Individuation is “a concept of being in which becoming is the most 




that … regards life and its relations to non-life not through its substance or form but 
through its temporality or becoming” (Grosz, 2007, p. 297). 
Individuation, then, might be seen as this constant state of ongoing affective interaction, 
of a constant state of genesis, afforded by multiplicities of interactions.  
Individuation is that movement preceding, including and post-dating the 
genesis and elaboration of any individual, material or organic: the individual 
is only one stage, a provisional product, within a larger movement of 
elaboration which gathers forces of disparate and incompatible, sometimes 
incommensurable dimensions that can only be resolved, if at all, in the 
creation of an individual which narrows down and provisionally harmonizes 
these disparities through a kind of unification, a ‘metastable equilibrium,’ a 
systematization or cohesion of some of their forces. (Grosz, 2007, p. 298) 
We can consider humans – indeed all life – to be in a permanent state of becoming, 
through individuation. Individuation is a continuous process of inter-relational 
interactions, in the present. Through this sense of ‘metastabilisation’, the ongoing 
processes of becoming may be unified into a sense of self. Individuation is, then, “the 
being of becoming” (Scott, 2014, p. 147). Therefore, what we call ‘identity’ is an always-
in-flux representation of multiplicities of affective interactions.  
There is no moment of attaining an individual, self-identical or stable status 
which dramatically transforms preindividual forces, the disparities in 
potential energy between incommensurable and non-communicating forces, 
into fixed individuals, as occurs chemically in quantum-type leaps of 
molecular reorganization. In life, the processes of individuation never cease, 
they coexist with the duration of the living organism itself – the organism 
never fully coincides with itself, or attains an identity in which it is what it is. 
(Grosz, 2007, p. 298) 
We are leaky bodies, and it is through ongoing movements of inter-affective interactions 
– “that part or aspect of the inside of our body which we mix with the image of external 
bodies” (Bergson, 2004, p. 60) – that a sense of self is experienced. It is through these 
always-in-motion processes – in duration, through perception, memory and action – that 
a sense of “double orientation” may emerge (Grosz, 2007, p, 288): a relational, dual sense 




together forming themselves, and distinguishing themselves in the same movement” 
(Simondon, translated in Scott, 2014, pp. 119). Life exists, then, as constant interaction.  
Any sense of the self for Simondon is an inter-active process, which of course, takes place 
through the experience of the lived body in duration. The individualised sense of selfhood 
is thus co-informed through affectivity and ‘emotivity’, which are the “permanent liaison 
of the individual to itself and the world, or rather the liaison between the relation of the 
individual to itself and the liaison of the individual to the world” (quoted in Scott, 2014, 
p. 68). As Hansen notes:  
[For Simondon] affectivity is precisely that mode of bodily experience which 
mediates between the individual and the preindividual, the body and its 
“virtual” milieu … As the mode of experience in which the embodied being 
lives its own excess, affectivity introduces the power of creativity into the 
sensorimotor body. (Hansen, 2006, p. 8) 
The point here to emphasise is that the experience of individuation is an always-renewing 
process of becoming out of interaction, an ongoing process of movements, of interactively 
affecting and being affected by the world within and around one’s own body, in duration. 
“The living organism is more a singularity than an individual” (Grosz, 2007, p. 298). It is 
a constantly-refreshing, collaborative ‘more-than’. Philosopher Brian Massumi 
characterises this Simondonian theme as an “insistence of the centrality of the concept of 
potential energy … There is no ‘one’ but always a one moreness: a ‘more-than-one’, 
everywhere energetically in potential” (2013, p. 33).  
What Bergson conceives as ‘consciousness’ out of affectivity, relationality and action, 
then, we can see reflected in Simondon’s thinking on individuation. “[T]he living being 
is itself partially its own principle of individuation”, Simondon argues – it is “at once the 
individuating system and its partial result’” (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 33). Yet 
for Simondon this kind of individuation is only a ‘psychic’ individuation – that is to say, 
the always-reconstituting bodily relation of itself, always in processes of movements in 
duration, to ‘other’. While Bergson’s analysis of memory informing action focuses 
largely on the notion of the ‘lived body in the world’ – i.e. ‘matter’ and ‘memory’ – that 
we might now call psychic individuation, Simondon’s theorising develops the notion of 
affectivity out of the domain of the body as seemingly discrete organism, and into that of 
the social, through what he conceives of as collective individuation. As we shall see in 




or people – individualising ourselves – yet it is only through collective individuation that 
a true sense of identity and what we call the individual may emerge.    
The ‘Individual’ and the ‘Collective’ 
How, then, can we think about the sense of the ‘identity’ that we surely experience? We 
have seen that, for Simondon, the apparent constitution of the self takes place through 
nuanced view of affectivity as transduction. This is a process that allows individuation 
through “permanent differentiation and integration, according to associated regimes of 
causality and finality” (quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 68). Since things must be thought of in 
terms of constant processes of interaction in duration, a sense of the selfhood is not so 
much a static ‘awareness of oneself’, but a constant dynamic “act of grasping the being 
of the individual in the continuum of ‘dephasing,’ making the potentially interminable 
and inventive unfolding process of becoming individuated” (Scott, 2014, pp. 37-38). As 
we have seen, this is similar in many ways to Bergson’s thinking, in which consciousness 
can be thought of as always in a state of flux, functioning as a way to permit or create 
useful action in that present moment. As Grosz summarises: 
[W]ithin consciousness [for Bergson] – to which all forms of life 
tend in varying degrees – there can be no prolongation of a state 
which is not at the same time a change in state … No state is 
disconnected from the tenor and color of all the others, for they 
are inseparable, interleaved or mutually fringing, never ceasing 
and always changing qualities, magnitudeless intensities. (Grosz, 
2007, pp. 291-292) 
For Simondon, as Massumi observes, there is only “form-taking informational activity 
(with as yet – that is to say, until its own future occurs to it – no content, no structure, no 
meaning)” (Massumi, 2013, p. 33). Consciousness, then, may be seen not so much an 
emergence out of the potential self, but rather is continuously effected through interactive, 
affective, inter-relational processes beyond the body. It is the ongoing sense of 
differentiation between one’s own body and its agencies, and a sense of ‘other’ – yet this 
differentiation involves duality, both being a part of and being apart from the other, and 
thus is always necessarily co-constituted between its different relations. 
The significant way in which Simondon’s fundamental theorising distinguishes itself 
from Bergson’s is in its extension of consciousness out of the body and into the social, 




Simondon rejects what he sees in Bergson’s thinking as a view of conscious (or ‘psychic’) 
reality as “a pure indissoluble and continuous unity, a ‘stream of consciousness’” (Scott, 
2014, p. 67), which consciousness condenses and filters into the discrete sense of the 
individual. What Bergson describes, from Simondon’s perspective of psychic 
individuation, is more a sense of conscious relationality of the individual to its 
environment, of individualisation. Rather, for Simondon, all life in constant processes of 
individuation, the sense of the conscious individual – as discrete personality or identity – 
emerges out of the group. It is the very sense of feeling a part of a group that informs a 
sense of individual identity, of ‘grouped individual’.  
Bergson certainly observes the inter-relational nature of individual and collective as re-
informing each other, “implied in each [other]” (Bergson, 1935, p. 169): “[S]ociety 
shapes an entire side of the individual by being prefigured in each one of them. The 
individual and society thus condition each other, circle-wise” (Bergson, 1935, p. 169). 
This theorising is set out in his 1932 book, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion 
(English translation, 1935), and we will reflect on this in greater detail in the final case-
study chapter. However, following Simondon, since individuals cannot really be seen as 
truly individual, we can no longer think of collectives as groups of individuals at all. 
Rather, collectives, like individuals, are always in a state of individuation: collectives are 
“not stable products but are themselves metastable, prone to forms of becoming and 
transformation, open in their ongoing forms” (Grosz, 2013, p. 54). Humans, and thus 
societies, are not made up of individuals, but of movements, of relations. “[I]t is relation 
which constitutes the group and the individual, both respectively and reciprocally” (Scott, 
2014, p. 130). 
Once again, we might consider that assumptions through the trappings of language are 
here the problem, since the words ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ already pre-suppose a 
binary distinction between the two, with the latter as a grouping of the former. Again, we 
must remind ourselves to think not in terms of ‘things’ in space, but in terms of processes 
in duration, in space – and of individuality and the social not as ‘things’ but ongoing 
processes in the moment. Thus, we might think of collectives, as Grosz has done, as 
“collectivities … culturally produced … effects of various complex relations between 
technologies, proximities / geographies, forces and modes of regulation” (Grosz, 2013, p. 
54; italics my own). Or, we might think of individuals and collectives as always-emergent 
“personalities” (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 135), as forces, with the co-extant 




[W]e are not speaking of structures of personalities anteriorly defined, 
constituted, and entirely individualized prior to the moment the group of 
interiority constitutes itself, to encounter itself and recover itself. Each 
individual personality is coextensive with the “personality of the group” – 
that is, instead of individual personalities in joining together being 
constitutive of the group. (Scott, 2013, p. 135-136) 
When we think of people in terms of ‘a collective’, it may be tempting to think in terms 
of formal organisations in space – for example, co-operatives or social enterprises – 
rather than informal, social processes, or organisings, in duration. To avoid any 
ambiguity, and in an attempt to emphasise that senses of being should be thought of not 
as ‘things’ but as processes, this thesis here takes the position to refer to the seemingly-
felt discrete, conscious body as the ‘transindividual’ and to collectively-individuating 
collectives of transindividuals as ‘socialities’. 
We can understand collective individuation as a process that creates subjects that are 
always both individual and collective, interactively co-affecting each other, leading to an 
apparent dissolution between a sense of subject and object. For Simondon, “[t]he social 
is a ‘network of relations’” (Scott, 2014, p. 130). “Participation, for the individual, is the 
fact of being an element in a greater individuation”, Simondon claims (2009). And it is 
through this participation in wider collective individuations that sense of ‘more than’ the 
self emerges – a sense of the ‘grouped’ individual, or ‘identity’ emerges. If the always-
emergent sense of selfhood is reconstituted through ongoing processes of psychic 
individuation, stabilising the body in the present, the always-emergent sense of individual 
is reconstituted through ongoing wider processes of collective individuation, stabilising a 
sense of the social in the present. The result of the social is the individual.  
Individual personalities and group personalities are constantly individuated through 
affective interaction with each other, “[t]he two individuations, psychic and collective … 
reciprocally dependent on each other” (Scott, 2014, p. 42). And this reciprocity, we can 
ultimately understand as constituting the human as a transindividual, which “accounts for 
the psychosocial unity of interior individuation (psychic) and exterior individuation 
(collective) … the purest expression of relational being” (Scott, 2014, p. 42). The 
transindividual, Simondon says, is ‘the systematic unity of interior (psychic) 
individuation, and exterior (collective) individuation” (Simondon, quoted in De Boever 
et al, 2013, p. 232). So, for Simondon, whereas collectively-individuating 




socialities), collectives without such inter-relational processes of (re)informing, would 
instead be what he understands as ‘communities’, made up of ‘interindividuals’ lacking 
the “pre-individual charge of nature that enables them to transindividuate” (Simondon, 
quoted in De Boever et al, 2013, p. 232). These ‘conscious’ bodies may relate to each 
other in the same way as a Bergsonian body may relate to its environment, yet they do 
not achieve a sense of ‘more than’, of collective, inter-informing agency, of sociality – of 
belonging. “[T]he the collective is, for the subject, the reciprocity of affectivity and 
perception, reciprocity which unifies these two domains each in itself in their giving a 
further dimension” (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 90).  
Through a reading of Bergson and Simondon, we can dissolve the binary distinction 
between subject and object, and individual and collective, thinking instead of 
transindividuals and socialities as affectively, interactively co-constituted in the moment, 
always in a process of becoming, out of the latent – the unknowable – and always 
(re)informing each other. We will attempt to situate our theoretical understanding of 
Simondon’s thinking on individuation in relation to bodily remembering and supposed 
‘collective remembering’ below, developing it more comprehensively through the case-
study chapters into a sketch for a kind of ‘synthesis of social theory’. For now, let us 
recognise that a Bergsonian-Simondonian approach to the individual, as Grosz notes of 
Simondon, “question[s] the assumption that individuals, whether biological, social or 
collective, are given and that their characteristics are static rather than evolving, self-
transforming and milieu-transforming elaborations” (Grosz, 2013, p. 55). Rather, we 
must see identity as always emergent processes of interaction, driven by charges of the 
pre-individual into the social. 
Yet here the thesis turns to make a perhaps bold claim. At an evolutionary level, we have 
considered life in terms of élan vital, a kind of vital impetus that can be recognised the 
progressive, creative drives of life. We have seen the it is in the realisation of memory-
potential that all conscious action is informed – be that at higher degrees of consciousness 
in intelligence, in actualising memory-potential into an almost representational memory-
image, or at lower degrees of consciousness in instinct, actualising memory into reflex 
action. In turn, we have seen that human life is geared toward the social through the pre-
individual charge. Here, then, we might ask ourselves, perhaps radically: What is élan 
vital but our very conception of memory-potential? Admittedly abstracted to its base 




creative, affective, relational action that leads, in its varying degrees of consciousness, 
toward evolution and toward all social interaction?  
Memory as Force of Life 
 “Life brings the virtual, the past, memory (but also the future, the new, intentionality, 
which are equally virtual), to bear on the actual, the present, the material”, Grosz says, 
following Bergson, noting that “it brings out the latencies already there but unactualized, 
providing new modes of actualization, indeed new actuals and new directions for 
actualization, while also generating ever-new virtuals” (Grosz, 2007, p. 296). Yet, in 
embracing a view of remembering as an inter-subjective, inter-relational function that 
acts as the key informer of the action in the present, as thus as driving the process of 
individuation, might we might equally and straightforwardly argue that it is remembering 
that brings ‘the virtual, the past, memory, to bear on the actual’, that these ‘latencies’ 
might be equally characterised as memory-potential?  
To live is to remember, in its most reductional abstracted form. If we consider once more 
that there may be a kind of vital impetus from which life draws the strength to act in the 
present, to push on toward the future, to live, as it were – and if individuation, psychic 
and collective, be so obviously involved with the processes of memory – then is that not 
precisely the function of what we have called memory-potential? If, as Grosz points out, 
“The élan vital is nothing other than the forces of self-organization functioning within 
those ‘systems’ that carry along the traces of their past in their present … the extension 
of the past into the present” (Grosz, 2007, p. 295), then might we not recognise in élan 
vital, or the drives toward individuating action, precisely what we have come to 
understand, at its most abstracted, as memory-potential? If life finds its interest in 
harnessing images “to ‘invent’ new forms and new practices, to evolve and become other” 
(Grosz, 2007, p. 294), might we not see memory-potential as its driving creative and 
relational charge? As digital theorist Tero Karppi observes of Bergsonian thinking, “For 
something new to emerge, there always needs to be a memory” (2018, p. 99).  
Likewise, for Simondon, “affectivity is precisely that mode of bodily experience which 
mediates between the individual and the preindividual, [introducing] the power of 
creativity into the sensorimotor body” (Hansen, 2006, p. 8). Yet might we not equally 
think memory-potential as acting like the pre-individual charge, realised at whatever level 
of consciousness through affective relation to its environment into individuating action? 




individuations from within itself”, that “it directs itself to problems, provocations not only 
through adaptation, but through the potential to reconsider its own internal organization, 
through its own individuating interiority” (Grosz, 2007, p. 299). It does not, this thesis 
contends, seem at all controversial to suggest that we might recognise in this 
‘individuating interiority’ the very processes of memory our developing approach has 
thus far described.  
It is important to emphasise that this is not at all to make claim to ‘revise’ nor attempt to 
‘co-opt’ the theorising of Bergson or Simondon. On the contrary, it is to suggest that, in 
intuitively abstracting memory into memory-potential and remembering as a realisation 
of this potential, in an appeal to thinking more closely to direct experience, do we not 
find ourselves, in principle, at their geneses, crucially wrestling with precisely the same 
sets of concepts and concerns as Bergson and Simondon are here discussing? If these 
concepts are not the same ‘things’, they are surely made of the same stuff. And, this being 
the case, does this not sensibly encourage a rationale for situating the concept of memory-
potential philosophically at the very heart of interpreting life itself, and its realisation 
through ‘remembering’ – at whatever lower or higher levels of consciousness – into the 
very heart of interpreting conscious existence?  
-- 
Through the above sections, we have conceptualised memory as a relational, reflexive 
and affective set of processes. These processes at their most conscious bodily 
manifestations inform consciousness, both in its sense of self-awareness and in the sense 
of identity and the individual, and at their least conscious can be dramatically considered 
the driving force of all life. From this perspective we might begin to see our central 
research question in more ‘high-stakes’ terms than those considering a question of 
whether we are remembering ‘more or less’ might have supposed – or at least a different 
kind of stakes – and these will be drawn out through subsequent case-study chapters. In 
order to do so, however, the final two sections of Part One aim to use our established 
affective approach to memory and remembering to develop a working theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between remembering and collective memory, and 





The being that remembers is more than the “I”; it is more than the individual; 
it is the individual more than some other thing (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 
2014, p. 125) 
The previous section looked at the way in which we might move, through a reading of 
Bergson and Simondon, into a way of thinking the human not in binary terms of 
‘individual’ or ‘collective’, but as co-constituted transindividual, and of further thinking 
affective inter-relationality as a challenge to the binary between subject and object. How, 
then, can we develop our approach to memory within such a framework?  
Following a Bergsonian-Simondonian reading of inter-relationality and affectivity, this 
section aims to expand our approach to memory into one of ‘transindividual 
remembering’, and to explore the relationship between the realising of memory-potential 
and the constitution of individually and collectively individuated ‘personalities’. We have 
thus far developed an approach to memory as a kind of memory-potential – the latent, 
inaccessible-in-itself learnings of past experiences – and of remembering as a kind of 
realisation of that potential – an actualisation of these learnings of past experience, 
through perception, for the purposes of useful action for the organism in the present. A 
Bergsonian-cum-Simondonian thinking-through of this approach in relation to the 
transindividual offers us the opportunity to now situate remembering within a sense of 
wider social inter-action and relationality. If we are to think existence in a less 
‘individualised’ sense – identities and consciousness as transindividual process, and 
remembering inter-relational – however, then such a move necessitates consideration of 
what we mean when we think of movements of ‘personal’ memory and ‘collective’, 
‘cultural’ or ‘communicative’ memory, and thus how we think of ‘useful action’.  
We have seen that memory represents a kind of duality of identity (or belonging) and of 
‘otherness’ – a way of differentiating oneself as a being from the world of inter-relations 
around oneself. “The memory’s content becomes the symbol of the present “I”; it is the 
other part; the progress of memory is an asymmetrical splitting of the subject being, an 
individualization of the subject being” (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 118-119). 
Yet, beyond individualising, humans may collectively individuate, informing a sense of 
the social, and thus the individual. How might we think of the role bodily realising 
memory-potential from this perspective? In its very nature of being realised inter-




process of realisation both informed by a group-sense of sociality, or simply inter-relation 
(through the always inter-relationality of memory and perception), and re-informing it 
(through its mediation in communication), in an ongoing, inter-relational and inter-
subjective series of interactions. Similarly, as media theorist Grant Bollmer has observed, 
through contemplating a Bergsonian view of collective memory we can see that processes 
of individual and collective ‘remembering’, while differing in kind, may be bound up 
together in movements of action toward collective individuation, “produced, along with 
their relation, through a specific, contextual organization of matter and discourse” 
(Bollmer, 2011, p. 454).  
Collective memory here ceases to be about the psychic memories that happen 
in an individuated human’s consciousness. Collective memory is, in a sense, 
non-conscious, although an individual-collective is still a specific kind of 
subject with its own phenomenology and its own sense of consciousness that 
exists beyond the psychic, as embodied actions and gestures only possible in 
the production of a specific assemblage. Collective memory is not about 
‘thought’, but is about becoming-together in space (Bollmer, 2011, p. 462) 
Returning to memory’s function in informing useful action for the individual, we can 
think here that what is being actualised is useful action beyond the individuations of the 
apparently discrete organism. Rather, in enlarging our conception of the organism from 
‘individualising body’ to ‘collectively-individuating individual’, we can 
straightforwardly think of the realisation of memory into action useful not just for the 
body, but for its perceived sociality. If to remember is to be “more than the individual” 
(Simondon, quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 125) then we might sensibly think of remembering 
as the co-constituted realisation of memory-potential useful for the ‘more than individual’ 
– for any one of the multiplicities of socialities out of which a sense of the individual is 
always emergent.  
We have arrived at a conception of memory that we can view as inter-subjective and inter-
relational. We can see remembering as a collectively-informed and collective-informing 
movements of realising memory-potential, in the moment, into transindividual action, 
useful for itself and/or its perceived sociality. Yet the feeling of being an individual is 
bound up in both the sense of bodily distinction and social belonging. In this sense, as 
Bollmer suggests, we might now start to view collective identities, such as those built 
around shared ‘histories’, as collectivised precisely through the experience of memory, 




of identity, psychic and collective. “[C]ollectives are individuals produced through the 
actualization of memory as shared embodied movement”, as Bollmer explains (2011, p. 
451), “Neither individuals nor collectives exist a priori to the practice of memory, and it 
is through memory as action that both individuals and collectives come into being” 
(Bollmer, 2011, p. 452). 
For Simondon, “all thought, precisely to the extent that it is real, ... involves a historical 
aspect in its genesis” (2005, p. 84). The psychically-individuating transindividual finds 
an emergent sense of ‘stable’ selfhood or personality through relating itself to its 
surroundings in the present as a being that has a past and a future. Likewise, collectively-
individuating socialities of transindividuals may find an emergent sense of stable 
personality, or identity, informing the individual, through reasserting and relating the 
common milieu or ‘group’ in the present to an apparent common past and future.  “Like 
all real being, like any fragment of the real that is individuated, thought is rooted in a 
milieu, which constitutes its historical dimension”, writes philosopher Muriel Combes, 
following Simondon, “[T]houghts are not ahistorical, not stars in the heaven of ideas. 
They emerge from a theoretical environment, drawing the seeds of their development 
from it” (Combes, 2013, p. 12).  
Here, then, the chapter aims to reorient our view of so-called ‘collective memory’, to be 
one not so much to do with ‘remembering’ a historical or shared ‘past’, but rather to do 
with informing a stable sense of ‘the social’ in the present. In such a thinking, cultural 
remembrances become less about what happened in the past, and more about how ideas 
of a common past can inform useful action for the reconstitution or preservation into the 
future for collectively-individuating socialities in the present. We will more substantially 
sketch out this synthesis and its implications for thinking memory in the online era 
through the case-study chapters, yet here it is important to consider theoretically the 
mechanisms through which these processes of collective individuation may take place: 
through communication. That is to say, through mediation and mediatisation – through 
artefacts.  
We have seen above that we may think ‘knowledge’ as a kind of technological taming, 
through repetition, of memory processes into habit memory, enabling a seeming 
‘knowing’ or ‘recall’ of the past. Psychically or physically embodied representations of 
the past – conceptual artefacts – are repeated in the present and into the future. Here, the 
chapter argues that we may think ‘history’, or ‘collective’ or ‘cultural’ memory, as kinds 




supposed ‘knowledge’ of the past may be technologically brought forward from the past 
into the social present. These media, of course, enabled through the conceptual 
technology of language, have developed beyond conceptual technologies and into 
physical technologies. They extend out of conceptual and bodily artefacts like oral 
history, performance or storytelling, and into technologies such as writing, drawing and 
illustration, photography, motion picture, as well as into the digitisation of all these media. 
Indeed, the contemporary and ubiquitous digitisation of media artefacts, in which media 
seemingly exist more virtually than physically, may help us to recognise the crucial 
implication of such a synthesis of collective remembering: that artefacts should not be 
seen as ‘things’ in space, but as technological enablers of processes of individuation in 
duration. Thus, as we will set out in Part Two, and expand on through the case-study 
chapters, artefacts should be seen not so much as things-in-themselves but as tools for the 
organising and apparent stabilisation of ‘the social’. As we will see below, artefacts do 
not hold any memory-potential. Rather they act as ‘carriers’ for the transindividual 
realisation of potential in processes of collective individuation. Or, as Middleton and 
Brown perhaps more easily-comprehensibly suggest, artefacts may act as “markers of 
relationships” (2005, p. 149-152).  
We can think, then, of collective remembering as technologically-mediated repetitions of 
ideas about the past, used to facilitate identity- and sociality-informing processes of 
collective individuation, in the present and for the needs of the perceived transindividual 
and its sociality. Yet, as social psychologist Ian Tucker observes, “We are not made to 
feel by digital technologies, we feel with them. Therefore, we need to consider conditions 
of emergence … to look at the contextual conditions within which emotional affectivity 
unfolds” (2018, p. 39). We remember through and with technologies. Therefore, if we are 
to be properly-equipped to tackle the research question, it is necessary to now think about 
the relationship between the human and the technological.   
Technics: Memory and the Man-Machine 
[M]an can be coupled to machine as an equal, and not merely as a being who 
directs or utilizes it through the incorporation of ensembles, or as a being who 
serves it by supplying matter and elements … There is an inter-individual 
coupling between man and machine when the same self-regulating functions 
are better and more subtly accomplished by the man-machine couple than by 




Previous sections advanced our developing working approach to non-archival memory 
through situating its central principle of realising potential in the present within a wider, 
inter-affective, inter-relation social framework, blurring the boundaries between the 
subject and object, individual and collective. It radically positioned the abstracted term 
memory-potential as a part of, perhaps the, driving force of life, and remembering as the 
selective, affectively co-constituted realisation of this potential into psychic and 
collective interactive processes or movements of individuation. Furthermore, it 
theoretically synthesised a view of ‘collective remembering’ as the technological use of 
artefacts to constitute a ‘stable’ sense of ‘the social’ or ‘society’ through repeating 
presentations of the past to inform useful action for the group in the present. And while 
personal and collective remembering may be seen to be different in kind to each other, 
rather than an extension by degrees of one into the other, we can see how through a 
reading of Simondon how they are both bound up in processes of individuation and a 
conscious, emergent sense of the individual.  
In this final section of Part One, then, we consider how we might think about the 
relationship between memory and technology within this developing approach. Through 
an exploration of Simondon’s (2017) theorising on the relationship between the human 
and technology and his conception of the technical object as “initiator of the psychosocial 
transindividual operation” (Scott, 2014, p. 197), the section aims to set out an 
understanding of how both personal and collective remembering may be technologically 
co-constituted. In doing so, it blurs the boundaries between the human, the non-human 
and the technological. Thus, it once more emphasises that when investigating what is at 
stake for ‘memory’ in the online era, we must attempt to think within the ‘bigger whole’, 
therefore considering the wider drives informing not just the relationships and 
interactions between biological or bodily and the cultural or social, but also those agencies 
inherent in the technological mechanisms through which such bodily and social action 
takes place.  
Technology as Extended Intelligence 
Through Simondon’s thinking on individuation, “[o]ld problems are remade”, such as, as 
we have seen, the relationality of individual to human, and “new problems appear – for 
example, how to account for a new relationship between the human and the technical 
object” (Scott, 2014, p. 7). Here, then, we explore this relationship so that we might situate 




Predating Marshall McLuhan’s famous conception of technologies as “extensions of 
man” (1964) by half a century, Bergson suggests explicitly in Creative Evolution that we 
may consider tools as extensions of the body of living organisms and their functions: 
“[T]he instrument forms part of the body that uses it; and, corresponding to this 
instrument, there is an instinct that knows how to use it” (Bergson, 1911, p. 146). Tools 
are here extensions of instinct. A rock becomes a stronger fist, a stick a longer arm; yet 
these are used as if they were a fist or an arm, based on core instinct. For Bergson, what 
distinguishes humans (for the moment) from lower animals is that we have evolved the 
ability to create tools beyond the level of instinctive need, instead creating tools as 
extensions of intelligence. Bergson observes, then, that this ability is the defining feature 
of the modern human as a species:  
If we could rid ourselves of all pride, if, to define our species, we kept strictly 
to what the historical and the prehistoric periods show us to be the constant 
characteristic of man and intelligence, we should say perhaps not Homo 
sapiens, but Homo faber. In short, intelligence, considered in what seems to 
be its original feature, is the faculty of manufacturing artificial objects 
especially tools to make tools, and of indefinitely varying the manufacture. 
(Bergson, 1911, p. 146) 
Bergson argues that that, while “instinct perfected” allows organisms to create and/or use 
“organised instruments”, “intelligence perfected is the faculty of making and using 
unorganised instruments” (Bergson, 1911, p. 147). An organised instrument would be, 
in-and-of-itself, already capable of being used for the function instinct requires – “Instinct 
finds the appropriate instrument at hand” (Bergson, 1911, p. 147). An unorganised 
instrument, however, requires intellectual effort to create and operate, its operations and 
mechanisms more complex:  
The instrument constructed intelligently … is an imperfect instrument. It 
costs an effort. It is generally troublesome to handle. But, as it is made of 
unorganised matter, it can take any form whatsoever, serve any purpose, free 
the living being from every new difficulty that arises and bestow on it an 
unlimited number of powers. (Bergson, 1911, p. 148) 
Since these tools are extensions of intelligent movements rather than instinctive 
movements, humans might be said not so much to use them, as to work with them, in a 




1911, p. 148). “Bergson conceives of technology”, as Hansen points out, “as the pre-
eminent means by which human beings employ intelligence to extend their perceptual 
grasp over matter, to enlarge their own living duration.” (Hansen, 2006, p. 258). Indeed, 
as Bollmer has argued, following Bergson – and as we shall demonstrate through 
subsequent chapters – it is important to “stop thinking of ‘subjective’ as referring to the 
human psyche” (2011, p. 462). Rather, the extension of human intelligence through 
technologies, “form a unified subject that perceives and moves in ways that exceed the 
psychic” (Bollmer, 2011, p. 462).  
Bergson makes an important observation about such a relationship that takes us here more 
broadly into Simondonian territory on ‘technics’: 
Above all, it reacts on the nature of the being that constructs it; for in calling 
on him to exercise a new function, it confers on him, so to speak, a richer 
organization … For every need that it satisfies, it creates a new need; and so, 
instead of closing, like instinct, the round action within which the animal 
tends to move automatically, it lays open to activity an unlimited field into 
which it is driven further and further, and made more and more free. (Bergson, 
1911, p. 148; italics my own) 
It is worth noting the recurring Bergsonian theme, here, of human intellectual 
advancement involving, as with the enlargement of perception, both an increase of 
opportunities to realise potential (for action) and a sense of limitation and selection – for, 
while intelligently-constructed tools may make the human ‘more and more free’, they 
also involve a limitation, since interaction is now framed within the limitations of the tool 
at hand and its immediate potential adaptations. This is a subject to which we will return 
below in terms of new, online technologies, as well in terms of the technology of language 
in the Part Two. But, for now, let us relate this Bergsonian position to key thinking in 
Simondon’s development of a philosophy of technology, and the coupling of the man-
machine. 
For Simondon, technologies, as extensions of intelligence, are always in a state of 
progression. Creatively informed through invention, technologies are thought of in terms 
of function, undergoing processes of “concretization” as, through lineages of versioning, 
they are adapted or perfected for the needs of the biological and social human (Simondon, 
2017, pp. 25-51). Thus, as we will explore more in the case-study chapters, we must 




the cultural and the technological. Furthermore, accepting the inter-depending functions 
and agencies of the human and the technological, in Simondon’s thinking on technics, 
Bergson’s description of an interactive, ongoing relationship between human and tool of 
intelligence would be an example the man-machine. This is a coupling in which man and 
machine may be thought of equals in their functioning relationship, occurring when “the 
same self-regulating functions are better and more subtly accomplished by the man-
machine couple than by man or machine alone” (Simondon, 2017, p. 135).  
This machine-man relation is realized when man applies his action to the 
natural world through the machine; the machine is then a vehicle for action 
and information, in a relation with three terms: man, machine, and world, the 
machine being that which is between man and world … The machine thus 
essentially serves the purpose of a relay, an amplifier of movements, but it is 
still man who preserves within himself the center of this complex technical 
individual that is the reality constituted by man and machine. (Simondon, 
2017, pp. 78-79) 
Both machine and human are able to perform particular functions on their own, but a 
man-machine function is one in which human and machine operate together, each 
responding to and with the other to perform better as a combined whole. In Simondon’s 
inter-relational thinking, then, we might not view technologies as simply as ‘extensions’ 
of intelligence – rather, human and machine together become a ‘more-than’ human or 
technology, representing a new kind of self-regulating co-interaction with the world, with 
technology situated ‘between man and world’. “Human reality lives through technology” 
(Scott, on Simondon, 2014, p. 1).  
In fact, through a Simondonian-Bergsonian perspective, we may view our whole 
experience of the world as technically mediated, since all of our experiences of the world 
are essentially ones of man-machine coupling. This can be so, because, as we have seen 
in the conceptual tool of learned habit memory, what we must recognise as technologies 
need not actually be made of matter. “Besides things”, Bergson explains, “there are 
relations” (1911, p. 155), and, in the same way that the intelligent, technical mind is able 
to create technologies of ‘things’, it can create through the same kind of processes 
technologies of ‘relations’ (Bergson, 1911, pp. 155-157). Moreover, we must appreciate 
that, beneath all more tangible, society-scale examples of such technologies of relation – 




technologies such language and relational concepts through which our whole intelligent 
experiences of the world are technologically framed.  
Memory and Technology 
How then, do we situate our approach toward memory within this thinking? On the one 
hand, we must situate the bodily realisation of memory-potential as a driving force for 
technological interactions, in terms of individuation. On the other, we must importantly 
acknowledge that our conscious experience of remembering, the practice of 
remembering, is itself one that should be understood as a man-machine technological 
coupling, or multiplicities of man-machine couplings, themselves involving the relation 
between and against bodily, cultural and technological drives and their inherent agencies.  
Firstly, then, let us remind ourselves that we might consider an abstracted form of 
remembering as the realisation of memory-potential, and a driving force of all 
transindividual interaction. That being the case, if the technical object is, as Scott 
suggests, “the most powerful initiator of the psychosocial transindividual operation … 
the means by which individuals are made to coincide and communicate via their 
significations” (2014, p. 197), then we must understand remembering as the action 
through which individuation, and therefore potential man-machine action, is made 
possible. Indeed, it is the very process of inter-relational remembering between human 
and machine and environment that makes at all possible what we might call ‘technological 
progress’ of the technical object– the previous human-known function (in terms of both 
actualised and habit memory) of the tool giving force to new and potential, imagined 
functions as we draw into the anticipated future. As Simondon acknowledges: 
[T]he process of learning, through which man forms habits, 
gestures, and schemas of action that enable him to use the highly 
varied tools that the totality of an operation requires, pushes this 
man to individualize himself technically. (2017, p. 77) 
Secondly, let us acknowledge that remembering, at least at a consciously-perceived and 
self-regulatory level, we can understand explicitly as a man-machine technical operation 
in two distinct yet overlapping ways – the first being straightforward within our existing 
understanding of memory, and the second requiring a little theoretical unpacking.  
In the first sense, we can understand technology and actualised human ‘personal memory’ 




we follow the Bergsonian notion that technologies (such as language and concepts) act to 
enlarge our “perceptual grasp over matter, to enlarge [our] own living duration” (Hansen, 
2006, p. 258), and recognise, in the nature of remembering, that “[t]here is no perception 
which is not full of memories” (Bergson, 2004, p. 24), then remembering must always be 
a semi-technologically-constituted experience.  
This is true equally of collective remembering, which, while different in kind to personal 
remembering, is always mediated in the form of conceptual or physical artefacts, and so 
is always technologically constituted. Thus, in a second sense, we can see the 
sophisticated use of artefacts – in terms of both cultural remembering and as so-called 
‘memory aides’ to personal remembering – as a formal coupling of man-memory to 
machine-memory. In On The Mode Of Existence Of Technical Objects (2017) Simondon 
specifically discusses the nature of machine memory and human memory as an illustrative 
example of man-machine coupling. He distinguishes machine memory as “the memory 
of the document, the result of measurement” (Simondon, 2017, p. 138), whereas human 
memory can be thought of more relationally:  
[T]hat which … evokes a situation because it involves the same significations, 
the same feelings, the same dangers as another, or simply because its 
similarity makes sense according to the implicit vital coding constituted by 
experience. (Simondon, 2017, p. 138) 
Through technological coupling, man-machines are able to employ both human memory 
and machine memory, in a relationship whereby “[t]he significations according to which 
human memory functions stop where those according to which machine memory 
functions begin” (Simondon, 2017, p. 138). A coupling of human to machine in this way, 
Simondon says, starts to exist “from the very moment when a coding common to both of 
these memories can be discovered, in order for a partial convertibility of one into the other 
to be realized, so that so that a synergy can become possible” (Simondon, 2017, p. 138), 
and to demonstrate this he gives the simple example of a obtaining a print-out of a data-
record of telephone calls, out of a then-contemporary system of magnetic tapes. In order 
to receive this print-out, one must rely on the one hand on the human memory that 
recognises signifiers in the form of names and words of records, and on the other the 
machine memory that “provokes one magnetic tape player to be powered and not another” 




Simondon suggests, then, that while each kind of independent, self-regulating memory – 
human and machine – can provide functions in and of themselves, the function of printing 
out a telephone call record is an interaction in which the machine and the human are 
coupled, in which the function is “better and more subtly accomplished by the man-
machine couple than by man or machine alone” (Simondon, 2017, p. 135). “This pure 
case of coupling between machine and man helps us to understand the mode of coupling 
that perhaps more complicatedly exists in other cases”, Simondon argues (2017, p.139): 
[T]here is a coupling when a single and complete function is carried out by 
both beings. Such a possibility exists in every time that a technical function 
has a defined self-regulation. Functions that contain self-regulation are the 
ones where the accomplishment of the task is directed not only by a model to 
be copied (according to an end), but by a partial result of the accomplishment 
of the task, intervening as a condition. (Simondon, 2017, p. 139) 
Yet, if we accept the Bergsonian observation that language and relational concepts are 
indeed non-material technologies, or conceptual technologies, as we saw above, then we 
may see that the man-machine relationship of memory runs much deeper than that for 
which his intentionally simple example allows. If we consider that our experience of 
memory is at all times coloured, if not determined, by those relational, conceptual, 
technological frameworks through which we experience and analyse it – for example, the 
learnt categorisation of memory into episodic, semantic; the general recognition of 
objects and sensations through perception as and through their signifier(s) in language; 
the linguistic and conceptual separation between individual and collective; the notion of 
memory as autobiographical and linear; or, of course, the lived likening of memory to an 
archive – then we can now understand that our whole human experience of memory and 
remembering, and therefore our whole perception of life, is framed within multiplicities 
of technological invention. The very images we perceive when we experience the world 
are afforded in one way or another through technological concept. To remember as 
conscious individual is to remember as man-machine. Once again, “[h]uman reality lives 
through technology” (Scott, on Simondon, 2014, p. 1), and it remembers through 
technology. Indeed, what we even consider to be remembering is largely conceptually-
technologically framed. 
Simondon’s theorising on technology and man-machine coupling, then, might in simple 
terms be understood as a logical and complementary relation of his theory of 




constant processes of individuations, of becomings, out of interactions between living 
organisms, non-living matter and the world around them. The use of technologies by 
living organisms is a further development of these interactions, giving further emphasis 
to the blurring of boundaries, through such interactions, around conscious sense of subject 
and object, individual and collective, agency and identity. For the intelligent, coupled 
man-machine, psychic and collective individuations always involve technology and 
technological action as mediator between the human and the world, indeed as equal part 
of the ‘more-than individual’ in the world – each part of the coupling being at once a 
shared subject and object of the interaction.  
If we seek, then, to re-state our approach to memory within an understanding of 
technological relations, we could now say that remembering is an inter-relational 
realisation of potential for action in the present, useful to the transindividual and its sensed 
sociality, always in a state of being (re)informed by perceptive relationality to the 
surroundings – environmental, inter-social and technological. Furthermore, as we will see 
in Part Two and Part Three, we must accept that to investigate remembering is also to 
investigate agential (and thus socio-political and economic) considerations around how 
technologies through which processes of remembering take place may frame our 
perceptions and actions in the world, and for what reasons. Before we do this, however, 
this section finally, and briefly, contextualises the investigation within the changes to 
technology in the online era.  
Into the Twenty-First Century 
Simondon’s example of the telephone record of course transposes readily to 
contemporary examples of coupled memory functions, largely reliant on database 
‘artefact’ technologies – the drawing up of a file from a computer hard-drive through 
Windows Explorer or Apple Spotlight, for example (as we saw in the Sparrow et al 
experiment, 2011), or the accessing of a particular server or website from a web-browser’s 
address bar. The main critical interrogation of the ways in which we are remembering 
through such new technologies and interfaces is reserved for the following chapters. 
However, here we will lightly examine how we might practically think our approach to 
memory in relation such technologies, and in order to draw attention to, and contextualise 
our approach to memory within, key observations on which these chapters will build. If 




think this experience changed through the advent of new, online and pervasive 
technologies?  
This thesis suggests that there have been three overt, major and inter-relating changes to 
the lived experience of remembering with the move into the online era: 
1. Connectivity – the global-scale actual and potential technological and social 
networks with and through which we may remember.  
2. Instantaneity – the speed at which communication allows us to connect with 
others, and to access information, the sense of temporality informed by this and 
increased connectivity, and the pervasiveness of the hard- and soft-ware 
interfaces that enable this.  
3. Materiality – the datafication and storage of communication and media of 
remembering into flows of relational digital information, and the experience of 
remembering through such processes.  
Through these moves, as we will explore through the case-study chapters, the abilities of 
the remembering man-machine have been perhaps enhanced in numerous ways. The 
human, with the machine, is able to connect with a greater number of people, within a 
greater number of networks, and do so practically instantaneously, raising questions 
around multiplicities of and potentials for inter-relationally-informed remembering. 
Machine memory, through its instant global networks, at once allows for human 
enhancement and allows for the increase and enhancement of its own supply of, and 
access to, “the memory of the document” (Simondon, 2017, p. 138) – data produced both 
for the purposes of remembering and through the processes of remembering.  
Humans now connect with others on meso- and macro-levels on a global level through 
various social networking and messaging interfaces, such as WhatsApp, Facebook and 
Twitter, with the enlargement of one’s perception and one’s sense of social network, or 
‘the social’, compared to pre-digital cultures. This runs alongside the expansion of online 
media storage and access, raising interesting implications for collectivised inter-
informing actions of remembering recent and more historical pasts. So, too, have more 
micro-level technological relationships evolved through the an apparent datafication of 
the concept of memory. Whereas the diary, for example, had certain limitations for 
recording and relating to autobiographical pasts, through size, capacity and the effort of 




recorded “personal cultural memory” (van Dijck, 2007, p. 1) – new modes of technology 
here, too, allow for greatly enhanced recording and ease of re-accessing such media 
content, almost unimaginable by comparison. We interact on a micro-level with apps that 
record and can recall our locations and our physical (and digital) activity at practically all 
times. Cloud storage allows documents and personal media such as photo back-ups, to be 
accessed anywhere, allowing for extended kinds of personal remembering that is non-
social, relational to just the user and the interface.    
Yet all of this happens through wirelessly networked devices and interfaces that pervade 
our lives, becoming increasingly ubiquitous, and the design and functioning of these 
involve sophisticated relations of cultural, economic and political agencies. While the 
hours spent looking at screens through various interfaces has continued to increase, other 
interfaces becoming more common as we move further into Web 3.0, or ‘the internet of 
things’, no longer use screens at all – such as Google Home or Amazon Echo – the kind 
of ubiquitous technology Adam Greenfield has called “everyware” (2006). These 
technologies we can think of in a very real sense as increasingly forming the very 
perceptual infrastructure of our personal and social lives, yet, it must be acknowledged, 
involve agencies well beyond the immediately-apparent functions and agencies of the 
human and the hardware-machine.  
The inter-relational experience of remembering, then, has been radically transformed in 
recent years and decades. Yet what kind of memory-potentials are being realised through 
such new, online and pervasive technologies? How can we think of the relationship 
between new technologies and changes to processes of psychic and collective 
individuation? In what ways are these realisations affected by a move into such 
technological relationships? How might we think of these technologies in a Bergsonian 
sense as ‘extending’ or ‘limiting’ the ability for realising memory-potential? What kinds 
of useful action are being informed through prominent forms of ‘remembering’ online, 
and for what reasons? And what might be the implications?  
These are some of the questions this thesis now aims to answer in later chapters. However, 
before we return to the research question, equipped now with a comprehensive theoretical 
approach to understanding memory non-archivally, it is necessary to consider in Part Two 
how we might concisely conceptualise this approach into a form in which it might be 





2. Conceiving Memory: From Archive to Anarchive 
In Section One, this chapter drew on the philosophy of Henri Bergson and Gilbert 
Simondon to develop a broad, working theoretical approach to understanding memory 
and the memory-technology relationship as an inter-relational, techno-socially co-
constituted process-experience, in duration, based on the realisation of potential for useful 
action of the individual or transindividual in the present, and in anticipation of the future. 
This lengthy expounding, of course, was developed as a comprehensive attempt to shift 
away from the European-historical reliance on the metaphor of the archive as a succinct 
conceptual tool with which to think about memory, which privileges contested 
assumptions around memory as the ‘storage of knowledge’ and leads to various contested 
tendencies of thought. Equipped with our own approach to memory, this section seeks to 
now create a route back toward the central research question – What role do new, online 
and pervasive technologies play in changing individual and collective memory 
processes? – by proposing an alternative conceptual tool into which such an approach 
might be incorporated. It aims to synthesise a concise and effective conceptual 
framework, as an alternative to the archive metaphor, through which we may apply this 
approach to memory in a real-world context through the following chapters. 
The section does this in two stages. Firstly, it returns to the problem of language and of 
conceptual metaphors, as lightly introduced in the Literature Review chapter. Drawing 
on the thinking of Bergson (2001) and Alfred North Whitehead (1938), it explores the 
conceptual constraints compelled onto philosophical thought through the technology of 
language, and its potential to guide empirical interpretation in unhelpful directions. 
Acknowledging that memory-experience, as mediated through symbolism in language, 
will always be one step (or multiple steps) removed from direct experience, the section 
aims to establish a conceptual tool for thinking about memory that takes us far from the 
spatialising nature of the archive metaphor and attempts to lead us closer, in a Bergsonian 
intuitive sense (Bergson, 1946), to an expression of the direct experience of the processes 
of memory. It contends that, rather than seek a more adequate metaphor for understanding 
memory, we ought to more usefully follow an anti-metaphor, which might allow us 
greater freedom from the traps of assumption-informing language. To this end, and 
forming the second stage of this section, it proposes that we consider the ‘anarchive’ as a 
useful conceptual anti-metaphor with which to think memory in exploration of the 
research question. Examining and interrogating the recent scholarly thinking on the 




(SenseLab, no date), it explores their developing conception of the anarchive and 
demonstrates how it might be usefully adapted and adopted as a conceptual tool for 
applying our working approach to memory within a wider, real-world sociological 
framework. Accordingly, it ends by setting out in a succinct statement how we might 
think of memory as an anarchive. 
The Trappings of Language 
A recurring theme has emerged in this thesis around the limitations that language may 
impose when attempting to understand the world, and when expressing that 
understanding. We saw in the Literature Review chapter the tendencies of thought that 
have historically arisen, and indeed persisted, due to the metaphorically-informed 
assumption that memory acts like an archive – indeed, spending the substantial portion 
of this chapter attempting to understand memory when viewed not through such a lens. 
Equally, interpreting psychological states of memory through a spatialised conceptual 
framework such as the archive has led, we may remind ourselves, to a popularly-
conceived false problem for memory of whether we are remembering less or more, when 
we would do better to explore a problem grounded in how we are remembering 
differently. Incorporating our understanding of language as a form of technology, as 
outlined above, into this task, this section draws further on Bergsonian thinking to explore 
the ‘problem’ with language, the role of and potential for expressions of philosophy 
within language, to consider what alternatives we might propose to the archive metaphor 
as a conceptual tool with which to ‘think’ memory in relation to the research question.  
“It is above all language that alienates us from direct experience”, Guerlac tells us, 
following Bergson (2006, p. 69). Bergson returns several times in his essay Time and 
Free Will (2001) to the subject of language. While, as we have discussed, Bergson takes 
a position somewhere in-between the realist and the idealist, for him language is a 
technology that was developed in order to relate to the images of the world that they 
perceive around them, the exterior world, rather than a way to understand the images 
one’s own psychological states, the inner world. As such, when we use language to think 
of psychological experience, we impose on it the ways in which we would think about 
external objects, perhaps since it is through thinking in this way that we might then 
express such feelings practically within this external, inter-relational world.  
[O]ur outer and, so to speak, social life is more practically important to us 




impressions in order to express them in language. Hence, we confuse the 
feeling itself, which is in a perpetual state of becoming, with its permanent 
external object, and especially with the word which expresses this object. 
(Bergson, 2001, p. 130) 
The language used to describe one’s psychological state is oriented toward useful inter-
relationally-informed action. Yet it is therefore several steps removed from the direct 
experience by which it is informed, and which it seeks to express. In fact, we might see it 
not so much as an ‘expression of the inner state’ as a ‘useful way in which to express that 
inner state’. Language, however, “is ill-suited to render the subtleties of psychological 
analysis” (Bergson, 2001, p. 13), and an expression of an inner state should not be 
confused with the always-becoming inner state itself – “[I]mages can never be anything 
but things, and thought is a movement.” (Bergson, 2004, p. 159; italics my own). 
Furthermore, contemporary research in psychology has demonstrated that the forms, 
structures or familiarity of language may encourage particular modes of perception, 
thought, decision and action. Studies with bilingual participants showing, for example, 
different judgements of a statement’s ‘truthfulness’ depending on the language in which 
it is read (Ellis et al, 2018). Others have shown that interpreted perception of colour is 
affected – and thus “visual consciousness” is affected – by the language of the perceiver 
(Maier and Rahman, 2018). Hence, while it may be practically useful in its conceptual 
simplicity to express one’s memories, in lives with a distinct past, lived in the present, as 
spatialised ‘things’ or ‘events’ of the past, through doing so we encourage ourselves to 
truly think the experience of memory that way, to begin to think in terms of ‘encoding’, 
‘storing’, ‘retrieving’. And while it may be useful to think of ‘time’ as divisible moments 
in the past, present and future, through doing so we encourage ourselves to think the 
experience of time in that way, when we ought to consider it as living in duration.  
The Need for Philosophy 
This imprecise, outward representation of inner states, through the technology of 
language, leads, Bergson suggests, to two senses of self: that which can be expressed in 
language, and is “artificially constructed” (Bergson, 2001, p, 237), as translated through 
technology; and that which “cannot be expressed in the fixed terms of language” 
(Bergson, 2001, p. 237), as directly experienced by the human. In trying to understand 
the latter in terms of the former, we remove ourselves from direct experience in duration. 




these words, as soon as they were formed, would turn against the sensation which gave 
birth to them, and, invented to show that the sensation is unstable, they would impose on 
it their own stability” (2001, p. 132). Language distracts from the experience of living in 
a world of duration, instead tending toward an imposition of space: “all these modes of 
symbolic representation interfere with our ability to grasp the temporal nature of reality. 
“They crush our sense of duration” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 19; italics my own).  
Bergson argues that the role of philosophy, and indeed the difficulty of philosophy, is in 
peeling back these layers of language in order to think more closely to the nature of the 
process of direct experience. “[I]mmediate knowledge”, he says, would “find in itself its 
justification and proof” if it were not for “the symbolic diagrams which cover it up, 
diagrams which have for us become reality itself, and beyond which only an intense and 
unusual effort can succeed in penetrating” (2004, p. 245). To hope to understand direct 
experience, we must therefore “give up certain habits of thinking, and even of perceiving” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 241) that symbolism in language has imposed on us.  
Similarly, process philosopher Alfred North Whitehead argues in Modes of Thought 
(1938) that “[t]he great difficulty of philosophy is the failure of language” (1938, pp. 67): 
The ordinary intercourse of mankind is concerned with shifting circumstance. 
It is unnecessary to mention self-evident facts … Language halts behind 
intuition. The difficulty of philosophy is the expression of what is self-
evident. Our understanding outruns the ordinary usages of words. Philosophy 
is akin to poetry. Philosophy is the endeavour to find a conventional 
phraseology for the vivid suggestiveness of the poet. It is the endeavour to 
reduce Milton's 'Lycidas' to prose; and thereby to produce a verbal symbolism 
manageable for use in other connections of thought. (Whitehead, 1938, pp. 
67-69) 
For both, there is an acceptance that language, as a technology of expression, will as such 
always be one-step removed from the pure experience of psychological life. Indeed, given 
that language as a technology has the evident capacity to at once extend and constrain our 
sense of intelligence, of understanding, it would be perhaps impossible to formulate an 
expression of what is for Bergson ‘direct experience’, and for Whitehead ‘what is self-
evident’. As Guerlac has noted, there is therefore a great difficulty in intuition, in the task 
of philosophy: “How can a philosopher examine immediate experience … experience that 




itself proceeds discursively?” (2006, p. 43). For Bergson, the answer is to make oneself 
“aware of how we usually speak about immediate experience … and … what kind of 
assumptions find their way into our thinking when we do so” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 43). Or, 
as novelist and academic David Foster Wallace more recently similarly suggests:  
“Learning how to think" really means learning how to exercise some control 
over how and what you think … It means being conscious and aware enough 
to choose what you pay attention to and to choose how you construct meaning 
from experience. (2009, pp. 53-54) 
Our goal, then, within philosophy, cannot be to find a perfect way of expressing inner 
experience in duration, but rather to attempt to formulate as adequate expression as 
possible to describe it, and one that encourages us to question our existing assumptions, 
informed by the likes of the language through which we make the expression.  
Alternatives to the Archive 
To this end, then, how might we approach describing our understanding of memory, as 
developed above? What kind of conceptual tool might we synthesise, in at least the 
English language if not ideally beyond, with which to most adequately express such 
understanding of memory – or, moreover, in the spirit of such an understanding, what 
kind of conceptual tool might most adequately express memory as it is directly 
experienced, especially in its relation to new technologies? Such a conception, it should 
be emphasised, would need to account for memory as an experience within duration, as 
an inter-subjective process, beyond the binaries of individual and collective and of 
human, non-human and the world and would need to encourage critical self-reflection on 
what assumptions we make (or risk making) when using it.  
A number of prominent non-archival conceptualisations of memory have emerged in 
recent years in various disciplines of scholarship, contributing to the slow shift away from 
the dominance of the archive. Brown and Reavey in their study of Vital Memory liken 
experiences of remembering to a “flow of experience”, drawing heavily on Bergson’s 
theorising on memory and duration, in a strong rebuttal to the power of the archive 
metaphor. Literary theorist Jens Brockmeier puts forward the idea of a ‘narrative 
approach’ to memory, which also focuses on the experience of memory, as well as in part 
attempting to incorporate an appreciation of memory as lived through a Bergsonian sense 
of duration. Equally, new-media theorist José van Dijck has proposed “mediated 




memory” (2007, p. 1) in the digital age. The concept emphasises technology and the 
experiences of how we are remembering through media – “the acts and products of 
remembering” (2007, p. 6) – rather than how much we are remembering, with an aim of 
providing a commonality of approach between more neurological or psychological study 
of personal memory and more sociological or cultural approaches to collective memory. 
Indeed, recognising the “renewed sense of two cultures in the air” (Brown, 2008, p. 269), 
it has been argued by Brown that a focus of some sort on mediation might provide a way 
forward for a unified field of ‘memory studies’ (2008).  
Building on these kinds of approach – yet placing  an emphasis on the attempting to 
escape the metaphor all together in interpretive analysis – this thesis now makes a 
perhaps radical contribution to how we may conceptualise memory, biological and into 
the social. If the language of metaphors acts to cloud our view of the direct experience of 
remembering through imposing on it too strongly an idea of what memory is, perhaps a 
more adequate (or at least less inadequate) approach would be to formulate a 
conceptualisation of what memory is not. Indeed, such an approach might, like the 
function of memory itself, offer a force of hesitation, enabling psychic distance – 
facilitating an encouragement of critical self-reflection on the assumptions encouraged or 
imposed by language. This thesis therefore proposes that we move away from seeking a 
notion of metaphor for conceptualising memory, and instead embrace the notion of the 
anti-metaphor: instead of thinking memory as acting like an archive, thinking of memory 
as acting not like an archive. In doing so, it hopes to offer opportunity for more intuitive 
analysis – disrupting tendencies toward spatialised conceptualisations, to seek to 
understand the topic from a perspective closer to processes of direct experience in 
duration. To this end, it offers up the notion of the ‘anarchive’ as conceptual anti-
metaphorical tool for thinking our approach to memory. 
Anarchive as Conceptual Anti-Metaphor 
This section considers how the concept of the ‘anarchive’ – or perhaps more pertinently 
the concept of ‘anarchiving’ – might be adapted and adopted as a useful anti-metaphorical 
tool with which to think memory in the way that we have developed above. In recent 
years, the concept of the ‘anarchive’ has received renewed scholarly interest, beyond the 
realm of archive studies – notably out of the interdisciplinary, international project 
‘SenseLab’, a collective involving renowned digital-cultural theorists such as Erin 




The next part of this section, then, attempts to engage critically with SenseLab’s 
conception of the anarchive, with the aim of testing its appropriateness to be developed it 
into a useful, working conceptual anti-metaphor with which to think with our developed 
approach to memory – and one that may adequately provide a more ‘joined-up’ approach 
to thinking the drives of the personal, the collective and the technological in remembering. 
To this end, after introducing the concept, it briefly works its way in turn through each of 
the seven points in the concise definition SenseLab has proposed for their own conception 
of the anarchive, reflecting critically on their potential relation to, and adaptability for, 
thinking memory as memory-potential and remembering as its inter-relational, 
transindividual and technological realisation. It ends by setting out a short working 
proposed ‘hybrid-definition’ for thinking memory anarchivally.  
The Anarchive 
The continuingly developing conceptualisation of the anarchive is an ongoing research 
project of SenseLab – an international, affinity-oriented network of academics and 
creative practitioners, based out of Montreal – and the concept can be contextualised as 
part of a wider project, Immediations, that explores the concepts and methods of research 
creation. Perhaps a philosophical exercise at its core, a ‘definite’ definition of the 
anarchive might be difficult to pin down, anti-metaphorical as the term seems to be: 
“What an anarchive can be is yet to be invented”, they note (SenseLab, no date). Rather, 
its conceptualisation comes out of the premise of a question of what can be archived – 
what is temporally in between the artefacts within a spatialised archive – or, indeed, out 
of the processes of attempting to answer it.  
The question is how what moves an event into taking form can be archived, 
as opposed to documenting the content of the event. Can traces of the event’s 
liveness be captured, in a way that might set the stage for a next event to occur 
in its wake? The anarchive would then be a kind of process seed bank for the 
dissemination of forces of emergent taking form. 
Useful similarities between this approach to conceptualising an anarchive and our own 
neo-Bergsonian approach to conceptualising this developed understanding of memory are 
unambiguous. Each is occupied with the processes and potentials that inform concrete 
ideas of the past (i.e. ‘memory’), and with the business of actualising or capturing these 
potentials. For the hypothetical anarchive, as with our notion of memory-potential, what 




realised in duration: the ‘liveness’ of events or actions, which is not accounted for in the 
traditional notion of the archive that privileges artefacts-in-themselves. Each might be 
seen as an attempt to concretise, or at least emphasise, the movements that come in 
between their respective representations of the past – to pin down duration. While our 
theoretical consideration of ‘memory’ began by examining the nature of ‘personal 
remembering’ informing all lived action as processes of psychic and collective 
individuation, we have seen that through ‘collective remembering’ these processes 
involve the re-presenting or re-versioning of artefacts of the past (conceptual or signified 
through physical objects), to inform useful action in the present. From an anarchival 
perspective, artefacts can likewise be understood not as having potential themselves, but 
rather acting as “carriers of potential” (SenseLab, no date a). The notion of the anarchive 
– or of remembering as anarchiving - then, acts as a useful tool with which to account for 
both ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ processes of remembering within our hybrid 
Bergsonian-Simondonian approach of realising memory-potential into individuating 
action.  
In other areas, too, has the question been raised about how a ‘Bergsonian-esque’ approach 
to thinking memory might have implications for the way in which we view the archive. 
Independently of SenseLab, Burton has, following Bergson, theorised a pertinently 
sympathetic perspective of the archive in terms of process rather than things:  
[T]he archive can be said to have its own ‘body-image’ with its own conatus 
and set of interests relating to its own survival or self-perpetuation. Just as in 
the case of memory, where the conscious picturing of memory-images by the 
body-image leads to a false understanding of the nature of memory, so the 
memory-images accumulated in the archive may lead to a false understanding 
of the nature of the subject studied.” (Burton, 2008, p. 332) 
For Burton, Bergson’s emphasis on memory as a process of limitation, selection and 
action, similarly to SenseLab’s conceptualisation, brings an opportunity to re-think the 
archive not as a collection of artefacts, but as a living, ongoing process. Indeed, in 
thinking this way we can see archives (and, by extrapolation, all technological processes 
of collective remembering) not as having a potential in ‘knowledge’ in the artefacts, but 
as platforms for processes of collective individuation through signification in objects. 
Indeed, as media theorist Wolfgang Ernst notes, “Let us not confuse public discourse 
(which turns data into narratives) with the silence of discrete archival files” (2004, p. 48). 




that we might release the potential to “recover salient aspects that have been ‘forgotten’” 
(Burton, 2008, p. 334). Through Burton’s analysis of the archive as dynamic movements 
of memory processes, we can see firm potential parallels between using the anarchive as 
an approach to thinking the archive and using the anarchive as an approach to thinking 
remembering. Such a radical re-conceptualisation of the archive in relation to the 
anarchive might, then, help to redress misunderstandings of the physical archive (i.e. 
helping us to see artefacts as carriers of potential rather than potential themselves), and, 
again, helps us to conceptualise both bodily and more cultural processes of remembering 
under one attempted ‘whole picture’ approach.  
Interrogating the Anarchive  
What follows here is a straightforward dialogue between on the one hand the seven-point, 
concise, working definition of the anarchive as developed by SenseLab (SenseLab, no 
date a) and on the other the spirit of the approach to memory we have developed above. 
We may here think of ‘the anarchive’ in relation to our own wider conceptualisation of 
collective remembering as habit memory, reproduced through repetitive processes of 
artefact production and presentation, and can understand how technologically-facilitated 
collective remembering may be viewed sympathetically with more biological memory 
through the conception of ‘anarchiving’. Thus, through such a dialogue this section aims 
to demonstrate how, in seeking to challenge the supremacy of the archive and instead 
focus on process, the anarchive offers itself up as a radical and useful conceptual anti-
metaphor with which we can think a more ‘joined-up’ approach to memory, in terms of 
the drives and functions of the biological, cultural and technological.  
1. The anarchive is best defined … as a repertory of traces of 
collaborative research-creation events. The traces are not 
inert, but are carriers of potential. They are reactivatable, 
and their reactivation helps trigger a new event which 
continues the creative process from which they came, but in 
a new iteration. (SenseLab, no date a) 
Our approach thinks of memory as memory-potential, a kind of 
latent potential out of previous experience, or events. Neither are 
these potentials considered inert. Rather, they can be realised in 
for the purposes of action in the present moment (through another 




drive of memory-potential, and creating new experiences that add 
to it. 
2. Thus the anarchive is not documentation of a past activity. 
Rather, it is a feed-forward mechanism for lines of creative 
process, under continuing variation. (SenseLab, no date a) 
Memory-potential is not a collection of ‘things’, of ‘memories of 
past events’. Rather it is a potential for interactive process, in the 
present, through its realisation, in turn informing new, creative 
interactions as we move from the past and into the future.  
3. The anarchive needs documentation – the archive – from 
which to depart and through which to pass. It is an excess 
energy of the archive: a kind of supplement or surplus-value 
of the archive. (SenseLab, no date a) 
Remembering relies on the experience of past events – in 
memory-potential – from which to depart and through which to 
realise itself. It is a surplus of perception of the past, within the 
present – more than memory and more than perception.  
4. Its supplemental, excessive nature means that it is never 
contained in any particular archive or documentation 
element contained in an archive. It is never contained in an 
object. The anarchive is made of the formative movements 
going into and coming out of the archive, for which the 
objects contained in the archive serve as springboards. The 
anarchive as such is made of formative tendencies; 
compositional forces seeking a new taking-form; lures for 
further process. Archives are their waystations. (SenseLab, 
no date a) 
Remembering not a ‘thing’ but a movement. It is neither 
‘contained’ in memory-potential, nor in its representations 
through perception. Rather it is a process of realisation through 
inter-relational interaction, drawing on the force of memory-




technological mediation. The movements of remembering, as the 
realisation of memory-potential are, incitements for further 
interaction.  
5. Since it exceeds the archive and is uncontainable in any 
single object or collection of objects, the anarchive is by 
nature a cross-platform phenomenon. It is activated in the 
relays: between media, between verbal and material 
expressions, between digital and off-line archivings, and 
most of all between all of the various archival forms it may 
take and the live, collaborative interactions that reactivate 
the anarchival traces, and in turn create new ones. 
(SenseLab, no date a) 
Remembering is always a process of inter-relational interaction. 
Memory-potential is realised through and with the interactions of 
the transindividual’s environment, socialities and mediation. It is 
represented through interaction through and with the present, in 
turn creating new potential for action.   
6. The anarchive pertains to the event. It is a kind of event 
derivative, or surplus-value of the event. This makes it an 
essential element of the Immediations project, whose stated 
aim has been to develop an approach to research-creation as 
a practice of interdisciplinary event design, or to quote the 
original application, as the practice of creating innovative 
“platforms for organizing and orienting live, collaborative 
encounters.” (SenseLab, no date a) 
Remembering pertains to action-in-the-moment. It is a kind of 
surplus of the past, in the present, a ‘more-than’ present. Through 
its realisation out of memory-potential and perception, it forges 
inter-relational interactions with its surroundings as a force of 
organising life in duration – itself a sense of the always-
anticipated future.  
7. Approached anarchivally, the product of research-creation 




creation a process-making engine. Many products are 
produced, but they are not the product. They are the visible 
indexing of the process’s repeated taking-effect: they embody 
its traces (thus bringing us full circle to point 1). (SenseLab, 
no date a) 
Approached as a realisation of memory-potential, remembering is 
process. Memory-potential realised through movements of 
remembering at its most abstracted is a force for enduring 
progression and interaction of life. Many images exist out of 
memory-potential – be they psychic memory-images, bodily or 
conceptual artefacts or physical artefacts – but they are not 
memory nor remembering. They are the visible representation of 
the force of memory-potential’s repeated and constant drive 
toward action in the present, through its latent potential out of past 
experience (thus bringing us full circle to point 1).  
Memory as Anarchival: Remembering as Anarchiving 
Perhaps the most crucial problem with the archival model of memory might be that it 
imposes form or solidity onto memory. “[T]he root metaphor of solids encourages us to 
initially think of memory as a ‘thing’ that needs to be preserved against the forces of 
erosion”, Brown and Reavey observe, “and then subsequently to commodify that thing as 
something that requires auditing and safeguarding” (2015, p. 70). Through such a 
conception, an interpretive misconception arises in the realm of the human in thinking 
memory as stored knowledge rather than the potential for action, and in thinking 
remembering a recall of this knowledge rather than a realisation of this potential. 
Furthermore, in the realm of the digital man-machine collective remembering a 
misconception arises in thinking memory as media or data, as artefact in itself, to be 
recalled, rather than transindividual, relational potential for action through movements 
and interactions, of the signification of this media.  
If the knowledge or artefact is not present, then its ‘memory’ has been forgotten. Yet, as 
we shall explore in the case-study chapters, it is in their anarchival engagement – through 
reproduction, re-presentation – that artefacts and ‘knowledge’ find their continuing life – 
and thus, as deceptively straightforward as it sounds, anarchivally forgetting might be 




Thinking with the anarchive can help to conceptualise this formlessness at the heart of 
our understanding of memory. Just as it encourages one to think the archive not as a 
collection but as a series of actions, so can the conceptual anti-metaphor of the anarchive 
encourage us to stop thinking about personal and collective memory as form in space, but 
rather actions in time. Memory-potential is formless in that it is not physical, and its 
realisation into memory-images is formless in that it is a movement. The anarchive allows 
us to stop thinking remembering in terms of already-actualised memory-images, as 
‘things’ – be they primarily psychically, physically or digitally actualised. Rather, we can 
begin to think remembering, more closely to direct experience, as movement in duration, 
allowing us to think of remembering and forgetting not as the storage or loss of 
knowledge, but as the comings, goings and absences of potentials. Here, then, is 
attempted a succinct synthesis on ‘memory as anarchival’.   
------------------------------------------------------- 
Remembering is anarchival because it is formless. It is not made of ‘things’ but of 
potentials. It does not inform ‘knowledge’ but movements, toward action. Remembering 
is anarchival because it is the realisation of potentials. Remembering is not the 
individual recall of an experience in space but an actualisation of potentials, through 
collaborative movements of interactions, in duration. Remembering is anarchival 
because it is recognised in movements. It cannot be recognised in the forms and 
representations that it produces, but in the inter-related and inter-subjective movements 
and (inter)actions that produce them. Remembering is anarchival because it is 
relational. Remembering is concerned with relations in the present, realising potentials 
of past experience in anticipation of the future. It is the force that drives lived inter-
relationality. Remembering is anarchival because it (re)produces action. Memory-
potential, realised, informs itself and its inter-relations, producing actions in the present 
and informing actions of the future. Likewise, the use of artefacts to inform collective 
individuation should not be seen as ‘objects’ but as the reproduction of signifiers or 
carriers of potential.  
------------------------------------------------------- 
This chapter began with three aims. Firstly, to develop a comprehensive, philosophical 
approach to how we can understand memory non-archivally, and its relationship with 
technology. Secondly, to develop a useful conceptual tool in opposition to the creative 




real-world contexts. And, thirdly, to begin to consider the research question through this 
approach, laying the groundwork for more nuanced examination through the case-study 
chapters.  
Grounding our theoretical position in the philosophy of Henri Bergson, and situating it 
within his wider theorising on consciousness in duration, the first section of chapter began 
by looking at perception. It explored the idea of perception as an affective relation with 
one’s present environment, in duration, with the purpose of informing useful action, 
involuntarily or otherwise. It then considered memory’s relationship with this 
understanding of perception. It examined how memory is always present in perception, 
allowing an organism to use past experience to inform useful action in the present, for the 
future. Consciousness, in terms of self-awareness, it suggested, can in simple terms be 
understood as the inter-related ability to stitch together a relational sense of self, through 
perceiving life in duration – always in the present – in relation to imagined ideas about 
the past and future. At the same time, it is constituted by the related ability to ‘delay’ 
impulse actions, giving higher organisms such as humans the fundamental ability of 
choice of action. The function of memory established, it then moved to consider its nature. 
It explored Bergson’s thinking on pure memory, and its realisation through remembering 
into memory-images, which may in turn lead to movements and actions, to argue for a 
reconceptualisation of memory as memory-potential, informed through past experience, 
and of remembering as a realisation of this potential. It then moved to consider the inter-
relational social and technological character of remembering, through situating it within 
a reading of Gilbert Simondon’s theorising on psychic and collective individuation. 
Emphasising the always-interactive nature of memory, it suggested that we think of 
remembering as a transindividual act, a process of becoming that is always coming out of 
and re-informing ‘more than itself’, a surplus. It made the radical suggestion that we 
might in these terms consider the force of memory-potential, in its always-impending 
push to be realised, as a key driving force of all living interaction. A working 
understanding of memory and its inter-relational character established, it finished by 
exploring through Bergson and Simondon how we might understand its relations to 
technology and technological action. In examining how technology can be understood as 
an extension of, and then enhanced coupling with, human intelligence, it argued that 
conscious remembering is an always-technologically-mediated process, allowing a 
temporal synthesis of consciousness, both through conceptual technologies and through 




consciousness through the extended and or expanded ways in which they enable us to 
perceive, remember and act in the world.   
A comprehensive, working, non-archival, theoretical understanding of memory now 
established, the second part of the chapter sought to develop a conceptualisation of 
memory that could usefully act as a challenge to the archive metaphor, as a conceptual 
tool with which this understanding of memory could be understood more readily in the 
lived world. It first examined the tendency of language as a technology to both broaden 
and constrain our ability to express and understand inner states of being, such as 
remembering. It emphasised that, while it might be impossible to use language to 
perfectly express inner states, the task of philosophy might be understood as a way to 
express those states as close to the nature of direct experience as possible. A key aspect 
of this, it saw, is to force oneself to be critically aware of the assumptions that can be 
brought to one’s understanding of something through the language used to express it. As 
an alternative to the archive as a conceptual tool for memory, then, it proposed that we 
might use the anarchive as a conceptual anti-metaphor, thus escaping archival tendencies, 
and encouraging a sense of critical, self-reflective distance and hesitation through forcing 
us to think about what memory is not. To this end, it explored how the notion of the 
anarchive has been conceptualised by the SenseLab project in relation to traditional 
archives, and, through a conceptual comparison, argued that such an approach would be 
both compatible and useful for thinking our new, more ‘joined-up’ approach to memory.  
We now have a working, non-archival, theoretical approach to memory and a useful 
conceptual tool with which to apply it within the real world. Thusly equipped, Part Three 
of this chapter returns our investigation to the central research question – What role do 
new, online and pervasive technologies play in changing individual and collective 
memory processes?  
--o0o-- 
3. Struggling to Remember: Memory in the Online Era 
Through the previous parts of this chapter, this thesis has attempted to develop a 
comprehensive, inter-relational, process- and affect-led understanding of memory and the 
memory-technology relationship, and to conceive of a useful way of applying such an 
understanding in real-world contexts through the adoption of the anarchive as a 




we return to the central research question – What role do new, online and pervasive 
technologies play in changing individual and collective memory processes? In 
preparation for subsequent case studies and discussion, Part Three of this chapter aims to 
sketch out the thrust of the subsequent case-study chapters by asking what might be at 
stake for memory in the online era if we examine how we are today remembering 
differently through such technologies. It suggests that, rather than being concerned with 
whether we are remembering too much or too little, the crucial areas for consideration 
may lie in the limitations, affordances and indeed agencies within the socio-political 
infrastructures through whose processes and interfaces consciousness-informing 
processes of memory, perception and action are now co-realised.  
Acknowledging Massumi’s important observation that affect cannot be easily separated 
from politics (2015), the section begins by making the radical argument that, as well as 
considering the intuitive experiences of remembering through new technologies, any 
investigation into how we are remembering differently in the online era must be equally 
situated within an arena of contemporary socio-political analysis. To this end, it advocates 
a two-pronged exploration within the case studies, including both empirical and 
situational analysis. Next, reflecting on the anarchival attitude to memory developed 
above, the section attempts to sketch out a speculative political economy for memory in 
the digital age, focusing on the key ideas of memory-potential and remembering as an 
actualisation of this potential into individuating action, through the lens of the anarchive. 
Through this process, it makes the crucial argument that, in part driven by its tendency to 
be seen as archival, processes of memory have been co-opted by practices and desires of 
neo-liberal, corporate economics – quantified, datafied, packaged, sold, repackaged and 
resold. Following Massumi’s thinking on the politics of belonging (2002, pp. 68-88), it 
suggests that we might think of new corporatist technologies of memory as in one way or 
another attempting to usurp the very realisation of potential that remembering represents. 
In a tension with more cultural and biological drives of remembering, rather than 
facilitating an inter-relational, anarchival memory-experience – as a realising of potential 
useful for transindividual action – key, prevalent platforms of twenty-first-century 
memory experience, such as social media networks, photo-back-up services and search 
engines, have instead promoted an archival, datafied experience of memory, designed to 
encourage, guide or even explicitly processes of individuation, chiefly in the service of a 




Toward a Political Economy of Remembering 
From the outset, this section stakes the claim that to think about remembering necessitates 
a move to think politically. The previous sections of this chapter set out a comprehensive 
philosophical understanding of remembering as an affective and inter-subjective process 
of realisation of potential – based on the usefulness of past experience for informing 
useful action in the present. And while a naïve reading of Bergson on memory might lead 
one to think of remembering as geared toward useful action for the individual, through a 
deeper reading within this approach, we have argued for an understand of remembering 
as always-complex, co-constructed processes of psychic and collective individuation. 
These processes involve tension and negotiation between different sets of actors and 
agencies: between one’s actualised past, perceived present and anticipated future; and 
between one’s environment/s, sociality/ies and technological mediation/s (physical and 
conceptual), enabling action useful for the more-than individual. This section aims to 
introduce the basis for the argument of a contemporary kind of ‘struggle’ for memory, 
between these different drives and agencies, as a departure point for the subsequent case 
study chapters.  
Remembering is Relational; Relational is Political 
An individual-collective is not only made up of human individuals. It is made 
up of many actors, human and technological, working together in specific 
ways to maintain the boundaries and solidity of the individual-collective. An 
actor can be defined as any element in a system that produces action, and thus 
includes, along with single human beings, the technological and cultural 
artifacts that enable specific movements. (Bollmer, 2011, pp. 458-459)  
What role do new, online and pervasive technologies play in changing individual and 
collective memory processes? Our approach to answering the question through 
subsequent sections of this chapter is, as already made clear, to consider how we are 
remembering differently in the online era. And, in employing our developed 
understanding of memory, this incites a method of empirical analysis of the experience 
of remembering through new technologies. Key areas of exploration within this would be 
the ways in which we perceive the past through new technologies. How do experiences 
through new technologies affect our perception of duration, of memory within duration? 
What kind of a remembered self do we experience through remembering as interaction 




of collective remembering online? And can we think about these experiences in relation 
to the archive and the anarchive? Indeed, with a focus on action in duration, how can we 
begin to think not only in terms of experiences of cyber-space but also in terms of 
experiences of cyber-time? 
However, we cannot ignore that remembering, as an affective, and multi-informed 
process, involves, as Bollmer puts it, “many actors, human and technological, working 
together in specific ways” (2011, p. 458), each with their own kinds of agencies – and, as 
such, is also an essentially political process. As Massumi observes, “The [Spinozan, as 
we shall see below] formula: ‘to affect and be affected’ is … proto-political in the sense 
that it includes relation in the definition … is to be open to the world, to be active in it 
and to be patient for return activity” (Massumi, 2015, p. ix). For this straightforward 
reason, then, our approach must also take care to account for a wider situational analysis 
of memory experiences, not looking solely at the experience of remembering through 
particular kinds of technologies or interfaces, but the decisions or reasons behind why 
they may be used in particular ways, why remembering is experienced in particular ways, 
indeed why interfaces are designed particular ways.  
While our study is chiefly centred around the consciousness- and subjectivity-informing, 
inter-affective processes of perception, remembrance and (choice of) action, we should 
not lose sight of the importance of the body in relation to the emergent sense of ‘the 
subject’. Indeed, since we may see the body as a centre for action, out of whose relational 
processes consciousness emerges, we might think all subjectivity, strictly speaking, to be 
embodied, and thus a sense of the subject intrinsically entangled with a sense of the body. 
However, as body and media theorist Lisa Blackman notes, “Affect theory presents a 
number of challenges to body studies … [taking discussion] beyond the body-as-
organism” (2012, p. 5). The relational consideration of the body and bodily experience in 
contemporary affect theory owes a significant debt to seventeenth-century Dutch 
philosopher Benedict de Spinoza, who conceptualises affect as “affections of the body by 
which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at 
the same time, the ideas of these affections” (1994, p. 154). “With affect”, argue cultural 
theorist Melissa Gregg and communication theorist Gregory J. Seigworth, “a body is as 
much outside itself as in itself – webbed in its relations – until ultimately such firm 
distinctions cease to matter” (2010, p. 3). From a perspective of body-as-relation, a key 
consideration for affect theory as method may thus be found, as sociologist and 




the “biomediated body” (2008). That is to say, following Ali Lara and others’ 
paraphrasing of Clough, that “the political power of affect studies lies not just in what the 
body can do, but also and more importantly in the analysis of what the body can be made 
to do” (Lara et al, 2017, p. 40). Moreover, and returning us to the notion of the subject, 
Lara et al argue that this principle may be expanded “towards an analysis of the tendencies 
or propensities in the emergence of human subjectivity, or what subjectivity can be made 
to do” (Lara et al, 2017, p. 40; italics my own). Yet, as Lara et al note, employing affective 
methods to examine the “distributed agency” (Lara et al, 2017, p. 40) of the subject is not 
to disregard the (sense of the) body. Rather, it is to consider the processes through which 
a sense of the body may emerge: 
[I]t means to further explore the ways in which new forms of control and 
manipulation of populations are setting conditions for the emergence of 
racialized, gendered, disable bodies, as well as the perpetuation of general 
homogeneous states of the body. (2017, p. 40) 
To remember in a world of digital and pervasive media is, generally, to inhabit a world 
of data, seemingly of ‘things’, each action, indeed interaction, dutifully logged and stored 
away, ready for later retrieval. Yet if, as we understand it, memory is not about knowledge 
but about action – not about truthfulness but usefulness – then how, for example, does 
this change the way in which we approach the idea of personal data, of so-called ‘digital 
traces’ or ‘digital footprints’? Of what use are such potentials when realised – and, 
perhaps more pertinently, who might they be useful for? In a world of ‘sharing’ and ‘pay-
per-click’, how might we now consider popular issues such as ‘fake news’, 
‘misinformation’ or ‘virality’? For whom and in what ways are the movements and 
actions of online extension and ‘spread’ of apparent personal and more collective media-
as-memory useful? In a world of socially-networked media and media-driven identity 
politics, how might we consider the nature of ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ history, and of 
cultural identity? If, through our approach to memory, we see senses of cultural identity 
and remembrance as “evolving, self-transforming and milieu-informing elaborations” 
(Grosz, 2013, p. 55) in the present, how can might we consider examining those platforms 
through which such processes of collectivisation take place?  
Memory-potential is not some sort of vital, teleological spirit, driving the individual 
forward toward its ordained future; it is a wild force for interaction toward individuation, 
borne out of past experience yet driven by affective inter-relations in the present that can 




which such potentials might be captured, and realised, through new memory experiences 
and through new technologies? Where, in remembering through online and pervasive 
technologies, might we say the relation of power currently lies in who remembers what, 
where, when, and for what purpose? How might we relate practices of remembering 
through platforms such as Facebook, Google or Twitter, each with their own agenda, to 
the psychological idea of collectivised “managed accessibility” of memories (Brown and 
Reavey, 2015, p. 14)? 
Thus, each of the case-study chapters takes same essential approach, exploring both the 
empirical aspects of how we may think about the experience of remembering through 
new technologies, and considering more political, situational aspects of these 
infrastructures of remembering. To this end, each asks broadly similar questions: 
examining processes of remembering by asking in what ways acts of personal or 
collective remembrances are taking place; considering the apparent purpose of these 
actions by asking what kinds of action are being informed, and why; and, finally, 
broadening the conversation by discussing the wider potential socio-political and 
philosophical implications. In doing so, the chapters aim to excavate what we may think 
of as the key ‘problem’ for remembering in the online era.  
The Technological and Economic 
“Technical life”, Simondon says, “does not consist in overseeing machines, but in 
existing at the same level as a being that takes charge of the relation between them” (2017, 
p. 140), and the nuance of our own investigation emerges, in many ways, out this idea of 
‘taking charge of relation’ between the human and machine, or indeed the lack thereof.  
If we return to Simondon’s example of the man-machine coupling of memory in 
producing a record of telephone calls, we can, in simple terms, understand such a coupling 
as human and machine working together to achieve an aim more productively than they 
could if apart (if indeed possible apart). The human, here, as ‘technician’, understands the 
function of the machine, and operates with it to achieve a common, greater function.  
There is something alive in a technical ensemble, and the integrative function 
of life can be ensured only by human beings; the human being has the capacity 
to understand the functioning of the machine, on the one hand, and the 




Yet, with new technologies of remembering, it is not necessarily always clear what 
‘function’ the human or the technology is performing when interactions occur. Think, for 
example, of interacting with a post on a free social-networking platform such as 
Facebook. While it might seem like a simple ‘liking’ of someone’s post is a function of 
connecting with another via a social networking platform, acts such as this, as people are 
becomingly increasingly aware, feed into a complex system of behavioural data-gathering 
that informs all manner of interactions, ultimately in pursuit of efficient advertising 
revenue. In that sense, the act is no longer a mutual function – rather, on the one hand 
there is a seemingly co-produced function of communicating with others through 
technology, yet all the while this is being harnessed for an altogether different function 
by the machine, not readily disclosed.  
As we have seen seminally through Plato’s Phaedrus, as well as Bergson’s reasoning on 
technologies on at once broadening and constraining perception, we may think that 
technologies and media technologies have always involved some form of 
‘pharmacological’ relationship. However, as Hansen observes: 
As a consequence of this operational split [no longer a mutual understanding 
of the function being performed] and the resulting possibilities for data-
gathering and manipulation, the long-standing pharmacological ‘pact’ that 
has characterized the history of media from writing to cinema would seem to 
have been broken or, at the very least, rendered obsolete: simply put, what we 
get back has no possibility to compensate for what we give up. (2015, p. 71) 
Within such a characterisation, might we perhaps say that the users have become the 
used? Through the subsequent case-study chapters, the thesis will argue that, in part 
enabled by the popular tendency to conceptually spatialise memory into a ‘thing’, 
corporate and more political drives behind prominent, contemporary technologies of 
remembering have exploited this ‘operational shift’ to great advantage. The conceptual 
‘datafication’ of seeing memory quantitively and archivally oriented ‘as media’, rather 
than anarchivally and qualitatively oriented as action, has allowed for the quantification 
and commodification of apparent ‘media-as-memory’, harnessing the drives out of 
memory-potential, and subversively employed to inform more artificially-constructed 
perceptions of users’ sense of personal and collectivised subjective identity.  
On the one hand, we might think of platforms such as Google or social media sites as 




what we may think of as kinds of ‘surveillance capitalist’ technologies (Zuboff, 2019) – 
through personal social-media timelines and photo-backups, wearables’ logs, location 
history website cookies, search histories – may then be used for the likes of data-analysis 
profit, such as through advertising, or as a currency and investment within the attention 
economy, packaged up, sold on (indeed sold back to us), repackaged and resold... In a 
very real sense, our recorded artefacts of the personal past are, as Hansen notes, “fed-
forward” (2015) automatically, and perhaps without much conscious consent, into our 
identity-informing perceptions of the present, and our remembrances within that present.  
On the other hand, the online-facilitated virality of hate speech and fake news in so-called 
collective memory, and platforms’ seeming inability to stem the flow, may indicate a kind 
of ‘loss’ of control for platforms when it comes to managing content. This seeming 
paradox, the case-study chapters will argue, vanishes once we begin to think what is at 
stake for memory in the online era not in terms of ‘memory as content’ but in terms of 
remembering as processes of psychic and collective individuation. What is different in 
the online era is not only the connectivity and instantaneity of man-machine-enabled 
remembering, but also the agency balance between the machine and the man – or, as we 
shall see through the case-study chapters, we may think of ourselves in the online era 
within a peculiarly new expression of the tensions between the more biological, cultural 
and technological drives of individuality and society, and between their own complex 
systems of agencies. The experience of perceiving and remembering through 
contemporary technologies involve many apparently clandestine agencies – and a covert 
shift toward more technologically-guided processes of perception and remembering-
informed identity, risks informing useful action not necessarily for the benefit of the 
transindividual user, but rather those agencies guiding our perceptions. Thus, action risks 
being actualised to further not just the economic or political benefit of the platforms 
themselves, but also any of the multifaceted multiplicities of commercial, socio-political 
or indeed more legislative actors, agents and special interests interdependent with the 
surveillance capitalist model, in what media theorist Andrew Chadwick has called the 
“hybrid media system” (2017).   
The Usurpation of Memory-Potential  
In Simondonian terms, it is tempting to argue that, rather than technicians coupled with 




‘worker’ or labourers, who – alienated from their own transindividual agency in 
experience – are not, according to Simondon, really transindividuals.  
[Workers] are not mobilized as ‘subjects’ … that is to say, as carriers of a pre-
individual charge of nature that allows them to transindividuate. The relation 
of labour merely puts individuals in relation with each other – it merely relates 
being as already individuated. (De Boever et al, 2013, p. 228) 
Workers, in Simondonian terms are not transindividual but interindividual. They do not 
become ‘more-than-individual’ in the sense that transindividuals within a collectively 
individuated society do, or as emerges in true man-machine coupling. Rather, they simply 
relate to each other, providing functions for each other but never in any way that will 
allow them to collectively individuate, to become more than. In this sense, this section 
does not aim to make an overblown argument that people are ‘enslaved’, or similar, by 
technologies. Rather, it is to say that, if our social and cultural memories are inter-
relatedly realised through an aspect of choice, which relies on perception, and, in the case 
of the man-machine, an understanding of the mutual function; if the transindividual 
agencies of consciousness-informing processes of perception and remembering are 
lessened enough, actions guided by technologies and interfaces, indeed in being unaware 
of the wider function of the individuating action; then this choice of how to act – the very 
foundation of Bergson’s thinking on consciousness – is rendered somewhat impotent. We 
are, perhaps, in Bergsonian thinking, relegated to the order of lower animals, processes 
of consciousness and action reduced to reaction and impulse; docile, and primed to offer 
up our labour to those who would tame and harness these processes. Alienated from the 
pre-individual charge, we become more akin to “communities” of interindividuals, active 
bodies externally placed in relation to each other, than to “true societies” of 
transindividuals (De Boever et al, 2013, pp. 224-225). This argument is made, then, to 
highlight the importance of being able (indeed permitted) to understand one’s own 
relation to multiplicities of less transparent agencies that inform the perceptions and 
actions guided through new, online technologies.  
In his 2002 essay on The Political Economy of Belonging, Massumi argues that the notion 
of belonging had been ‘usurped’ by models of global capitalism, whose “ultimate capture, 
[is] not of the elements of expression, not even of expression, but of the movement of the 
event itself” (2002, p. 88). Yet might we not liken the attempt to capture ‘the movement 
of the event’ as the problem we find ourselves facing when considering the 




It is in no way underestimating capitalist control to call its worldwide 
trafficking in modulation the stylization of power. It was argued earlier that 
the model of power was usurpation. What is being usurped here? The very 
expression of potential. The movement of relationality. Becoming-together. 
Belonging. Capitalism is the global usurpation of belonging. (2002, p. 88) 
Indeed, we might in many ways through the following case studies think of new, 
surveillance capitalist technologies of personal and collective remembering as the 
attempted usurpation of memory-potential. The re-appropriation of processes of realising 
memory-potential, and indeed its resultant actualised action. The commodified digital 
artefact being mistaken for ‘memory’, while the true processes of remembering, in inter-
relational interaction in duration – the ‘expressions of potential’ – are more and more 
guided by interfaces and algorithms whose primary, or at least duplicitous, purpose is not 
of usefulness to the transindividual and its socialities, but to the profit margins of those 
corporations through whose infrastructures we now remember.  
Through the case-study chapters, three sequential themes are drawn out into each other. 
In the first, we examine how ‘personal pasts’ may be remembered through new 
surveillance technologies. In doing so, the chapter argues that we may think ‘memory as 
media’ as being used to excite and harness processes of realising memory-potential, and 
thus the drives toward psychic and more collective individuation – to excite engagement 
in the app as well as, or perhaps in supremacy over, exciting useful action for the 
transindividual. In the second, we examine how socialities may emerge and/or 
reconstitute themselves through collectively-individuating acts of ‘coalescing’ around 
creatively-reproduced media artefacts representing the past. In doing so, it argues that we 
may think artefact-facilitated remembrances as driving collective individuation not only 
through the past but through ideas of the past – useful for stabilising a culturally-driven 
sense of sociality in the present. Furthermore, it argues that the likes of social media act 
to encourage the facilitation of such connections not principally for usefulness for always-
emergent socialities, but in order to secure continued monetisable interaction with the 
platform. In the third, we examine so-called ‘fake news’, and consider how these ideas of 
the past need not be at all true – arguing that transindividual socialities may reconstitute 
a stable sense of their group identity through the formation of and belief in false pasts, 
more recent and more historical. In doing so, it emphasises that surveillance technologies 
may guide culturally-driven beliefs and resulting actions through a connection-




but to promote engagement and interaction for the purposes of revenue-generation. 
Ultimately, through the thrust of the case study chapters, the thesis argues that we must 
think ourselves within social fields of ‘struggles’ for memory, in which we find the 
various, competing-yet-complementary, consciousness-informing drives of the 
individual, the wider cultural and the technological to be in unprecedentedly complex and 
critical socio-political-economic negotiation, risking upsetting the balance of agency in 
control over what constitutes memory, the individual and social – indeed consciousness 













Me, Myself and iPhones:  
Mediated Memory and Pervasive Personal Pasts 
 
Memory is the seamstress, and a capricious one at that. Memory 
runs her needle in and out, up and down, hither and thither. We 
know not what comes next, or what follows after. Thus, the most 
ordinary movement in the world, such as sitting down at a table 
and pulling the inkstand towards one, may agitate a thousand odd, 
disconnected fragments, now bright, now dim, hanging and 
bobbing and dipping and flaunting, like the underlinen of a family 
of fourteen on a line in a gale of wind. 
Orlando (Virginia Woolf, 2003, p. 37) 
 
In fact, there is no perception which is not full of memories. With 
the immediate and present data of our senses, we mingle a 
thousand details out of our past experience … Perception, 
impregnated with our past.  
 (Henri Bergson, 2004, p. 24) 
 
Intended as a basis for theoretical expansion in subsequent Case-Study Chapters, this 
chapter explores from our anarchival perspective how processes of remembering personal 
pasts may be experienced in their extension through new, pervasive and online 
technologies. Examining the experience and functions of three key kinds of prominent 
contemporary ‘technology of memory’ – Google Maps, Facebook’s and others’ ‘On This 
Day’ feature, and the ‘Memorialization’ of Facebook or other social-media accounts – it 
has two aims. On the one hand, it aims to consider in what ways and for what reasons the 
ways in which we remember personal – or more autobiographical – pasts may be 
changing through the engagement of data-artefacts in such interfaces. On the other hand, 
acknowledging perception and remembering as part of wider affective, social movements 




which to more substantially explore broader collective – that is to say, techno-cultural 




1. The Dropped Pin: Google Maps and Personal Pasts  
In this section we examine how processes of remembering personal pasts may be 
extended through the ubiquitous and pervasive technology of smartphone app Google 
Maps. After first briefly introducing the app and its features – with a focus on how ones 
‘personal past’ or indeed ‘private past’ may be re-presented in the perceived present 
through historical user-data – the section explores how we might think the concept of 
transindividual, extended remembering through the platform from our anarchival 
perspective. Reflecting on popular ideas of ‘cognitive extension’ as outlined in the 
Literature Review Chapter, it argues that, more than seeing the Google Maps’s data-
collection as a ‘store-and-retrieve’ database repository, we may see it anarchivally as 
movements of human and machine-calculated re-presenting of data-artefacts in 
duration, for the perceived needs of the present. From our theoretical view of the 
technologically-extended body as affective processes in duration, then, we may see 
remembering through Google Maps as man-machine-coupled movements of expanded 
perception, memory, action, and thus consciousness, in the present. This established, the 
section moves to introduce a consideration of the role that more material and economic 
factors in the feed-forward (Hansen, 2015), surveillance-capitalist (Zuboff, 2019) 
platform-model may play in affectively constituting processes of remembering through 
the app. It observes that, while the consciousness-informing re-presenting of data-
artefacts through Google Maps may serve useful action in the present, we may question 
the ways in which the action is useful for whom, and thus questions the agency-balance 
within the man-machine coupling.  
Where’d You Park the Car? Remembering with Google Maps 
On your Android phone or tablet, open the Google Maps app. 
Tap the blue dot that shows your location. 




Google Maps is the world’s most popular navigation app, with more than a billion 
monthly active users as of the end of 2017 (Alphabet Inc., 2018). In April 2017, Google 
introduced a new feature for the app, allowing users to save their current location as a 
parking spot (see Figure 1): once the user requests to ‘save’ their spot, the app’s display 
holds a ‘dropped pin’ at that location so they may later easily find their way back to the 
vehicle through the app. “Always forget where you parked the car?”, asks a major U.S. 
news outlet at the time of the feature’s launch (Yurief, 2017) – Google now remembers 
for you.   
‘Save your parking’ is just one of several features offered in Google Maps that we 
might from a perhaps more traditional perspective think of as so-called ‘memory aids’. 
More substantial than one dropped pin, Google’s servers by default retain a record of 
the user’s entire location history, collected through location-tracking on the user’s 
smartphone (and, on Android devices, even in the background when not using the app – 
Schmidt, 2018), which users may remind themselves of in various ways. For example, a 
user’s location history can be viewed via menu item, ‘Your Timeline’, grouped by date 
and path-taken, or geographical location (see Figures 2, 3 & 4) – or the app may 
‘remind’ the user of dates of previous visits to a place when searching for or tapping on 
the place through the app (see Figure 5). Google Maps also ‘syncs’ with other inter-
synchronised Google services to provide a greater breadth of reminders in the present – 
such as displaying geo-tagged photos from a user’s private Google Photos account in 
their Maps Timeline (see Figure 2) or overlaying a location with the details of an event 
or meeting scheduled there through Google Calendar. Indeed, Google Calendar’s sync 
with Gmail as well as other imported, third-party calendars allows Google Maps to 
display yet more app-external information within its own platform – for example, 
automatically scraping details for a hotel stay or concert performance from a booking-
confirmation email and laying the details over the respective locations in everyday 
Google Maps use (see Figure 6).  
As suggested in the previous chapter, following media theorist Mark Hansen, we may 
think of these apparent ‘reminders’ as part of a kind of “feed-forward” mechanism 
(Hansen, 2015). In such a technological mechanism, data-artefacts from a user’s past – 
the “[m]achine memory … of the document, the result of measurement” (Simondon, 
2017, p. 138) – are brought forward, re-presented, into the transindividual’s phone-
screen-interface-facilitated perceived present. Furthermore, personal user-data 




(intentionally or otherwise) past. Google Maps’s ‘For You’ feature, for example, draws 
on undisclosed machine-processed data of a user’s past activity, in combination 
machine-perceived data of the user’s present environment, to make suggestions for new 
action. For example, through algorithmically processing a kind of ‘machine-knowledge’ 
of the user’s present location and establishment-specific location history, the app may 
offer automated, personalised recommendations for places to visit, or restaurants to eat 
at, or link to news articles about places in the user’s local area.14  
The difference, then, between the likes of Google Maps and mere ‘digitised memory 
aids’ (for example, contacts lists in a smartphone rather than an address book, photos on 
a hard-drive rather than a physical album, or automated reminders on a smartphone or 
computer rather than, say, on Post-It notes) is that Google Maps operates as a machine 
with its own functions and drives, rather than a tool that is simply used. Thus, while 
digital humanities scholar Paul Longley Arthur suggests, for example, that we “are 
increasingly dependent on memory banks that are external and separate to do the 
memory work for us” (2009, p. 56), this ‘memory work’ extends to more than the 
simple storage or processing of data-artefacts on hard drives or servers. As we will 
discuss below, we might think that Google Maps does so much operate as memory 
extension, as operate as technologically-expanded perception, in dialogue with the user, 
seemingly with its own set of agencies.  
We will come to the subject of agency later in the section. For now, however, let us 
think about how we might approach the role Google Maps may play in changing 
memory processes in terms of supposed technological extension of remembering, 
indeed of mind.  
 
 
14 Yet, as we shall see below, such transparent, on-screen, ‘user-accessible’ features do not represent 
the full body of more clandestine user-data collection and analysis, with much more collated and 





Figure 1 – ‘Save your parking’ Google Maps feature Figure 2 – Google Maps Timeline feature 
   




   
Figure 5 – Google Maps ‘you visited this place’ feature  Figure 6 – Google Maps Gmail-scraped schedule overlay 
 
Extended Remembering: Google as Hybrid Consciousness 
In what ways might we think that processes of perception and remembering are changing 
through their seeming extension in the use of apps like Google Maps?  
As discussed in the Theory Chapter, beyond the “body-as-organism that, by the late 19th 
century, had become the model of what a body is” (Clough, 2008, p. 2), we may see the 
body from an affective perspective as ‘more than human’, as processes of biological and 
technological relations – what sociologist and philosopher Patricia Ticineto Clough has 
called the “biomediated body” (Clough, 2008). However, more an extension of the body 
or intelligence into functioning tool or machine of mediation, Google Maps, initially at 
least, seems to act with its own agency, algorithmically organising what it deems useful 
to display the user. Indeed, we might be tempted to for the moment (somewhat 
dissonantly) think of the app as making choices that affect the transindividual, human-as-
user processes of perceiving the present and remembering the past. We might think of 
this co-perception as what Hansen has called a kind of “functional processing of 
information in hybrid human-machine assemblages” (Hansen, 2006, p. 101). Or, as 




perspective, with machines the human may be “seen as part of a distributed system” 
(1999, p. 290).  
We saw in the Literature Review chapter how other cognitive or positivist approaches to 
the idea of remembering have proposed the idea of human-machine-hybrid action as a 
kind of “extended cognition” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), resonating with various popular 
public discourses. In their seminal work on Extended Mind Theory (1998), philosophers 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers use the very example of tool-informed directions to 
navigate – instructions in a notebook – as way in which cognition might be thought as 
extended beyond the body. And this navigation example provides a perhaps serendipitous 
opportunity to consider how using Google Maps may look different from our more 
affective, anarchival approach to the case-study, against a more positivist, archival 
approach.  
Let us remind ourselves of Clark and Chalmers’s example around “belief embedded in 
memory” (1998, p. 12). In this example, two people each wish to find their way to a 
destination: the Museum of Modern Art. For, ‘Inga’, the first, “[s]he thinks for a moment 
and recalls that the museum is on 53rd Street, so she walks to 53rd Street and goes into 
the museum” (1998, p. 12). ‘Otto’, the second, however, suffers from Alzheimer’s 
disease, and relies on a notebook in which he continuously records information about his 
life, and thus from which he can look up “old information” as and when required (1998, 
p. 12). For Otto, then, “[h]e consults the notebook, which says that the museum is on 53rd 
Street, so he walks to 53rd Street and goes into the museum” (1998, p. 13). Clark and 
Chalmers conclude that “in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous” (1998, p. 
13), arguing that “information in the notebook functions just like the information 
constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies 
beyond the skin” (1998, p. 13). 
In principle, Clark and Chalmers’s notion of ‘extended cognition’ is not a million miles 
away from our own approach to consciousness, perception and remembering as processes 
co-constituted beyond the supposed borders of the human body. Though theirs takes a 
cognitive approach, we might think that from both perspectives the inter-relational, 
technologically coupled movements of interaction with Google Maps may be seen as co-
informing a sense of self-aware or conscious relation to, and action in, the world. Indeed, 
similar to our understanding of the affective man-machine coupling, Clark and Chalmers 
think of the use of tools or machines in as “a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive 




the tendency in this approach to think archivally, in terms of things in space, rather than 
intuitively, in terms of processes in time and space. It is to think memory as informing 
knowledge and belief rather than enabling action – indeed to risk mistaking media for 
stored memory. Thus, Clark and Chalmers find themselves discussing memory in terms 
of ‘information’ that might be ‘stored’ or ‘processed’ somewhere – indeed physically 
extended elsewhere. And, as we saw in the Literature Review Chapter, this spatial, 
cognitive conception of memory as knowledge-information, brain as processor of ‘bits’ 
of information, has become equally manifest in academic and more popular commentary 
on the relationship between human memory and new, online technologies.  
From an extended-mind-theory perspective on perceiving and remembering, then, 
processes of remembering through the ubiquity, speed and availability Google Maps 
might be seen – just as with Otto’s notebook – as an extension of the cognitive system, 
and an externalisation of supposed memory ‘storage’. As Clark and Chalmers suggest, 
we might think of the relationship as “an extended system, a coupling of biological 
organism and external resources” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 18). Indeed, we might 
think of the automatic (re)presentation of user-data, signifying one’s past, as a kind of 
interface-facilitated expansion of availability of media-as-memory into a conveniently-
presented present. And, in thinking memory as information, it would be perhaps 
straightforward to now appreciate the emergence of the supposed problems around 
supposed loss or gain in human memory retention, explored in the Literature Review (a 
number of which we will return to later in the chapter). For example, those various 
academic and more popular concerns around the role of new technologies in changing 
brain plasticity around perception, attention and memory retention - and its supposed 
implications for human processing and recall of information.15 
Yet how might the notion of Google Maps as extension look from our anarchival 
perspective – considering remembering not as serving knowledge but as working with 
perception to inform useful action in duration? And what kind of resultant problems might 
we find through such an investigation? Grounding ourselves in an attempt to think of pure 
 
15 For example, let us remind ourselves about Hayles’s notions of “hyper” and “deep” attention, pointing 
to changing cognitive processing “styles” for perceiving information in the online era (Hayles, 2007). 
More quantifiably, pop-writer Nicholas Carr worries about how the internet is changing our cognitive 
“capacity concentration, contemplation, and reflection”, affecting how well long-term memories may be 
‘consolidated’ (Carr, 2011). Perhaps more apocalyptically, neuroscientist Susan Greenfield warns of 
supposed “source amnesia”, where information being stored online leads to a human inability to 
‘source’ it within a narrative – where “all your memories will blur instead of being compartmentalised 




experience in duration, the next section tackles this question through a two-pronged 
approach. It considers what kind of sense of temporality, of space and time – of the 
present – may be informed through using the app. And, at the same time, it reflects on the 
ways in which memory-potential may be excited into realisation, and thus engagement 
encouraged between a user and a sense of their personal past, through the app’s feed-
forward, data-artefact significations of those pasts.    
Archival Time? Platform Perceptions and Automated Artefacts 
Let us remind ourselves, since all perceiving involves remembering, that in remembering 
and perceiving we occupy a conscious realm that is at once within the physical plane of 
action and the virtual plane of dream (Bergson, 2004, pp. 217-215). “We shift between 
virtual and actual states all of the time”, philosopher Keith Ansell-Pearson notes, 
following Bergson, “never completely virtual or completely actual” (2010, p. 68). And it 
is useful to here re-emphasise Bergson’s insistence on perceiving not in terms of physical 
“thing” or mental “representation” but in terms of images – “an existence placed half-
way between [things and representations]” (Bergson, 2004, pp. vii-viii). Through the 
conceptual lens of perception in terms of experiencing images, as literary scholar Susan 
Guerlac argues, our “usual habits of thought” are disrupted (2006, p. 112), allowing us 
the possibility of more closely, intuitively appreciating affective experience in duration 
for what it purely is – to some extent escaping the trappings of more discretely bifurcated 
mind-versus-matter, subject-versus-object framings.  
It is from this perspective that we will throughout this and the following chapters attempt 
to understand the experience of remembering through new, online technologies.  
We developed through the Theory Chapter an understanding of artefacts, and indeed 
knowledge, as a form of habit memory, where the past may be repeated or re-performed 
into the present – be it through conceptual, bodily or more external technological 
repetition. For Bergson, habit memory is not ‘true’ memory, since, rather than involving 
the realisation of memory-potential about past experience to inform useful action in the 
present, the repetitions of habit memory “merely act” the past in the present (Bergson, 
2004, p. 91). In this sense, then, the chapter conceptualised artefacts (or what we might 
above have thought of as personal or collective ‘memory aids’) as – through their 
repetition or re-engagement – technologically-facilitated means of bringing pasts forward 
into the present. They act as technologies of relation (Bergson, 1911, pp. 155-157), 




those that would have been otherwise perceived relationally in the present. In this way, 
they act as carriers of potential, which through signification may excite the realisation of 
memory-potential into memory-images and individuating action – and excite more social 
drives toward collective individuation. They act to expand our perception of the extending 
bodily and social being from its past and into its future, engendering a sense of more-
than, across the double-planes of virtuality and actuality. 
If we now return to the notion of technological extension in Clark and Chalmers’s thought 
experiment, we may recognise that what Otto and Inga are both dealing with is not truly 
‘memory’ in a strict sense at all. Rather, they each engage with a kind of habit memory 
or artefact – Inga’s being a repeated, (learnt) virtual conceptual artefact of the city’s 
streets, and Otto’s being a physically-noted artefact of the same directions. Each example, 
of course, involves memory – always present with perception and lived action. Yet, in 
mistaking knowledge for memory Clark and Chalmers do not recognise that neither Otto 
nor Inga remembers the directions as memory per se – rather they perceive technological, 
artefactual re-presentations or repetitions of the past, which we may now think of as 
knowledge. Thus, the difference between their supposed memory experiences are not so 
much a difference of degree, of supposed capacity for cognition, tentacle-like, creeping 
out of the body and into numerous tools. Rather, and in the emphatic spirit of leaky bodies, 
they represent a difference in kind – between a conceptually-repeated, leant artefact and 
a physically-re-engageable artefact.16  
How, then, might we approach the experience of remembering through the case-study 
object of Google Maps through such an understanding?  
Temporality and Virtual Space 
Sociologist and cultural theorist Rob Shields presents a compelling Bergsonian critique 
of the how “temporality and memory” may (or may not) be presented through 
contemporary Geographical Information Systems (GIS), which “intended as digital forms 
of mapping struggle to represent time, change and temporality” (Shields, 2018 p. 316). 
With their focus on space, “defined according to coordinates” (2018, 317), Shields 
 
16 Neither is the belief aspect of Clark and Chalmers’s conjecturing to be ignored. For them, belief may 
equally spatially be ‘held’ and influenced through internal and extended external operations (1998). In 
the final Case-Study Chapter, we will return to the concept of belief not as ‘thing’ but as process out of 
drives toward individuation – yet, for now, this chapter maintains its focus on the ways in which new, 




observes, technologies like Google Maps (and, its family members, Google Earth and 
Google Street View) experience practical difficulties in presenting notions of temporality:  
[T]he past can only be added as a narrative about a point, or implicitly 
represented through the changing location of a user or device. It can be 
understood by users’ comparing two maps showing a changing situation over 
time or animating a digital map on screen to display this change. Alternately, 
an implicit trail of the coordinates of someone changing location traces a line 
on a map. (Shields, 2018, p. 317) 
While options like these may illustrate a “geographical ‘before and after’”, Shields 
argues, they cannot account for change to the user or the device – “just a trail of points” 
(2018, p. 317). Thus, while for GIS “location is innate, experience is a foreign concept” 
(Shields, 2018, p. 317). 
While Shields rightly notes the inadequacy GIS in properly presenting a sense of 
temporality of the historicity place, and of duration in space, this section – not 
disagreeably – intends to argue something quite different. We here argue that, while the 
app fails to visually display a sense of duration, it does offer a particular sense of 
individuated temporality of the personal and social present, in the user’s own, lived 
duration, through its permeation of fed-forward data of personal and social pasts into that 
depicted present. In examining the experience of using Google Maps through its suite of 
synchronised personal and more socially-informed, interactive features, the section 
argues that the app does somewhat adequately facilitate an anarchival, inter-relational, 
transindividual temporality of the past, through its (admittedly overly spatial) rendering 
of the present.  
Hayles stresses what she observes as the unattended importance of thinking contemporary 
memory studies in terms of databases – describing them as “exteriorization of human 
memory”, while accentuating their “prominence and importance in twenty-first century 
culture” (Hayles, 2016, p. x). Indeed, when we perceive and remember through Google 
Maps, we may think of the app, in terms of resources on which it draws to present the 
present, to be working with the machine-memory of databases – both in terms of mapping 
co-ordinates, and – as we’ll examine further below – in terms of the personal databases 
of Google-collected behavioural data (the user’s own, and the analysed data of 
immeasurable numbers of other users). Correspondingly, we might think in three inter-




technological, structured expansion of perception, through machine-facilitated database 
analysis. Firstly, in perceiving geographical space in the apparent present, through 
mapping databases – exploring places familiar or otherwise through the technology of a 
digital map. Secondly, in perceiving potential options for action in the anticipated future, 
through databases of mass-collated user action of the past, and through similarly collected 
data in the present. For example, the app may present the user with the most direct route 
based on measuring the historic average, automatic, smartphone-reported time taken by 
others, or may use the same reporting-mechanisms in real time to warn the user of heavy 
traffic, or indicate the current level of footfall at a convenience store – each presented 
through the app in visible relation to their usual intensity. And, thirdly, in having one’s 
own personal data fed-forward into the already-doubly perceived present through, for 
example, the overlaying of location-specific schedules, and other features discussed 
above.   
In the essay Archive as Metaphor, media theorist Wolfgang Ernst argues that “the archive 
is not dedicated to memory but to the purely technical practice of data storage” (2004, p. 
6). Thus, and resonating with our anarchival view of remembering through artefacts as 
carriers of transindividual potential in duration, he claims that “[t]he archive has no 
narrative memory” and “any story we add to the archive comes from outside” (2004, p. 
6). Yet, in comparison with traditional notions of the archive, he suggests, remembering 
through new technologies such as digital media is less about space, and more about 
dynamics – “The essential feature of networked computing is its dynamic operativeness” 
(Ernst, 2004, p. 50). In such a (perceived) move from static archives to dynamic 
operations of communication through data-processing and data-transfer, Ernst argues that 
we are in a shift from the sense of “an archival space into an archival time, in which the 
key is the dynamics of the permanent transmission of data” (2004, p. 46; italics my own). 
Thus, through new, networked, digital technologies, Ernst surmises, “Space becomes 
temporalized, with the archival paradigm being replaced by permanent transfer, recycling 
memory” (Ernst, 2004, p. 50).  
Ernst’s essay relates largely to data storage and its human-directed retrieval and transfer, 
rather than algorithm-machine-managed databases, and it is worth noting that the essay 
was published in 2004 – a year before web-based Google Maps was even launched, and 
four years before it would be released as a smartphone app. Yet Ernst’s emphasis on the 
experience of digital media as permanent transmission of data within archival time is 




individuating ongoing processes of engaging with artefacts (and data-artefacts) and the 
Theory-Chapter-conceived notion of thinking in cyber-time.  
Google Maps as Calculated Anarchive 
The processing of machine-memory in relation to archives (indeed artefacts), and we 
might infer, databases, Ernst reminds us, is not to do with narrative – rather, he claims, 
“[A] digital culture deals with calculating memory” (2004, p. 49; italics my own). Unlike 
traditional physical maps, we might imagine that, under the veneer of a spatialised, 
somewhat static, cartographic presentation, Google Maps exists as a whole machinic 
world of data-interaction and calculation, in the present, as ‘the programme runs’. We 
have seen that Hayles notes the cultural ‘prominence and importance’ of databases in 
contemporary society. Similarly, geographer Nigel Thrift observes that the widespread 
ubiquity of computing power into everyday interaction – what Adam Greenfield calls 
“everyware” (2006)– means that: 
many quite mundane human activities are now shadowed by numerous, often 
quite complex, calculations. Calculation, in other words, is becoming a 
ubiquitous element of human life. (Thrift, 2008, p. 94) 
Let us remind ourselves of the at least three kinds of database calculations informing the 
experience of Google Maps: cartographically, in plotting representations of space against 
coordinates; socially, in feeding mass user-data of the past and the present into the more 
‘open’ or social experience of the map; and privately, in feeding-forward personal user-
data into user-specific map overlays and recommendations within this social domain. 
Here, we argue that these calculations, turned representations on screen, inform an 
ongoing sense of expanded perception of the conscious present, through personal and 
more social senses of inter-relationality – to space, and a sense of personal and social 
extension, from the past and into the future. Dynamic, ongoing database-calculations into 
presented digital artefacts in the present give rise an ever-emergent sense of the present – 
a man-machine facilitated sense of archival time as duration.  
The first kind of database-informed experience we may take somewhat as a given. Google 
Maps, as a tool, allows a technologically-expanded form of perceptual representation of 
space. Users can view somewhat accurate cartographical representations of seemingly 
almost anywhere on earth, and, more than that, through Street View, users can in many 
countries across the world zoom in to a ‘human’s-eye view’ of any public location (see 




agilely accessed, in-app: on zooming in, cartographic labels switch from country to 
region; further in, to town, to street names, to business names. From our Bergsonian 
position, thinking perception in terms of images, we can perhaps think of the likes of 
Google Maps, like all interactive ‘virtual reality’, as bringing the virtual into the actual. 
Spatially-represented artefacts may, through the app’s interactivity be explored, 
navigated as they might be conceptually in the conscious plane of dream. Yet, rather than 
psychic concept-images through conceptual movements, through Google Maps we 
perceive screen-presented images through movements of the thumb and finger – and, 
beyond them, of those of ubiquitous database-calculation. One need not dream in the 
conceptual virtual, so much as act in the digital virtual.  
Yet, as Shields notes, this sense of the virtual, while spatially versatile, is temporally 
fixed:  
For GIS, this is a fixed and static snapshot. As if assuaging anxiety over 
change and dynamism of the world, GIS accommodates no temporality as 
such (i.e. as temporal change). (Shields, 2018, p. 322) 
What role, then, might those further movements of database-calculation pertaining to the 
social and the personal play in expanding this sense of virtual space into a sense of 
temporal, past-informed present? 
As a useful vehicle to answer this question, let us return to our business names, zoomed 
in within the app. The user taps the business’s name and a card appears on screen, 
presenting relevant information, fed into the app through various social data – collected, 
processed and displayed through Google, partnered or world-wide-web-scraped 
calculations. For example, Google Maps may tell the user the opening times of the 
business, or what public events are coming up. The app may display photographs, tapping 
through to an album of images posted by the business and any Google Maps users. Indeed, 
it offers the tap-through option to view what the business looks like on the street, or even 
inside, through Street View. The app’s display shows the likely length of time it would 
take to get there right now, navigable through the app in terms of driving, walking or 
taking transport. It may draw on presently-reported and collated previously-presently-
reported user-location-data to show the current footfall at the business, compared to the 
average for that time and day, and display anticipated levels for other days and times. It 
may show a business rating, through Google Maps’s review feature; on tapping through, 




named users, whose other reviews the user may then search through; and see how reviews 
may have changed or remained consistent through their time stamps. Google Maps also 
allows opportunity for action beyond the confines of the screen – more than hyperlink to 
a phone-call to the business it may, for example, offer in-app options to make a booking, 
or message the business. 
A veritable sense of social-ness in the present, extended out of the past, may be imbued 
into the virtual space depicted by Google Maps, through feeding-forward user-data into 
interactive media-artefacts displaying the past (e.g. reviews), the present (e.g. current 
footfall) and the future (e.g. upcoming events) – emergent through interaction out of the 
seemingly-static, cartographical interface representations. Human engagement is of 
course important to recognise here: “The archive does not tell stories; only secondary 
narratives give meaningful coherence to its discontinuous elements”, Ernst notes, “In its 
very discreteness the archive mirrors the operative level of the present, calculating rather 
than telling” (2004, p. 48).  
More than a static map, struggling to show the temporality of the past because of its focus 
on fixed space, the app engenders a sense of temporality and social inter-relationality 
through dynamic, interactive and interacted representation of the past-informed present. 
Calculated archival time informs hybridised sense of cyber-time through processes of 
user-machine artefact presentation and engagement – an expanded sense of the present 
through mediated techno-virtual-social interaction. Moreover, this sense of the social 
allows action – the artefact-driven perceptions of the present and the past informing useful 
action in the here-and-now. In a sense, the app-as-interface enables an engagement in the 
actual, through the virtual, offering new kinds of ways to perceive, remember and act in 
the social present beyond the app.  
Yet, we ought to finally consider the remaining form of data fed-forward into visual 
artefacts through the app-interface: personal data of the individual user’s past behaviour. 
We saw above that these calculated mediations may take various forms, some more 
overtly signifying one’s past, and other’s more clandestinely structured into one’s present. 
On the one hand, for example, overlays of scheduled events, drawn out of email 
databases, may signify remembered pasts. Other examples might include: reminders of 
previous times the user has visited places, drawn out of location-history databases; and 
reminders of photographs they have taken there, drawn out of Google Photos databases. 
On the other hand, data about a user’s past may be used to inform anticipated action in 




percentage-based ‘Your match’ anticipated affinity for local places to visit, based on the 
user’s location history. Through the experience of such calculated, tailored, artefact-
(re)presentation features, interwoven into the already presented social present, the 
transindividual may experience not only a relation to the on-screen social-signified 
images, but a personal inter-relation with them. In doing so, an inter-affective sense of 
consciousness – of inter-related self within the social – may emerge, the social extending 
itself from the past and into the future, and the equally extended self as related to that 
social.  
Moreover, we might think of these kinds of fed-forward, expanded, supposed 
‘remembrances’ as positively anarchival. Data-artefacts that inform perception, memory-
potential realisation and action, are actualised not arbitrarily but through relational 
negotiation with the digital-virtual-spatial and temporal environment. As a 
straightforward example, artefactual reminders of when you last visited a place are 
emergent only when a user taps on the place – perceptions of artefacts presented 
relevantly in relation to virtually-presented place spurring the realisation of memory 
potential. Equally, working searchably, relationally, rather than linearly through Your 
Timeline to find out where you were at what point, we might liken to Bergson’s 
description of working through processes of “intellectual effort” in trying to recall events 
of particular pasts (1920, pp. 186-230). Furthermore, it does not necessarily recall what 
happened in the past so much as use what has happened in the past to inform perceptions 
useful for action in the present (and anticipated future) – for example, in the automated 
‘Your match’ system, which displays not the past but signifies potentiality in the present. 
More widely, those data-artefacts of the social we can see likewise: information displayed 
on screen not so much arbitrarily but in relation to what the user is looking at. Yet what 
is important to note – as we shall draw out below – is that, in this man-machine coupling, 
it is not only the user who makes action-informing decisions about what pasts are re-
presented, and how they may be re-presented, but the machine.  
-- 
In attempting to see Google Maps in terms of user-experience of processes of perception 
and memory in duration, we begin to see a bigger picture of memory’s supposed extension 
through new platform-technologies. Through Google Maps, users may experience an 
augmented, expanded perception of a social and spatial-temporal present, through which 
a sense of inter-related individuated – perhaps expanded – selfhood may emerge. The app 




data and more personal user-data about the present and the past into media-artefacts 
represented through its interface, informing action in the present. And, through highly-
structured user engagement and interaction, it may engender in the user an inter-relational 
sense of a body within a social present – of a sense of contemporary inter-relationality 
within a group or community.  
Guerlac notes that bodily consciousness offers a kind of virtual “temporal synthesis” 
(Guerlac, 2006, p. 117) – affording a sense of being with past and future, in the present. 
Yet, all syntheses of time “interfere with our ability to grasp the temporal nature of reality. 
They crush our sense of duration” (Guerlac, 2006, p. 19; italics my own). Likewise, we 
might think the man-machine coupling of Google Maps as offering a digitally-extended, 
virtual, temporal synthesis, allowing for an expanded sense of that being. Thus, the app 
cannot bring us closer to a sense of temporality as duration. Indeed, it takes us further 
away, expanding our sense of conscious temporality, and fulfilling – as we shall see 
through further chapters – the techno-culturally-facilitated role of (spatio-temporally) 
stabilising a virtual sense of the individual and society as extending out of the past and 
into the future.  
Throughout this chapter and subsequent ones, we will consider the notion of 
consciousness as emergent through technological, artefact-driven social relation – how 
artefacts may be thought of as “markers of relationship” (Middleton and Brown, 2005, p. 
149-152), out of which a collectively-individuated sense of the individual may emerge 
out of the social. And we will develop this foundation into a more forceful theoretical 
position in the following chapter. Yet, for now, this chapter turns its focus on the more 
socio-economic factors in thinking the role of new, consciousness-expanding 
technologies in changing processes of remembering. If technologies like Google Maps 
may inform our processes of consciousness, through their artefact-presentation of a sense 
of the personal and social, past-informed present – and if, as we have seen above, we can 
think of the choice of construction and presentation of these perceptual artefacts as shared 
between both human and machine – then how might we think about the agencies 
informing such choices? What choices are being made around selection and limitation of 
perception – both perception of the present, and memory-potential-stirring perceptions of 
presented pasts? What kind of present- and future-oriented actions are being informed 
through these changing processes of remembering? For what reasons? And to what degree 






Figure 7 – Google Maps Street View coverage  
 
Surveillance Technologies: Agency and the Feed-Forward 
We have seen that we may, from our anarchival perspective, think of Google Maps as a 
kind of man-machine-coupled enlargement of scope for processes of perception and 
consciousness in the present. Through the virtual experience of the app, one may perceive 
a wider sense of the physical present, as represented in map-form. Yet a sense of artefact-
facilitated remembering is also enlarged. And, while there may be “no perception which 
is not full of memories” (Bergson, 2004, p. 24), movements of memory-potential 
realisation may here be encouraged not just through reflexive perception and recognition, 
but through the active (re)presentation of data artefacts of the user’s past by the app itself. 
In this final section of Part One, and as a launchpad for further consideration, we briefly 
introduce and examine the reasons why such processes may be extended through Google 
Maps. What kinds of actions may be informed through such feed-forward mechanisms? 




“[T]he chief office of consciousness is to preside over action and to enlighten choice” 
(2004, p. 182), Bergson argues, “Therefore it throws light on the immediate antecedents 
of the decision, and on those past recollections which it can usefully combine with it ; all 
else remains in shadow” (2004, p. 182). How, though, may we think the nature of choice 
in the engagement of perception-remembrance, man-machine couplings like that of the 
Google Maps? Hayles notes that, from a posthuman perspective of the human as more 
than a body, constituted through relations of organism and environment, “conscious 
agency has never been in control” (1999, p. 288). And, through our Bergsonian-
Simondonian-developed perspective, we may similarly see consciousness as emergent 
out of multiplicities of inter-affective processes and relations – blurring boundaries of 
agency between subject and object, human and technological. Nevertheless, what is 
different here is both the nature of these relations (as we have examined above) and the 
nature of the conscious agencies that organise these relations. Thus, we must consider 
here the potential agencies of the technological partner in the user-Google-Maps coupling 
– examining the more socio-economic factors informing its operations, and gesturing 
toward potential implications from our anarchival perspective.  
Google Maps may appear to be a mapping or navigational app, but, like all of Google’s 
apparently ‘free’ products, it serves a parallel – perhaps primary – purpose: to generate 
income. Indeed, business and sociology scholar Shoshana Zuboff describes Google as 
“the pioneer” of what she calls “surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 9) – a business 
model that through the use of technologies “unilaterally claims human experience as free 
raw material for translation into behavioral data” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 8). In her historicising 
of Google’s shift into a surveillance-capitalist corporation, technology and 
communications scholar Meg Leta Jones explains Google’s move into surveillance 
indicates the breadth of user-data the organisation may collect, through “its many 
[synchronised] social services, including email, chat, telephony, photo collection, maps, 
and a social networking site” (2016, p. 7): 
The [Google] privacy policy now explains that the company collects 
information you give it and information from the use of its services, including 
device information (such as your hardware model, operating system version, 
unique device identifiers, and mobile-network information including phone 
number), log information (including search queries; telephony log 
information; IP address; and device event information such as crashes, system 




of your request and referral URL, and cookies), location information 
(including GPS, sensor data, and WiFi access point), local storage, and 
cookies and anonymous identifiers when interacting with partner services. 
(Leta Jones, 2016, p. 7) 
While some of this collated data, Zuboff observes, is used to improve the corporation’s 
service or product:  
[T]he rest are declared as a proprietary behavioral surplus, fed into advanced 
manufacturing processes known as “machine intelligence” and fabricated into 
prediction products that anticipate what you will do now, soon, and later on. 
(Zuboff, 2019, p. 8) 
First, the surveillance technology must secure user-engagement through harnessing the 
drives toward useful action. Google Maps does this through making freely-available an 
admittedly very useful, popular and convenient tool. It then retains engagement through, 
as we have seen, a multi-faceted and sophisticated host of features that enable the user to 
inter-relationally individuate themselves in a sense of the social present – extending their 
perceptions of the world into a kind of expanded or augmented present. Yet, in using 
Google Maps, users feed into an ever-accumulating, vast system of collecting and 
analysing users’ behavioural data. This data can then be used, on the one hand, to improve 
Google’s products – for example, confirming location histories to test and improve 
accuracy – or, on the other, fed into mass-analysed ‘prediction products’. At its most 
basic, we may recognise prediction products as targeted adverts – linking the product of 
advertiser with its most receptive audience, through complex analysis and data-
correlation of mass user-data and individual user’s personal data-profiles.17 Indeed, it is 
significant to note that income from advertising revenue is reported make up around 85% 
of Google’s overall earnings (Schomer, 2019). Such data-profiles are constructed and 
shared more widely across Google’s whole portfolio of products and services, and each 
interaction may increase the size of these data-archives and scope for their analysis, 
raising interesting implications for the nature of remembering. As Hayles notes: 
Correlation … implies that many single data entries, innocuous in themselves, 
can become potent invasions of privacy when concatenated together … As 
databases rocket upward … it becomes possible for someone with the right 
 





access to form data derivatives to look for almost anything under the sun … 
In the face of this overwhelming tsunami of data mining, human memory 
begins to occupy different ecological niches within social, economic, cultural 
and capitalist context than it had previously. (Hayles, 2016, p. xi) 
A significant further characteristic of surveillance-capitalist technologies is their 
tendency toward clandestine nature: appearing to offer one service to users, while using 
this engagement and interaction to perform parallel, more covert operations in the service 
of themselves and others. As social-political commentator Evgeny Morozov notes, “All 
too often the design of technologies simply conceals the ideologies and political agendas 
of their creators” (2011, p. 298). Zuboff suggests that the model of surveillance capitalism 
is enabled by the profound complexity of such data-calculation operations – indeed, we 
might think, the perceptual distance between the contemplation of such complex 
operations and the actual user-experience in duration – arguing that “The scientific and 
material complexity that supported the capture and analysis of [Google-collected] 
behavioral surplus also enabled the hiding strategy, an invisibility cloak over the whole 
operation.” (2019, p. 89). In fact, Greenfield predicted such a shift to covert surveillance 
in the mid-2000s, arguing that, given that “[i]nformation processing can be embedded in 
mundane objects, secreted away in architectural surfaces, even diffused into behaviour” 
(2006, p. 237), this may lead to “scenarios in which personal information, including that 
of the most intimate sort, can be collected without your awareness, let alone your consent” 
(2006, p. 237). Indeed, outside of the active kinds of data-collection we might associate 
with monitoring app-use, Google utilises a suite of methods to collect data more passively, 
“whereby an application is instrumented to gather information while it’s running, possibly 
without the user’s knowledge” (Schmidt, 2018, p. 2). Beyond background-running apps, 
publisher tools like Google Analytics and Adsense, and advertiser tools like AdMob and 
AdWords, Google’s surveillance technologies may be embedded into devices themselves 
(Schmidt, 2018, p. 2). For example, research by computer scientist Douglas C. Schmidt 
found that a phone running on Google’s Android operating system over twenty-four hours 
“communicated ~900 data samples to a variety of Google server endpoints” (2018, p. 14) 
– around fifty times more than communicated with an iPhone (See Figure 8).  
Hansen has argued that the nature of this transaction has significant implications for users 
in terms of manipulation and fairness, arguing that such platforms aim to “manipulate us 




[T]oday’s digital networks possess the capacity to gather and to exploit all 
kinds of data without us having any knowledge, and, to a great extent, any 
possibility for knowledge, of such activity … the longstanding 
pharmacological “pact” that has characterized the history of media from 
writing to cinema would seem to be broken, or, at the very least, rendered 
obsolete: simply put, what we get back has no possibility to compensate for 
what we give up. (Hansen, 2015, p.71) 
Indeed, it is in many ways a mistake to consider Google Maps a user ‘product’ or ‘service’ 
at all, since the techniques of surveillance capitalism represent such a dramatic shift from 
older, more overt service-user/service-provider exchanges or transactions. As Zuboff 
argues:  
Surveillance capitalism’s products and services are not the objects of a value 
exchange … Instead, they are the “hooks” that lure users into their extractive 
operations … We are not surveillance capitalism’s “customers” … We are the 
sources of surveillance capitalism’s crucial surplus … Surveillance 
capitalism’s actual customers are the enterprises hat trade in its markets for 
future behavior. (Zuboff, 2019, p. 10).  
And, beyond Google’s more clandestine data-collection, we may overtly see adverts as 
‘prediction products’ in Google Maps through the use of targeted ‘promoted pins’ to in-
map advertise, say, events or businesses – or through the targeted paid-for promotion of 
particular businesses when using the search function.  
Here, then, we have found what we will see is a crucial issue for remembering in the 
online era: that of awareness in perception and remembering. If users are en masse 
engaging in man-machine-coupled operations, designed to predict and facilitate actions 
useful not just for the user but also – indeed perhaps principally – useful for others, it 
raises numerous potential implications over how such actions might be considered 
consciously “free, or at least partly indeterminate” (Bergson, 2004, p. 279).  
We have seen that what we can consider higher degrees of consciousness, in terms of a 
sense of selfhood, can be understood as the degree of choice over selection and limitation 
over what to perceive – and, through the parallel processes of relational realisation of 
memory-potential, how to voluntarily act. Through technologies such as Google Maps, 
the ways in which we perceive and remember in the world are highly structured, designed 




resource for revenue production. Indeed, we might think of the likes of Google Maps as 
usurping the user’s psychic, conceptual virtual plane of consciousness with a co-
constructed digital virtual plane, accessed visually through the app-interface. The dream 
is presented for us by the platform. Through an expanded sense of virtual perception, we 
see, think and act through the platform.  
Yet agencies toward the user’s action exist beyond the relationship between human and 
interactive map. What is displayed on the map-as-interface may represent an 
encouragement toward action not only (or indeed principally) useful for the 
transindividual-as-user, but for the platform and its wider invested interests. Choice over 
the selection and limitation of what to perceive is extended to agents unknown.  
Furthermore, while older ‘read-only’ technologies – such as books, theatre, cinema and 
into Web 1.0 – offer a perhaps similar usurpation or extension of the virtual, the 
distinction in technologies like Google Maps is found in both the pervasiveness of its 
reach – even beyond active engagement and into passive engagement, such as location 
tracking – and in the active (more secretive) agencies driving the kind of transaction 
taking place. Google Maps offers an undoubtedly useful service in its man-machine-
facilitated presentation of cartographical, personal and more social data into its various 
data-artefact-constructed sense of the expanded perceived present. Yet the problem we 
have found with this user-machine relationship is in the largely undisclosed nature of the 
wider surveillance-capitalist transaction, and indeed the widespread (perhaps necessary, 
or at least helpful, for the platform) lack of awareness of the nature of the transaction. 
Such observations raise questions around implications for agency in how we perceive, 
remember and act. With such control over processes of what is perceived, how, and for 
what reasons, the agencies of the machine in the man-machine coupling, we might 
suggest, exercise an undue level of control over the actions ultimately informed through 
these processes of consciousness – presenting a new kind of struggle for remembering in 
the twenty-first century. In such a scenario, as we will explore in the following chapters, 
action may be encouraged to serve not only useful action for the transindividual-as-user, 
but also (even, perhaps, more so) for the wider interests of others. And, while Hansen 
rightly points out, we might consider these to be primarily “the ‘special interests’ 
controlling the network” (2015, p. 74), these tensions and struggles may extend further, 
into more- and less-organised movements of cultural drives.  
Equipped now with a working understanding of the nature of the extended relationship 




two sections of this chapter broaden our analytic gaze into the wider realm of social 
interaction. Through case-study explorations, in anticipation of a further theoretical 
development in subsequent chapters, they aim introduce an understanding of the ways in 
which digital artefacts (and their host archives or databases) may be used to remember 
through new technologies such as social media, and gesture toward potential implications.  
 
 
Figure 8 – Figure from Douglas C. Schmidt’s research into ‘Traffic data sent from idle Android and iPhone mobiles’   
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2. Mediated Madeleine Moments: Past Presents as Present Pasts  
In the previous section, we considered engagements with apparent digital-artefact 
archives, produced out of Google Maps users’ (seemingly personal) past activity, and re-
presented ostensibly for the user and by the platform. Here, records of the user’s past, 
signified through data-artefacts, may be fed-forward into present user-perception, 
involuntarily and voluntarily, through and with the app, to inform variously useful action 
in the man-machine-perceived present. Through these mechanisms a relational sense of 
the self may be reproduced – though one that is at once oriented toward useful action for 




useful action for the platform, through data-collection and through targeted, paid-adverts 
through which the platform’s revenue is generated.  
In this section, we turn our focus onto kinds of personal, digital archives that might be 
considered created consciously by the user through the platform, and seemingly for their 
own and others’ remembrances – using the likes of Facebook’s user profiles or Google 
Photos photo-backup service. Through an analysis of ways in which media-artefact-
reminded remembrances of personal pasts may take place through such apps, the section 
aims to demonstrate that, as with Google Maps, consciousness-informing agencies of 
remembering, perceiving and acting through these platform-archive, man-machine 
couplings might be balanced more in favour of the platform than they first appear.  
Proust, Potential and Me: Social Media and Involuntary Personal Memory 
I raised to my lips a spoonful of the tea in which I had soaked a morsel of the 
cake. No sooner had the warm liquid mixed with the crumbs touched my 
palate than a shudder ran through me and I stopped, intent upon the 
extraordinary thing that was happening to me. An exquisite pleasure had 
invaded my senses, something isolated, detached, with no suggestion of its 
origin … I sensed that it was connected with the taste of the tea and the cake, 
but that it infinitely transcended those savours, could not, indeed, be of the 
same nature. […] It is plain that the truth I am seeking lies not in the cup but 
in myself … I put down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone can 
discover the truth. But how? … Seek? More than that: create. It is face to face 
with something which does not yet exist, to which it alone can give reality and 
substance, which it alone can bring into the light of day. (Proust, 1981, pp. 48-
49) 
In this infamous 1913 passage from what would form the first instalment of his renowned 
work, In Search of Lost Time, essayist Marcel Proust describes the experience of trying 
to call to mind the seemingly elusive memory of a past excited in mind by the taste of a 
cake dipped in tea. It is hardly difficult to draw a parallel between Proust’s description 
and Bergson’s theorising on the “intellectual effort” of “laborious recall” in consciously 
actualising memory-potential (1920, pp. 186-230) – what we might think of as something 
being ‘on the tip of the tongue’. Thus, while psychologists David Middleton and Steven 
D. Brown note that the historically-held categorisation of Proust as a ‘Bergsonist’ may be 




contemporaries (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 138), they nevertheless recognise that 
“there is something in this characterisation” (2005, p. 138).  
Despite often contemporarily mischaracterised as describing a “flood” of memory 
(Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 139), we might think Proust’s passage a fitting literary 
description of a process of voluntarily and imaginatively realising memory-images out of 
memory-potential, itself involuntarily stirred through perception in the present. Indeed, 
Proust expressly acknowledges that, while the tea and cake might have sparked this 
feeling, it is through processes of mind that the past he seeks will be drawn out. 
Furthermore, as Middleton and Brown demonstrate, what Proust ‘remembers’ are not 
recollections of events – since they are imbued with aspects “that were not readily 
apparent to him at the time” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 139). Rather, in a profoundly 
Bergsonian sense, we might think that “[w]hat Marcel recollects is a set of qualities that 
are extracted from his unlimited ‘virtual’ prior experience” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, 
p. 141), actualised into a seemingly-representational memory-image. 
Middleton and Brown offer a helpful interrogation the apparent power of the object in 
Proust’s so-called ‘madeleine moment’ in their 2005 study, The Social Psychology of 
Experience – and we will reflectively draw on some of this thinking throughout this and 
subsequent chapters, in relation to our own anarchival thinking on artefacts. However, 
this section first aims to draw a novel comparison between Proust’s apparent description 
of the experience of consciously actualising memory-images out of the feeling of 
involuntarily-excited memory-potential, and the experience of engaging with ‘push-
notification’ style features of contemporary, online, media technologies. 
Their smartphone buzzes and, on checking the screen, the user sees a push notification 
from the Facebook app: ‘You have memories to look back on today’. Tapping through, 
they are presented a page displaying their account activity from the same date in previous 
years – posts they made or in which they were ‘tagged’, for example, or friends they 
‘made’ that day (see Figures 9, 10, & 11). The top of the page reads, ‘We hope you enjoy 
looking back on your memories on Facebook, from the most recent memories to those 
long ago’. Scrolling through, perhaps the user recognises an image of a holiday photo 
shared to their network in years gone by, along with the post’s accompanying text, 
location, and ensuing ‘likes’ and comments. At first through a feeling, and then through 
a sense of remembering, the user imagines themselves into the virtual past signified by 




[W]e detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves, first in 
the past in general, then in a certain region of the past – a work of adjustment, 
something like the focusing of a camera (Bergson, 2004, p. 171) 
Virtually in the past, yet actually in the present, perhaps the user finds themselves reading 
through the post’s accrued comments – like the post, seemingly frozen in time, re-
presented in the present – and finds themselves wanting to re-engage in the conversation, 
in the present. Underneath the post, a button with the image of an arrow reads: ‘Share’.  
Facebook launched ‘Memories’ in mid-2018 as a developed rebrand of popular 2015-
introduced feature, ‘On This Day’ (Hod, 2018; Gheller, 2015), declaring:  
Every day more than 90 million people use On This Day to reminisce about 
these moments they’ve shared on Facebook, and [Facebook’s own] research 
suggests this kind of reflection can have a positive impact on people’s mood 
and overall well-being. This is why we’re updating the experience to ensure 
all of your memories are easy to find. (Hod, 2018; Research: Konrad, 2017) 
‘Memories’ involves re-presenting Facebook users with previously-shared media – 
mainly annotated photographs or videos, or textual updates – or with datafied and 
collected activity, feeding-forward their past user-profile behaviour into the user’s in-app 
perceived present. The feature brings together the On This Day function of re-presenting 
“past posts and major life events from this date” (Hod, 2018) with other ‘reminders’. 
These include: “Friends Made On This Day … a list of friends you made on this date in 
the past, including special videos or collages that celebrate your friendversaries” (Hod, 
2018); “Recaps of Memories … seasonal or monthly recaps of memories that have been 
bundled into a message or short video” (Hod, 2018), including a yearly ‘Year in Review’; 
and “Memories You May Have Missed: If you haven’t checked your memories lately, 
this section will show you the posts that you might have missed from the past week” 
(Hod, 2018). 
It is worth noting that Facebook is not the only media company to offer such an 
experience. Users report that Facebook has been trialling the replication of ‘On This Day’ 
on its sister-platform, Instagram through its Archive feature (Verma, 2019). And, while a 
starkly different kind of platform, photo-backup services Google Photos and Amazon 
Photos each have similar features, presenting users with photos they have taken on that 
date in previous years – ‘Rediscover this day’ and ‘This Day’, respectively (see Figure 




artificial-intelligence ‘Assistant’ create and push-notify users to, for example, a new, AI-
stylised photo, or a newly-created album, grouped through metadata such as geo-tagging 
and time-stamps, or through its AI photo-recognition technology – creatively feeding-
forward recent and more distant pasts into the user’s perceived present.  
In the following section we move to consider how we might understand the experience 
of remembering through such interfaces and features from an anarchival over archival 
perspective.  
 
   














Mediated Memory versus Image-Artefact: Remembrance as Individuation  
What served in place of the photograph; before the camera’s invention? The 
expected answer is the engraving, the drawing, the painting. The more 
revealing answer might be: memory. What photographs do out there in space 
was previously done within reflection. (Berger, 2009, p. 54) 
In this text from the 1978 essay, ‘Uses of Photography’, art critic, novelist and essayist 
John Berger implies that we might think photographs a kind of physical extension, or 
even replacement, of memory. His remarks serve as response to writer and philosopher 
Susan Sontag’s essay ‘The Image-World’, in which she chastises Proust for his 
‘disparaging’ attitude toward photography: 
Whenever Proust mentions photographs, he does so disparagingly: as a 
synonym for a shallow, too exclusively visual, merely voluntary relation to 
the past, whose yield is insignificant compared with the deep discoveries to 
be made by responding to cues given by all the senses—the technique he 
called “involuntary memory.” … by considering photographs only so far as 
he could use them, as an instrument of memory, Proust somewhat 
misconstrues what photographs are: not so much an instrument of memory as 
an invention of it or a replacement. (Sontag, 2005, p. 128) 
However, we might here propose from our anarchival perspective that, Proust’s views on 
photography aside, Sontag herself appears to misconstrue memory. For, in Sontag’s 
conceptualising photographs as at once “pieces of evidence in an ongoing biography or 
history” (Sontag, 2005, p. 130) and an ‘invention’ or ‘replacement’ of memory, we may 
see that, for her, as for Berger, what is being referred to in such commentary is not memory 
per se, but artefacts, used to create a sense of individuating, conscious narrative of the 
human as self. Once more, we find ourselves wrestling with the conflation of memory as 
knowledge, and thus media as memory. Indeed, out of such conflation, we may recognise 
in Berger the now-familiar, Phaedrus-like, specious anxieties of supposed amnesia versus 
extension of memory: “The camera relieves us of the burden of memory. It surveys us 
like God, and it surveys for us. Yet no other god has been so cynical, for the camera 
records in order to forget” (2009, p. 60).  
Rather, in thinking remembering in terms of process more than objects in space – 
memories as affective, action-oriented movements more than ‘things’ – we may 




realising memory-potential, they may not stand-in for memory-potential itself. Thus, we 
may see photographs as what we have conceptualised as technological artefacts of 
remembrance. While photography may be understood as an extension of modes of 
remembering, it is not a technological extension of memory, but rather of habit memory, 
physically repeated across duration, and out of whose engagement memory-potential may 
be realised. Thus, with photography, as with re-presented social-media posts, “if it 
deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because 
it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment” (Bergson, 2004, p. 93).  
Indeed, we might more properly say that, if photography approaches the supposed partial 
replacement of anything, it is not memory, but perception in duration. Through 
artefactually re-presenting the transindividual with of significations of the past within the 
present, the present is, in a sense, usurped by the past – encouraging a relational shift, 
through memory-potential realisation, from the plane of action into the plane of 
dreaming. Again, we “detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves … 
in the past” (Bergson, 2004, p. 171). In short, artefacts of remembrance, we might suggest, 
usurp the perceived present (the actual) with the imagined past (the virtual) – or at least 
encourage a move from the actual into the virtual – through their technological imposition 
of memory-potential-exciting re-presentations of the past onto perception in duration.  
Conceptual disaccord over what photographs may be notwithstanding, Berger’s and 
Sontag’s focus on the uses of photography offer an interesting avenue for discussion – in 
a return to an exploration of experience of processes of remembering through new, online 
technologies, in duration. Echoing social psychologist Ian Tucker’s “Spinozist take on 
bodies, which asks not ‘what are bodies’, but ‘what can bodies do?’ (2013, p. 8), we might 
here ask not ‘what are photographs’, but ‘what can photographs do?’ – what is happening 
when we remember through photographs and new technologies?  
Berger identifies that for Sontag we may recognise the ‘god’ of photography as “the god 
of monopoly capitalism” (Berger, 2009, p. 29). Sontag argues that the camera has largely 
been appropriated for capitalist purposes: 
Cameras define reality in the two ways essential to the workings of an 
advanced industrial society: as a spectacle (for masses) and as an object of 
surveillance (for rulers) … The freedom to consume a plurality of images and 




free economic consumption requires the unlimited production and 
consumption of images. (2005, p. 140) 
In addition (perhaps in opposition), Berger highlights what he calls “an alternative 
photographic practice” through the private rather than public use of photographs (2009, 
p. 60): 
In the private use of photography, the context of the instant recorded is 
preserved so that the photograph lives on in an ongoing continuity. (If you 
have a photograph of Peter on your wall, you are not likely to forget what 
Peter means to you.) The public photograph, by contrast, is torn from its 
context, and becomes a dead object which, exactly because it is dead, lends 
itself to any arbitrary use. (Berger, 2009, p. 60) 
In resonation with our own theorising on artefacts as carriers for the realisation of 
transindividual potential toward individuation, rather than having potential themselves – 
Berger argues that “photographs do not in themselves preserve meaning … do not 
narrate” (2009, p. 55). Rather, as we saw Ernst similarly notes of archives of artefacts, 
“any story we add to the archive comes from outside” (Ernst, 2004, p. 6). Indeed, in terms 
of personal archives, Berger describes the curation of personal artefacts in a way we 
might now think as facilitating a sense of bodily and wider social identity through 
relationality, through individuation: 
Adults and children sometimes have boards in their bedrooms or living-rooms 
on which they pin pieces of paper : letters, snapshots, reproductions of 
paintings, newspaper cuttings, original drawings, postcards. On each board all 
the images belong to the same language and are all more or less equal within 
it, because they have been chosen in a highly conscious way to match and 
express the experience of the room’s inhabitant. Logically, these boards 
should replace museums. (Berger, 1972, p. 30)  
In an intriguing, perhaps quasi-reflection of the twenty-first-century social technologies 
we examine here, Berger points us toward a future in which “[t]he distinction between 
the private and public uses of photography would be transcended” (2009, p. 61), through 
the development of personal uses photography over more capitalist uses. In such a future: 
[T]he living take that past [signified in, and actualised through, photographs] 




making their own history … all photographs … reacquire a living context … 
continue to exist in time, instead of being arrested moments. (Berger, 2009, p. 
61) 
Media theorist José van Dijck picks up on this theme of personal-cum-social, artefactual 
remembering in relation to newer, digital technologies in her 2007 study, Mediated 
Memories – arguing, as we shall, that the network-mediated transmission of personal 
memory holds significant stake in how we more widely culturally remember. Drawing 
partially on Bergson’s thinking on perception, van Dijck argues, "Mediated memory 
objects ... can be located neither strictly in the brain nor wholly outside in (material) 
culture but exist in both concurrently” – rather, “they are manifestations of a complex 
interaction between brain, material objects, and the cultural matrix from which they arise" 
(2007, p. 28).  
In fact, social psychologists Lewis Goodings and Tucker argue that Bergson’s non-
dualistic conception of the experienced world – made up not of subjects and objects but 
of inter-affective images – offers precisely a solution to apparent difficulties when 
considering the apparent distinctions between online and offline bodies, and their 
representation online. If we intuitively think “bodies as images … disposed for action” in 
duration, and, in doing so, “blur the subject–object and representation–being dualisms” 
(Goodings & Tucker, 2014, p. 37), we may move away from “a dualistic rendering of 
body–representation or real–virtual … [and] explore the ways people experience the 
socially mediated production of their bodies [as images]” (Goodings & Tucker, 2014, p. 
40).  
In thinking the use of artefact-sharing technologies from a Bergsonian perspective, in 
terms of actions and process of signifying and signified images, we might, then, 
understand the production of, engagement with, and indeed fed-forward re-engagement 
with personal social-media posts as kinds of man-machine-facilitated acts of 
(re)constituting a sense of self in the present – through the interface presenting and 
interacting with socially-mediated images of oneself to oneself and the wider world. In 
their fed-forward re-engagement through the likes of Facebook’s Memories feature, such 
posts may “live on in an ongoing continuity” (Berger, 2009, p. 60). As such, in 
consciously re-recognising in the present their bodily extension from past, and into 
anticipated future, the user-as-transindividual, reconstituting their sense of self, of more-




Furthermore, Simondon’s theorising on individuation allows us to extend this 
consciousness-informing relationality beyond the bodily individuation, and into the 
notion of the social, out of which a grouped sense of the individual may emerge. Van 
Dijck observes that “[t]echnologies of self are--even more so than before--technologies 
of sharing" (2007, p. 48), noting that “[b]y nature of their creation, many digital memory 
items are becoming networked objects … in constant interaction with other people, even 
anonymous audiences. (2007, p. 48). From a Simondonian perspective, we might think 
of the production and sharing of personal posts, through the social-mediation of the body, 
within a social network – or sense of in-group – as acts of collectively-individuation, 
cementing group bonds in a perceived, and always-emergent, sense of sociality. As we 
will examine in depth in the next chapter, we may think these the sharing of artefacts as 
signifiers of cultural value, “markers of relationship” (Middleton and Brown, 2005, p. 
149-152), and think their social interaction as re-constituting a sense of belonging within 
a group. Thus, a sense of grouped individuality, of belonging, emerges – through 
collectively-individuating reciprocal affections between the personality of the group and 
the personalities of its members. Moreover, in interactively, socially re-engaging with 
posts in the future, through platform-encouraged, fed-forward acts of remembrance such 
as Facebook Memories, artefacts may be ‘live on’ in Bergerian ‘ongoing continuity’. In 
doing so – like the stabilisation of a sense of self through recognising the body’s extension 
out of the past, through the present and into the future – socialities out of man-machine-
facilitated interaction may technologically, artefactually, indeed culturally, re-constitute 
themselves in the present as seemingly temporally-stable societies, with social pasts 
extending into the social future.  
We will progressively develop this theoretical synthesis through the second Case-Study 
Chapter. For now, however, let us retain our focus on the experience of personal acts of 
remembrance through the likes of Facebook Memories. We have seen above that we may 
think these remembrances as man-machine-co-constituted, artefact-facilitated 
movements of individuation. Through the push-notification-encouraged engagement with 
socially-mediated artefacts of bodily representation, the transindividual may excite 
memory-potential into a realised memory image, engendering a sense of individuated self, 
with past and future. In turn, with its bodily impetus always toward action, the user may 
interactively re-engage with these artefacts, driving more collectively-individuating 
action within their perceived, and networked, sociality. It the final section of Part Two, 




elements that equally inform the reasons behind such man-machine experiences. Yet, 
having considered how such remembrances may be taking place through new, online 
technologies, it is important to first consider the nature of what may be being 
remembered.   
Public Posts/Public Pasts: Surveillance and the Spatialisation of Memory 
We have discussed above how we may see remembrances through the likes of Facebook 
Memories as feeding into biological and collective drives toward individuation. Through 
the excitement and realisation of memory-potential in perceiving such reminders, the 
user-as-transindividual may consciously, virtually situate themselves as an individuating 
being, with its own past and future, within various environmental and social milieus. In 
this section we briefly examine the kinds of remembrances that may take place in man-
machine couplings of remembering like Facebook – considering what kind of experience 
of time and memory may be facilitated through Facebook’s platform architecture, before 
examining the likely nature of what is remembered through re-engaged Facebook posts 
as artefacts of remembrance.  
Let us begin by reminding ourselves of the fundamental nature of remembering as 
relationally serving action. From an anarchival perspective on remembering, bodies as 
centres of action, we may see the realisation of memory-potential as always relational to 
the transindividual’s bodily and social environment, as the body-as-centre-of-action 
endures beyond the past and into the future, through useful action in duration. We will 
discuss in further chapters the more cultural drives toward useful action in the social 
sharing of artefacts of remembrance. Yet, how, for the moment, might we consider the 
experience of remembering personal pasts through the likes of Facebook Memories?  
Media theorist Joanne Garde-Hansen suggests that social media “could be seen as a 
significant move toward understanding personal digital archiving as the expression of 
memory rather than history” (2009, p. 136). Yet, it is useful to note from the outset that 
Facebook Memories, like Google Photos’s Rediscover this Day, re-presents signifiers of 
a past not based on relationality to present environment, but simply, functionally, on 
historical date. Setting aside the small number of Gregorian-calendar-fixed cultural 
events, in which such a process of remembering might be somewhat relational – such as 
being reminded of previous posts made on, say, Christmas Day, Hallowe’en, birthdays, 
U.S. Independence Day, or New Year’s Eve – such spatialised systems of remembrance 




instigation through app push-notifications, we might – as we will discuss in more detail 
below – consider such acts not as useful to the transindividual, but seemingly almost as 
remembering for remembering’s sake.  
Moreover, it is important to situate these kinds of acts of remembrance within the wider 
experience of perceiving and remembering through such apps. While Facebook’s News 
Feed, as we will see in the next chapter, might to some degree be considered a form of 
expanded temporal perception of the social, its personal Timeline, in its archival 
presentation and engagement, we can understand as spatialising the past (indeed the 
present). In the Timeline – from which ‘Memories’ are ostensibly drawn (or at least where 
the fed-forward data-actualised-as-artefact is more fully, chronologically presented) – all 
of a user’s posts are displayed, in an almost endless scrolling mechanism, from most 
recent to most distant uploaded past. Such a spatialising of memory at once encourages a 
linear, archival conceptualisation of memory and the past – of the sort we have forcefully 
in this thesis rejected – and implies the related conflation of media as memory. Thus, 
reflecting on Bergson’s observation of “the pure present being the invisible progress of 
the past gnawing into the future” (2004, p. 194), Goodings and Tucker argue: 
[T]he Facebook Timeline acts as a kind of force that spatialises past social 
media activity and goes against the virtual aspect of memory for Bergson, in 
which the past is not contained but endures, taking a temporal not spatial form. 
(2014, p. 47)  
Following Bergson, Goodings and Tucker note that “thinking the past as stored 
somewhere is problematic” (2014, p. 47) – rather, we might think it an affective process 
of relationality in duration. Yet, as they observe, “[F]or Facebook users, this is exactly 
what they are now facing, their past social media activity stored and recorded 
chronologically, with connections to friends and family” (2014, p. 47). Rather than acting 
as a platform for living in duration, they argue, remembering through such interfaces 
make it more difficult to live: “[H]aving one’s past laid out and made visible to others is 
felt as artificial, an impediment to everyday living” (Goodings and Tucker, 2014, p. 48). 
We might likewise think of Google Photos’s interface as encouraging a spatialised view 
of time and autobiographical memory: its interface similarly linearly sets out a user’s 
‘past’, scrolling down from the present into the their seemingly never-ending personal 
memories; its automatic album-creation neatly compartmentalises supposed ‘memories’ 




we might consider that Google Photos does offer features, through its AI-technology for 
searching (e.g. through photo-recognition of subject; metadata of date, location), that are 
somewhat encouraging toward a more anarchival mode of extended artefactual 
remembering - as well as more Bergerian notions of private remembering that we might 
relate to drives toward Simondonian individuation. As just one example, after initially 
‘tagging’ the human subject in user in an image, the user may search for the name of that 
person, bringing up, through facial-recognition, every photo of that individual in one’s 
personal archive. More than that, the user may include specific or loose dates (month, 
season, year) or accurate or broad location – as well as additional subjects and background 
subjects (e.g. cake, garden, landscape) – to help them ‘remember’ that for which they are 
searching in mind. Such a process of selective reminding we might again think an 
extension of Bergson’s processes of psychic-virtual ‘intellectual effort’ of ‘laborious 
recall’ into the on-screen, digital-virtual of new, ubiquitous technologies. Furthermore, 
through the production of ‘shared albums’ of such content, Google Photos users may 
create private-social, personal archives, acting as a means for collaborative and relational 
interaction between users – engendering a co- or collectively-individuated sense of more-
than, of belonging.  
Nevertheless, we might argue that both Facebook and Google encourage of view of the 
personal archive as memory – the promoted default being that moments shared should be 
moments stored. Indeed, more widely, the propagation of anxieties around “digital 
amnesia”, should digital photos be lost (Kaspersky Lab, 2015) – or, for example, 
Dropbox’s promotion of its own camera-auto-backup service as a way to “[k]eep your 
memories safe” (Campbell, 2015) – speak to the popularity of such perceptions. Garde-
Hansen has suggested we might consider the popularity of social media indicative of a 
need to archive – “a need: for identity, for memory, for stories and for connectedness … 
a personal digital archive fever” (2009, p. 148). Certainly, we must recognise that through 
their push-notified ‘On This Day’ and ‘Recap’ style features, both Google Photos and 
Facebook do encourage more of an archival, non-relational experience of remembering 
mediated personal pasts than an anarchival one that would be relationally geared toward 
useful action in duration. But here we arrive at the second theme of this section: setting 
aside their anarchival degree of relationality, just what kinds of mediated pasts are being 





When a user is reminded of Facebook Memories, about what kind of event do they 
reminisce? We will see in the next chapter how what is shared through Facebook’s News 
Feed can be considered a kind of socially-affective, temporal present – such as cultural 
theorist Rebecca Coleman describes as “fun, quirky, and involves friends sharing 
experiences … it is a temporality that is ‘(a)live’ (2018, p. 68). And this man-machine-
perceived sense of present, Coleman observes, “[D]oes not preclude the past or the future 
… present events can be archived into the future” (2018, p. 68). Yet, as Goodings and 
Tucker argue, out of case-study group-interview research, in presenting spatialised, 
selected ‘snapshots’ of previously-shared ‘present events’ as the past, the platform does 
not truly offer “new possibilities for experience … [rather, it] restricts experience and 
activity through its artificial and reductive form of digital memory” (2014, p. 48). Events 
are not so much relationally remembered, as media-artefacts are perhaps interactively 
recycled – the socially shared artefacts of past presents non-relationally repackaged and 
resold as present pasts.  
To be sure, it is perhaps this live-ness of to-be-archived social media that informs 
emergent surveillance anxieties around supposed remembering through previous posts’ 
re-engagement – representing not so much artefacts created to be recorded for posterity 
in the future, but significations to be shared in the present. As Garde-Hansen notes, “[I]t 
would be naïve to think that users were not acutely aware of their self-projections and the 
awkwardness of knowing so-called friends could see your profile” (2009, p. 142). An 
awareness that such posts may be visible in future as well as present to “other people, 
even anonymous audiences” (van Dijck, 2007, p. 48) may lead to anxieties about what to 
post in the first place, affecting transindividual social interaction. For example, as one of 
Goodings’s and Tucker’s participants claimed:  
[Y]ou have to be aware of everything that you posted on someone else’s wall 
or on your own wall everybody can see it now even if its like 5 years ago … 
you have to be really really careful about what you’re writing and even if it’s 
a private message that person you’re writing it to might just say “hey come 
look what this person said about you” (2014, p. 46) 
Indeed, such anxieties around “peer-to-peer surveillance” (Tucker, 2013, p. 2) perhaps go 
some way toward understanding the cultural shift of active users in recent years toward 
more ‘temporary’ media formats – such as ‘self-destruct’-style messaging services like 
Snapchat, where messages are deleted once they have been viewed, as well Snapchat’s  




collated posts are visible to one’s network for only twenty-four hours. Here, mediated 
representations of present moments may perhaps be shared for their signifying experience 
in the present, rather than the present and an anticipated future. We might think that, more 
than a digital archive fever, we may be witnessing a digital-augmented connection fever, 
individuation fever, indeed belonging fever.  
Nor need surveillance technologies produce anxieties solely in terms of posts intended 
for (semi-)public audiences – as perhaps more dramatic events around more private 
media-artefacts have in recent years evidenced. For example, the 2014 scandal around 
hundreds of leaked celebrity nude photographs, reportedly hacked from Apple’s iCloud, 
set a public spotlight on the kinds of photographs user’s allow to be saved, perhaps 
vulnerably, ‘to the cloud’ (Peterson, Yahr & Warwick, 2014). Online-stored artefacts 
always risk, however unlikely, being seen by unwelcome and anonymous audiences. And, 
with an awareness that all camera-roll images will, for example, on enabled Android 
devices, be automatically backed-up to the cloud, it does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that a certain degree of anxiety may emerge about not just what to ‘save’ as social 
signification of mediated body-as-image, but what to photograph for oneself in the first 
place. Similarly, beyond photographs believed saved online, the so-called ‘Snappening’ 
– also 2014 – saw more than 90,000 explicit Snapchat users’ images posted to 4chan and 
other forum sites, fuelling speculation about what kind of body-images should or should 
not be mediated online (Landi, 2014). While Snapchat media are by design displayed only 
temporarily, third-party, work-around apps enabled users to save such images, and it is 
from these apps’ online databases that the leak is reported to have emerged.  
Moreover, in returning to the apparently recycled media-artefact remembrances of ‘On 
This Day’ and ‘Recap’ style, platform-pushed reminders of Google Photos, Facebook and 
others, we may consider a surveillance anxiety around what one’s future self may think 
of posts made in the present, when coming to see them in the future. As one Instagram 
user reportedly posted, when app-notification-reminded of year-old (or years-old) posts 
in their privately ‘Archive’. re-presented into their perception of the apparent present, 
“Your future self is watching you right now through your memories” (jasonkioke, 2019). 
And, as Garde-Hansen rightly notes, online platforms as archives, like Facebook or 
Google, “may well forever store memories they would prefer to forget” (2009, p. 149).  
Indeed, such an observation was confirmed when Facebook initially brought in its On 
This Day feature in 2015, with users reporting anger or frustration not simply at 




onto them – thus being involuntarily reminded of upsetting or traumatic posts in previous 
years. A The Verge article from a week following its launch evidences, for example, users 
being reminded of a friend’s suicide, or of an apartment fire that happened on that date 
previously (Dzieza, 2015). Tellingly situating the feature in opposition to anarchival 
processes of remembering in informing memory-images useful to the present situation, 
another example talks of being reminded of a friend’s long-term coma-inducing accident: 
“"It was the absolute last thing I needed to see the day before midterms” (in Dzieza, 2015). 
The platform’s implemented solution to such a problem was to continue with more 
artificially-presented artefacts of remembrance of posts made on that day in previous 
years, but to put in place controls that would prevent such re-presentations from exciting 
“memories that may spark negative feelings that you would rather avoid” (Hod, 2017). 
These included both user-initiated controls to filter posts related to either people or dates 
about which they would like to be reminded (Facebook Help Centre, no date), as well as 
the platform’s own algorithmically-led filters to censor negative posts all together, 
showing only positive posts from a user’s past – “to filter content that will select photos 
we believe may be the most relevant and enjoyable to you” (Hod, 2017). Likewise, 
Google Photos does not remind users every day of photographs they have taken on that 
date in previous years, but relies on sophisticated algorithms that allow the platform to 
decide what media to re-present to the user.   
One further anxiety we might identify surrounds user activity not in terms of the posts 
they make, but their wider activity on the platform – indeed, not to do with potential 
human audience but machine audience. As we shall discuss below, what a user interacts 
with feeds into a wider data-collection and -analysis, feed-forward model for the platform 
– around, for example, what kinds of adverts may be targeted at the user, and what kind 
of media content may in the future be presented by the app as the present, or re-presented 
as the past. And an awareness of these processes may feed into wider behavioural attitudes 
about not only what to post, but what to look at or interact with. This kind of surveillance, 
of course, extends beyond the confines of social-media and media-sharing platforms – 
into the economic realm of cookies, and ad-trackers, as well as governmental-cultural 
arenas such as service-provider records or the user’s government.  
Let us here, then, move toward the end of Part Two by examining wider consideration 
around the agencies underscoring the platform’s role in the kinds of remembering we 
have explored above. We have seen that interactive, artefactual processes of 




Rediscover this day might facilitate movements toward psychic and collective 
individuation, through relational, cultural signification, engendering an emergent sense 
of self and individual in duration. Yet such remembrances might equally be felt as 
somewhat contrived or artificial through the platform architecture in two ways: firstly, 
in offering a spatialised, systematic sense of memory as linear, indeed perhaps as linear 
media-archive; and, secondly, in re-presenting not what is useful for the transindividual 
in the moment, to relationally realise memory-potential into advantageous action in the 
present, but rather re-presenting what (positive) media-artefact happens to have been 
posted to the network in the past, irrespective of its relevance to their present situation. 
Perception is seemingly encouraged into the realm of the dream – of reminiscence – rather 
than (conscious) action. Yet for what purpose? For whom, and to what degree, might we 
think such a refocusing of perception (and resultant action) as useful?  
In the final section of Part Two, we once more turn to more socio-economic 
considerations around the platform through which such remembrances take place, 
examining the reasons why the experience of remembering might be structured in such 
ways, and speculating on potential implications – to think not ‘what is being 
remembered’, but ‘what do such remembrances do?’ 
Pushing the Past: Involuntary Memory and the Man-Machine 
Through Part Two of this chapter, we have seen how involuntary remembrances may take 
place through contemporary ‘On This Day’ technologies like Facebook Memories or 
Google Rediscover This Day. Through incidental re-engagement with previously-
mediated, artefactual records of historical presents in the actual-perceived present, the 
transindividual may through such technologies stir memory-potential, realising it into 
memory-images of the conceptual-virtual past, lived through a digital-virtual present. 
Such reminiscences may serve to re-constitute a sense of selfhood through processes of 
individuation. Yet the increased connectivity and thus surveillance of the digitally-
networked body has peculiar implications for how these images of selfhood may be 
experienced and understood. As Tucker observes: 
[T]the boundaries of individuality are subject to change. Activities 
traditionally viewed as private, located internally, such as personal desires, 
preferences, thoughts have become externalized through information 




Moreover, the past-significations of media-artefacts are not remembered through an 
anarchival relation of the body to its wider environment as lived in duration. Rather they 
are ‘pushed’ onto users through notifications on their smartphones – encouraging events 
to be remembered for seemingly arbitrary reasons, remembering for remembering’s sake. 
Here, we consider what kind of action is being informed through such platform-
encouraged remembrances, and for what reasons.  
Coleman notes that, with socially-interactive posts on platforms like Facebook, “[w]hile 
humans may be partly involved in these processes of creation, collection and analysis, 
they are only one aspect of it; technologies … are involved in their creation” (Coleman, 
2018, p. 71). Yet, here, the platform in the man-machine coupling does more than 
structurally co-create media-artefacts in the present – it pushes, through seemingly its 
own agency, their fed-forward re-engagement in future presents.  
Like Google, Facebook’s financial model is that of surveillance capitalism, selling 
services out of harvested data-representations of behavioural surplus. Thus, the user is 
not Facebook’s customer, but rather the resources to make sales to its actual customers – 
those paying for targeted posts and adverts. As media archaeologist Jussi Parikka notes: 
[T]he so-called free platforms we are using to connect to friends and to share 
ideas, links, and preferences for films and music are all material for data 
mining, which is the new form of subsumption of our lives into capitalist 
production and accumulation of value. This algorithmic unconscious of social 
media cultures knows a lot about us and is often keen not only to keep but to 
sell those data to third parties. (2013, p. 2) 
In order to maintain such a practice, the platform must secure and retain users’ 
engagement. “User engagement is at the heart of Facebook’s business model” (2018, p. 
28), claims media theorist Tero Karppi, exampled through descriptions in Facebook’s 
financial literature: 
If we fail to retain existing users or add new users, or if our user decrease their 
level of engagement with our products, our revenue, financial results, and 
business may be significantly harmed. (Facebook Inc., 2015, p. 8) 
When Facebook began advertising, Zuboff recounts, the platform recognised that their 
“social graph represented an awe-inspiring source of behavioral surplus” (2019, p. 92). 




developed a model whereby targeted advertising through the likes of ‘sponsored content’ 
could be used not only to reach users, but to excite further data-collecting platform-
interactions, which themselves could in turn be monetised: 
[T]hrough the artful manipulation of Facebook’s culture of intimacy and 
sharing, it would be possible to use behavioral surplus not only to satisfy 
demand but also to create demand.” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 92) 
In Facebook Memories we may see a similar approach to repurposing or multi-purposing 
media artefacts. Previously-posted media, languishing forgotten in perhaps accidental 
archives, may be fed-forward once more into the present, recycled to offer new 
opportunities to secure user engagement and participation, and thus enable an ongoing 
collation and analysis of more user data. At the time of publication of Ernst’s The Archive 
as Metaphor essay, Facebook was only months into development – still named 
‘TheFacebook’ and available only for students and alumni of thirty-four Ivy League and 
Boston-area college campuses (Rosen, 2005; Wired Staff, 2004). Yet Ernst’s theorising 
on a shift of the archive into the temporality of data transfer offers an almost clairvoyant 
insight into what would inform the later, more-corporate development of such media 
processes:  
[I]n the case of the Internet, this archival infrastructure itself becomes 
temporally dynamic with the need for access data at a given moment in a 
virtual text. Memorial space is being replaced by a limited series of temporal 
entities. Space becomes temporalized, with the archival paradigm being 
replaced by permanent transfer, recycling memory. (Ernst, 2004, p. 50; italics 
my own) 
In one sense – such as through Google Photos’s image search function – a recycling of, 
or re-engagement with, historical personal-media posts may be thought of anarchivally 
as an augmentation of artefact-facilitated processes of remembering. Yet, a crucial 
difference between a theoretical, anarchival, cultural recycling of media-artefacts as 
remembrance and what is experienced through the likes of Memories or Rediscover This 
Day we may think of as a matter of agency. We saw above that such modes of 
remembering might not so much engender useful action for the transindividual in 
duration, as offer artificial-feeling opportunities for remembering for remembering’s sake 
– albeit leading to possibilities for individuation. Here, we may recognise that in fact 




Yet such action – of engagement and participation in the platform – we may think of as 
both instigated by and useful primarily for the platform, perhaps only secondarily for the 
user-as-transindividual. Thus, such acts of remembrance, while of course involving 
human agency, may be understood as part of standard machine-facilitated, feed-forward 
mechanisms to secure engagement and further data collection – “the parasitic activity of 
social media … the extraction of information from people’s online activity, which can 
then feed back into future action” (Goodings & Tucker, 2014, p. 50). What event is 
remembered through these features is unimportant. Why it is remembered is important: to 
retain user engagement. Indeed, even in more anarchival uses of Google Photos’s search 
feature we may see the perhaps parasitic nature of user-as-resource – in providing raw 
material for the application, training and testing of AI systems (Murphy, 2019). We may 
recognise, then, a potential contemporary imbalance of agency in how we may perceive, 
remember, and thus act, through surveillance technologies. 
Such observations bring our discussion once more to the matter of choice. We have 
emphasised throughout this thesis that from a Bergsonian position we may think “the 
chief office of consciousness … to preside over action and to enlighten choice” (Bergson, 
2004, p. 182), and that it is through choosing what to perceive and how to act that a 
relational, individuated sense of consciousness emerges – both of bodily self and of social 
individual. “We only see what we look at”, says Berger, “To look is an act of choice. As 
a result of this act, what we see is brought within our reach” (Berger, 1992, p. 8). Yet, 
here – push-notifications embedded into the ubiquitous hardware of contemporary 
technological life, in duration, drawing us into the platform’s own online portal – might 
we think such a choice truly a highly-conscious one?  
In apparent unwitting parallel with Bergson’s stressing that an augmented sense of 
perception necessitates an augmented ability to limit (2004, p. 34), media theorist Ben 
Light observes that, with social-media technologies, “we have to disconnect in some way 
in order to make the connections we want to emphasize at a particular point in time 
feasible” (2014, p. 4). Through push-notified invitations of On This Day features, we may 
think that users disconnect from other lived activity – on-screen and off-screen – to now 
find themselves within a digitally-facilitated, virtual realm of reminiscence. 
Evolutionarily speaking, taking the joint Bergsonian-Simondonian line developed in the 
Theory Chapter (Bergson, 2004, p. 279; Scott, 2014, pp. 118-119), conscious 
remembering acts as a hesitational force, in its excitement distancing us from the 




choice in that perceived moment. Machine-excited artefactual remembering through On 
This Day features may equally give us distance from the now - yet, anchored not to the 
actual but to the potential for platform-engagement, they tear us from the consciously 
perceived and lived world, usurping it with the encouraged perceived and lived platform. 
Reflecting those concerns discussed around Google Maps above, we may think that the 
platform acts to impress itself onto users, extending perception and action out of the 
conceptual-virtual into perception and action within the digital-virtual. And, while 
opportunities for individuation may arise from such interaction, it is tempting to think 
such possibilities a sugared sweetness to mask the latent pharmacological imbalance 
within such man-machine couplings of remembrance.  
We may talk about a usurpation here, since – as reminded above – Facebook seeks not to 
simply engage the user, but to keep the user engaged. Thus, we may think the likes of On 
This Day features as what Zuboff calls “the ‘hooks’ that lure users into their extractive 
operations” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 10). As such, these features act primarily not as useful 
reminders for the user, but simply as calculated, connective data impressions with the 
potential to initiate user platform-interaction. And, once ‘hooked’ into the platform, it 
uses numerous mechanisms to keep the user interacting. For example, the infinite, spatial 
scrolling of the News Feed means the user is never ‘caught up’ with the social now; 
targeted posts appeal to what the platform algorithmically predicts the user most likely to 
engage with; and the ‘logged’ and notified evidence of social interaction, through likes, 
reactions or comments speak to those drives toward collective individuation. Indeed, in 
line with the need to maintain engagement, ex-Google Design Ethicist Tristran Harris 
observes that surveillance technologies are designed to be addictive – “hijacking your 
mind” (2016). As writer Richard Seymour argues, these mechanisms are designed “to 
ensure that they monopolize as much of the user’s time as possible … exploiting a 
vulnerability in human psychology” (2019, p. 27). The ‘social’ arm of surveillance 
capitalism, he suggests, have “created addiction machines, not as an accident, but as a 
logical means to return value to its venture capitalist investors” (Seymour, 2019, p. 27). 
The result of such mechanisms, when successful, is the extended attention of the user 
toward the platform – perceiving, remembering and acting through an actualised, digital-
virtual experience. And this, in turn, suggests further implications for agency-balance in 
these kinds of man-machine couplings. We have seen how Facebook’s Timeline or 
Google’s photo archive displays only variously selected material, organised 




duration, psychically realised into memory-images only when relationally useful for the 
transindividual. Selected chronologies only tell part of the story (and linearly, rather than 
relationally) – thus, Goodings and Tucker argue, a Timeline-style feature “consequently 
places potential restrictions on the present and future movements of online bodies” 
(Goodings & Tucker, 2014, p. 50). Moreover, it is through the Facebook’s landing page 
of the News Feed that wider perceptions, social remembrances and user-interaction takes 
place. As we will see in the following chapters, the highly-structured interactivity of these 
platform-environments – designed to algorithmically ensure connections through targeted 
curation rather than to inform – may play a role in how transindividual perceptions of 
society, social consensus and even belief are formed, indeed perhaps exploited. And, if 
consciousness-informing processes of selecting and limiting what is perceived, 
remembered and acted are engendered to a high degree by the machine, itself in service 
of increasing paid-for connections, this raises serious implications for agency and useful 
action in the nature of the man-machine coupling.   
Key to understanding what is at stake for remembering in such scenarios we once more 
argue is the consideration of awareness and thus the ethical consideration of consent. As 
we saw with Google Maps in Part One, a perhaps crucial aspect of the surveillance 
capitalist model is one of enshrouding the processes of revenue-generation with a 
seemingly ‘free’ experience.  And, while a negative On This Day reminder, for example, 
might encourage a disconnect – a questioning of why the user ought to have remember 
such an event – the calculated restriction to more positive ‘memories’ preserves the user 
in the propitiating flow of the scrolling, virtual platform-present, in duration. 
Furthermore, while a limited awareness of the economical operations surveillance 
technologies might seem to offer potential for conscious disconnection, its conceptual 
distance from what the app-experience appears to be may nullify what we might think 
ought to be consciously-permeating concerns. Apparent convenience in the present, we 
might argue, serves to dampen conscious perspective. Indeed, we might, if perhaps 
allegorically, liken such a dualistic experience to the famous mid-late-twentieth-century 
‘Stamford Marshmallow Experiment’ – in which infants were tested on their willpower 
by being presented one reward (such as a marshmallow) in the perceivable present, yet 
told they would be presented with two rewards if they were able to ignore the first for 
around fifteen minutes, left alone.  
Moreover, it is worth noting, as we have seen above, that platforms like Facebook and 




app-engagement. For example, Facebook collects data, perhaps unknowably or invisibly, 
through various website plug-ins, related to liking, sharing or commenting on articles, or 
advertising services. Indeed, one need not even use Facebook for the platform to collect 
data through these services. The platform may create a so-called ‘shadow profiles’ for 
people who do not have a Facebook account for various reasons – for example, to 
advertise for them to join Facebook, or, through contact-data-correlation to advertise to 
people they may know, to invite them to join.  
Through Berger and Sontag, we might be tempted to consider an internet-age update of 
tensions between capitalist and consumer, between private and corporate modes and 
practices of mediation. And there exists a certain irony that, in one sense, those private 
archives Berger saw in opposition to capitalist media-production have since been 
appropriated for mass corporate gain, through the likes of social media. Indeed, in a 2015 
interview Berger argues:  
[The internet] possesses the same duality of possibilities, one opposed to the 
other, as both an instrument of control by the forces that govern the world – 
that’s to say, financial capitalism and what I call ‘economic fascism’ – but 
also for democracy, associating directly with one another, responding in a 
spontaneous but collective way. (Berger, 2015)  
Through the remainder of this thesis, however, an argument is put forward that we might 
find a problem for remembering in the twenty-first century more complex than a 
reiteration of the traditional worker/capitalist dichotomy. Rather, precisely because of the 
connective nature of surveillance technologies, beyond the tensions between the bodily-
self and the techno-economic, we must consider wider tensions between various drives 
of the social or cultural, toward action in duration. Indeed, we must recognise and 
interrogate the tensions and negotiations between, and arising from, those very 
‘spontaneous but collective’, supposed-democratic drives and agencies to which Berger 
ascribes acclaim.  
Yet, before we move into the next Case-Study Chapter, it is useful to situate the discussion 
more firmly within the wider social sphere – shifting from notions of how one may 
remember oneself in the online through personal media-artefacts, toward an exploration 
of how artefacts of remembrance may be used more socially. As a useful vehicle for such 




artefacts of the user’s own past may (or may not) be used by others once they have passed 
away. 
--o0o-- 
3. Social Media and the Memorial: Facebook as (Web)Site of Commemoration 
In the sections above, we examined ways in which the transindividual may remember 
aspects of their more private and then more social personal past when engaging with 
digital artefacts through various forms of platform-accumulated, personal data-archives. 
We saw that, although platforms like Google Maps, Facebook and Google Photos have, 
in their different ways, in one sense technologically enlarged our capacity for processes 
of perceiving and remembering, they equally play a significant role in determining the 
corresponding limiting of these consciousness-informing processes. While undeniably 
offering new ways to remember personal and more social pasts, such platforms, the 
sections argued, act in accordance with a principal, and often clandestine, economic-
strategic agency – to secure user-engagement. As such, an uncritical, unaware, or not-
fully-consensual reliance on these technologies risks upsetting the balance of agency 
within their consciousness-informing, interface-facilitated, man-machine couplings, 
through which such perceiving and remembering takes place.   
In this final case-study section of the chapter, we consider from our anarchival perspective 
ways in which these digital artefacts may be used to inform remembering after the 
producer, or supposed owner, is no longer active in its engagement – perhaps through 
death, though also through ‘disconnecting’ from the platform. In examining the ways in 
which such artefacts may be used for posthumous engagement and interaction, the section 
has two aims. On the one hand, it emphasises the developing argument around the risks 
of man-machine agency-imbalance in prominent forms of online remembering through 
economic models of surveillance media. And, on the other, ahead of further exploration 
in the subsequent chapters, it broadens the focus of our analysis into the wider social 
sphere of affective online processes of interaction and collective individuation, with their 
own inherent biological, cultural and technological tensions and struggles. In such a 
synthesis, we may think of reproduction of personal and social artefacts not necessarily 
as belonging to any supposed individual, nor signifying their virtual-body-image, but 
rather as signifiers of cultural value toward a collectively-individuated sense of sociality, 




Ghost Riders and Graveyards: Mourning through Memorialised Media 
At some point in 2014, YouTube user 00WARTHERAPY00 posted a comment under a 
video from a now-defunct PBS YouTube channel that asked, “Can Video Games Be A 
Spiritual Experience?” (PBS Game/Show, 2014). The comment tells a story, describing 
how 00WARTHERAPY00 had been purchased an Xbox by their father in the early 
2000s, at the age of four, which they would often play together (see Figure 13). When 
they turned six, 00WARTHERAPY00 says, their father died, and from this point they 
“couldnt [sic] touch that console for 10 years” (00WARTHERAPY00, 2014). On 
returning to the machine a decade later, and loading a car-racing game, the story claims, 
“i found a GHOST. literaly [sic]” (00WARTHERAPY00, 2014). The user explains:  
you know, when a time race happens, that the fastest lap so far gets recorded 
as a ghost driver? yep, you guessed it - his ghost still rolls around the track 
today. and so i played and played, and played, until [sic] i was almost able to 
beat the ghost. until one day i got ahead of it, i surpassed it, and...~ i stopped 
right in front of the finish line, just to ensure i wouldnt [sic] delete it. Bliss. 
(00WARTHERAPY00, 2014) 
The father in this story, simply through playing the video game, had created an accidental 
artefact of his and his child’s shared personal past, which long after his death would, 
through its engagement, become an accidental memorial – or site of commemoration. In 
playing the game in the present, the now-teenager, perhaps -adult, was able to reminisce 
about their late father, remembering their relationship through interacting with an 
animated artefact – itself indeed a technological repetition, or re-enactment, of an animate 
process.18 
 
18 What is interesting to note from our thinking on collective individuation is the subsequent interaction 
with, and inventive re-versioning of, 00WARTHERAPY00’s story. The comment gained some notoriety, 
and, out the original interactive YouTube comment, another user creatively re-signified the story into a 
new interactive artefact, in the form of an original, dramatised video post. This post in turn, generated 
interest, ‘going viral’ and stimulating conversations in the comments section between those with similar 
experiences of commemoration or simply loss. The video, furthermore, was able to be embedded into 
other social-media or forum sites, such as Reddit, generating similar responses beyond its host-site of 
YouTube. We will place a greater focus in subsequent chapters on this apparent process of collective 
coalescing around ideas of the past, and the supposed ‘editing’ of these ideas in their mediations, for 
the potential needs of the present. We will develop our thinking around how a kind of inventive, re-
versioning ‘coalescing’ around media-artefacts may be understood in terms of collective individuation. 
Yet, for now, this chapter wishes to focus on the ways in which existing, more personal artefacts may be 





The example of the ghost rider artefact is itself far from the only kind online, potential 
memorial – indeed site of commemoration – to emerge by accident of design. In a 2009 
Facebook note, former chief security officer for Facebook Max Kelly described the death 
of his Facebook-co-worker and best friend of nearly twenty years in a cycling accident. 
Following his friend’s death, Kelly writes: 
The question soon came up: What do we do about his Facebook profile? We 
had never really thought about this before in such a personal way. Obviously, 
we wanted to be able to model people's relationships on Facebook, but how 
do you deal with an interaction with someone who is no longer able to log on? 
When someone leaves us, they don't leave our memories or our social 
network. To reflect that reality, we created the idea of "memorialized" profiles 
as a place where people can save and share their memories of those who've 
passed. (Kelly, 2009) 
As Facebook continued to grow through the late 2000s, it was inevitable – though 
apparently unanticipated – that users, with profiles on the network, would begin to die. 
When they did, as online death researcher Anna Haverinen notes, their profile pages 
might often become sites of commemoration and mourning – becoming unintended 
memorials, pre-constructed out of the shared media-artefacts of the now-deceased user 
(Haverinen, 2014).  
Since Facebook’s business model is, as we have seen, built around facilitating 
engagements between (living) bodies online, a need emerged for the platform to 
differentiate between profiles signifying living people, in the present – whom it wished 
to ‘remind’ to interact with each other – and those constructed by the now deceased – 
whose network it risked disengaging through such reminders. In response, the 
‘Memorialized Account’ was conceived, as “a way for people on Facebook to remember 
and celebrate those who've passed away” (Facebook Help Centre, no date a) (see Figures 
14 & 15). While all the deceased user’s content remains on-platform, and already-
connected users may continue to make posts to the ‘memorialized timeline’ in acts of 
remembrance and commemoration, there exist two defining features of Memorialized 
accounts. Firstly, the profile does not appear in any public (i.e. living) spaces “such as in 
suggestions for People You May Know, ads or birthday reminders”, and, secondly, “the 
word Remembering will be shown next to the person's name on their profile” (Facebook 




Facebook reports that over 30 million users engage with Memorialized Facebook 
accounts each month, “to post stories, commemorate milestones and remember those who 
have passed away” (Sandberg, 2019). The feature is in continuing development, through 
dialogue with and feedback from users, and in 2019 the platform introduced a new 
‘Tributes’ section to Memorialized profiles, preserving their timeline at the point of death, 
and creating a separate section in which users may make new posts (see Figure 15). This, 
the platform suggests, “lets people see the types of posts that are most helpful to them as 
they grieve and remember their loved ones” (Sandberg, 2019).  
The Facebook Memorialized account, then, offers a prominent and popular example of 
changing processes of artefact-facilitated remembrance and commemoration in the online 
era. How, though, might we approach analysing the experience of Memorialized accounts 









Figure 14 – Memorialized Facebook Account 
 




Death and the Data-Profile: Enduring Online Artefacts  
In what new ways, then, are media-artefacts used through Memorialized Facebook 
accounts for acts of personal and collective remembering? And how might we understand 
these database-facilitated experiences from an anarchival view of remembering?  
It is important to note that online memorials are not a particularly new phenomenon – as 
the Death Online Research Network notes, “When an increasingly large part of life, from 
the most intimate to the most officious is manifest online, it should be of no surprise that 
death is there as well” (no date). During the Web 1.0 era of the 1990s, ‘virtual graveyards’ 
began to appear on the world wide web – reportedly the oldest of which (Marshall, 2000), 
The Virtual Memorial Garden (henceforth TVMG), continues to receive visits today. 
These kinds of website would typically involve a form – on TVMG via a section entitled 
“Remember” (The Virtual Memorial Garden, no date) – though which visitors may 
complete a simple memorial-entry for the deceased: name; dates of birth and death; and 
a short epitaph. In TVMG, each entry has its own individual URL, and guest-visitors can 
click a link to sign a ‘Visitors Book’ through which remembrances may be personally 
made and publicly displayed.  
There are numerous and clear differences between both the technologies and cultural-
commemorative practices in the likes of TVMG and a Memorialized Facebook account. 
Yet perhaps key to exploring these is the nature of the memorial-artefact. Whereas 
TVMG’s unique-URL ‘virtual gravestones’ are created by the bereaved as purpose-made 
memorials, what becomes a memorial on Facebook is created by the deceased themselves 
– the data they leave behind. Garde-Hansen notes that “Facebook is a database of users 
and for users; each user’s page is a database of their life, making this social network site 
a collection of collections and collectives.” (2009, p. 141). Indeed, we saw above how we 
might think these collections of media-artefacts as new kinds of accidental (and not 
necessarily useful-to-the-user) archive – and the Memorialized account may be 
understood as the platform’s response to accidental archives likewise becoming 
accidental memorials.  
While the users were alive, their ‘life databases’ might be seen (albeit problematically 
linearly) as a kind of “living archive” (Hoskins, 2016), geared toward the present, yet 
“archived into the future” (Coleman, 2018, p. 68) – a kind of “’[s]ocial network memory’ 
… [that is] a new hybrid form of public and private memory” (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins & 




engaged with through the News Feed and on users’ Timelines as kinds of markers of 
relationship – operating as image-signifiers of the living body. Yet, when this live-ness 
is stripped from the image, through awareness of death, the more archival, artefact-
facilitated basis of the platform is starkly revealed – as Garde-Hansen notes, with media-
memory theorists Andrew Hoskins and Anna Reading, “The instantaneity and 
temporality of social network environments disguise their potential as mediatised ghosts 
to haunt participants far beyond the life-stage of their online social networking” (2009, p. 
6). Indeed, as Karppi notes, “Memorial pages and memorialised accounts conserve the 
dead in the living in a very literal sense” (2018, p. 100) – their Timelines static in a moving 
virtual-realm of the living.  
While death is a part of life, its engagement is often highly culturally-structured – shifting 
historically and contemporarily between the more private and the more public across 
social contexts (Walter, 2014). Pre-Tribute-feature Memorialized Facebook accounts 
(indeed pre-Memorialized-accounts), the platform allowed similar kinds of interaction 
with deceased users’ posts as with living users’. Yet, as well as finding difficulty in 
presenting death, the hyper-social, live-interaction-oriented platform-model fostered 
peculiar issues in relation to negotiating the personal and the private when users came to 
engage with deceased users’ past posts – as “hybrid public-personal digitised memory 
traces” (Garde-Hansen, Hoskins & Reading, 2009, p. 5). The infrastructural blurring of 
boundaries between personal and private led to personally-felt acts of remembrance – as 
private mourning – on an inherently public social platform. As death theorists Tony 
Walter and others note, in interacting with deceased users’ profiles, “It may be that 
writing online feels private, almost like a confessional, yet there is in fact a wider 
audience”. (Walter et al, 2012) Thus, as a contemporary study by computer- and social-
scientists Jed Brubaker, Gillian R. Hayes and Paul Dourish observes: 
[T]he system presents challenges to others who are not grieving or who are 
grieving differently. Some find comfort, while others express distress at seeing 
what they consider private expressions of grief and may even question the 
authenticity of users’ messages, given the medium by which they are 
expressed. (Brubaker, Hayes & Dourish, 2013, p. 162) 
With a blurring of boundaries, then, between the mediated-artefact (e.g. deceased users’ 
posts) and the body-image-signification of the artefact’s mediator, in parallel with the 




became somewhat problematised. Let us think back on Berger’s thinking on private uses 
of photography:  
[T]he context of the instant recorded is preserved so that the photograph lives 
on in an ongoing continuity. (If you have a photograph of Peter on your wall, 
you are not likely to forget what Peter means to you.) (2009, p. 60) 
Yet, on Facebook, the user’s photograph of (here-deceased) Peter is not theirs. Rather, it 
is a shared image, distributed centrally by Peter or a ‘friend’ of his across their own social 
networks. And interaction with such a body-image-artefact, once clearly seen as within 
an archive of the deceased – through, for example, commenting on posts or on their lived 
Timeline – may be no longer seen as living interaction, but perhaps closer to desecration.  
In the intervention of the Tributes-era Memorialized account, we might think of Facebook 
as implementing a move away from personal-private acts of remembrance, and toward 
more personal-public acts. In ‘fixing’ the Timeline, users are no longer able to make new 
posts on the Timeline, nor comment on existing posts (Shu, 2019). The interface display 
is emphatically split into two virtual places: Timeline and Tributes. Personal 
remembrances through interacting with existing Timeline posts become read-only, 
private. And more public remembrances are overtly structured through the Tributes 
section – indeed, guided by the instructions of the platform: ‘Share stories, commemorate 
a special day or let friends or family know you are thinking about them’ (see Figure 15). 
The deceased’s body-image-as-social-media-post is archived into the past, into the 
Timeline. Tributes becomes not so much about the past, but about commemorations in 
the present. The site becomes once more about the social.  
From our anarchival perspective on remembering, the now-private personal acts of 
remembering through the Memorialized Timeline we may say still suffer the same 
drawbacks as the live Timeline – spatialised, chronological, “a kind of force that 
spatialises past social media activity and goes against the virtual aspect of memory” 
(Goodings & Tucker, 2014, p. 47) – albeit with the different conscious experience of non-
live-ness of the signified, yet now-deceased body-image. However, the Tributes section 
offers an interesting opportunity to think in terms of collective remembering and 
individuation. 
Just as Garde-Hansen notes that Facebook may be considered “a collection of collections” 
(2009, p. 141), we may now see the Timeline, through its memorialisation, as the archive 




to the ‘virtual graveyard’ – Facebook has created a platform through which a remembered 
idea of the deceased – an image of the deceased – may be engaged not through the altering 
of existing artefacts, but through the creation of newly-mediated posts-as-artefacts; 
memorials within memorials. Once more, a sense of the psychically-virtualised past may 
be extended through and into the digital-virtual. As Karppi observes of Facebook 
mourning practices, “A posted picture of the deceased, a comment … and other acts of 
mourning create new connections, new ideas; in other words, they actualise the virtual” 
(2018, p. 100).  
Moreover, in the new context of a social present in the Tributes feature, no longer tied to 
a perhaps revered respect for the past contained within the fixed Timeline, users may now 
reference the deceased’s past not through re-engaging with the deceased’s original posts 
but through linking to, re-presenting or – as we shall discuss in the subsequent chapter – 
re-versioning these artefacts of their past. The Tributes section, we may begin to think of 
as a site for collective individuation: a social virtual-space in the present in which the 
sharing of significations of the deceased – indeed a remembered and mediated “set of 
qualities” (Middleton & Brown, 2005, p. 141) around the deceased – may be used to 
cement the social-relational-bonds of those who knew them. “Commemoration is as much 
about establishing who we are now, as social beings, as it is about settling what happened 
in the past”, argue Middleton and Brown (2005, p. 21). And the connectivity of 
Facebook’s Memorialized accounts allow for the expansion of such commemorations into 
a wider sense of the social. As much as maintaining “ongoing bonds with the dead” 
(Brubaker & Vertesi, 2010, p. 2), we may see Facebook-facilitated commemorative 
practices as maintaining ongoing bonds with the living through the dead. Through 
movements and interactions of commemoration through a Memorialized Facebook 
account, then, we might think of users as transindividually, artefactually facilitating 
processes of collective individuation – reconstituting, through their shared experiences of 
the past, a sense of the deceased’s in-group sociality in the present, out of which a sense 
of the reconstituted, relational, grouped individual may emerge.  
Ahead of subsequent chapters, what is crucial to note, in examining the ways in which 
we may remember through Memorialized accounts, is not only the technological 
affordances for extended collective individuation through cultural commemorative 
practices. In exploring the ways in which changing cultural processes of remembrance 
have been driven by the platform, we have found ourselves also exploring the ways in 




and the input of how users want to commemorate. Indeed, Facebook claims that “[w]e’ll 
continue to build on these changes as we hear more feedback” (Sandberg, 2019). Moving 
forward in the following chapters, then, it is not enough to consider only the agencies of 
the biological and cultural as affected by new technologies – we must equally consider 
the wider role of the biological and the cultural in affecting the processes of technologies 
themselves. 
Yet, these processes, as we have seen, extend beyond providing an apparent service for 
the user, through creating a platform for collective commemoration. As a surveillance 
technology, other, more economic drives are always at work through user-engagement 
with Facebook. Thus, before we come to the close of this chapter, in order to properly 
situate the role played by new technologies in post-mortem remembrances, let us now 
turn once more to the prospective agencies informing the platform in facilitating such 
practices.  
Managing Memory: Personal Data and the Monetised Memorial 
We have seen that, through a relation to archived artefacts signifying a deceased user’s 
past, the Memorialized account may provide a platform for expanded practices of 
commemoration. New artefacts-as-posts may be produced and shared, offering 
opportunities for the reconstitution, through commemoration, of collectively-
individuating socialities around the online network of the deceased. Yet, in shifting from 
the experience of such remembrances toward a consideration of the more socio-economic 
agencies at play for the platform, how might we broaden our understanding of what may 
be at stake for remembering through using such technologies?  
It is important to preface this consideration with the emphasis, once more, that the media-
posts we are here discussing – both of the deceased and those commemorative posts – 
should not be considered ‘memories’. Rather, they are artefacts that carry, through 
cultural signification, opportunities for processes of transindividual memory-potential-
realisation. They are artefactual markers of relationship, that offer opportunities for inter-
relation and collective individuation among always-emergent, networked socialities, in 
the present. Yet, artefacts they remain – as usefully illustrated in a 2018 German court 
case over parents’ rights to their deceased daughter’s Facebook data. In their decision, 
the judge concluded that “it was common to hand over private diaries and correspondence 
to legal heirs after death, and there was no reason to treat digital data any differently” 




kinds of artefacts of remembrance as assets, as a form of digital inheritance – and as 
assets that may (or may not) be managed by others, in one way or another, once the user 
is deceased.19  
While Facebook does offer users the 2015-introduced choice to have their account deleted 
upon death, the default remains for accounts to be memorialised. 2015 also saw the 
introduction of the option to appoint a ‘Legacy Contact’ (Callison-Burch, Probst & 
Govea, 2015), who, following an account’s memorialisation, may in a sense tend the 
digital grave – granted permission to accept new friend requests, pin a post to the Tributes 
section, change the profile picture and cover photo, and even request the account’s 
removal.20  
Once more, this raises interesting implications in terms of the experience of remembering 
through platform artefacts, and the tensions between seeming articulations of public and 
private, versus their more formal realities. Take as an example that when a deceased 
user’s account is deleted, all their posts are of course deleted with it. Ordinarily a user 
may, through their own profile, explore previous artefacts of personal remembrance, in 
engaging with the ‘Photos of You’ section – informing, as we have discussed above, a 
relational sense of individuation. Yet, unless these photos are selfies of one sort or 
another, they are more likely to have been uploaded by another user than by the here-
individuating being. Thus, these artefacts of remembrance, while seemingly shared with 
the user, in fact belong to another’s profile and may, while anticipated to remain, vanish 
if the other user’s account is deleted following death – or indeed in life, through the post’s 
deletion, through the user being ‘unfriended’, or through the poster’s voluntary 
disconnection from the platform.  
From an anarchival perspective, we will further explore in the next chapter how the value 
of artefacts of remembrance may lie not so much in their own preservation, but in the 
cultural value that is signified through their relational, anarchival re-engagement or 
reproduction – indeed, through creative repurposing of artefacts, or re-versioning of 
 
19 Indeed, the issue of digital inheritance – or, perhaps, post-mortem, digital-asset management – and 
our online experience of death is becoming one of increasing popularity and concern. Counselling 
psychologist Elaine Kasket’s book All the Ghosts in the Machine (2019) provides an excellent 
introduction to the subject-area.  
20 Indeed, left unmanaged by anyone, profiles of deceased users may become vulnerable – as illustrated 
when, in 2016, a year after the former New York Times media columnist had died, David Carr’s Twitter 
account was seemingly hijacked by a spam-bot, changing the name to ‘Miranda Davis’, switching the 
profile image to an image of an underwear-clad young woman, and tweeting out to his hundreds of 





signified pasts through new artefacts, for the needs of the present. Rather than thinking in 
terms of ownership of things, we must think in terms of affective processes of artefact-
mediated interaction. Indeed, in the instance of a deleted account, we may understand the 
problem not as the potential loss of the artefact, but rather the working lack of awareness 
around expectations and authority over who decides what artefacts of remembrance 
should be preserved for potential re-engagement and why.  
Yet, importantly, for the platform too we may think ownership of these media-artefacts a 
secondary concern. Let us remind ourselves that the platform’s principal goal is to secure 
and retain engagement, for interaction. We might think that for the platform, it is once 
more not what data is, but what data does. As such, as Hansen observes, ownership of 
media is less important than how it – and its data derivatives – can be used:  
“[T]he question of who owns the information it gathers is, in a sense, 
subordinate to the more general issue of the sheer capacity it and similar 
platforms have to collect personal information on such a massive scale and 
without the awareness of their users.” (Hansen, 2015, p. 72)   
In the case of the Memorialized account, we might think in economic terms of the 
platform making use of existing assets (a deceased user’s Timeline-as-archive) to harness 
existing or excite new drives toward engagement and interaction (individuating drives of 
commemoration), as modes of revenue-generation. Indeed, in terms of what we shall in 
later chapters consider as choice architecture (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009) or controlling 
menus (Harris, 2016), it is interesting to note that, by the time the Legacy Contact or the 
user’s legal heirs come to make a decision on what to do with the deceased’s now-
seemingly-defunct social-media profile, the options have changed. In automatically 
memorialising accounts following a reported death, the platform now presents them with 
a choice of whether or not to keep a pre-packaged, likely already-active memorial to the 
deceased. Yet, we should be careful not to fall into unnecessary cynicism. As Hayles 
notes, while through the use of new, online and networked technologies “the interests of 
individuals are in dynamic interplay with the vested interests of large corporations” 
(2013, p. 18), such relationships can sometimes be seen as “working together to create 
win-win situations” (2013, p. 18). And, in this instance of Memorialized accounts, it is 
significant to acknowledge the ways in which the needs of, behaviour of, and feedback 
from Facebook users around commemorative practice has influenced platform 
architecture. To be sure, we have seen above how the decision to automatically 




through database categorisation, to prevent upsetting pushed interactions with the dead in 
the virtual space of the living. Thus, just as we may examine the ways in which processes 
of remembrance may be changing through the use of new technologies, it is equally 
important to recognise that personal and cultural processes of remembrance may be 
changing those same technologies, in an ongoing process of co-development.  
We might liken these movements of inter-development in remembrance practices to, for 
example, Facebook’s introduction of a platform-automated, French-flag, profile-picture 
overlay in the aftermath of a 2015 terrorist attack in Paris (Facebook, 2015). Adopting an 
emergent user-activist practice of changing profile pictures, the platform here introduced 
its own system, while exciting large-scale user-interaction, posting an update reading, 
“We stand together. #JeSuisParis […] Change your profile picture to support France and 
the people of Paris” (Facebook, 2015). While popularly taken-up, the introduction 
produced a subsequent cultural backlash over the platform’s absence of support for 
concurrent tragedies and attacks in non-European nations, and by 2017 the platform-
automated feature of ‘solidarity’ or ‘remembrance’ overlays had been gently abandoned 
(Bondarenko, 2017).  
Here, then, we must emphasise that there exist roles for wider cultural agencies in shaping 
the ways in which we remember through new technologies, beyond notions of a tension 
between only human and machine. We have seen how the ways in which we remember 
through the likes of Facebook may be shaped not only by the platform, but by issues 
around, for example, legal rights to artefacts, cultural practices and indeed cultural-
political pressures.   
Nevertheless, while it might be tempting to think only in terms of the Facebook providing 
an apparent service to the user through these processes of co-development, Hansen’s 
observation reminds us that those doing the commemoration through Facebook are not in 
fact the platform’s customers. Rather, the facilitation of commemorative practices on the 
platform serve its twofold goal through securing and retaining user-engagement – on the 
one of hand generating revenue through targeted paid-adverts, and on the other of 
harvesting even more user-activity data to feed-forward back into the model. Indeed, we 
may here re-enforce our own, developing, two-fold problem for remembering through 
surveillance technologies. On the one hand, this relates to the imbalance of the 
pharmacological ‘pact’ (Hansen, 2015, p.71) in terms of the apparent service in exchange 
for mass data collection. On the other hand, indeed moreover, it relates to the clandestine 




around the nature of this pact, limiting opportunities for voluntary choice in how we 
perceive, remember and act in the online era.   
--o0o-- 
Archival Individuation: Agency, Identity and Platform-Networked Self 
Through this chapter, we have developed a working application of our anarchival 
approach to the artefactual expansion of processes of perceiving, remembering and acting 
through new, online and pervasive surveillance technologies – as well as introducing 
wider socio-political considerations around roles of inherent forces of the biological, 
technological and cultural in driving such processes.   
We examined how perceptions of the spatial and social present may be expanded through 
the likes of Google products and Facebook. Such a platform-facilitated social present, we 
saw, involves not only on-screen, artefactual renderings of the (near-)present, but uses 
database-calculated feed-forward mechanisms to re-present data from public and user’s 
private pasts in the perceived present – expanding the psychically-perceived and -
remembered conceptual-virtual into the digital-virtual. These kind of remembrances of 
the past may take explicit and user-intended forms, such as publicly-authored reviews, or 
a dropped pin to privately signify where the user’s car is parked. They may equally take 
forms of more accidentally-archived or involuntary-remembered media, such as social-
media posts intended to be shared in the moment, or photos being automatically uploaded 
to Google Photos – and their pushed-remembrances through smart-phone apps. 
Importantly, data of user’s previous public and private pasts may also be fed-forward into 
new artefacts by the platform themselves, not re-presenting events of the past itself, but 
using data to predict and encourage action in the present – for example, through the 
curation of a user’s Facebook Timeline to be one of interest, in targeted promoted adverts, 
or through ‘Your match’ ratings with locations on Google Maps. Moreover, the ability to 
act in the world through these interfaces, the chapter argued, extends the digital-virtual 
into the digital-actual – enabling a man-machine-coupling-facilitated enlargement of 
consciousness through processes of digital-artefactual perception, remembering and 
interaction. Within such psychically- and collectively-individuating interaction, users 
may develop an expanded conscious sense of self in relation to their own past, present 




Yet, technologies such as Google and Facebook, the chapter demonstrated, do not involve 
only the extension of the agencies of the transindividual-as-user in these couplings. 
Rather, through personal data-collection and -analysis, these platforms seek to encourage 
connections to secure and retain user interaction – in order to micro-target advertisements 
that form the majority of their financial revenue, and to secure more opportunities for 
data-collection to feed back into this prediction product model. As such, we 
conceptualised surveillance technologies as a model that harnesses drives toward 
individuation – psychic and more collective – as resources for monetised interaction. A 
pharmacological tension was thus identified between the service users appear to be 
receiving and the actual transaction taking place. Moreover, in a lack of user-awareness 
of such a transaction, those consciousness-informing processes of perceiving, 
remembering and acting risk being skewed toward action (and ultimately, perhaps, 
towards a sense of identity) useful not for the transindividual-as-user, but for the platform 
and its related financial and special interests.  
Beyond a simple dichotomous struggle between user and platform in shaping human 
memory practices, however, the chapter used the example of the Facebook Memorialized 
account to demonstrate that platforms – in relying on user engagement – are equally 
shaped by human considerations. Personal and collective remembering, the chapter 
showed, may be shaped by movements of, for example, personal user-behaviours, legal 
obligations, cultural trends, and cultural-socio-political pressures.  
In the next chapter, then, we move to examine more thoroughly how we may be 
collectively remembering in the online era – exploring how processes of cultural 
remembrance may be changing through new, networked technologies, and considering 









Error 404 – Memory File Not Found:  
Historicising in an Age of Networked Pasts 
 
‘Who controls the past,’ ran the Party slogan, ‘controls the future: 
who controls the present controls the past.’ 
1984 (George Orwell, 1961, p. 32) 
 
The true mediation between technics and power cannot be 
individual. It can be realized only through the mediation of 
culture. For there is something that allows man to govern: the 
culture he has received; it is this culture that gives him 
significations and values; it is culture that governs man, even if 
this man in turn governs other men and machines.  
 (Gilbert Simondon, 2017, p. 161) 
 
The previous chapter examined how the transindividual may remember personal pasts 
through new, online-networked technologies. Through this, it explored how supposed 
individual as well as human-to-human processes of memory-realisation and co-
individuation may be changing through affective couplings with contemporary 
technological interfaces and online data storage, and it identified potential socio-political 
implications. Reflecting on existing affect theory and relating it to our own approach, this 
substantial chapter now comprehensively attempts to develop our anarchival perspective 
on remembering into a sketch for an anarchival synthesis of online social theory. In doing 
so, it aims to examine the ways in which wider affective fields of collective individuation 
may be changing through engaging with new, pervasive technologies in more collective 







Error 404 Case Studies Outlines 
Here we briefly introduce three case-study examples of how the potentials out of records 
of the past have been used to collectively ‘remember’ in the present, as vehicles to drive 
forward the theoretical thrust of this chapter. These introductions focus plainly on the 
events around each example – examining how records of the past may be engaged with 
in acts of remembrance in the present – and aim to provide a foundation for more nuanced 
analysis in the chapter proper.  
The ‘Memeification’ of Unflattering Beyoncé Super Bowl Photos (2013-present) 
On 3 February 2013, US pop-star Beyoncé headlined the half-time show at the NFL Super 
Bowl in a critically-acclaimed performance that would be noted by Twitter as the most-
real-time-tweeted-about event in then-Twitter-history (Rogers, 2013). The following day, 
capitalising on the event’s popularity, news-media entertainment company Buzzfeed 
published a somewhat tongue-in-cheek blog of Beyoncé’s “fiercest moments” from the 
performance (Yapalater, 2013), featuring a range of notable, dramatic and more 
humorous Getty Images news photographs, and GIFs taken from the event recording. 
Among the more comical of the thirty-three posts were seven about which Beyoncé’s 
publicist contacted Buzzfeed on 5 February with a request to remove, due to their 
perceived ‘unflattering’ nature (BuzzFeedCeleb, 2013). Rather than remove the offending 
posts, however, BuzzFeed took the editorial decision to exploit the situation and on the 
same day publicise the email request itself, along with reproducing the offending images, 
under the headline ‘The "Unflattering" Photos Beyoncé's Publicist Doesn't Want You To 
See’ (BuzzFeedCeleb, 2013). In turn, further interest was generated in the images, and 
the story picked up by other Western news outlets (for example: Potter, 2013; Shapiro & 
Mirkinson, 2013; The Week, 2013; Vancouver Sun, 2013; Vincent, 2013). 
Over the course of several days, as well as the Super Bowl photographs being increasingly 
shared online, ‘memeified’ and photoshopped images adapted from the originals started 
to appear in forums and imageboard social media sites, such as Imgur, Reddit and 4chan 
– perhaps in an attempt to poke fun at Beyoncé or her request for the photographs’ 
removal. These took on numerous creative forms, with notably-shared examples of the 
most popularly-adapted photograph – in which Beyoncé pulls a striking facial expression 
and physical stance – ranging from simple image macros (see Figure 1), to the addition 
of a barbell in Beyoncé’s hands (see Figure 2), to turning the pop-star’s skin green in a 




February it was reported that most of the original ‘problem images’ had been removed 
for purchase from the Getty Images catalogue (Juzwiak, 2013), they remained on 
numerous news websites, including the original BuzzFeed articles, and continued to be 
reproduced, adapted and reposted through social media sites, helped along by inter-active 
media campaigns such as contests for the best Photoshopped memes (Ley, 2013).  
While as time moved on from the 2013 Super Bowl interest in such images waned (see 
Figure 4), they nevertheless have continued to be actively engaged with (albeit at a lesser 
intensity than their initial reception) through social media sites. Google Trends, for 
example, shows a mild tendency across several years for Google searches related to 
‘unflattering Beyoncé’, mainly from Western countries, at around the time of that year’s 
Super Bowl (see Figure 5).21 Equally, as of the time of writing, nearly a quarter (twenty-
four) of the one hundred most-recent album posts given the tag of ‘Beyoncé’ on Imgur 
overtly reference or simply repost the unflattering Beyoncé meme, each encouraging 
further sharing of meme variations through the interactive comments section below. 
These posts were made regularly across the span of around a year, all by unique users, 
with many including text or titles variating on ‘never forget’, ‘just a reminder’, ‘keep it 
alive’ or ‘never let this picture die’ (see Figure 6). And while some posts may have only 
several hundred views, others have amassed well over 100,000 views and hundreds of 
comment submissions, suggesting a somewhat ‘hit-and-miss’ limited but nonetheless 






21 The figure also shows an uptick in searches in April 2018, coinciding with the artist’s request to news 
outlets and fans not to post any non-approved photographs from her upcoming performance at 





Figures 1 & 3 – Unflattering Beyoncé memes 
 





Figure 4 – Worldwide searches for ‘unflattering Beyoncé’, from the meme’s emergence through to today.  
Source: https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=2013-02-03%202019-06-05&q=unflattering%20beyonce 
 






Figure 6 – Screenshot of the most recent Imgur posts labelled ‘Beyonce’ as at 6 June 2019.  
Source: www.imgur.com  
 
 
Facebook and the ‘Napalm Girl’ Photo (2016) 
The Pulitzer-Prize-winning photograph, The Terror of War (see Figure 7), was captured 
on film by Associated Press photographer Nick Ut in June 1972, following the mistaken 
napalm-bombing of a South Vietnamese village by their own air force. The now-iconic 
image, commonly known as ‘Napalm Girl’, depicts villagers fleeing the aftermath of the 
bombing, including a naked nine-year-old child. As well as provoking further global 
debate over the value of nations’ involvement in the Vietnam War, the picture challenged 
the editorial practices of mass-media news outlets of the time, leading numerous 
publications, such as the New York Times, to amend their guidelines around the 




Over three decades later, in the summer of 2016, Norwegian author Tom Egeland 
included the image in a seven-picture post on his Facebook account, drawing attention to 
“photographs that changed the history of warfare” (Egil Hansen, 2016). While other 
images remained, The Terror of War was deleted by the platform for violating its 
‘Community Standards’ – and when the author responded to its deletion, that post too 
was reportedly deleted, and his Facebook account suspended (Egil Hansen, 2016). When 
the event was subsequently highlighted by Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, and the 
article and image shared to its own Facebook page, the news outlet received a message 
from Facebook, requesting that they “either remove or pixelize” the image (Carrie Wong, 
2016). Within twenty-four hours, and before the newspaper had responded to the request, 
their post and image too had been deleted by Facebook, prompting the editor-in-chief 
Espen Egil Hansen to produce a front-page (and online) open letter to Mark Zuckerberg, 
calling on the CEO of Facebook as “world’s most powerful editor” to take a more liberal 
approach to freedom of publication (Egil Hansen, 2016).  
Coverage of the article quickly expanded through other online news outlets and social 
media, provoking outrage across Norway and globally. Indeed, the now-adult and 
relocated subject of the photograph herself, Kim Phúc, made a public statement on the 
debate from Canada, claiming, “I’m saddened by those who would focus on the nudity in 
the historic picture rather than the powerful message it conveys” (quoted in Levin, Carrie 
Wong & Harding, 2016). Social media users began to share the image on Facebook to 
protest its perceived censorship. with by the following day high-profile Norwegian 
politicians among them – including prime minister Erna Solberg. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
these images too were deleted by the platform, with Solberg lambasting the act as 
“edit[ing] our common history” (quoted in Ross & Carrie Wong, 2016). The same day, 
under mounting pressure and backlash from international users, as well as the Norwegian 
government, Facebook reneged on its editorial decision. In a public statement, the 
corporation declared that, “after hearing from our community”, they had decided that 
“[b]ecause of its status as an iconic image of historical importance, the value of permitting 
sharing outweighs the value of protecting the community by removal”, and the image 
would thenceforth be permitted to be shared on the platform (Levin, Carrie Wong & 





Figure 7 – ‘The Terror of War’, or ‘Napalm Girl’, by Nick Ut  
 
 







Led by Donkeys – Brexit Billboards, and Beyond (2019-present) 
On the morning of 9 January 2019, a photograph was posted to Twitter, featuring a north-
London billboard displaying a scaled-up tweet posted during the 2015 UK general 
election by then-prime-minister David Cameron. The post’s caption read, “Last night we 
started a little project to record for posterity the prophetic words of our leaders. Here’s 
the first one … Eyes peeled for more … #TweetsYouCantDelete” (Led by Donkeys 
2019). The billboard itself displayed Cameron’s words: “Britain faces a simple and 
inescapable choice - stability and strong Government with me, or chaos with Ed 
Miliband” (see Figure 10). The original tweet had been popularly recirculating online at 
the time, in apparent mocking protest of the present difficulties posed by Brexit – Britain’s 
tightly-won, referendum-mandated exit from the EU – itself a product of Cameron’s 
largely-unexpected general election win. The four-strong group of friends who erected 
the poster would later explain that putting the tweet onto a billboard represented an 
attempt not to let the perceived past lies or present hypocrisy of politicians and 
government leaders be forgotten or go unnoticed simply through the deletion of the record 
– “highlighting what brought us to this point” and holding those implicated to account 
(Led by Donkeys, in Wollaston, 2019).22  
By the afternoon of 9 January, the billboard had been papered over – its installation had 
been an act of guerrilla activism on “borrowed” space (Led by Donkeys, 2019a) – yet its 
influence on social media was only commencing, with the tweet quickly amassing 
thousands of likes and retweets, hundreds of comments, and media attention. In the 
coming days, the group would discreetly erect a handful more billboard posters, placing 
them now in the more Leave-voting areas of Romford and Dover, and featuring historical 
tweets of further Brexit-implicated politicians, again photographing them and posting 
them to Twitter. The campaign continued to rapidly increase its social-media engagement 
online. Within a week of the first billboard poster, the group had received national media 
coverage (Evans, 2019; Geraghty, 2019; Quinn, 2019; Sky News, 2019; York, 2019) and 
had launched a crowdfunding drive to ‘legitimately’ enlarge the campaign – securing 
£30,000 in its first nine hours.  
At the time of writing, half a year after the project launched, Led by Donkeys had 
crowdfunded around £500,000, with which it had installed hundreds of billboards across 
 
22 Hence the group’s name, chosen to reflect the popular description of British infantry led by 




the UK, as well as documenting them and sharing them online – each featuring apparently 
hypocritical statements made by politicians involved in the UK’s withdrawal from the 
EU. The content and location of these billboards have been often sourced collaboratively 
with the campaign’s social media users, having grown their Twitter following to nearly 
250,000 users (Led by Donkeys, 2019b). And while not every billboard may specifically 
reference a tweet – perhaps a snippet of a recorded historical conversation, a comment 
made in an interview, or a statement made in a news piece – each has been rendered into 
the aesthetic format of a tweet, its source referenced, and accompanied by the text, “What 
changed?” (Led by Donkeys, 2019c). With increased funding the group expanded the 
scope of their work. An 800m2 lightweight, overhead banner was commissioned for a 
March 2019 anti-Brexit protest march, along with hiring a helicopter to document its 
employment (Led by Donkeys, 2019a). Works utilise video – projected, for example, on 
the cliffs of Dover (Led by Donkeys, 2019d) or Houses of Parliament (Led by Donkeys, 
2019e), reaching millions of viewers online. In May 2019 the group launched a fresh 
billboard campaign against the newly-launched, populist Brexit Party, ahead of the EU 
parliamentary elections. The ethos of the project, however, appears to remain the same – 
to dynamically use records of politicians’ past statements to relevantly (re)inform the 
public in the present, for the alleged sake of the future. The group’s Twitter posts of these 
revitalised records continue to be widely engaged with online, regularly receiving tens of 
thousands of likes or retweets.  
 
 







Figure 10 – Screenshot of the tweet of the original billboard installed by Led by Donkeys 
Source: Led by Donkeys - https://twitter.com/bydonkeys/status/1082938368491700224  







1. Connected Remembering and Collective Present Pasts 
In this section we explore the ways in which shared, more cultural-historical collective 
remembrances may take place through the greater connectedness of contemporary media 
technologies. Using the case study examples set out above, the section considers how 
technologically-enabled changes to the connectivity of how we culturally remember 
through and with records of past events might be seen differently from an anarchival 
perspective on memory than from traditional archival perspectives. How can we 
conceptualise technologically-enabled, ‘connective’, collective remembering within an 
anarchival approach? In what ways are apparent potentials out of past records being 
engaged with through more-connected technologies? What kind of action is informed 
through these connective engagements, and for what reasons?  
Moreover, the section considers how an anarchival conceptualisation of ‘culture’ may be 
helpful for understanding cultural remembering in opposition to the popular notion of 
memory, indeed the internet, as archive – acts of collective remembrance being seen not 
as recalling ‘knowledge’ of the past, but as using potential, through significations of the 
past, to (re)inform collectively-individuating socialities in the present.  
From Archive to Anarchive: From Annals to Action, to Identity 
In her 1985 essay, ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’, feminist-political theorist and technology 
scholar Donna Haraway envisions a ‘myth’ of cyborg imagery, through which we may 
conceptualise collectives as emerging not out of collective “identity” but collective 
“affinity” (2016, p. 17). Through technologically-enabled connections, Haraway 
suggests, we may overcome essentialist ideas of the human subject-as-individual, of 
identity-constructs, and embrace a notion of technologically-facilitated ‘coalitions’, built 
around shared affinity – “on the basis of conscious coalition, of affinity, of [for example] 
political kinship” (Haraway, 2016, p. 18). In Haraway’s view, using the technologically-
augmented cyborg as a metaphor we might understand ideas of collective ‘identity’ as not 
built through hierarchical (perhaps, we might think, spatially-conceived) social 
taxonomies of class, race, gender or sexuality, but through “explicitly embracing  the  
possibilities  inherent  in  the  breakdown  of clean  distinctions  between  organism  and  
machine  and  similar distinctions structuring the Western self” (Haraway, 2016, p. 53).23 
 
23 Indeed, there is a mild irony to Haraway’s use of the metaphor of the cyborg, since from our 




It is interesting to relate Haraway’s thinking on a sense of the social as more about 
connection than identity – and the “leaky distinction … between animal-human 
(organism) and machine” (Haraway, 2016, p. 11) – to parallels in Bergson’s theory of 
consciousness and technological extension, Simondon’s theorising around collective 
individuation, technics and the emergence of the individual out of the collective, and, 
thus, to relate it to our own anarchival approach to remembering. As social psychologist 
Ian Tucker observes, following Simondon and philosopher Brian Massumi, “We are 
‘leaky bodies’ in relation to data with our porous bodies in continual transformation 
through moving in and through lines of affective individuation” (2018, p. 40). And, 
similarly to the conceptualisation of the cyborg and affinity-based coalition, philosopher 
and feminist theorist Elizabeth Grosz argues that Simondon’s theory of individuation 
allows us to think in new ways about what we call subjective ‘identity’ (2013). Through 
thinking of socialities and individuals as the ongoing, emergent products of collective 
individuation, Grosz argues, we may challenge the assumption “that individuals … 
biological, social or collective, are given and that their characteristics are static rather than 
evolving, transforming and milieu-transforming elaborations” (2013, p. 55).  
Let us remind ourselves that, for Simondon we do not begin with the individual, which 
then acts on the world. On the one hand, as we saw in previous chapters, we may think of 
psychic individuation as the affective experience of consciously being, out of the bodily 
ability to choose (out of perception and memory-potential) how to act on one’s 
environment. Yet, on the other hand, the true sense of an individual, as subject, emerges 
through acts of collective individuation. The individual emerges out of a relation to other 
bodies – in a sense the individual comes after the collective, as a ‘grouped’ or ‘group’ 
individual, driven by the potential of the pre-individual charge into the social (Scott, pp. 
136-137). Thus, as Grosz observes, “Subjectivity can never be identified with a particular 
identity” (2013, p. 53). Rather: 
Subjectivity is … the internal enfolding of a multiplicity of bodily and 
conceptual operations, never finished or finalized, never reducible to a thing, 
never identifiable with any of its stages, never complete, never determinate, 
always in the process of becoming-more and other. (Grosz, 2013, p. 53) 
 
method can be considered an affective coupling of human and (conceptual) technology – indeed 
perhaps a ‘cyborg’. As N. Katherine   notes:  
Whether or not interventions have been made on the body … even a biologically unaltered 
Homo sapiens counts as posthuman. The defining characteristics involve the construction 




From our anarchival position, we may understand one’s sense of identity as a process of 
realising potentials from the past – memory-potential – to inform interactions in the 
present, themselves informing individuation, out of which a sense of individual and social 
identity may emerge. Indeed, what emerges is “more than identity” (Scott, 2014, p. 151). 
As we saw in the Theory Chapter, we can think of Simondon’s ‘transductive thought’ – 
or, from a perhaps more Bergsonian perspective, ‘choice’ – highly conscious or 
otherwise, as affective movements or interaction, being realised out of memory-potential 
through an ongoing negotiation with both one’s perceived surroundings and one’s 
perceived personal or cultural past:  
Like all real being, like any fragment of the real that is individuated, thought 
is rooted in a milieu, which constitutes its historical dimension; thoughts are 
not ahistorical, not stars in the heaven of ideas. They emerge from a theoretical 
environment, drawing the seeds of their development from it (Combes, 2013, 
p. 12). 
Like Haraway’s cyborg-influenced notion of societies overcoming social-constructivist 
taxonomies of identity, in this sense we might understand collectively-individuated in-
group identities – and the acts of collective remembrance that inform them – as less about 
groupings of individuals, and more about multiplicities of affective interactions and 
connections. These active connections are informed, across varying degrees of conscious 
thought, through technologically-communicated shared affinity and cultural outlook – 
themselves informed by the realisation of memory-potential – reconstituting always-
emergent, collectively-individuating socialities. Let us further remind ourselves that, for 
Simondon:  
one cannot, even speak of an individual, but only of individuation; one must 
go back to the activity, the genesis, instead of trying to apprehend the being 
as entirely made in order to discover the criteria by which one will know 
whether it is an individual or not. The individual is not a being but an act. 
(Simondon, 2005, p. 191) 
If we are to think of individuals as acts, out of memory-potential, then we may think of 
societies not to be made up of people, but of movements out of realised or realising 
memory-potential, forming processes of collective individuation. Social identity within 
this conceptualisation is not, then, formed out of shared traits within social taxonomies, 




through leaky beings. Conscious societies are not groups of ‘pure’ individuals, but 
technologically-mediated, relational movements of individuation – affective processes 
out of which the sense of individual is in a constant state of (re)emergence.  
Connected Collectives: Cyborg Socialities 
How, then, might we reflect on our case-study examples within this framework? Media 
theorist Joanne Garde-Hansen suggests that we might see new technologies like social 
media as archiving tools – Facebook as a “creative archive”, and the wider internet, 
through archiving platforms like search engines or YouTube, as a kind of “self-archiving 
phenomenon” (2011, p. 80) – and thus consider the connective possibilities of the internet 
perhaps as “democratisation” of archives (Garde-Hansen, 2011, pp. 70-87). As we saw in 
the Literature Review chapter, while there has long been held a distinction between the 
top-down ‘official history’ of, for example, colonial archives, and the supposed 
‘unofficial history’ or ‘public memory’ of bottom-up collective or social remembering, 
the internet does offer opportunities for new, more ‘open’ claims to using historical 
records to remember. And there is no doubting that the internet, as ‘cyber space’, 
continues to collate and store increasing masses of data, much like an archive. As media 
archaeologist Jussi Parikka observes:  
As every museum and archive knows (or should), the labor of how culture 
remembers and retrieves from memory is shifting from the official institutions 
to everyday media environments—social media or, more generally, the way 
in which data are transmitted and stored, even if fleetingly. (2013 p. 16) 
From an archival perspective, then, we might be tempted to see each of our collective 
memory case-study examples as a kind of hierarchical, political power struggle for 
knowledge: ‘the people’ or the perhaps oppressed coming together through remembering 
against the perceived dominant and tyrannical forces of compulsory obliteration, forging 
a new, democratised custodianship of the memory archive. The unflattering Beyoncé 
meme might here represent a struggle against the attempts of the powerful to curate their 
own idealised versions of ‘the past’ on the internet, as archive of the present and future; 
defiance against Facebook’s censorship of The Terror of War could be understood as the 
democratic forcing of a stubborn and powerful ‘gatekeeper’ of history to allow us to 
remember knowledge of the past through the archive, accessing and sharing the image; 
the Led by Donkeys campaign we might see as an attempt to ‘liberate’ archival Twitter-
memory, at risk of being accidentally or purposely forgotten (deleted), back into the 




Yet, while a focus on the internet as a kind of archive of knowledge may offer an 
interesting political view of how the increased connectivity of media may be changing 
tendencies of democratised collective remembering in the online era, its overly-
spatialised approach – seeing the capture and escape of potentials in terms of quantified 
loss or gain of memory – risks leading once again to perhaps falsely-perceived problems 
of differences in degree – of less versus more.24 Rather, in taking an anarchival approach 
to understanding these case studies – remembering as informing action rather than 
knowledge – and in thinking the problem in terms of differences in kind, we must consider 
on the one hand what kind of more nuanced interactions and resultant identities might be 
(re)informed through these new acts of artefact-facilitated social remembering, and on 
the other the new ways in which these are affected – indeed effected – through the 
increased connectivity of new technologies.  
We might from our anarchival perspective, then, understand the creation and circulation 
of memes of Beyoncé’s unflattering photographs as more than an attempt to remember 
something seemingly important that ‘someone more powerful’ wanted forgotten. Rather, 
we might see transindividual connections through sharing the media-artefacts within 
processes of collective individuation – of the realisation of transindividual memory-
potential into shared acts of remembrance, reconstituting affective bonds out of whatever 
affinity-based sense of connection within an emergent sociality in duration.  
Indeed, it is crucial to note that questions of power dynamics in relation to non-white 
bodies and female bodies (or, indeed, the inter-affective images of bodies) in the 
contemporary West (as elsewhere) are entangled within a broad range of complex 
sociological and historical considerations around notions of, differentiations between, and 
often prejudiced attitudes toward race, gender, sexuality, class and more. And, while the 
focus of this thesis may not allow us to adequately unpack such multifaceted debates 
herein, it is important to recognise and bear in mind that an engagement with case studies 
of these kinds cannot be divorced from these wider social-historical contexts. 
What is important here seems to be more than the event being remembered. It is also the 
networked, affective, social bonds forged through its present-day remembrance. Thus, 
the continued re-engagement with the meme in subsequent years serves not primarily as 
a continuing, perhaps humorous reminder that Beyoncé once wanted some unflattering 
 
24 Moreover, as we will explore further below and in the next chapter, and as technology and political 
commenter Evgeny Morozov reminds us, increased connectivity is not necessarily a good indicator of 




photographs deleted, but rather a continuing reconstituting of those affective bonds forged 
in the past, maintained in the present. Similarly, the widespread connections forged 
through sharing the photograph The Terror of War might not be seen only as a protest act 
of staunch remembrance of the horrors of the Vietnam War in the face of perceived 
historical censorship: we might think of it also as an act of shared political kinship, of 
movements of identity-re-informing collective individuation. Out of a shared political 
affinity for freedom of publication, through the sharing of the image connections are 
enlivened that serve to affectively reconstitute group bonds, instilling a sense of shared 
identity – of ‘more than’, of belonging to an in-group. Equally, online engagement with 
records of politicians’ past statements as put out by Led by Donkeys we might understand 
as a creative, inter-connected process of reconstituting a sense of collective identity. More 
than attempts to preserve pasts that perceived powerful others might want forgotten, these 
may also be understood as collectively-individuating interactions out of shared affinity, 
the visible connections afforded by social media informing a sense of collective identity 
in opposition to the perceived actions of these politicians in the present.25 Indeed, the 
collaborative, and collectively-individuating nature of the process is somewhat 
exemplified in both the crowd-funding of their costs and crowd-sourcing of their media 
content through campaign engagement:  
Once it was a bunch of friends … searching for what they could find on Iain 
Duncan Smith or whoever, on Twitter or Google or the They Work For You 
function of Hansard. Now the crowd is sourcing quotes. (Led by Donkeys, in 
Wollaston, 2019)  
This notion of remembering as informing identity within an ‘in-group’ specifically in 
opposition to a perceived ‘other’ is an interesting one, and one to which we shall return 
to in the next chapter. However, having conceptually explored how these acts of cultural 
remembrance may be seen as (re)informing identity, let us now turn our attention to the 
role new technologies may play in shaping these remembrances, through increased 
technological connectivity – indeed, let us first consider what we might mean by the 
notion of ‘cultural’ remembrances at all.  
 
25 It is worth noting in this example that the collective bond does not appear to be about cementing 
existing historical bonds of voting Leave or Remain in the EU referendum – since at least one member of 
the group identifies as a Leave supporter (Wollaston, 2019). Rather, one may understand the 




Cultural Connections: Networked Society as Anarchive    
It is perhaps to observe the excessively obvious to note that man-machine couplings 
effective in social-media interfaces represent a huge increase in the possibility for 
connections – far beyond more historical constraints of geographical space and time. Yet 
it is important to note that with such an increase in potential transindividual connections 
has come the possibility, as envisioned by Haraway, for more easily-afforded, 
collectively-individuating networks to emerge and reconstitute themselves, based not 
solely on more traditional social taxonomies (of, for example, class, gender, race, 
sexuality etc.), but equally – perhaps even more so – on the likes of shared, affective 
cultural or political kindship.  
‘Access’ to so-called ‘cultural memory’ has been hugely augmented through the advent 
of the world-wide web. Following seminal collective-memory theorist Maurice 
Halbwachs’s claim to collective remembering that “I need only carry in mind whatever 
enables me to gain the group viewpoint, plunge into its milieu and time, and feel in its 
midst” (1980, p. 118), media and memory scholar Andrew Hoskins observes:  
Well, the actuality of the group today is cast and bonded more than ever before 
by the virtuality and the simultaneity or near-simultaneity of the group (from 
proximate to the global). There is no need to ‘carry in one’s mind’ much 
beyond that which facilitates access to the group; today, memory in this way 
is less a question of remembering and more a matter of where to look. 
(Hoskins, 2009a, p. 29)  
Remembering through technological man-machine couplings like hyper-connected social 
media platforms greatly expands the perceptual affective fields or atmospheres through 
which individuating connections may be made through mediated interaction. To be sure, 
collective remembering, as online creative repetitions and representations of artefacts – 
what we have previously called ‘social habit memory’ – does not take place in an online 
vacuum. Social-networking sites do not operate in isolation. Rather these processes form 
part of wider techno-social systems of cultural media-content sharing, on- and off-line – 
what media theorist Andrew Chadwick has called the “hybrid media system” (2017). This 
contemporary system is, as Chadwick describes it, “built upon interactions among older 
and newer … technologies, genres, norms, behaviors, and organizational forms … in the 
reflexively connected fields of media and politics” (2017, p. 4). Thus, what in the 




2011) we may now reconsider in terms of multiplicities of man-machine-coupled 
relations between different actors, media and their respective agencies.  
Through the popular interest in our case-study examples we can begin to see some of the 
complex transindividual and inter-individual inter-relations through which these acts of 
remembrance take place – for example, between online and offline forms of 
communication, between official news outlets and more social-media-led platforms, 
between the degrees of corporate and more ‘personal’ concerns, and so on. The more 
political agencies in these relationships, and the resultant implications, we will explore in 
the final section of this chapter, but for now it is important to recognise that these 
‘connections’ through which acts of collective, cultural remembrance take place involve 
sophisticated techno-socio-political tensions and inter-relations between different actors, 
agents, and their respective agencies.  
It is significant, however, to here pause and consider what we mean when we talk about 
‘cultural remembrance’.  
Culture as Social Drive 
Let us emphasise at this point that what we might loosely call ‘culture’ or ‘cultural 
memory’ – the mediation of social artefact – both emerges out of the transindividual into 
the group and re-informs the transindividual through their exposure to its mediation. We 
in turn act on the group and the group acts on us. Thus, we are not defined individuals 
within the group, but constantly emerging subjects reflexively “coextensive with the 
‘personality of the group’” (Scott, 2014, p. 136), and with the group itself affectively 
reflexive to the emergent personalities of its members, with cultural memory re-informing 
such a social identity. How might we then conceptualise ‘culture’ within our anarchival 
approach?  
It is useful here to remind ourselves of memory’s essential function, as proposed by 
Bergson: to inform useful action in the present (Bergson, 2004). And, as we saw in the 
Theory Chapter, we can envision the notion of ‘useful’ from both a level of instinct and 
intelligence – instinct informing a kind of sense of biological (pre- or lesser-conscious) 
imperative and intelligence a (more conscious) technologically-achievable one.  
This chapter suggests that we might in this respect draw a tangent between Bergson’s 
bodily (or instinctive) and intellectual (or intelligent) ‘usefulness’ and Simondon’s more 
nuanced expression of ‘value’ as a “transductive tendency” for the transindividual, toward 




but three types of transductive or relational value, as helpfully outlined by sociologist 
Andrea Bardin:     
Two of them are related to what institutes a kind of relationship functional to 
the individuation of the living: ‘value as organic or technical condition’ as 
food or medicine. The third kind of value, called ‘absolute’ by Simondon, is 
the ‘beginning or trigger’ of the collective relation. This ‘absolute’ value is 
culture. (Bardin, 2015, p. 136) 
Culture, for Simondon, is what enables the transindividual to operate at beyond the 
perceived biological and technological level we see in Matter and Memory (Bergson, 
2004), and at the collective level, or within the social. From our anarchival perspective, 
we can say that there exists a tension between the values of instinctive and intelligent 
processes in what ‘counts’ as useful action. As Bardin argues, culture can from this 
perspective be conceptualised as a reflexive, creative manipulation or stabilisation of 
these processes to “in order to be functional to the maintenance of group cohesion” (2015, 
p. 137): 
The collective integrates the normativities exceeding the functioning of the 
social system by ‘enveloping them’ … with significations. Culture is therefore 
to be conceived as the transindividual milieu in which social systems emerge 
thanks to a tendential homeostatic stabilisation of their constituting biological 
and technical processes. In fact biological and technical processes are the 
condition of the possibility of culture, i.e. of the collective process which 
makes them compatible through the production of a system of symbols. 
(Bardin, 2015, p. 137) 
We might surmise, then, that what we call ‘culture’ is a ‘system of symbols’ (i.e. 
technologically-mediated artefacts) that, through and indeed as processes of collective 
individuation, informs a sense of collective-identity or togetherness in the present, toward 
the social future – and in fact enables social systems to function in the first place. Culture 
is concerned with ‘the past’ in so far as it makes use of significations of, and out of, the 
past – and thus use of records of the past – to inform action in the present and the future. 
Yet culture itself is a mediating process in duration, of the present, driven by the 
transindividual processes of biologically-perceived and technologically-perceived 
usefulness in the present – themselves out of the lesser or greater conscious realisation of 




and evolving transindividual process, co-operatively in tandem with the processes of 
biological and technological value, and is at the same time the value that allows the two 
to operate together, and so allows for social systems to constitute themselves at all. Thus, 
Simondon strikingly observes that “it is culture that governs man, even if this man in turn governs 
other men and machines” (2017, p. 161).  
Cultural or collective remembering, then, we may now conceptualise as a making use of 
significations of the past – or ideas of the past – through artefacts (physical or acted) to 
inform useful, coherent action for the collectively-individuating transindividual in the 
present.  While it is through technologically-mediated individuation that a sense of 
identity emerges, it is through the perceived value of mediated culture that the personality 
of that individual-as-group-member is re-informed (that individual in turn re-informing 
its perceived in-group). The value of media-content – rather than the supposed content 
itself – being the reconstituting, perceived-to-be-shared culture. We might once more 
liken this conceptualisation of the cultural artefact as a carrier of potential for the 
transindividual (re)establishing of social relations to psychologists David Middleton’s 
and Steven D. Brown’s notion of objects as “markers of relationships” (2005, p. 149-
152). For them – again following Halbwachs’s thinking on collective memory, along with 
French philosopher Michel Serres – more than simply representing social relations, the 
‘projection’ (or apparent projection) of memory onto objects or artefacts represents a way 
to perceptually establish and stabilise longer-term social relations and systems into a 
“more prolonged process” (2005, p. 151). 
This synthesis of course provides an interesting point from which we might anarchivally 
approach the notion of cultural or historical remembering through new, online-connected 
technologies. We should from an anarchival perspective be careful not to think about 
‘ownership’ of culture or history as a kind of ‘shared past’ – the historical past as a ‘thing’. 
Rather we might think of exposure to, use of, and especially reproduction of cultural 
media by a perceived sociality as relational. Cultural remembering provides a way in 
which the sociality may continually reconstitute itself in the present, cementing bonds, in 
anticipation of useful action for the transindividual, in turn reconstituting an always 
emergent sense of group-identity within members a sociality. Collective memory is not 
remembering ‘the past’, but a process of mediating social identity- and action-informing 
value in the present. Remembering through historical records from this perspective 
becomes less about knowing what the past truthfully ‘was’ and more about how ideas of 




always-emergent (shared) identities – in effect, to remind our (perceived) selves of who 
we (feel we) are, and how we should act.26  
Thus, for those whose identity is (re)informed through connecting with Led by Donkeys’ 
media, it is unnecessary to have seen at the time or have since become familiar with the 
initial posts now being reproduced – only to participate in their being reproduced and 
shared, in duration. Indeed, while the group’s seminal tweet reads that the project intends 
to “record for posterity the prophetic words of our leaders” (Led by Donkeys, 2019) – an 
intention reported at the time of writing to still drive the initiative (Gelblum, 2019) – we 
may better understand the project as using records of the past, through the connectivity 
of social media, to culturally cement affective bonds of the emergent sociality in the 
present, and in anticipation of that sociality’s future. ‘Posterity’ is thus achieved not 
through passive acts of archiving in the past, but the ongoing, present acts of anarchiving 
into the future. Equally, for those sharing unflattering Beyoncé memes, it is unimportant 
to personally remember Beyoncé’s Super Bowl performance, nor necessarily have taken 
part in the initial cultural phenomenon of its memeification – only to recognise in its 
cultural signification the reconstituting, through its interactive mediation, of affective 
group bonds. Likewise, the signification of the The Terror of War photograph as a record 
of war – or even of its historically-induced anti-war meaning – becomes secondary to its 
in-the-moment cultural value to those who find in-group commonality in opposing 
perceived bullish Facebook censorship.27  
What is particularly noteworthy about the affordances of new, connective technologies 
for collective remembering, then, is the possibility of enabling wide-spread individuating 
and thus identity-informing interaction through engaging with cultural media. A 
collective act of remembering informs individuation; informs transindividual identity; 
informs society; informs remembering. The expansion of potential affective fields 
through social media technologies allows for multiplicities of socialities to (re)emerge 
and co-exist through multi-agency, techno-social connections beyond the limits of only-
recently more restrictive, conventional geographical boundaries. With social media, it is 
tempting to think that top-down narratives of the past such as those of the colonial archive 
or hierarchical social taxonomies no longer hold the dominant power over how societies 
 
26 We will pick up in depth on this notion of truthfulness versus memory, and ‘the past’ versus ‘ideas of 
the past’, in the next chapter. 
27 Indeed, Kim Phúc’s despair at those “who would focus on the nudity in the historic picture rather than 
the powerful message it conveys” (quoted in Levin, Carrie Wong & Harding, 2016) does not account for 
the fact that the ‘message’ being conveyed through the image’s being shared, in its opposition to 




may emerge and organise themselves culturally through remembering, as groups find the 
apparent ability to form true societies based on seemingly less-hindered man-machine 
interactions around shared cultural affinities.  
Perceived Potentials: Affective Artefacts as Culture-Carriers 
We saw in the Theory Chapter that for Simondon “all thought, precisely to the extent that 
it is real, ... involves a historical aspect in its genesis” (2005, p. 84). Within our anarchival 
conceptualisation of remembering, we can understand this in terms of memory-potential 
being realised into memory-images, and in turn into identity-affirming actions within 
emergent socialities. Yet here we can appreciate in a real-world context how these digital 
records of past events may be used to realise potential into individuation and identity. 
Rather than looking at apparent machinic capture and escape of digital records being used 
to remember in quantified and/or oppositional terms – as ‘loss’ or ‘gain’ of memory, or 
in terms of ‘ownership’ of memory – we might do better to conceive of them anarchivally 
in terms of wider affective processes of social-identity-informing individuation. That is 
to say, we might conceive of the use and sharing of digital records as processes of 
realising memory-potentials into collective-individuation, through technologically-
mediating value within a perceived sociality, for useful action for that perceived sociality.  
Thus, media records of ‘the past’ – data itself – such as the Beyoncé images, The Terror 
of War photograph, or reproduced politicians’ statements, should not be seen archivally 
as potentials in themselves, nor even necessarily as reminders of the events they depict. 
Rather, a more nuanced view, as philosopher Erin Manning has proposed in relation to 
artefacts in the traditional archive, would be to see online data as “carriers of potential” 
(2018), in duration. It is in these cultural records’ anarchival engagement, through 
connected interaction, that potential is realised out of the transindividual into collectively-
individuating actions in the present. And this potential is realised for the usefulness to the 
perceived collectively-individuating individual-as-collective – to become, and act for the 
benefit of, ‘more than’ the individual. In short, to collectively remember is to engage in a 
process of realising transindividual memory-potential into action-informing collective 
identity (and equally into collective-identity-informing action), through individuation in 
duration. Likewise, engagement with records of past events acts as a technological mode, 




What is different in kind in remembering through and with new, online and pervasive 
media, such as social media, is the increased potential for these connections.28   
We may understand, then, that, just as we may view societies as made up of multiplicities 
of transindividual movements more than of groupings of subject-individuals, we may 
view the networked data-communication of ‘the internet’ not merely as a static platform 
for conceptually-spatialised connections of identity in cyber-space, but more temporally 
as a dynamic site of ongoing, spatiotemporal, transindividual-affective, shifting and 
creative movements between data. The description of online-expanded, multi-agency, 
affective fields or atmospheres, afforded through increased connectivity, may well evoke 
strong notions of spatiality, yet we must remember that it is in duration that these affective 
interactions take place. Cyber ‘space’ is after all experienced action in cyber-time. As we 
will explore below, what hyper-connective media brings to remembering is not so much 
the apparent sense of reduction of physical space, bringing things closer together, but an 
expansion of the perceived ‘present’ into wider space. Or perhaps conversely an 
expansion of wider space into the perceived present, replacing traditional notions of 
geographical space with an expanded virtual space – or at least a different kind of 
experience of space and time.  
Thus, in the next section of this chapter we develop our individuation- and interaction-
centric approach to collective remembering into a more spatiotemporal social experience 
– analysing the experience of online collective remembering in duration. Then, equipped 
with a comprehensive synthesis of anarchival social remembering, the final section 
 
28 A supplementary example here could be found in reconsidering the Rally Sports Challenge X-Box 
racing-game ‘ghost in the machine’ introduced in the previous chapter. The cultural data-artefact in 
question here – the ‘ghost rider’ of the author’s father’s fastest lap – was initially mediated to a wider-
than-personal audience through a story in a YouTube comment, on a partly-relevant video. From here, 
the story was third-party (re)produced into a dramatised video of its own, and ultimately sparked a 
forum-like comments-section discussion in which people expressed their sympathy, appreciation and 
indeed shared similar stories of fathers’ deaths, either of their own or that they had heard. And the 
video itself could then be embedded into other social-media sites, like Reddit, where further comments-
based discussions would establish themselves. We can see in this example the how the supposed 
cultural artefact is mediated through various data-forms across techno-affective atmospheres: the 
personal experience of playing the video game offline, into online-shared comment-text, into online 
video-stream, into wider relational comment-based interactions. The technological platform and/or 
medium – indeed even its content – does not so much represent potential itself, to be realised by the 
transindividual. Rather, the media act as carriers of value-as-potential, allowing for memory-potential to 
be realised into individuating action for the transindividual whom infers value from the mediation, and 
thus to the always-emergent socialities within and through which it forms a sense of belonging. Thus, 
both the medium and the meaning attributed to the cultural artefact may shift and change through the 
anarchival movements of its collective engagement, to mean something more – from ‘moving story’ to 




conducts a closer inspection of the agential materiality of new technological platforms, 
and the more socio-political resulting implications.  
--o0o-- 
2. Interaction in Cyber-Time: Remembering in the Social ‘Now’ 
In the previous section, we considered how we might understand changes to anarchivally-
conceptualised collective remembering through the greater inter-relational connectivity 
of the online era. Increased opportunities for connectivity provided by new, networked 
and pervasive media technologies have led to possibilities for the constitution and 
reconstitution of identity-informing socialities beyond historical constraints of space, 
through the technological augmentation of inter-relational affective atmospheres. Yet 
they also allow interaction beyond historical constraints of the experience of time – of the 
present – offering possibilities for ubiquitous, near-instantaneous interaction, in the 
moment, irrespective of physical distance. This section, then, examines how we can 
understand how the spatiotemporality of ‘expanded’, online, real-time, mass-connected 
remembering from our anarchival approach to remembering in duration. How has the 
instantaneity of online telecommunication changed the ways in which we collectively 
engage in acts of cultural remembrance in the present? Indeed, in how might we consider 
the sense of ‘the present’ at all, and how is its experience different through the likes of 
new, socially-connected technologies? What kind of action usefully achieved in engaging 
with ideas of the past through supposedly open-network technologies like social media, 
for whom, and why?   
Structures of Feeling: Online Remembering and the Expansion of the Present 
We have seen that we may understand collective remembering as an affective, relational 
and identity-informing act: we act constantly on the group, and the group on us, in 
movements of individuation in the present, into the future. Now – using an initial reading 
of Raymond Williams’s ‘structures of feeling’ to critically relate to our anarchival 
understanding of cultural remembering – we turn our focus onto that sense of the present, 
and the role new technologies play in shaping anarchival processes of perceiving and 
remembering within it. 
In his 1970s essay of the same name, political theorist Raymond Williams sets out a 
cultural concept of ‘Structures of Feeling’ (1977), in which the experience of culture is 




present, through which we might understand everyday “characteristic elements of 
impulse, restraint, and tone; specifically affective elements of consciousness and 
relationships” (1977, p. 132). The experience of these social ‘structures’, Williams 
argues, constitutes in the human a conscious sense of “temporal present”, concerned with 
“meanings and values as they are actually lived” (1977, p. 132), where social interactive 
relations inform feelings, which themselves inform thought and action: “not feeling 
against thought, but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a 
present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity” (1977, p. 132).  
It is perhaps difficult not to see parallels between Williams’s theorising culture as 
affectively and relationally informing conscious thought and experience in the present, 
and our own anarchival approach to remembering as concerned with interaction in 
duration, out of Bergson and Simondon. We may anarchivally think of individual 
consciousness as feeling, relationally individuating out of affective interaction with one’s 
environment and perceived collective – itself informed through the bodily realisation of 
memory-potential into (choice of) action in the perceived present. What we call ‘culture’ 
can be recognised as the value that facilitates this transindividual drive toward the social, 
and through which a sense of consciousness within the ‘social present’ emerges. Thus, all 
thought, as we know for Simondon, and might now infer for Williams, involves “a 
historical aspect in its genesis” (Simondon, 2005, p. 84).  
As we have seen in previous chapters, Bergson argues that life should be seen as a kind 
of creative extension, facilitated through action in duration. And let us remind ourselves 
that, through gaining a conscious sense of this progression (through having choice of 
action), we experience a sense of ‘personality’, of psychic individuation – of being a 
relationally aware being (or what we might call ‘knowing being’) in the present, and of 
‘freedom’ to act. “The more we succeed in making ourselves conscious of our extension 
or temporal progress in pure duration” (Bergson, 1911, p. 212), Bergson claims: 
[T]he more we feel the different parts of our being enter into each other, and 
our whole personality concentrate itself in a point, or rather a sharp edge, 
pressed against the future and cutting into it unceasingly. (Bergson, 1911, p. 
212) 
Simondon’s thinking on culture develops this sense of experiencing the self in the present 
as a sense of ‘more than’ – of psychic individuation in the moment – through broadening 




individuation, into the always-extending society. Thus, through collective individuation 
our ‘personality’ – our consciousness as the Bergsonian “note of the present” (2004, p. 
181) – is broadened into the social sphere, a feeling of social consciousness, or collective 
identity in duration: the note of the social present. 
Certainly, we might read Williams’s description of the function of structures of feeling as 
generating a ‘temporal present’ in inadvertent parallel with the ‘bringing together’ of the 
transindividual Bergsonian memory theory and Simondonian social theory that underpins 
our anarchival approach: 
Yet this specific solution [a structure of feeling] is never mere flux. It is a 
structured formation which, because it is at the very edge of semantic 
availability, has many of the characteristics of a pre-formation. until specific 
articulations – new semantic figures – are discovered in material practice: 
often, as it happens, in relatively isolated ways, which are only later seen to 
compose a significant (often in fact minority) generation; this often, in turn, 
the generation that substantially connects to its successors. (Williams, 1977, 
p. 134)  
In such a reading, we can perhaps think of the ‘edge of semantic availability’ relative to 
the processes of realising non-representational memory-potential – as emergent feeling – 
into action-informing thought (i.e. a mental ‘image’), to whatever degree of 
consciousness, all in relation to the perceived present environment. Similarly, we can 
think of ‘articulations’ discovered in ‘material practice’ as those formal symbols of 
cultural value that enable the actions out of instinct- and intelligence-led processes of 
memory-potential-realisation to emerge into collectively-individuating socialities of 
transindividual – to emerge into a sense of ‘the social’.  
Conditions of Culture 
In order to develop a nuanced relation of our anarchival approach to Williams’s thinking, 
it is worth considering his theorising of three core ‘elements’ or ‘conditions’ of culture 
(1977, pp. 121-127). Firstly, the dominant condition, which is to say hegemonic culture. 
Secondly, residual, which relates to culture(s) of ‘the past’, which, though an active part 
of present cultural processes, “the dominant culture neglects, undervalues, opposes, 
represses, or even cannot recognize” (Williams, 1977, p. 124). And, thirdly, emergent, a 




practices, new relationships and kinds of relationship … continually being created” 
(1977, p. 123).  
From our anarchival perspective on memory, we might think of these cultural conditions 
as co-extant, ongoing and individuating technological modes of remembering – it follows, 
as modes of social consciousness. Through processes of collective remembering in 
cultural signification – once occurred and as experienced, be it consciously determined 
as dominant, residual or emergent – memory-potential is transindividually realised into 
individuating, identity-informing action. This, in turn, gives us a grasp of the consciously-
perceived social present. Thus, we experience a technologically-expanded present, 
beyond the instant of the individual body, in duration, as centre for action – to whatever 
degree of consciousness. More than the immediate bodily sense of ‘the present’ as “a 
perception of the immediate past and a determination of the immediate future” (Bergson, 
2004, p. 177), cultural modes of perceiving and remembering, by no means limited to 
physical or digital ‘artefacts of the past’, allow us to situate ourselves in a wider social, 
past-informed present, oriented toward a transindividual – that is to say sociality-directed 
– future. As such, while not objects, we might liken culturally-mediated actions, as 
signifiers of the past, to Middleton and Brown’s notion of ‘markers of relationships’ – as 
carriers of potential for the transindividual to realise the sense of social-relational self. To 
exist in the social now is to escape – or perhaps to lose – the lesser-conscious, purely 
reflexive sense of being-in-duration, since the social now is at all times a relation to the 
anarchivally-imagined and -rehearsed social then. 
In this sense, then, we might think of a ‘structure of feeling’ as a parallel with what we 
consider the ongoing processes of conscious reconstitution of the bodily- and socially-
relational individual, through cultural (that is, artefact-facilitated) acts of collective 
individuation, across affective fields or atmospheres – with the ‘more than individual’ 
emerging out of an always-developing sense of shared temporal sociality. A structure of 
feeling, we might say, is the very experience of processes of biologically-, 
technologically- and culturally-organising collective individuation, into a sense of 
prolonged social present, out of which, and within which, a transindividual sense of ‘the 
social’ may constitute itself.  
The Online Expansion of the Now 
Yet let us now relate this theoretical understanding to the role new, pervasive and 




Cultural theorist Rebecca Coleman provides a useful critical relation of Williams’s 
thinking to new, social-media technologies, in which she observes that the “connectivity, 
instantaneity and constant availability of social media creates a present temporality … 
that is concerned with ‘the now’, and is stretched and condensed in various ways” (2018, 
p. 68). Furthermore, Coleman argues that “the liveliness of social media is a situation that 
is experienced (i.e. felt) before it becomes something coherent” (Coleman, 2018, p. 70). 
Whereas, as we saw in the previous chapter, social media might in the past have been 
used to share and (perhaps) ‘store’ records of events that had already happened, the 
connective mobility and ‘live-stream’ text-, photo- and video-functionality of more 
contemporary hardware and software mean that they today operate more as ubiquitous 
sites of witnessing than of remembering, in the strictest, more-traditional sense of the 
words. Indeed, this is the purported aim of many social-networking platforms - media 
theorist Tero Karppi points to Twitter’s Annual Report 2016 by way of example, in which 
they claim:  
Twitter has always been considered a “second screen” for what is happening 
in the world and we believe we can become the first screen for everything that 
is happening now. And by doing so, we believe we can build the planet’s 
largest daily connected audience. (Twitter Inc., 2016, p. 5) 
Yet from our anarchival perspective we can see that collective ‘remembering’ is always 
concerned primarily with perception and interaction in the present over accurate 
recollections of the past.  
The important distinction that must be drawn here from our anarchival position is that, 
while social media feeds may present the world through a spatialised lens, to remember 
with and through social media is not necessarily to consciously reflect on or through ideas 
of the spatialised or quantified past (or indeed present), so much as perceive and act in 
the social present through and with them. Indeed, Coleman observes that “both users and 
analysts of social media experience rather than observe” (2018, p. 71). To perceive an 
‘expanded’ or ‘social’ present through culture presented across social media ‘feeds’ is a 
kind of lesser-conscious experience, out of which an ‘aware’ temporal synthesis of ‘me, 
in the now’ – or, moreover, ‘me, in relation to them, in the now, in relation to the then’ – 
may relationally arise. With social media, then, lesser-conscious perception is extended 
into a virtual, and spatiotemporally enlarged, social atmosphere, through and with which 
memory-potential is relationally realised into greater conscious (to whatever degree) 




Social media, we can say, inform a technologically-mediated, expanded and relational 
perception of the social present. And such an understanding helps to develop our working 
conception of cyber-time to be one concerned not only with a seeming shortening of 
geographical space, but also with an expansion of one’s perception of the relational 
‘social’ in the present. For those creating, sharing and inter-acting with the Beyoncé 
memes, for example, its engagement is in this sense more than a cementing of bonds 
within a perceived ‘fixed’ or even fluid community. It is an experience in the now of 
group participation and interaction in the world – an expansion of the social present across 
geo-spatial constraints, to inform a sense of group-belonging in the moment, as the 
sociality continuously, affectively cements those bonds within and in relation to wider 
society. Similarly, for those posting the The Terror of War images as protest, the sharing 
of the image might not only be seen as an affective coming-together of a sociality through 
this act of shared value. More than this, Facebook’s sense of almost open-ended 
connectivity in seeing others’ posts through its News Feed allows for a sense of self-
aware acting in the moment within an enlarged sense of collectively-individuating 
socialities – existing and perceiving in the anticipated perception of users beyond those 
who would even themselves share the image. In doing so, it reflexively impresses the 
cultural value across wider perceptions in the social now. Equally, interaction with Led 
by Donkeys media posts does not simply cement bonds of belonging within a specific (if 
always-evolving and always-emergent) collectively-individuating sociality in that 
moment. Rather, the open connectedness and publicness of Twitter means that such 
interactions form part of a wider social sense of society as it is in the present, and one’s 
relational positioning in it – the sociality reconstituting itself in relation to a broader sense 
of a social present.  
We have seen, then, that collective remembering can be understood as a transduction of 
commonly-perceived cultural value across affective fields, transindividually realised out 
of memory-potential and into interactions of collective individuation, in turn modulating 
a sense of cohesive ‘society’ through instilling a conscious sense of the relational social 
now. And the instantaneity of new, widely-socially-networked technologies has expanded 
the geographical scope of sense of the social now these cultural values may inform.  
Yet value may be mediated through to-some-extent imagined ideas of the past – the 
importance being more on the value being mediated, beyond how it is mediated or even 
the information content of that mediation. Thus, cultural mediation need not necessarily 




through the idea of that past. Indeed, its signification or mediation is ipso facto 
technologically achieved, and technics are, as we have seen in the Theory Chapter, 
inherently a process of invention, themselves undergoing constant processes of creative 
change in relation to the present. In the next section, then, we move to consider the 
inherent function of creativity in processes of collective remembering, how these may be 
manifesting and changing through online technologies, and how the implications might 
be understood differently from an anarchival rather than archival approach to memory.  
Creative Culture to Code Drift: Social Media and the Newness of the Past 
Williams’s concept of structures of feelings represents the development of his synthesis 
of the ‘emergent’ cultural condition into beyond what we might think of as the ‘already 
emerging’. Rather, he suggests that that we should think in terms of ‘pre-emergence’. 
This pre-emergence of culture is, for Williams, “active and pressing but not yet fully 
articulated” (1977, p. 126) – it is an ongoing and active social process that “depends 
crucially on finding new forms or adaptations of form” (1977, p. 126).  
Here, the chapter proposes that Williams’s notion of pre-emergent structures of feeling, 
out of which culture creatively and socially emerges, we might liken to the 
conceptualisation in the Theory Chapter of memory-potential in its essential form (in 
relation to the Bergsonian élan vital and Simondonian pre-individual charge) as a 
fundamental and above-all creative potential that drives forward all transindividual, 
individuating action and conscious experience in duration – thus, our whole conscious 
sense of existence in the now. As Coleman notes of Williams, “[T]he state of pre-
emergence … is increasingly not only the preserve of emergent culture, but what the 
dominant social and cultural ‘is’” (2018, p. 71). Pre-emergence is in a sense the condition 
for other cultural conditions (i.e. dominant, residual, emergent) – the potential that drives 
it forward in time, through action. That culture which perceptually ‘is’, then, we might 
think from our anarchival perspective as the experience of the always-about-to-emerge, 
creative realisation of memory-potential into transindividual inter-action, in the moment, 
and in relation to that moment – and the resultant conscious feelings of the social (and 
thus individual) temporal self. It is through the experience of these creative and reflexive 
processes of memory-potential realisation into individuating action – inter-relational with 
the emergent sociality’s perceived past and imagined future – that the sense of the 
transindividual now may be consciously, to whatever degree, affectively constituted.   
It is on this notion of creative charge seemingly at the heart of collective remembering 




remembering with traditional views of history as ‘accurate’? How can we think about our 
case studies in relation to the creativity of collective remembering? How are significations 
of the past creatively adapted and adopted in the present? And for whose benefit? And 
what role might be played by new technologies in guiding these creative acts of supposed 
‘remembrance’?  
‘Remixing History’ 
In his essay, ‘Remixing History in Digital Media’, artist and academic Shaun Wilson 
considers how past events, recounted or ‘remixed’, and re-versioned through processes 
of online, edit-facilitating and social-media technologies, “may rearticulate the past – 
consequently changing our perceptions of human history and the unwritten memories of 
our pending future” (Wilson, 2009 p. 195). Accepting that collective remembrances of 
the past need not represent themselves as ‘factual event’ but rather a ‘version’ of the past 
(2009, p. 185), for Wilson, variously edited or remixed digital artefacts are today used 
across three ‘conditions’ of memory:  
[F]irst, as an event supported by artefact (first past); second, an account 
(remix) of the event shared through a combined artefact (second past); and 
third, a versioned remix of the artefact (third past). (Wilson, 2009, pp. 185-
186) 
For Wilson, we may infer that the first condition represents a perhaps truer version of the 
past (the ‘event’), with subsequent versions shifting further away from the ‘fact’ of the 
event. Yet new technologies have offered greatly more-expanded opportunity for 
remixing and re-versioning historical artefacts and, thus, for him, a potential threat for 
memory has emerged:  
[O]ur over-indulgence of an ‘edit desire’ risks the possibility of ‘dumbing 
down’ a sense of memory because there is very little need to engage memory 
when histories of all manners can be accessed with a few clicks. With the need 
to remember diminished, a remixing culture might create a situation where 
much of our daily media content has ultimately been reshaped so many times 
that the history of a first and second past may completely vanish altogether 
leaving the over- versioned artefact weighted with incalculable layers of 
forgotten history. 
Wilson points to colonial histories as a perhaps pre-online example of a ‘third-past’ 




the history of such a place might be fictionalised, edited, forgotten or replaced with 
something” (2009, p. 195). Yet in archivally approaching the topic, from the perspective 
of memory ‘as’ artefact ‘as’ knowledge, Wilson seems to limit himself to strict, 
archivally-conceived ideas of apparent ‘ownership’ or ‘validity’ of remembering – of 
forgetting as ‘loss’ and remembering as ‘gain’ of quantified ‘memories’. Rather, from an 
anarchival perspective, we might see the third-past remembering as the ‘actual’ condition 
of cultural remembering, before it is technologically tames by conceptual notions of 
‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ – the creative biological-technical-cultural processes of 
repurposing of a signification or idea of the past, out of pre-emergent feeling and into 
perceived useful transindividual action.  
From this view, ‘the need to remember’ (informing collective individuation in the 
present) might be better served by the seemingly-dangerous ‘edit desire’ than Wilson 
assumes. In fact, there is a seeming paradox in Wilson’s position, since the reliance on 
and trust in the pure archive ‘as memory’ – as ‘official’ knowledge that must be preserved 
closely to the fact of its artefacts’ ‘events’ – we might speculate is made of similar or 
perhaps the same stuff as that social force empowering the ‘re-versioned’ colonial archive 
‘as history’ in the first place. That is to say, thinking the physical artefact as ‘supporting’ 
an account of an event is already to privilege the archive over, say, differently-artefact-
mediated cultures and traditions of oral history, storytelling or song. Indeed, as media 
theorist Wolfgang Ernst notes, archives are not about supposed memory-storage – rather, 
“real archives link authority to a data storage apparatus” (Ernst, 2004, p. 47), to which 
stories may be attached. From an anarchival perspective, however, we can approach all 
collective remembering as closer to a mediated, ‘versioned remix’ of the past, in which 
colonial history is an example of a more socio-politically ‘dominant’ sociality enforcing 
its organised remix, for its own perceived benefit. The preservation of physical artefacts 
is not so important as the actions of repeating artefacts, whatever their format. The power 
difference from this perspective would not be a question of perceived over-versioning of 
others’ ‘authentic’ pasts – rather, all collective remembrances would be seen as processes, 
actions, of re-versioning in that present, with the difference being in considering whose 
over-versioning is socially dominant, forced into hegemony, and why.29  
 
29 The point here is that, more than a forced ‘forgetting’ of the past, colonial histories might be also 
studied in terms of sociological processes of forced, and technologically-mediated remembering-as-
action, recounting re-versioned pasts useful for that dominant perceived sociality (i.e. the coloniser), in 
constituting a sense of cohesive society (or at least cohesive for the dominant sociality/ies) itself a series 
of social movements toward useful action for perceived grouped individuals. We must be careful, 




Collective memory ‘as culture’ is from the anarchival perspective always – and 
necessarily – malleable, as its actualisation informs and draws on not knowledge but 
creatively individuating action as a realisation of progress. It is, we might think, not so 
much through ‘having’ one’s own story that a sense of the social emerges, but through 
the relational and reciprocal, collectively-individuating interaction of creatively telling it 
or relating it to the always-re-emergent group in the present.30 For Bergson, “reality is a 
perpetual growth, a creation pursued without an end” (1911, p. 252), and it is the 
consciousness of this creativity of extension that human “life and action are free” (1911, 
p. 212). Creativity in itself, creative acts on their own, then, does not contain value per 
se, but rather serve the function of cementing this progress-driving sense of freedom, of 
‘more than’.   
Every human work in which there is invention, every voluntary act in which 
there is freedom, every movement of an organism that manifests spontaneity, 
brings something new into the world. True, these are only creations of form. 
How could they be anything else? We are not the vital current itself ; we are 
this current already loaded with matter, that is, with congealed parts of its own 
substance which carries along its course. (Bergson, 1911, p. 252) 
And, following Simondon, we may see ‘culture’, and thus conscious cultural acts of 
remembrance of the supposed past, as ways in which we may socially reconstitute 
ourselves in duration. We might argue, then, that collective acts of cultural remembrance 
benefit from their own creativeness, in driving forward collective individuation and an 
emerging sense of ‘more than’, of (useful) progress into the future. The transduction of 
social value through collective individuation and into the social is accomplished not just 
through the sharing of remembered culture alone, but by way of its novelty – its 
abstraction signifying a stabilised sense of extension out of the past, relational to the 
present environment and the future. The cultural value of records of the past is not ‘lost’ 
 
political imposition of colonial histories, more recent and more historical. Rather, it represents an 
attempt to re-think power in the political colonisation of histories not in terms of ‘loss’ or ‘gain’ of 
‘owned’ memory, but rather in terms of the politics of sociality-informing movements, processes and 
inter-relations in the present – out of the dynamic, pre-emergent charge of memory-potential and its 
creative realisation into conscious, collectively-individuating representations (and perceptions) of 
collective pasts. Thus, the focus is (perhaps remains) trained not necessarily on the ‘history’ itself, nor its 
authenticity or ownership, but on those processes around transindividual social remembrances, and the 
socio-politically-motivated appropriation of these processes to enable the ‘enveloping’ of one 
apparently stable sociality by another.  
30 The ethical (indeed moral) considerations around processes collective remembrances, and the sense 
of ‘ownership’ of cultural remembering, are an important topic, and one which we will explore more 




in the past’s apparent re-versioning. On the contrary, it is in its re-versioning that the 
value is found. Records may be used to reflect on past events, yet if their primary function 
is to technically act as ‘markers of relationships’ then their relationality must be 
amendable – as reflexively tethered to the need for creativity and invention in the present 
and toward the future as it is tethered to the notion of past as ‘event of fact’, if not more 
so. 
Thus, the creativity of mutating and evolving unflattering Beyoncé memes we might 
begin to see as a process to creatively inform a sense of collective identity in the now 
geographically-expanded social present – stabilising a sense of a collective social present 
through reconstituting itself in inventive acts of progression or extension into the future. 
Participation involves a creative dialogue with records of the past, to inform a sense of a 
sociality and its members’ progression into the future – of continuously emerging as 
‘more than’. In gradually ‘re-presenting’ the evolving memes, themselves recognised 
from the past, with a sense of the ‘new’, those participating members of the sociality 
(itself being collectively reconstituted through the sharing) help to instil a greater 
sensation of stable extension of those group members from the past and into the future. 
Thus is produced a sense of social belonging, of group stability, and a resulting conscious 
sense of group-individual identity in the present. Similarly, might we think of cultural 
value for the transindividual in widespread sharing-as-action of The Terror of War to be 
found in its creative employment? In inventively using existing significations or cultural 
forms, out of the past, the protest-sharing of the image informs a novel cause in the 
present. The actions of using a known artefact of past events to creatively relate to 
perceived present events, in anticipation of a perceived shared future, instilling a sense of 
extension of that present group, out of the past and into the future. And the Led by 
Donkeys campaign perhaps most overtly champions creativity in re-presenting the past 
as a way to socially extend out the past, and the present, toward the future. The seminal 
David Cameron post had already been circulating online, and had done in the past, in 
novel relation to Brexit. Yet by re-packaging, and re-appropriating (indeed re-versioning) 
the mediated signification of the digital artefacts and content they present, such media 
might appealingly convey a sense of extension, or progression, of a presently stable, 
collectively-individuating social group, as it seeks to promote useful action into the 
future.  
This theoretical position established, we must once again return to the role that new 




make use of new, pervasive, social media technologies as tools for reconstituting always-
emergent socialities. And processes of collective individuation through acts of cultural 
signification are, as we have seen, always bound up in processes of the technical. Let us 
remind ourselves that for Bergson technologies may be thought of as extensions of 
instinct or intelligence (1911, p. 146) and that for Simondon processes of biological as 
well as technological transductive value are stabilised by those of cultural value (Bardin, 
2015, p. 137). Thus, let us shift gear for the moment, and now consider the nature of the 
technical as creative process of individuation, and the role new technologies may be 
changing these processes. In doing so, and in anticipation of the final, more-politically-
focused section of the chapter, we can thus establish a more ‘joined-up’ attitude toward 
the couplings of man-machine technologies of remembering, and their inherent agencies.  
‘Code Drift’ and Technical Invention 
In their 2010 essay ‘Code Drift’, digital cultural theorists Arthur and Marilouise Kroker 
describe the contemporary human as “code drift” or “data flesh” – “the genetic drift of all 
augmented data bodies” (2010). For them, the pervasiveness of technologies mean that 
“[n]either global nor local, today we are mobile – we are code drift” (2010). Above all, 
code drift is a creative process: 
Just as genetic drift occurs by chance, producing in its wake unpredictable 
streams of genetic variation, so too code drift. Code drift cannot be 
programmed in advance, but occurs by chance variations through unexpected 
uses, creative applications, a fluctuation in our perception that produces 
complex technological transformations. Random fluctuations that build over 
time, resulting in complex yet subtle changes in the genetic makeup of a 
population: an indeterminate future of flux, chaos, intermediations, 
intersections, remix. (Kroker & Kroker, 2010) 
This conceptualisation offers a useful critical reflecting board for considering the notion 
– and significance – of creativity within our anarchival approach to memory-potential and 
technics. There are of course obvious parallels to be drawn between the existing notion 
genetic drift and Bergson’s notion of creative evolution and élan vital (1911), and Kroker 
and Kroker’s contribution we might think of an attempt to extend into the technical realm 
this sense of vital, creative process:  
Code drift is the spectral destiny of the story of technology. No necessary 




culture at drift in complex streams of social networking technologies filtered 
here and there with sudden changes in code frequencies, moving at the speed 
of random fluctuations, always seeking to make of the question of identity a 
sampling error, to connect with the broken energy flows of ruptures, 
conjurations, unintelligibility, bifurcations. (Kroker & Kroker, 2010) 
Code drift, then, might be seen in relation to the affective sense of humans as ‘leaky 
bodies’ bleeding into the technological structures through which we live, and vice versa. 
We live through a mish-mash of biological-technological couplings of perception and 
action. And these technologies themselves undergo creative processes of their own, as 
their forms re-emerge from past to future through human technicity, that is to say, 
processes of technical invention, in, and in relation to, the present (Simondon, 2017).31 
“Human reality lives through technology” (Scott, on Simondon, 2014, p. 1), and, in an 
age of data, pervasive media and ubiquitous computing, the digital-technological 
permeates into practically all life – “digital subjects today are fiercely tethered to 
mobility” (Kroker & Kroker, 2010).  
Kroker and Kroker admirably and importantly draw attention to the affective nature of 
data-technological existence, as apparent extension of the body into data, or indeed the 
affective relation of the body as lived through and with data. Yet there is a critical 
observation to be made here from our anarchival perspective, exemplified through Kroker 
and Kroker’s identification as a “real challenge” of “data trauma – the fact that data 
cannot keep up, either metaphorically or materially to the speed of perception” (2010). 
While we may live through these technologies, for Kroker and Kroker a tension or 
disjuncture thus exists between the bodily and the technical, causing what Simondon 
would describe as a sense of alienation (Simondon, 2017, pp. 254-261). Yet this sense of 
alienation, this thesis argues, might be better thought of as the erroneous omission of 
culture into the synthesis – and, thus, to not account for the binding together of values of 
body and technics through culture, in the social now. For Kroker and Kroker, for example:  
While technology has the illusion of control — consider how social 
networking technologies always strive to facialize themselves in the 
 
31 It would be interesting in further, related, theoretical inquiry to consider Williams’s notions of 
emergent, dominant and residual culture in relation to Simondon’s technical essence, continuousness 
(i.e. progressive “optimizations”) and discontinuousness (the process of “concretization” of a technical 
object’s progress, through continuous minor optimisations) – for a brief outline, see: De Boever et al, 





possessive language of the “I” and “You” — Facebook, iChat, iPhone, You 
Tube — the persistent data reality is code drift. Encoded by technology, 
everyone today is a code drifter, touched by technology and remixing the 
technology right back. (2010) 
Yet to see the “language of ‘I’ and ‘You’” in social-media technologies as purely code 
drift – itself ‘at drift’ and ‘with no definite goal’ – is to deny the agency of society and 
culture and indeed invention into technics, into the progression of technical existence in 
the present and into the future. In fact, the engagement with and continuing development 
of new, pervasive technologies are teeming with the cultural-political agencies of those 
actors who deploy them, and who use them, who contribute to the ever-forward 
progression of technologically-biologically-culturally-constituted existence in duration. 
“Refusing stability, never stationary”, Kroker and Kroker suggest, “[D]ata is condemned 
to a cycle of endless circulation” (2010). Yet this is to ignore that life itself is process, 
‘refusing stability, never stationary’, and that culture is precisely what enables a sense of 
stability to be given to both the embodied-social and the technological. Likewise, rather 
than seeing bodies as “encoded by technology … touched by technology and remixing 
the technology right back”, for example, we can turn again to media theorist Mark 
Hansen’s synthesis of this back-and-forth ‘feeding forward’ of data from the past and into 
the present through socially-networked platforms as intrinsically informed by the 
corporate goals ‘data capitalism’. As Hansen reminds us:  
Far from it being an instance of a digital network operating in some fantasied 
autonomy from human interests, then, what is at issue here is the calculated 
extraction of data, that, though generated through user activity, operates to 
serve the interests of the network itself or, more exactly, the “special interests” 
controlling the network. (Hansen, 2015, p. 64).   
On the one hand, then, it is important to acknowledge the importance of the technological 
in determining human experience. The Beyoncé meme is as much about, for example, the 
format of the meme as artefact – as much, for example, about the materiality of the 
networked-platform as perceptual gateway to the social present – as it is about the 
sociality or emergent individual that its signification and sharing helps to reconstitute. 
Yet on the other hand we must accept that technological invention, and the materiality of 
technical existence, is driven by culture value – by the social and political agencies 
practically inherent in the make-up of the interface-experience, and the wider hybrid 




photograph, for example, or the Led by Donkeys media posts, is only made possible by 
the architected designs of those platforms, guided at least as much by the interests of the 
platform as its users. In today’s world of socially-networked interaction, the social now 
becomes not only a mediated dialogue with and into the social, but a negotiation with 
wider corporate and socio-political concerns feeding into the materiality of the platforms. 
In the final section of the chapter we will move to address some of these socio-political 
concerns. In anticipation of this – and having established a comprehensive working 
conceptualisation of collective remembering and its relation to the biological, 
technological and cultural – let us end this section by situating the study within an 
investigative approach that attempts to ‘bring together’ these affective biological, 
technological and cultural values inherent in processes of collective remembering. 
 ‘Infra-Structures of Feeling’: Politics of the Man Machine (1,000 words)  
Through the above sections, we have conceptualised collective remembering as creative 
acts of technologically-mediated cultural value, in the present, across multiplicities of 
technologically-facilitated affective fields, out of which a sense of ‘the social’ may 
emerge. Through a dynamic kind of social ‘coalescing’ around ideas of past, culturally 
mediated, a sense emerges of being able to situate oneself in a perceived ‘social present’ 
– oriented, in the social now, not toward the past but toward the group’s immediate or 
more distant future. And, whereas in previous eras these interactions were more greatly 
constrained by the limits of geographical space and technological speed of 
communication over space, the ‘real-time’ nature of new, pervasive and social-media 
technologies have enlarged this sense of the perceived social now, perhaps globally. More 
than being constructed and experienced in the social now, creative acts of remembrance 
– and thus our always-emergent sense of identity – are co-constructed and co-experienced 
through and with each of those technological-media, man-machine couplings, and 
biological, technical and cultural relations out of which ‘the social’ is made possible. We 
are leaky bodies; we exist through the technological as through the social; we are ‘more-
than’ human.  
In applying Williams’s inter-affective thinking to contemporary social-media 
technologies, Coleman draws our attention to sociologist and philosopher Patricia 
Ticineto Clough’s notion of “infra-empiricism” (Coleman, 2018, p. 71; Clough, 2009). 
Emphasising the supposed subject’s always-relational experience of the world, Clough 
suggests – after Massumi and Simondon – that we might conceive as a basis for 




is … the population, technologically or methodologically open to the modulation of its 
affective capacities” (Clough, 2009, p. 50).32 Affective relations exist not simply between 
people, and between people and ‘things’, but across all perception, action, experience, 
thought, concepts and supposed knowledge. Coleman, following Clough’s approach, thus 
suggests expanding Williams’s concept into a notion of ‘infra-structures of feeling’ as an 
attempt to “account for the often neglected technological and institutional linkages or 
systems that are central to the organisation and functioning of social and cultural life” 
(Coleman, 2018, p. 73). In fact, as we have seen, we can consider collective remembering 
to take place across a kind of hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017) of multiple kinds 
of online and offline forms of communication; and “rather than being located in one 
genre, social media works across a potentially diverse range of supporting structures” 
(Coleman, 2018, p. 73). Thus, from our anarchival perspective, we might think of ‘infra-
structures of feeling’ as the combined processes biological (bodily), technical 
(technological) and cultural (social) values that continuously reconstitute our relational 
senses of collective past, and social-individual identity in the present.  
Yet, if we are properly to analyse the role that new technologies, and all their affective 
inter-relations, may be playing in changing collective memory processes, it is not enough 
to consider just the how. We must also consider the why. As post-modern theorist N. 
Katherine Hayles argues on experience being embodied through new technologies, 
“serious consideration needs to be given to how certain characteristics associated with the 
liberal subject, especially agency and choice, can be articulated within a posthuman 
context” (1999, p. 5). The perceptual technological materiality of interfaces through 
which bodily-realised actions of remembering take place manifestly contributes to the 
consciously, transindividually-experienced social now, and thus to one’s own sense of 
 
32 A growing body of scholarly work has developed in recent decades around an approach to the 
‘subject’ as relational. Postmodern and post-humanist theorist N. Katherine Hayles’s definition of 
reflexivity, for example, refers to “the movement whereby that which has been used to generate a 
system is made, through a changed perspective, to become part of the system it generates” (Hayles, 
1999, p. 8). Accordingly, Hayles questions “how engagements with digital technologies are affecting the 
presuppositions and the assumptions of humanities scholars” (2013, p. 20). We might likewise think this 
shifting approach to sociology and the humanities in relation to theoretical physicist and feminist 
theorist Karen Barad’s conception of “intra-action” or “agential realism” (2007) as a shifting approach to 
scientific method. Through an intra-active approach, Barad argues, conscious empirical awareness must 
be understood as always relational – discursive phenomena not as intrinsically existent, but as 
emerging, from an empirical perspective, through human and nonhuman intra-action (2007). Yet we 
might strikingly, in turn, draw a line directly back to Bergson’s seminal ‘idealist-realist’ proposition in 
Matter and Memory, that beyond notions of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ we exist in a world of inter-affective 
images – “more than that which the idealist calls a representation, but less than that which the realist 
calls a thing; an existence placed half-way between the ‘thing’ and the ‘representation’” (Bergson, 2004, 





identity and historical past (and anticipated future). Yet at the same time it is important 
to recognise that these interfaces and technologies – intrinsic in constituting our own 
sense of self – are themselves underpinned by the cultural-social, political and certainly 
commercial agencies of those who govern them. Thus, in the final section of this chapter, 
we turn our focus more politically to the tensions between the different actors and 
agencies inherent in the complex man-machine couplings of collective online 
remembering, and examine the resulting implications.  
--o0o-- 
3. Architected Anarchives: Platforms as Perception Portals 
We have seen in the above sections that we can think of collective remembering as 
creative acts of sociality- and identity-constituting collective individuation, in the 
moment. Through technologically-mediated significations of cultural value in whatever 
their always-adaptable form and content, the transindividual may emerge out of the 
biologically-conscious, psychically-individuating body and into a wider sense of 
individual in the social present. When collectively mediating, coalescing around and 
consuming ideas of the past online, we can think of records, accounts or artefacts of the 
past as not to do with the events of the past alone, but the process-based reconstitution of 
a perceived sociality in the present, toward its future. Records are not potentials 
themselves, but carriers of action-oriented potential emergent from the transindividual. 
Collective remembering, then, is not so much about drawing ‘the shared past’ into the 
present and future, as about the perceptual, interactive and inter-affective experience in 
duration of using ideas of the past to inform a stabilised sense of the multi-subject-
relational social present, oriented toward group-action in anticipation of the future. 
Collective remembering is perhaps, then, more forward looking than backward looking.  
New perceptual technologies such as social media augment this sense of the social 
present, allowing socialities to reconstitute themselves, in the now, across previously 
constrained spatiotemporal limits. Yet, perceiving through technologically-coupled 
systems today involves multiplicities of inter- or infra-relations across the affective fields 
of online, inter-connected, hybrid media systems. Thus, the experienced sense of the 
present is co-constructed – co-lived – through and with the materiality of perceptual 
technologies and interfaces. Such platforms, which we will below think of as kinds of 
‘perception portals’, in turn involve their own entanglements of and tensions between 




In this chapter’s final section, then, we turn to consider the nuanced and more general 
socio-political implications of collectively remembering through new, networked and 
pervasive online technologies. Using our anarchival approach to memory as a more infra-
affective attemptive examination of the material experience of remembering, the section 
takes three sequential and overlapping steps: firstly, looking at how the surveillance 
society may affect what people culturally share online and why; secondly, exploring how 
the social now may be perceived online (i.e. what we are shown online) and why; and, 
thirdly, examining issues around what we are not shown and why. It takes the prominent 
examples of the Twitter timeline or Facebook News Feed model, along with Google’s 
search engine, as gateways into exploring the wider materially-affective ways in which 
social present may today be experienced and acted in, investigating several inter-related 
questions.33 What sociality- and identity-informing perceptions of the social present are 
being engendered through these interfaces, how, and for what reasons? How do these 
interfaces affect the technologically-facilitated, transindividual “construction of 
subjectivity” (Hayles, 1999, p. 4) in the present? What kind of different actors and 
agencies act across these interfaced affectations? Indeed, what tensions of agency exist 
across the multifaceted man-machine couplings through which these perceptions are 
informed, guided, even perhaps controlled? And, of these, what might be the wider 
implications for memory?  
Pervasive Media and the Man-Machine: Sharing in the Surveillance Society 
We developed in the previous chapter an understanding of how the affective nature of 
online ‘surveillance society’ may impact on the kind of events users may record and share 
of their lives through mediations on the like of social media, in the present – and what 
may be later ‘remembered’ of their personal pasts through these datafied previous actions 
being ‘fed forward’ (Hansen, 2015) into the experience of the future present. The 
technological realisation of the body-as-subject in the online world now takes place in the 
“continual presence for surveillance of bodies and information through 
technologies” (Tucker, 2013, p. 13). Through our anarchival conceptualisation of 
collective remembering, we now develop our approach to surveillance technologies into 
the broader affective sphere of what is culturally remembered online, and why.  
 
33 Unlike the examples of The Terror of War and the Led by Donkeys campaign, the unflattering Beyoncé 
meme was largely lived through Imgur, rather than Facebook or Twitter. It is worth noting, however, 
that the material feature being analysed here is the News Feed or Timeline feature, and its economic 
underpinnings, and that the tailored results and advertising approach examined is the general model 




It is helpful here to return to and reflect upon the supposed problem of the ‘Digital Dark 
Age’, introduced in the Literature Review chapter. In such an impending scenario the 
quickly-obsolete media and hardware of contemporary society lead to a “Digital Gap” for 
future historians (Hillis, quoted in Maclean & Davis, 1998, p. 42), unable to access media-
archaeological records of the twenty-first century. We noted in the chapter media 
archaeologist Wendy Hui Kyong Chun’s argument that the notion of a potential digital 
dark age can be traced to an erroneous, archivally-conceived, conflation of “digital media 
as memory” (Chun, 2011, p. 199; italics my own), and in support drew on sociologist 
Barbara Misztal’s observation that “[i]t is society that ensures what we remember, and 
how and when we remember it” (2007, p. 381). In shifting away from the archive 
metaphor through our developed, process-based, anarchival perspective, we have formed 
a nuanced synthesis of ‘society’, of the ways in which media-records are shared and 
socially circulated under the banner of ‘cultural remembering’, and of the underlying 
function of these social practices. Even when considering the formal notion of the 
‘traditional’ archive, we may now see choices around the inclusion of, and re-engagement 
with, artefacts as not just to do with a desire to ‘document’ the past or present for the 
future, but also, perhaps more so, to do with the drive toward collective individuation in 
the present – in fact to socially constitute the present. Artefacts are humanly important 
not in terms of objects needing to be physically ‘saved’ for the future, but in terms of 
ongoing, sociality-informing processes of mediation of cultural value, engendering a 
sense of stable, relational, individual and collective self through ideas of the past, in the 
present and toward the future. Equally, as we have seen through our case-study examples, 
with the production of ‘accidental archives’ through surveillance technologies like social 
media, cultural (as well as personal) ‘pasts’ that are shared online may be considered less 
to do with ‘preserving’ that cultural artefact or idea, and more to do with relational 
processes of identity-reconstitution in the perceived social now. Thus, the notion of a 
future digital dark age we should see not primarily in terms of the physical preservation-
for-posterity of ‘artefacts’, digital or otherwise, but once again in terms of what happens 
between the artefacts. The formal, social preservation of artefacts should be seen in 
relation to the anarchival processes through which representations (or relational markers) 
of ‘the past’ may be inventively mediated, re-engaged and re-versioned in duration, for 
the needs of the transindividual and its always-emergent sociality in that perceived 
present.  
More than the format of media records, then – central to fears of a digital dark age – it is 




remembered through artefacts in the present, and into future presents. To be sure, it is not 
precisely ‘society that ensures what is remembered’, but those techno-cultural processes 
that produce the very sense of the social, extended out of the biological. Thus, as well as 
the drives of the cultural into the social, to understand what is at stake for collective 
memory from our infra-affective approach, we must acknowledge the agencies vested 
within surveillance technologies themselves in materially guiding these processes of 
remembering.  
We saw in the previous chapter how awareness of surveillance might affect user’s 
behaviours online. Here, we briefly sketch out how user-activity might be affected in at 
least three related ways.  
Firstly, such media may change the ways in which the user chooses what type of personal 
‘presents’ to record and share with their network, in relation to the externalisation of the 
private into the public (Tucker, 2013) – for example, through the apparently ‘open’ 
networked and large-scale audiences of Facebook or Twitter. And we might 
straightforwardly extend this affective change into the realm of what kind of ‘culture’ 
might be shared online from our perspective on the expanded social now, beyond the 
mediation of ‘personal presents’.  
Secondly, the surveillant nature of such media may affect what information the user 
‘looks up’ that others have shared – which websites, digital artefacts or other users they 
interact with. For example, a user’s knowledge that data of their online behaviour is being 
collected when using websites and apps – by the platform, the ISP or even one’s 
government, and through cookies that may collate saleable personal-profiling data – may 
encourage or inhibit the choice to seek out or engage with certain cultural material in the 
first place.  
Yet personal data gathered by surveillance media (either with or without the user’s 
awareness) may also be used by the platform (and third parties) to influence future 
perceptions of the present. A user’s entire historical platform-activity, in a sense ‘saved’ 
or ‘archived’ into the future-oriented past, may be technologically (and without conscious 
user agency) ‘fed forward’ (Hansen, 2015) by platforms into the experience of the social 
now. These data-pasts do not have to be in any true sense re-witnessed or ‘remembered’ 
by the user – though they may be, for example, like in the platform’s re-presenting records 
of users’ previous social-media posts as memory. They may also be used clandestinely 




between that user and what information is deemed most ‘appropriate’ for them - 
determining through records of past behaviours what the user ought to perceive of the 
wider social present. For example, user activity surreptitiously collated by platforms may 
be used to determine the likes of tailored Google search results, Twitter Home timelines, 
Facebook News Feeds or targeted adverts. This, then, adds a third level to the affective 
nature of collective remembering through surveillance technologies – since users, aware 
that the record of their present action may affect how future presents will be presented to 
them by the platform, may consciously modify their in-the-moment behaviours.34   
This third kind of affectation of surveillance technology reminds us that in this 
investigation we must consider not just the agencies of the user in perceiving collective 
remembering online, but the nuanced agencies inherent in the machine side of man-
machine couplings. In assessing the balance of power in the complex, interdependent 
coupling, we must think in terms of the agency of the platform itself – or, more properly, 
of the economic and socio-political concerns of its human operators – and wider socio-
economic stakeholders. As a perhaps seemingly innocuous example, as we shall examine 
below, Facebook and Twitter increasingly regulate their platforms in relation to 
‘Facebook Community Standards’ or ‘The Twitter Rules’. However, beyond enforced 
etiquette, or overt surveillance of the ‘platform-as-archive’, affecting what is posted in 
the first place – indeed beyond more covert personal-data-collection effecting a sense of 
embarrassment or unease at ‘being watched’ – we must take into account that 
surveillance-platforms operate as businesses. That is, we must weigh up the tensions 
between, and implications of, how personal data may be used by the platform to inform 
a notion of the ‘collective’ that can facilitate profit-making, and how these relate to the 
interdependent agencies of further platforms and users’ own creative social drives.  
Thus, the next section examines the material and affective infrastructure underpinning 
what is shown to us through the platform architecture of new social perception portal 
technologies like Google, Facebook and Twitter, and why.  
Corporate Connections: Echo Chambers, and Ecologies of Online Remembering 
The Facebook News Feed or Twitter Home timeline is the perception portal greeting a 
user on opening the respective app on their phone or tablet, or website on their computer. 
The concept of the News Feed revolutionised the experience of using social media 
 
34 At a very simple level, to appreciate this one need only think about the effect of seeing multiple 




technologies when Facebook introduced it in 2006 – rather than platforms consisting 
merely of individual profiles that users could visit to interact with, one-to-one, if publicly, 
the News Feed brought all these interactions visibly into one place. Today, as one scrolls 
down through a seemingly endless series of posts – by friends, membership groups, 
‘followed’ celebrities or public figures and organisations, as well as ‘promoted’ or 
‘sponsored’ links, and more – one’s perceptions are guided in particular sets of ways.  
“Our goal with News Feed is to show you the stories that matter most to you, every time 
you visit Facebook”, Facebook claims: 
[O]ur News Feed is a personalised, ever-changing collection of photos, 
videos, links and updates from the friends, family, businesses and news 
sources that you've connected to on Facebook. (Facebook, no date)  
Likewise, Twitter’s default Home timeline displays to users ‘top Tweets’, which are 
“ones you are likely to care about most” (Twitter, no date). Instagram’s feed is where “the 
photos and videos we think you care about most will appear” (Instagram, no date). While 
there are somewhat constrained settings that can be changed on each platform, the News 
Feed remains ostensibly the same beast: algorithmically-informed decisions are made as 
to what the platform claims to think you ‘want’ to see. Based on data around who posted 
the content, the kind of content, and interactions with the content – in combination with 
the data-profile the platform has compiled for the user her/himself  – “each post is 
assigned a ranking to determine where it appears in your News Feed and which stories 
appear first” (Facebook, no date).  
These feeds, uniquely produced for each user, have led in recent years to the infamous 
notion of the ‘echo chamber’, in which people, seemingly surrounded by self-constructed 
online networks of like-minded individuals, find themselves isolated from those with 
opposing opinions. However, this term is inadequate, since the feeds constructed by the 
likes of Facebook and Twitter do not rely solely on the user’s own network. Rather, 
agency is shared between the user’s own choice of who or what to ‘follow’, and the 
platform’s algorithmically dictated input, which draws on sources beyond this. Twitter, 
for example, says: 
[Y]ou will sometimes see Tweets from accounts you don't follow. We select 
each Tweet using a variety of signals, including how popular it is and how 
people in your network are interacting with it. Our goal is to show you content 




conversation in a meaningful way, such as content that is relevant, credible, 
and safe. (Twitter, no date) 
As Karppi notes, “Relations on social media sites are not only connections between 
people; they also serve as data aggregates and bait to draw users’ attention” (2018, p. 11). 
The social now produced through interacting with social media is, while expanded in its 
reach, always perceived, indeed limited, through algorithmic decision-making beyond the 
human. Filtered by the platform itself, what is experienced is not so much an echo 
chamber as perceiving through a so-called “filter bubble” (Pariser, 2011). Consider, for 
example, that seventy per cent of the media watched on YouTube is driven by its 
‘recommendation’ system, driven by deep-neural networks negotiating likely potential 
connections between data characteristics of the video as data-object and the user as data-
profile.  
Thus, while Hoskins claimed in 2009 that the online era has shifted the notion of 
collective memory to be “more a matter of where to look” (2009a, p. 29), a decade later 
the hegemonic power of social-media platforms as perception portals for social 
consciousness might lead us to think it ‘more a matter of what we’re shown’.  
Perception Portals as Limiting Social Consciousness 
While an entirely different kind of platform to Facebook, Twitter or YouTube, Google 
search engine likewise feeds one’s own past activities back into the present in 
constructing a social ‘now’. As media theorist José van Dijck notes back in 2007: 
Google’s power lies not in its ability to search fixed sets of databases, but in 
its ability to navigate a person through a vast repository of mutant items, 
yielding different content depending upon when and how they are retrieved, 
reshaping the order of its data upon each usage. (2007, p. 166) 
Google’s ability to collate and analyse vast quantities of personal, user-activity data and 
‘match’ the most appropriate records with the individual user is perhaps its ‘USP’ in being 
consistently the world’s most visited website.35 Yet, here too are perceptions of the world 
filtered by the platform, feeding forward users’ past online interactions into a largely 
algorithmically-directed presentation of ‘the now’. So, while the user may input the 
search term, the results – our perceptions of the world – are presented based on what the 
platform ‘thinks’ the user wants to see. Furthermore, as we saw in the previous chapter – 
 




through ubiquitous computing, the likes of social-media push notifications, and the 
tendency to ‘look up’ rather than recall supposed ‘information’, we now can be accessed 
through a computer (Sparrow et al, 2011) – these engagements are pervasive being any 
distinction between online and offline experiences of the social now (if indeed such a 
distinction can or should be made).36  
From a Bergsonian view, consciousness emerges – at its base – from voluntarily being 
able to choose what to perceive. The subjective sense of being-in-the-world “results from 
the discarding of what has no interest for our needs, or more generally for our functions” 
(Bergson, 2004, p. 30), leading at its cultural extension within our synthesis to a stable 
sense of the social now. Yet, through new, pervasive, perceptual technologies the 
processes of cultural value that drive an emergent sense of the social now we might think 
give way to some degree to the automated, more involuntary (or at least, perhaps, not ‘in 
the moment’ consciously consensual) technological processes of the platform – and thus 
those agencies that underly them.  
Returning to the man-machine, then, it seems clear that the everyday balance of agency 
is, when remembering through surveillance technologies, shifted dramatically toward the 
machine. Continuing uncritically on such a trajectory, rather than “becoming with digital 
media” (Tucker, 2018 p. 39), we risk finding ourselves – the perceptions of the social now 
out of which our sense of individual and social self emerges – being governed to an 
inequitable degree by the platform, with limited, if any, conscious action by the user. 
Individuals experience themselves in relation to each other and to a wider social, yet these 
relations, administered as they are largely automatically by the platform, do not 
necessarily allow for a “true society” (De Boever et al, 2013, p. 225) to emerge through 
collective individuation. Rather, the assemblages of the relational, social now as 
information organised and presented by Google, Facebook or Twitter might be better 
understood as more approaching a sense of ‘community’. Through automation and the 
construct of artificial collectives, users may risk like Simondon’s ‘workers’ losing the 
possibility for trans-individuation, alienated from the true social, as the platform-as-
 
36 A recent study of search-users across seven countries (Dutton et al, 2017) argues that in relation to 
search engines “the filter bubble argument is overstated”, since users tend to consider multiple media 
outlets, and “[m]ultiple sources of information tend to counter any potential filter bubbles created by 
search algorithms”. These findings, however, negate neither the consciousness-implicating shift in 
agency toward search engine, rather than user, nor the key tenet of personalised, targeted 
advertisements as platforms’ revenue model. Moreover, as we shall see in the next chapter, even within 
multiple media outlets across the hybrid media machine can artificial socialities be constructed, through 





managed-community “merely puts individuals in relation with each other” (De Boever et 
al, 2013, p. 228).   
Economic Ecologies of Remembering 
Of course, the essential idea that our perceptions of the world may be manipulated by 
powerful media outlets is not a new one. Yet there are two significant, economic 
differences in new, surveillance technologies. Firstly, in terms of who produces the 
content – as media theorist Natalie Fenton points out, “The difference between the 
audience commodity of traditional mass media and of the internet is that on the internet 
the users are also content producers” (Fenton, 2012, p. 129). And, secondly, in the 
personal tailoring of the experience, and why – “The imaginative labour of ordinary 
people”, observes Des Freedman, “is appropriated for the benefits that accrue to those 
companies, like Facebook … who hope to sell the personalised content generated by users 
to advertisers and marketers.” (2012, p. 88).  
Here we hit upon a key concern for collective remembering in the online era: the tensions 
between economic, transactional inter-relations and agencies across platform, clients and 
users. While Google, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube may on the one hand provide a 
service to the user – in terms of socially connecting them to information – they also, 
indeed primarily, operate as businesses, with income-revenue toward profit as a necessity. 
And, while search engines and social media platforms may represent seemingly very 
different services at the user-experience end, their business models remain essentially the 
same, as examined in the previous chapter: ensure user engagement and sell advertising 
(Karppi, 2018, pp. 28-32). This kind of engagement is facilitated not just through 
algorithmically-informed filter bubbles, but in the design of platform architecture – for 
example, the never-ending ‘scrolling’ on Facebook or Twitter feeds, or the ‘next up’ or 
auto-playing of recommended YouTube videos. Indeed, YouTube again offers an 
example of the complexity of economic-agential tensions at play in engaging with 
material online. Since platform-paid authors – worked out through its secretive and often-
changing formula for ‘cost per mille’, or payments per one thousand views –inform its 
business model as well as advertisers, content both production and consumption of online 
media may be driven by potential for raising revenue.  
In the previous chapter, we therefore drew attention to the lack of awareness, when using 
technologies like social media, of how one’s on-platform interactions and engagements 




with collective remembering, too, it is crucial to consider the tensions between the 
agencies and awareness of the user and the platform. While the user may wish to connect 
with news, culture, other users, and so on, the platform’s two-fold, interconnected goals 
are to not just satisfy that demand but to firstly keep the user engaged with it, in order that 
they can secondly connect them with paid-for services – be they overt adverts or more 
covert, ‘sponsored posts’.  
Moreover, beyond the confines of the platform exist the wider agencies of the various 
inter-connected actors within the hybrid media system – for example, the rise of online 
news outlets, or the attempted virality or ‘clickbait factor’ of articles intended to drive 
monetisable website traffic and/or socio-political agenda.37 
The implications of surveillance technologies for collective remembering, then, are, like 
the platform business model, equally two-fold. Firstly, we must appreciate that there 
exists a distinction and a tension between what cultural media is useful for the 
collectively-individuating transindividual to share and perceive, in co-constituting a sense 
of the stabilised social now, and what media is useful for the platform to present in 
keeping the user monetisably engaged. Secondly, we must recognise that this social now 
as experienced through the likes of Google, Facebook and Twitter, is at least partly, yet 
often discreetly, co-constructed by the drives of capitalist commercial interest – for 
example, paid-for, targeted, and attention-grabbing media, designed principally to drive 
traffic or otherwise benefit the platform or third party. Biological-cultural-technological 
processes underlying the reconstitution of socialities are, in a real sense, manipulated. 
Action facilitated within these more artificial senses of the social now is useful chiefly 
not for the user but for the advertisers or promoters, and thus the platforms they 
remunerate. The drive toward belonging is harnessed out of the transindividual to 
encourage engagement in the app over useful action for that transindividual, in effect 
creating artificial socialities acting primarily for their economic usefulness to the 
platform, and the wider inter-dependent actors and agents in the ecology of the hybrid 
media system.38  
 
37 We can see plainly in our Beyoncé meme case study, for example, the interplays between the 
‘shareable’ and encouraging sensationalism of news-media website articles, and the increased 
engagement in these stories and the increased participation in the acts of memeification. And while 
here we focus on the implications of the more economic aspects of these inter-relations, we will address 
below and in the next chapter more theoretical and socio-political points around the notion of 
‘shareability’, ‘spreadability’ and ‘virality’.  
38 Yet, as we will see in the next chapter, there is no real difference in degree between harnessing this 
sense of belonging to ‘produce’ an artificial sense for platform-economic gain and taking advantage of 




It might seem at first intrinsically absurd to critique social media for not being social. Yet, 
in perceiving the world through automated filter-bubbles – designed to fuel interaction 
not for the sake of “pure sociality” (Massumi, 2015, p. 205), but to harness its potential 
toward connective engagement interaction for corporate profit – we cannot be said to truly 
collectively individuate. “The collective is not just an aggregate of individuals”, Massumi 
tells us, following Simondon (2015, p. 201) – rather, it is formed through collective 
individuation. This is not to say that meaningful interaction with the world and the social 
cannot place at an individual level of psychic individuation and co-individuation through 
such platforms and their relation to hybridised media systems. Rather, it is to scrutinise 
the agencies inherent in how whole socialities may collectively individuate themselves, 
exterior to the perceived individual. Affective, collectivising inter-relations are brought 
into being through these technologies, but, in their genesis, they are induced not for the 
usefulness to the sociality itself, but the revenue production of the social network platform 
and its extended, interdependent beneficiaries. Socialities are guided from their outset 
less through processes of inter-relational, individuating beings, and more through top-
down algorithmic calculation – what will make them engage?  
Censored Socialities? Forgetting in the Corporate Social Now 
Platforms such as Google, Facebook and Twitter might appear free at the point of use, 
then, yet they may be far from liberating. We have seen above how surveillance 
technologies may shift the conscious balance of what is shown to the user, and thus how 
one’s sense of sociality and the social now may be perhaps inequitably re-informed to suit 
the needs of the platform over the needs of the user – prioritising continued engagement, 
and reducing the transindividual’s conscious agency in the man-machine coupling. And 
it is important here to return to our theoretical understanding of consciousness as explored 
in the Theory Chapter: the voluntary choice of what to perceive, and, out of realised 
memory-potential, how to act. Let us remind ourselves that Bergson’s may be understood 
as a “subtraction theory of consciousness” (Hansen, 2006, p. 79) – a consciously 
expanded perception is just as much about the choice of greater limitation as it is about 
greater inclusion.39 Thus, in the final section of this chapter, we explore the affective 
 
false sense of sociality as purportedly created through Cambridge Analytica dark ads around political 
votes (Cadwalladr, 2017; Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018), or recent revelations around Lynton 
Crosby and a network of individually-seemingly innocuous propaganda websites and webpages 
(Waterson, 2019b).  
39 Indeed, when we considered the hypothetical notion of ‘pure memory’, Bergson declares that “[t]o 
perceive all the influences from all the points of all bodies would be to descend to the condition of a 




materiality of exclusion in culturally remembering through new, pervasive media – of not 
just what is shown, but what is not. In what ways are perceptions of content restricted by 
corporate platforms of remembering, such as Google, Facebook and Twitter? For what 
reasons? In what ways do wider biological and cultural agencies (both governmental and 
social) exercise conscious control over perceptions produced through new, pervasive 
technologies? And how might we understand the implications of these for collective 
remembering and the reconstitution of the social now? 
Perception portals algorithmically limit one’s sense of the social now to what is 
anticipated as useful for monetisable continued engagement with the platform. And 
selective inclusion, it follows, necessitates selective exclusion. From an archival 
perspective on remembering, it might be tempting, therefore, to consider the likes of 
Google, Facebook and Twitter to be archives, or more properly the gatekeepers of 
archived information-as-knowledge. Indeed, Google’s mission statement is to “[o]rganise 
the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful” (Google, no date). 
Yet it is important here to remind ourselves not to think of the commercial value for 
surveillance media being in content, or data, itself. Rather, value is realised through the 
use of data to excite connections, potentials, in duration, that engender prolonged 
engagement and interaction with the app – with these actions in turn re-informing data-
profiles in a continuing process, feeding forward from the recorded past into the 
anticipated future. Thus, the data, the content-as-information – digital artefacts in 
themselves – have no true value until they are used to realise the potential of the 
transindividual into engagement, and into revenue. They are once more the carriers of 
potential, and not potential in themselves. From an anarchival perspective, then – 
focusing not on knowledge in space, but connection, action and engagement in 
spatiotemporal duration – we might think of surveillance technologies not as gatekeepers 
of knowledge, but channelers of (pre)emergent, transindividual potential-for-action in 
duration. They are not so much gatekeepers of the past as gatekeepers of the present.  
Content is presented to the user in the present not because of its informational merit, but 
because the data with which it is associated ‘fits’ with the potential for user-engagement, 
derived algorithmically in relation to both the present and the data-profile of one’s 
behaviour in previous presents. As we have ascertained, content deemed by the platform 
to be less ‘relevant’ to the user is unlikely to be selected to be shown to the user – be that 
 





less relevant ‘matches’ in search results through Google, or less interacted-with, less 
compatible, indeed less excitable, posts on Facebook and Twitter. In a markedly 
Bergsonian way, then, what is ‘forgotten’ in such social, automated, man-machine 
couplings can be thought of as simply that not deemed by the algorithm as useful to be 
‘remembered’ for action the present moment. The key difference, however, is for whom 
and to what degree these technologically-facilitated acts of remembrance can be 
considered useful.  
Yet, while less unimportant for the economic needs of the platform, the content of media, 
agency removed from the user and held by the algorithm, may have profound and socially 
or personally unwanted impact – for example, the platform-determined auto-playing of 
extreme-violence or misinforming YouTube videos, “the algorithm taking me on a 
journey of its own volition” (Lewis, 2018). Here, then, we move to consider issues around 
how and why content may not be allowed on prevalent platforms.   
Platform-Moderated Forgetting 
In the wider context of the ‘information age’ the technological-relational model of 
remembering and forgetting through surveillance technologies may be problematic for 
the platform. Facebook, for example, while long insisting it should not be classified as a 
‘publisher’ – rather, a platform to “connect the world … [and] bring the world closer 
together” (Zuckerberg, 2017a) – nevertheless hosts content. Thus, web platforms have 
come under pressure in recent years to capitulate to wider publishing regulations and 
expected standards, forcing the moderation or disallowance of content. As such, a tension 
emerges between the platform’s agency in technologically showing what is useful for 
engagement and external, cultural agencies toward showing what is 
socially/politically/legally, regulatorily acceptable – or, more correctly, toward not 
showing what is unacceptable.  
At a basic level, Facebook and Twitter each stipulate a behavioural code, to which they 
expect users to abide – the ‘rules of engagement’, so to speak – and these have historically 
been generally policed by users themselves, reporting violations to the platform to 
manually undertake action.40 As we see in our The Terror of War case study, as well as 
in progressing campaigns such as ‘Free the Nipple’, these codes may in time shift in line 
 
40 See, respectively: Facebook’s ‘Community Standards’ (Facebook, no date a); and Twitter’s ‘The Twitter 




with expectations of the user ‘community’ at the discretion of the platform.41 It is after 
all “culture that governs man” (Simondon, 2017, p. 161). Yet, surveillance technologies 
have also come increasingly under the regulatory force of government legislation, shifting 
the affective agency-balance in terms of discretion toward what should not be permitted 
on platforms.  
We might take as a significant example within EU policy, of the ‘struggles’ between 
platform, user and governmental agencies, the so-called ‘Google Right to Be Forgotten’. 
Introduced in its draft form in European Data Protection Regulation in 2012, and brought 
into law through a 2014 court case (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2014), the 
right to be forgotten allows individuals to request that Google remove search results (in 
the EU) that they feel are no longer relevant and/or are damaging to their ongoing personal 
right to privacy. The ‘right’ itself is a source of continuing debate – not least around 
arguments for the legal right to freedom of speech, or alleged ‘whitewashing’ of history. 
We lack the wordcount to here drill down into the myriad and messy legal sensitivities of 
the right, and the complex legal issues around the demand that others collectively forget.42 
Rather, let us remain focused on the present role surveillance technologies in facilitating 
this ‘forgetting’ and its potential implications for ‘remembering’ in relation to wider 
cultural and technological agencies.  
Key to the issue from our perspective is that, should a request to ‘be forgotten’ be granted, 
the consequence is only that the links to particular webpages may be removed from search 
results in the EU. It is, thus, perhaps not so much ‘whitewashing’ the past as ‘limiting’ 
apparently easy access to artefacts connected with it. Webpages themselves still exist; 
information may freely be shared on social media and/or by searching news websites; 
easily-accessible virtual private network software can display the unedited results from a 
choice of non-EU countries. Indeed, the affected user-awareness that results may have 
been limited (Google displays the text, ‘Some results may have been removed under data 
protection law in Europe’) means that we in a sense find ourselves back in Hoskins’s 
notion of online collective remembering being ‘a matter of where to look’. In some ways, 
then, while information is made more inaccessible through enacting the right, users may 
ironically find themselves in a more consciously aware state, more able to make choices 
 
41 Facebook announced in June 2019 that it was considering relaxing its rules on generally prohibiting 
images portraying the female nipple (Titcomb & Boland, 2019). 
42 For an in-depth study of the social and legal history and implications of the Right to Be Forgotten, see 




about what information to seek out rather than settle for what they are automatically and 
initially shown.  
What is important to make clear, here, however – in a return to the themes of the supposed 
digital dark age – is that Google search engine is not a historical archive, and nor is the 
worldwide web from which it draws its results. Though Google searches indexed, public 
web pages, these are neither stable nor permanent – as scholar Meg Leta Jones argues, 
“[t]he web is a communication and information resource … We cannot treat it as an 
ongoing permanent historical record” (2016, p. 191). Likewise, Google’s operations are 
not archival processes of choosing to include or exclude content in cyber-space. Rather 
the search engine’s function is in forging connections in cyber-time, in duration, 
channelling engagements in the moment, rather than organising information per se.  
This function is illuminated in contrasting the platform’s approach to apparent inclusion 
with its enforced approach to ‘right to be forgotten’ exclusion. Rightly or wrongly, for 
now the decision as to whether links should be removed from search results rests, at least 
initially, with the platform itself. While the process is not transparent, reports emerging 
out of court cases suggest that, once a user submits a request, it is put to an all-human 
‘Removals Team’ to assess. As a Google ‘legal specialist’ describes it:   
The process of dealing with each delisting request is not automated – it 
involves individual consideration of each request and involves human 
judgement. Without such an individual assessment, the procedure put in place 
by Google would be open to substantial abuse, with the prospect of 
individuals, or indeed businesses, seeking to suppress search results for 
illegitimate reasons. (in Corfield, 2018) 
While the process of ‘deciding’ what content should be shown to users is, then, a fully-
automated, algorithmically-informed operation, the process of deciding what content 
should not be shown requires substantial human-technical intervention.  
This human aspect of ‘editing’ equally does not come without its own set of potential 
agencies and implications. As 2018 film The Cleaners showed, content moderation in 
general is deeply problematic for social-media platforms. Substantial ambiguity may 
exist, for example, over choosing what should or should not be considered as ‘allowed’ 
or ‘breaking the rules’, compounded by potential prejudices, biases or slip-ups of 




This might seem paradoxical from a more archivally-oriented approach to remembering 
– if Google is a gatekeeper of archived ‘information’, and its operation based on 
successfully controlling what information users are shown, why should it pose such 
difficulty if an external actor requests that the platform do precisely that? However, this 
supposed paradox evaporates when considered from an anarchival perspective. Google 
search engine as a platform does not concern itself with controlling access to content or 
information, to digital artefacts. Rather it is concerned with the transindividual 
movements and engagements that may be excited through facilitating connections with 
digital artefacts: the content is not of concern, only its ability to appropriately engage the 
user.  
In many ways, then, we may think of Google not in terms of controlling ‘content’ at all. 
Rather, its difficulty in removing content can be seen as a result of a business model 
designed not to inadvertently guide affective perceptions through controlling content, but 
to inadvertently guide content through controlling affective perceptions.  
Losing Control 
This same difficulty in controlling content, when required by outside agencies, may 
equally be ascribed more widely to other corporate social-media platforms.  
The tightly-won and controversial June 2019 legislation on the EU’s ‘Directive on 
Copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (European Parliament, 2019), for example, has 
thrown up radical questions for how the likes of YouTube, Facebook and Twitter will be 
able to operate in Europe in future. Specifically, so-called ‘Article 13’43 establishes 
liability for larger commercial platforms in illegitimately hosting copyrighted material, 
irrespective of who posts the material – leading to its unofficial branding as ‘the meme 
ban’. Under the legislation, largescale commercial media-sharing platforms would need 
to monitor users’ uploads to implement quick filtering or removal copyrighted material 
from their platforms, rather than traditional forms of ‘report and remove’ content 
moderation, or themselves be held liable. It is significant to note, from our anarchival 
understanding of collective remembering, that the final text approved provided exemption 
made provision for memes, stating that: 
Users should be allowed to upload and make available content generated by 
users for the specific purposes of quotation, criticism, review, caricature, 
 
43 The article was numbered 13 in the draft directive, yet had been re-ordered as ‘Article 17’ by the time 




parody or pastiche. That is particularly important for the purposes of striking 
a balance between the fundamental rights … in particular the freedom of 
expression and the freedom of the arts, and the right to property, including 
intellectual property. (European Parliament, 2019) 
Thus, the freedom to inventively repurpose digital cultural artefacts in acts of collectively-
individuating remembrance would be protected for the ordinary user. Nevertheless, to 
refocus on the material functions of the platform, such an apparently progressive 
exemption has been condemned by numerous organisations and corporations, since it 
would require far-from-perfect upload filters, already criticised (as we will see below) for 
their unreliability, and their propensity toward giving ‘false positives’, to make nuanced 
distinctions between legitimate copyright issues and creative reworkings of the material 
(Reynolds, 2019).  
This difficulty in stemming the transfer of media of course further highlights the ongoing 
struggles between platforms in balancing social-cultural, individual and technological 
agencies of remembering in man-machine-coupled acts of remembrance. Indeed, “If there 
were no copyright”, Ernst notes “every online user might take advantage of the fact that 
in digital networks the separation between archival latency and present actualization of 
information has already collapsed” (2004, p. 52). Yet perhaps the most emotionally 
striking illustration of contemporary social-media platforms’ incapability to control 
content, however, is in the policing of hate speech or hate media.  
YouTube’s existing (and culturally and legally contested – Sandler, 2019) technical 
processes around policing media deemed (algorithmically) inappropriate, violent or adult 
content involves demonetising videos (removing incentive for producers) and, similar to 
the Right to Be Forgotten, delisting them from the platform’s search results (YouTube 
Help, no date). However, in June 2019, YouTube announced that it would be 
implementing further rules to tackle hate speech by:  
prohibiting videos alleging that a group is superior in order to justify 
discrimination, segregation or exclusion based on qualities like age, gender, 
race, caste, religion, sexual orientation or veteran status. (YouTube Official 
Blog, 2019)  
However, within days it emerged that the hate speech “purge” (Murphy, 2019) had 
unintentionally affected hundreds of clips of educational material, identifying them as 




some clips now carried warnings that the material may be found offensive (Waterson, 
2019), at least one history teacher reportedly had their entire YouTube channel deleted, 
removing access to fifteen years’ worth of historical educational uploads, covering world 
history of the past one hundred years (Murphy, 2019a).  
We might view these events of apparently over-zealous censorship in contrast with the 
online sharing of video footage of a mass shooting in a mosque in Christchurch, New 
Zealand, which took place just weeks earlier. In the aftermath of the right-wing terrorist 
attack, the footage, live-streamed by the perpetrator to Facebook, quickly began 
circulating internationally online across numerous platforms – in the UK apparently 
including mainstream tabloid news outlets (Watts, 2019). The virality of the video left 
social media sites scrabbling to delete posts of the video, being uploaded to sites much 
faster than their teams of content moderators and filters could remove them, with, once 
again, significant human intervention becoming necessary when considering what not to 
show to users. Even making minor edits to the clip meant that users were able to avoid 
detection through existing technologies of automatic filters, highlighting the potential 
technological limitations of legislative expectations of, for example, Article 13. Indeed, 
events would cast a perhaps techno-deterministic spotlight on the calls of a UK-
government white paper, published a few weeks later, for “all platforms to take reasonable 
steps to keep their users safe” (HM Government, 2019, p. 55), once more drawing 
attention to the struggles between the agencies of the individual, cultural and 
technological in online collective remembering. Indeed, so great was the struggle for 
YouTube staff in suppressing and removing posts of the Christchurch attack, that the 
company reportedly took the unprecedented step of “temporarily disabling several search 
functions and cutting off human review features to speed the removal of videos flagged 
by automated systems” (Dwoskin &Timberg, 2019).  
This apparent ‘loss of control’ over content we can from our anarchival perspective 
consider not so much a ‘fault’ in the otherwise normal programming – “a profound flaw 
in its design that allows hate or conspiracies to flourish online” (Dwoskin & Timberg, 
2019). Rather – in thinking social media sites not so much as merchants of content but as 
harnessing, exciting and monetising the realisation of techno-culturally-mediated value 
of collective individuation into app-engagement– we might consider that platforms 
embroiled in viral sharing of hate speech are operating precisely as intended. The 
difference, here, is simply that technological agency of the platform, prioritising 




positioned in relation to calls from social-cultural agential authorities for censorship – 
for actual informational control.44 Surveillance technologies do not operate at their core 
archivally as content-management systems, but anarchivally as organisers of flows of 
media-facilitated affective interaction, irrespective of content. Indeed, it is perhaps telling 
that the notion of ‘substantial abuse’ through parties seeking to manipulate search results 
for ‘illegitimate reasons’ should be a concern to Google when dealing with what not to 
display to users, and apparently not with what to display to them.   
Yet individual-cultural-technological struggles in collective remembering run deeper than 
platform-level. As  the Christchurch footage shows, mediated acts of collective 
remembrance take place beyond the constraints of discrete platforms, through 
multiplicities of affective atmospheres across myriad parts of hybrid media’s online and 
offline infrastructure.45 So, while individual sites may take measures to remove material, 
the drives of collective individuation toward sociality-informing interaction may quickly 
move beyond the platform’s powers of visibility and control. Indeed, as we will see in the 
next chapter, while platforms may play a part in organising and guiding ‘filter bubble’ 
perceptions of ideas of the past, these ideas may be strongly driven (and perhaps the 
platforms themselves manipulated) by those affective, ‘cyborg coalitions’ of perceived 
shared affinity-as-identity, irrespective of the platform (and indeed of the degree of 
‘truthfulness’ of these ideas of the past).  
As a discerning final example, here, we might look at the migration of users of 4chan 
message-boards associated with hate speech, indeed the migration of their hate speech. 
In 2014, 4chan – an anonymised image-board forum site, credited with, among others, 
first popularising the viral YouTube video ‘Chocolate Rain’ (Anonymous, 2007) – found 
 
44 Moreover, the matter is further complicated when one factors in that individual posts might appear 
subjectively innocuous, yet when part of a wider pattern of postings or viewings, often algorithmically-
facilitated,  may be seen as more malign. In June 2019, for example, it was reported that YouTube’s 
algorithmically-led recommendation system – which guides the majority of the site’s traffic – had been 
instrumental in connecting paedophiles with videos of partially-clothed minors, compounded by such 
users employing the comments sections to link users to other videos (Fisher & Taub, 2018). One woman 
who posted a video of her infant daughter and her friend playing in a pool in their garden was shocked 
to discover that within a few days the video had been viewed more than 400,000 times. Yet YouTube, 
despite its public ripostes and subsequent re-commitment to “protect minors and families” (YouTube 
Official Blog, 2019a) finds itself nevertheless hindered in limiting such recommendations, at the mercy 
of its economic reliance on “family vloggers, some of whom have many millions of followers” (MIT 
Technology Review, 2019).  
45 The Christchurch shooting offers a particularly morbid example of intersecting cultural agencies across 
hybridised media systems. During the video of the massacre, the shooter reportedly utters the words, 
“Subscribe to PewDiePie” (Wakefield, 2019) – referencing the so-called ‘Great Subscriber War’, in which 
YouTuber PewDiePie vied to remain the number-one subscribed channel on the platform 




itself entangled in the emerging #GamerGate controversy.46 When 4chan banned 
discussion of GamerGate, discussion was not silenced. Rather, many users reportedly 
migrated to then-little-known, ‘free-speech-friendly’ alternative 8chan (O’Neill, 2014), 
which has since been repeatedly associated with far-right hate speech and mass shootings, 
Christchurch included. At the time of writing, 8chan users had been linked with another 
mass shooting, in El Paso, Texas, and the website’s host had refused the site service. The 
site quickly secured a new host, yet that host’s own service was reportedly that very day 
shut down, following a consequential severing of ties by the company from whom it 
leased its server hardware-infrastructure (Robertson, 2019). Nevertheless, as claims the 
founder of Gab.ai, a social-media site principally for those banned from Twitter: 
If 8chan is shutdown here is what will happen: someone else will spin up a 
new imageboard, say 20chan or whatever. People will flock to that … Or 
someone will create an 8chan telegram channel. Or an 8chan Gab group. Or 
an 8chan Gab Social server hosted by someone else. Or they will go back to 
4chan. (Torba, quoted in Broderick, 2019) 
As technology journalist, Ryan Broderick observes, “Shutting down the site is unlikely 
to eradicate this new extremist culture, because 8chan is anywhere” (2019; italics my 
own). Cultural agency is after all what drives the technological into the social, in the 
present – and, with an awareness of the technological and external agencies in play, 
voluntary choice serves its role and the matter becomes to a larger degree once more one 
of culture governing man. Thus, if users in large 4chan threads anticipate the conversation 
may soon be deleted, leading only to an error page, it is perfectly common for them to 
migrate the thread onto alternate servers of other platforms “before the 404” (Broderick, 
2019).  
Social Struggles: Cultures and Capital 
In this chapter, we have sketched an initial, though thorough, synthesis of how we may 
understand collective remembering within an anarchival perspective on memory, 
consciousness, technology and the social in duration. Such a synthesis conceives of 
collective remembering as acts of collective individuation, using ideas of the past to 
constitute a sense of extended, stable sociality out of the past, in the present and into the 
future. New, online-networked technologies such as Google, Facebook, Twitter and 
 
46 The GamerGate controversy, beginning in late 2014 and actively continuing until well into 2016, was a 
complex and public social media campaign, largely of harassment, under the hashtag #GamerGate, 




YouTube have allowed for a greater scope for socialities to emerge beyond historical 
constraints of space and time. However, the economic agencies of social-media 
platforms-as-businesses, prioritising platform-engagement over useful action for the 
transindividual, risk producing more filter-bubble-informed artificial socialities, through 
machine- over user-controlled perceptions of the social now – in which participants may 
inter-relate but not truly collectively individuate. Nevertheless, cultural agencies as well 
as wider economic agencies operate in expressed tension against these platforms, 
compounding the contemporary ‘struggle for memory’. These may take the form of more 
stabilised cultural forces of governmental legislation or more ‘loose’ charges of viral 
contagion online, in which the platform must decide not just what to show but what not 
to show. An inability of platforms to act against these tensions, the chapter argued, 
emerges not out of ‘design fault’, but as a direct consequence of platform architecture 
geared toward exciting monetisable engagements over purported ‘organised content’.  
Yet this inability has in recent years led to increasing concern around the supposed rise 
of ‘fake news’ and ‘misinformation’ through new technologies in informing almost ‘fake 
socialities’. Media theorist Andrew Murphie observed in 2000 that ‘the digital’ seems to 
give us: 
the means to negotiate a world consisting of so very many dissimilar and 
divergent series of elements which nevertheless rub up against the world and 
recreate the world differently at each moment. (2000) 
Nearly twenty years on, we may observe how perception portals of since-dominant 
surveillance technologies – and all the inter-related agencies feeding into and out of them 
through the hybrid media system – may ‘recreate’ the perceived world at each moment 
with perhaps little agency afforded to conscious negotiation on the part of the 
transindividual.  
In the final case-study chapter, then, we move to consider the implications on the one 
hand of the observation that collective remembrances need not necessarily be at all ‘true 
to the event’ of the past, and on the other of the potential manipulation of socialities 










Facts, Fakes and Filter Bubbles:  
False Memory in the Twenty-First Century  
 
A storyteller does not concern themselves with the truth.  
Stories are truer than the truth.  
American Gods (Neil Gaiman & Bryan Fuller, 2019) 
 
[T]he past is only an idea, the present is ideo-motor.  
(Henri Bergson, 2004, p. 74) 
 
The first case-study chapter briefly situated how we can think remembering personal pasts 
as extended through and with new, online technologies, examining the apparent changing 
balance of agencies in man-machine couplings. The second chapter substantially 
developed this theorising into the wider social sphere, expanding our thinking on 
memory, technology and individuation into a nuanced sketch for a social theory of 
remembering. Through this synthesis, we may see collective remembering as acts of 
coalescing around ideas of the past to inform a sense of relationally belonging to a 
perceived-stabilised society in the social now, and its extension through online 
technologies as enabling a kind of ‘expansion’ of that social now. As well as observing 
that processes collective remembering need not necessarily relate to ‘the facts’ of the past, 
we observed that these materially-facilitated, sociality-informing online perceptions – and 
thus the resultant emerging socialities themselves – may be limited, indeed guided, by 
much more than the users’ transindividual drives. Indeed, perceptions may be co-
informed by those platforms’ own economic drives toward user-engagement, as well as 
wider techno-cultural agencies within the hybrid media system.  
Through an exploration of the broad phenomenon of so-called ‘fake news’ – and returning 
to our central notion of memory and perception informing action over knowledge – this 
chapter now succinctly examines the implications of these observations in terms of useful 




vehicles to explore the nature of online ‘collective false remembering’, it aims on the one 
hand to further develop our understanding of how individual, cultural, technological 
processes of collective remembering, identity and action, may be changing in the online 
era, and on the other, in anticipation of the subsequent Conclusion Chapter, to speculate 




1. From False Memory to Fake News 
Subsequent sections of this chapter will focus through numerous examples on the ways 
in which false memory may be experienced differently through new, online technologies, 
and consider the resulting implications. This section first attempts to conceptualise the 
phenomenon of false memory within the anarchival synthesis on personal and collective 
remembering as developed in previous chapters. In doing so, it lays the foundation for a 
more nuanced ensuing analysis of the relationship between false memory and new 
technologies.  
The employment of the term ‘false memory’ in this chapter should not be taken as a tacit 
endorsement of a conceptualisation of memory as a faculty for recalling accurate 
information about the past, with false memory as an apparent ‘failing’ – nor of the perhaps 
problematically interpreted research into the supposed phenomenon. As we have seen in 
the Theory Chapter, the very notion of false memory should be seen more as a failing of 
a philosophical conceptualisation of remembering than as a failing of memory itself. 
Here, then, the perhaps somewhat irreverent appropriation of the term should be taken 
strictly as a vehicle for critical engagement with the ways in which pasts that did not 
occur may today be narrativized, mediated and thus remembered in the present. 
Trump and the Twin Towers 
In November 2015, then U.S.-presidential hopeful Donald Trump told a crowd of 
supporters at an Alabama rally: 
Hey, I watched when the World Trade Center came tumbling down. And I 
watched in Jersey City, New Jersey, where thousands and thousands of people 




cheering. So something’s going on. We’ve got to find out what it is. (Quoted 
in Kessler, 2015) 
The now well-known problem with Trump’s infamous recollection of supposed 9/11 
rooftop celebrations is that they never appear to have happened. Numerous journalists, 
fact checkers and academics would report in the following hours and days (indeed months 
and years) that there existed no record of any such celebrations beyond unsubstantiated 
rumours, long-circulated online (Carroll, 2015; Dwyer, R., 2015; Kessler, 2015; Kiely, 
2015; Lacapria, 2015). Nor could prominent public officials from 2001 recollect any such 
incidents. Former New Jersey attorney general, John J. Farmer Jr., for example, told the 
New York Times that, although he had ordered an investigation on the very day of the 
attacks into rumours of a small number of radical Islamist celebrations, it found them to 
be false (Dwyer, R., 2015). Nevertheless, when Trump’s claims were challenged on ABC 
News the day after he first aired them, he insisted they were true, and that the events had 
been reported widely on television:  
It did happen. I saw it. It was on television, I saw … It did happen. There were 
people that were cheering in the other side of New Jersey, where you have 
large Arab populations. They were cheering as the World Trade Center came 
down. It was well covered at the time. (Trump, in Phelps, 2015) 
Others, according to Trump, had apparently witnessed the same events. He would 
soon post on Twitter that “[m]any people have tweeted that I am right” (Trump, 
2015) and would tell a rally in Ohio that he had since received phone calls “by the 
hundreds”, to tell him that “they were there, and they saw this take place” (in ABC 
News, 2015). Indeed, rival Republican presidential candidate Ben Carson, when 
subsequently questioned by reporters about the alleged rooftop celebrations, at least 
initially claimed to recall seeing footage of them (ABC News Politics, 2015). And 
today searches on social media sites such as Reddit and YouTube continue to draw 
up numerous posts by those who have since claimed – given the political 
connotations, and the overarching theme of this chapter, perhaps not always 
genuinely – to remember similarly.   
It may be tempting to interpret Trump’s behaviour as evidence of straightforward 
lying (Waldman, 2018), or of his propensity toward ‘post truth’. Or perhaps to think 
it more akin to philosopher Harry G. Frankfurt’s 2015 conception of ‘bullshit’ – the 




is said for that purpose (Frankfurt, 2005). Widespread commentary, however, has 
suggested that Trump might be falsely remembering the events of 9/11 through a 
potential combination of rumour, misappropriation and confirmation bias (Lacapria, 
2015). Indeed, a long-term, U.S.-wide study of people’s recollections of 9/11 after 
one week, then 11, 25, and 119 months, showed that, while in the general U.S. public 
confidence in recollections remained strong in the years following the attack, long-
term memories nationwide showed significant inconsistency in their accuracy (Hirst 
et al, 2015). Unverified reports of rooftop celebrations do seem to have been made 
on local radio (Trotta, 2007), and continued through online rumour in subsequent 
years; and while no footage exists of ‘thousands’ of Muslims in New Jersey 
celebrating the attack, a video clip of a small gathering of Palestinians doing so in 
East Jerusalem was certainly circulated at the time by large-scale American news 
media outlets including Fox News, CNN and NBC (Mackey, 2015).  
This chapter does not seek to definitively come down on one side or another as 
regards Trump’s potential motives. Rather, it seeks to use the events around his 
claims as a useful vehicle to drive forward the investigation. It is conceivable that, 
in holding this belief (if indeed he truly does) Trump is experiencing a so-called 
‘false memory’ of these events, informed, at least in part, by experiencing media 
technologies. And it is from this juncture of false memory and its relation to new 
media technologies that we will begin the investigation of this chapter.  
Memories ‘Implanted’: Memories Imagined  
We examined in the Literature Review chapter psychological studies conducted since the 
1970s into false memory. Such studies have demonstrated how one’s memory of an event 
can be affectively manipulated through lingual (i.e. technological) suggestion when 
prompting the recollection (Loftus & Palmer, 1974) or through conceptual expectation 
(again, i.e. technological) within one’s environment (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; 
Brewer & Treyens, 1981). Indeed, researchers have been able to establish recollections 
in participants of entirely fictional events, some potentially incriminating (Loftus, 2005; 
Shaw, 2016). Yet, as we saw, the idea that personal memory is not about recall of past 
events at all – rather a relation of what past experience might mean in relation to the 
experiencing being in the lived present – was already by then well established. Pioneering 
experimental psychologist Frederic Bartlett famously showed in the 1930s that supposed 
recollections were influenced by cultural expectations of the individual as much as by the 




demonstrates the significant role meaning and imagination play in the process of 
remembering.  
So, how might we approach the idea of false personal memory within our anarchival 
understanding of remembering? Firstly, let us remind ourselves that what we consciously 
call a ‘personal memory’ we can conceptualise as a discernible memory-image, 
imaginatively and affectively realised, or pictured, in relation both to memory-potential 
and to perceptions of the present environment. It is, as philosopher Brian Massumi has 
put it, “a memory of the past, which is a rear view of the past from the perspective of the 
consciously experienced specious present of lived duration” (2015, p. 62). Secondly, it 
should be emphasised that the evolutionary purpose of remembering is not to recall 
specifics of past events, but to inform useful action for the bodily-being in the lived, 
perceived present, in duration – it is at its root “ideo-motor”, reflexive (Bergson, 2004, p. 
74). And, thirdly, we must consider that for the consciously (to perhaps whatever degree) 
experiencing being, this useful action is in turn bound up in a constant, creative, 
transindividual drive toward individuation, out of the pre-individual, to be ‘more than’. It 
is through the collectively-individuating mediation of cultural value, such as sharing ideas 
of collective histories or shared pasts, that a sense of a stabilised social now may be 
experienced, out of which a relational sense of the ‘individual’ – as ‘grouped individual’ 
– may emerge.  
Taken from our anarchival perspective, it seems perhaps straightforward to appreciate 
how one’s semi-imagined, personal recollections of a past event might differ (or be 
manipulated by present relations into differing) from the facts of the events, coloured as 
they are by the perceptions of the present environment and present interactions (including 
suggestible questioning), and the experiences of other pasts (the realisation of memory-
potential as ‘expectations’). To be sure, such a differing would be expected. Indeed, we 
might say that the whole idea of ‘false memory’ as a ‘phenomenon’ could be better put 
down to a conceptual failure of the traditional archival model of memory as ‘knowledge 
of the past’ to accommodate the actual nature of remembering than to a supposed ‘quirk’ 
or failure of memory itself.  
We may assume that Trump, like many others, would have experienced at the time of the 
9/11 attack rolling television news coverage of the attack and its aftermath. Yet this 
coverage would air in combination with footage of anti-U.S. celebrations in other nations, 
perhaps alongside somewhat unrelated stories or contextualising archive footage, and 




describes as a “collapse” of memory into “an overloaded and shifting present” (2004, p. 
110). In addition, contemporary radio and online reports did at the time rumour rooftop 
parties and other celebrations by American Muslims. Attempting to remember the events 
of that day in a present-day environment of increasing hostility toward Muslims, we 
might, regrettably, begin to understand how someone with existing prejudices might find 
themselves believing that such non-existent events as Trump’s rooftop celebrations really 
did take place. Furthermore, from our anarchival perspective, it does not seem too much 
of a bold claim to make that, given the immediate and widespread reach of Trump’s 
claims, his own public ‘recollections’ then might affectively spread, inciting others, too, 
to believe they witnessed the same events.  
Belief as Sense-Making 
Aware that recollections are not necessarily accurate reflections of the past, when 
presented with reliable evidence in opposition to their own recollections, one might 
expect most people to accept the falsity of their belief. Indeed Carson, when later 
challenged over his recollection of witnessing footage of New Jersey Muslim rooftop 
celebrations, retracted the claim47 (Faulders, 2015). However, perhaps like Trump, some 
with demonstrably – or highly-likely – false memories do still appear to hold their belief 
in them despite evidence to the contrary, and this deserves a more nuanced analysis.  
In her 2005 study, Abducted, psychologist Susan A. Clancy researches the (presumed) 
false memories of individuals within groups of people who believe they have been 
abducted by aliens (Clancy, 2005). As such, the study finds itself concerned as much with 
belief as it is with memory. Clancy bases her argument within the idea that most abduction 
beliefs are rooted in the individual having experienced sleep paralysis – a condition during 
waking or falling asleep in which one cannot move, and which may be accompanied by 
auditory or visual hallucinations, often of some form of natural or supernatural intruder. 
Beliefs in false memories of alien abduction, Clancy suggests, may be an attempt 
(personal or manipulated through the likes of hypnotherapy) to draw on cultural material 
to ‘make sense’ of, or find meaning in, an experience that seems at odds with our usual 
experience or perception of the world. “It probably doesn’t much matter to the abductees 
 
47 It is interesting to note that, rather than admitting his mistake, Carson claimed that his original claims 
had been taken out of context – that he was referring to footage of Muslim people in general 
celebrating (Gass, 2015). Nevertheless, the record shows that Carson’s claims were made in response to 




whether they’re right or wrong”, she argues, “They simply feel better because of what 
they believe” (2005, p. 143).  
Belief Serving Individuation 
Yet how, then, might we speculatively conceptualise false belief from our anarchival 
perspective on remembering? It is important to note here that this is not an attempt to 
fully define the phenomenon of ‘belief’. Rather, it serves as an attempt, for the purposes 
of this investigation, to develop a working conceptualisation of belief in false memory in 
relation to our existing philosophical position on remembering. Indeed, as Bergson is 
reported to have more than once argued, “You may attribute what meaning you like to a 
word, provided you start by clearly defining that meaning” (Translators’ Preface, in 
Bergson, 1935, p. v).  
The kind of belief that we are here considering, then, is not so much to do with immediate 
recognition in perception, “as ‘ultimate fact’ of experience” (Massumi, 2002, p. 221), 
informing expectation – “I believe that is a fallen tree”. Rather, it is more akin to an 
explanation based out of memory of concepts – “I believe that tree fell because it was 
damaged in last night’s storm”. Yet, more than this, these false beliefs seem more 
psychically grounded in what Bergson would call the plane of dreams or imagination than 
the plane of action (Bergson, 2004, pp. 217-219) – “I believe that the tree was felled by 
an angry giant”.  In such a plane, “we detach ourselves from our sensory and motor state 
to live in the life of dreams” (Bergson, 2004, p. 211).  
Taking the example of belief in one’s abduction by aliens, then, we might consider that, 
whatever experience may have first informed memory-potential, the processes of 
realising this memory-potential out of abstract feeling and into discernible memory-image 
are influenced by all manner of different expectations, experiences and present 
perceptions of the world. Remembering is after all a creative act, “mingling dream with 
reality” (Bergson, 2004, p. 96). It involves imagination. Alfred North Whitehead argues 
that “a feeling bears on itself the scars of its birth; it recollects as a subjective emotion its 
struggle for existence; it retains the impress of what might have been but is not” (1969, 
p. 265). Following him, political theorist William E. Connolly has thus suggested we 
might think of remembering not in terms of recollecting an event itself, but in terms of 
“pluripotentiality” (2018) – of imagining all the events it could have been. We might then 
think of personal remembering as a creative process of realising memory-potentials not 
just in terms of the experiences that have been but also those that might have been. Indeed, 




events can increase the likelihood of participants believing them (Schacter, 1996, p. 196; 
Shaw, 2016). The memory-image of alien abduction we can say with some probability 
does not serve to accurately represent past events – rather it may serve creatively as a 
kind of ‘best fit’ to make sense of what might have been, to promote useful action in the 
perceived present. While verging on the crass, we might topically borrow from Agent 
Mulder’s phrasebook to perhaps think false remembering not so much believing, as 
wanting to believe.  
What useful action, though, might warrant some people finding it easier to dismiss 
perceptible evidence that contradicts their beliefs (or indeed dismiss a lack of evidence 
for their beliefs) and harder for them to disbelieve their own seemingly glaringly false 
memories? As Clancy seems to imply, might the act of explaining a complex experience 
in a way that absolves the individual of the need to act in fact be useful action for the 
individual? Might such creative remembrances, the chapter speculates, serve a drive 
toward individuation? Toward a meaningful sense of ‘belonging’? Certainly, Simondon, 
as paraphrased by philosopher David Scott, argues that “religious communities 
organizing themselves around belief, as a mode of membership in a group, represents the 
expansion of personality, that is, a scheme of incorporation” (Scott, 2014, p. 129):  
[T]he individual gives itself an origin in this group of interiority, real or 
mythic: he or she is of this group and for this group; future and past are 
simplified, brought to a state of elementary purity (Simondon, in Scott, 2014, 
pp. 129-130 – italics my own.) 
To believe oneself having shared an experience of something almost exceptional 
demonstrably provides opportunity to feel ‘more than one’ – to transindividually “share 
some kind of internal resonance” (Grosz, 2013, p. 54). Clancy, for example, notes that 
since the 1960s “countless abductees have said that they are ‘thankful’ they’ve been 
‘chosen,’ they ‘feel less alone,’ they feel ‘blessed’ because of their experiences” (2005, 
p. 153). And when one considers possibilities for human-to-human connection in the 
networked era based on a shared sense of identity, as we have done in the previous 
chapter, the opportunities for collective individuation around shared remembered 
personal experiences become increasingly augmented. In this sense, such socialities 
might be viewed as little different to more conventional collectives formed through shared 
personal experience of verifiable events, such as medical problems, traumatic 




A personal belief in a non-existent event, then, we might understand as at once a process 
of individuation within, as social psychologist Ian Tucker puts it, “the reality of subjective 
life” (2018, p. 39), and a point around which emergent, like-minded, collectively-
individuating socialities may emerge.  
In the following section, we will consider this notion of shared personal belief in 
experienced pasts might be considered in relation to new technologies, and in relation to 
its distinction from shared collective belief in the past. For the moment, though, let us 
simply posit that, irrespective of their veracity, personal beliefs in a false or seemingly 
ludicrous memory may serve useful (inter)action for the transindividual being.  
--o0o-- 
2. Collective Identity and Pretence of the Past  
In the previous chapter, we considered how people may (or may not) dynamically 
reconstitute collectively-individuated socialities, coalescing around shared notions of past 
events – for example, through social media posts, forums and search engine results. The 
chapter argued that multiplicities of socialities – or collective identities – are in ongoing 
states of becoming through such technologies, fuelled through creative actualisation of 
memory-potential, interior and exterior to the individual. Through collectively-
individuating interactions around ideas of the past extending out of the past, and into the 
future, a stabilised perception of the relational ‘social now’ may be experienced, out of 
which a sense of both ‘the social’ and thus the relational ‘individual’ emerges. Here, this 
chapter seeks to consider the above conceptualised notion of belief in false memories to 
argue that socialities need not, then, collectively individuate through shared, verifiable 
notions of past events. Rather, this may be achieved through shared ‘ideas’ of or beliefs 
in the past, irrespective of their veracity, with opportunities for like-minded connection 
or reconciliation only increased through widely-networked, high-speed, online 
technologies. The chapter attempts this through an examination of two seemingly 
markedly different examples of false remembering online – the supposed ‘Mandela 
effect’, and the persistent ‘Irish slaves’ online myth – exploring how these remembrances 
are taking place, and for what seeming purposes.   
The ‘Mandela Effect’  
As one might expect, Donald Trump is not alone if remembering past events differently 




remember is not to recall knowledge of past events, but to use potential from past events, 
realised into memory-images, to creatively encourage action in the perceived present. Yet 
it is once again this common archival misconception of memory as knowledge or recall 
of the past that informs the first of our examples – the so-called ‘Mandela effect’.  
The Mandela effect is a term coined in recent years to describe a shared personal 
‘misremembering’ or false memory. Its name derives from self-described ‘paranormal 
researcher’ Fiona Broome’s claim that she shared a memory in common with many others 
that South-African political leader Nelson Mandela had died in prison in the 1980s or 
1990s, though he would not die until 2013, several years after this observation (Broome, 
2010; Dagnall & Drinkwater, 2018). Through the connectivity of online technologies, in 
setting up a blog- and comments-based website, Broome has been able to draw together 
a community of hundreds of people or more who share this belief as well many others. 
Furthermore, an independent Reddit community, ‘r/MandelaEffect’ boasts more than 
133,000 members at the time of writing, for “people realizing they remember things 
differently than generally know [sic] to be fact” (Reddit, no date). Though numerous 
apparent examples are discussed on these sites, a seemingly prominent instance is the 
collective misremembering of children’s book franchise The Berenstain Bears as having 
undergone a subtle name change, previously having allegedly been spelt The Berenstein 
Bears (Broome, 2014, emphasis my own). Another is a collective remembering of 
American stand-up comic Sinbad starring in a 1990s film named Shazaam, in which he 
plays a genie who helps one or two young children – this, despite no evidence of its 
existence, and Sinbad himself denying he ever played such a role (Broome, 2016; Sinbad 
2016; Tait, 2016).  
Broome claims that “[t]hese aren’t simple errors in memory; they seem to be fully-
constructed incidents (or sequential events) from the past. They exceed the normal range 
of forgetfulness” (2010). Indeed, in an interview for the New Statesman, a man now in 
his 50s claims to be able to recall Sinbad’s film scene by scene, since, working in a video 
store, he was required to watch it each time a customer had a problem with the cassette – 
“It feels like a part of my childhood has now been stolen from me”, he tells the magazine, 
“How does a movie simply vanish from our history?” (Tait, 2016). Similarly, a recent 
Reddit post out of many on the topic has amassed hundreds of comments within only five 
months, as community-members discuss their memories of the film’s storyline (Reddit 
user Drive-or-doze84, 2018). Some social media users have constructed a mock-up of 




existed (see Figure 1). To be sure, assuming others do share Trump’s recollections of the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, we might consider their incongruity with the known facts, 
too, a supposed example of the Mandela effect in action. And for Broome, then, as for 
others employing an uncritically archival view of memory, such misrememberings are 
taken unequivocally not to be false memory at all. Rather, for her, if something is not 
wrong with her memory, presumably taken as accurate recall of past events, then 
something seemingly must be wrong with the world. Thus, while apparently remaining 
open to other possibilities, Broome’s preferred hypotheses that “make the most sense” 
are either that “we’re ‘sliding’ between parallel (or similar) realities, or that we’ve visited 
holodecks [i.e. holographic virtual reality spaces, as conceived in Star Trek television 
series] (and may be in one, right now) that have some glitches” (Broome, no date).  
Yet from an anarchival perspective on remembering the Mandela effect is not just 
understandable – it is unremarkable. If remembering is the feeling of realising memory-
potential, and any resulting memory-image somewhat imagined to inform voluntary (i.e. 
conscious) action in relation to the perceived present, then, as we have already seen, there 
is no reason to assume a discerned memory-image should be true to the facts of previous 
events. Indeed, there is ample reason to assume the opposite, influenced as all 
remembering is by a combination of multiple potentialities out of past experience, 
imagination and the perceived present environment. And, assuming enough perceptual 
commonalities exist, one might expect people with somewhat alike culturally shared pasts 
and presents to ‘misremember’ similarly to each other.  
Consider that “-stein”, as countless commentators have noted, is simply a much more 
common suffix than “-stain” and it is not unreasonable to see why confusion should arise 
either when first encountering The Berenstain Bear books or when trying to remember 
them. Equally reasonable evidence exists surrounding Shazaam, as New Statesman 
journalist Amelia Tait observes:  
In 1996, the basketball player Shaquille O'Neal played a genie who helped a 
young boy find his estranged father in a commercially unsuccessful film. The 
cover art of the film features Shaq with his arms folded, laughing, in front of 
a purple background. His name, “Shaq”, dominates the top half of the cover. 
The movie’s name is Kazaam. (Tait, 2016) (Also: see Figure 2) 
It is important, then, to note that the phenomenon – if it can be called one at all – of the 




of 180 people from Bologna and familiar with the Italian city’s railway station, for 
example, found that more than 9 out of 10 participants shared a personal memory of the 
station’s clock having not worked since a 1980 bomb explosion. Although all participants 
were adults at the time of the attack, in truth the clock, though damaged in the explosion, 
was quickly repaired and had continued working until 1996 (de Vito, Cubelli & Della 
Salla, 2010), after which it was left stopped. As with the examples above, the study’s 
authors cite other experiences and events – including the widespread, iconic use of the 
stopped clock as symbolic of the attack – as influencing people’s remembrances around 
the matter.  
Yet what does set aside the Mandela effect in terms of a new kind of remembering is not 
so much that it should exist, but the new, technologically-facilitated ways in which these 
remembrances are able to take place – sharing ideas about the past beyond the bounds of 
geographical community – with new, online-enabled socialities (re)emerging through 
them. As with the sharing of the ‘unflattering Beyoncé’ meme explored in the previous 
chapter, opportunities for the emergence of the belonging individual are presented 
through these interactive, affective acts of remembering within the existing sociality – 
erroneous as they may in these cases be. Such socialities are dynamically reconstituted 
through a sense of mutually-existing belief, itself a manifestation of transindividually 
realised memory-potential, and inter-communicated though media. Thus, it is important 
to emphasise, the discerned memory-image, realised out of its potential, and irrespective 
of its accuracy in relation to events of the past, is in a sense secondary to the true resolve 
for memory: the (creative) action its creation informs, and its usefulness for the 
individuating individual. Whether these misrememberings are ‘true’ or not is unimportant 
– the sense of cultural value transduced through their collective sharing and engagement 






   
Figure 1  – Mockup (perhaps tongue in cheek) of supposed Shazaam cover artwork (left) 
Figure 2 – Actual cover artwork for Kazaam (right) 
 
Irish Slaves in America 
Let us now contrast our thinking on the Mandela effect with a seemingly very different 
example of shared belief in the past. Rather than a collective belief in lived experience, a 
personal experience one has (supposedly) lived through, the ‘Irish slaves’ myth concerns 
a collective belief or trust in a false past not personally experienced – a false history.  
In early 2016, a group of more than 80 academics and interested parties published an open 
letter to three news websites – American sites Irish Central and Scientific American, and 
Irish site Irish Examiner – asking them to “revise”, “correct” and “remove” false claims 
about allegedly “forgotten white Irish slaves” (Hogan, 2016) in articles they had 
published online. The websites, the letter’s authors showed, had relied on unqualified 
source material around the general claim that, as a Snopes article claims, “Early in 
America's history, white Irish slaves outnumbered black slaves and endured worse 
treatment at the hands of their masters” (Emery, 2016). Articles making the claim, which 
has circulated on websites since at least 2008 (Emery, 2016), are credited to numerous 
authors, though present this story through generally identical text. Facts about Irish 




today “conveniently” left out of “biased history books” (Dwyer, R., 2015). Yet these 
‘facts’, as set out in remaining source articles for the claim, may be shown reliant on 
demonstrably false historical recollections – they do not appear to be at all true (Emery, 
2016; Hogan, 2015; Stack, 2017). As well as reportedly referencing non-existent events, 
misrepresenting historical dates and timelines and inflating numbers (Hogan, 2015), the 
articles base their claim largely on a disingenuous conflation of chattel slavery of the 
transatlantic slave trade and indentured servitude, in which free individuals agreed to a 
number of years’ labour in exchange for passage to the USA. Similar claims around 
‘white slavery’ in the USA had been made in a 1993 book, self-published by Holocaust 
denier Michael Hoffman (Hogan, 2015a), before appearing in articles online, repeated 
through conspiracy platforms such as InfoWars.com (Hogan, 2015a; InfoWars.com, 
2014), and eventually becoming various incarnations of image-text memes shared 
through social media.   
The open letter argued that in promoting this myth, the outlets had “added a veneer of 
credibility to what is a well known [sic] white nationalist conspiracy theory more 
commonly found on Neo-Nazi and Neo-Confederate forums” (Hogan, 2016). Indeed, 
rather than its purported aim to ‘correct the historical record’, the sharing of the myth has 
been shown to be well established within white-supremacist circles for more present-day 
political purposes. The Southern Poverty Law Center, a non-profit organisation 
monitoring hate groups in the USA reports: 
Predictably, this revisionism has attracted Neo-Nazis, White Nationalists, 
Neo-Confederates, and even Holocaust deniers, while racist trolls have 
deployed the myth to attack the Black Lives Matter movement. More 
worrisome, though, is its widespread adoption by principally American 
Internet users as if it were a point of "Irish pride." 
Such political motives are illustrated starkly in a common version of the Irish slaves 
meme. Overlaying a reportedly misappropriated image (Hogan, 2015b), the text reads: 
White Irish slaves were treated worse than any other race in the US 
When was the last time you heard an Irishman bitching & moaning about how 
the world owes them a living? (see Figure 3) 
How, then, might we consider this kind of fictionalised historical memory in relation to 




As with those practices of historical remembering exampled in the previous chapter, it is 
important from the outset to think of the iteration of the Irish slave myth not simply as 
the material retrieval of a perceived record of the past. We must equally – indeed 
primarily – think of it as an anarchival process of engaging with the present, in duration, 
drawing on the potential of the past to inform individuation through (inter)action. 
Examples highlighted in the previous chapter explored how socialities may be 
reconstituted through reproduced engagements with historical records. In these cases, it 
was speculated that the potential, dynamic interactions around shared pasts through such 
remembrances give rise to opportunities for ongoing collective individuation for 
socialities. Meaning in the present for the group is found through choice of (inter)actions 
in sharing records of the past – for both the past and the individual to become ‘more than’ 
in the present. Thus, the records of the past – even their content – do not have potential 
in themselves. Rather, they operate as carriers of potential, itself realised out of the 
transindividual’s engagement with the cultural artefact. And the ‘truth’ of the event, is to 
a large extent less important than the cultural value that may be transmitted through the 
re-versioning of the past, to reconstitute a sense of the stable sociality in the present.  
Yet, while the examples of the Beyoncé meme, The Terror of War photograph and Led 
by Donkeys reproduced political statements examined in the previous chapter involved 
the extending coalescence around ideas of the past that we can accept with some certainty, 
or evidencable trust, to have happened, the Irish slaves myth is demonstrably just that – 
a myth – and requires what we might think ‘a leap of faith’ to believe a demonstrably 
unprovable history in the fact of dominant narrative.  
Here, it becomes clear that collective engagements with records of the past are not, so to 
speak, to imbue the past through its in-the-present re-engagement with a sense of ‘more’ 
substance or ‘more’ meaning than simply historically having happened. Rather, 
engagement with and belief in these records of the past serve primarily to give greater 
sense of meaning and identity to the collectively-individuating being in the present, 
irrespective of whether the events actually happened. As psychologists David Middleton 
and Steven D. Brown, argue: 
[I]t does not matter whether the events recalled did or did not happen in the 
way in which they are retold. What does matter is that the commemoration 
takes a form that is sufficiently consonant with the group’s collective values 





Collectively-individuating socialities reconstitute themselves not out of the potentials of 
an event having happened, but in coalescing around the pluripotentials of an event that 
could have happened – of an imagined or fictionalised ‘version’ or ‘interpretation’ of the 
past. The sense of collective identity (re)informed through coalescing around a fictional 
idea of the past helps to shore up ongoing support for the apparent stabilisation 
preservation of the ever-emergent sociality – its history stabilised in the present through 
its perceived extension out of the past and into the future. Indeed, while acknowledging 
the wider, important, political and historical sensitivities and implications of propaganda, 
we might echo Clancy to suggest that belief in the Irish slaves myth to some extent simply 
makes people – here a collectively-individuating sociality or socialities – ‘feel better’.  
We can through Simondon consider a more nuanced distinction between shared false 
personal memory of, say, Mandela’s early death and shared collective belief in the 
veracity of the Irish slaves myth. For Simondon, collective beliefs are not “the basis for 
their [a sociality’s] existence”, rather they are “a phenomenon of disassociation or 
alteration of groups” (quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 147). Shared collective beliefs such as the 
Irish slaves myth do not serve, like shared personal beliefs of those who believe in the 
Mandella effect or their own abductions by aliens, to (co)create an individuating sociality 
on the basis of a psychically-individuated belief in a shared past. Rather, a collective 
belief in a historical past is, as we saw in the previous chapter, developed as collectively-
individuating action to defend or perhaps simply continue the precarious existence of an 
existing individuating perceived-sociality, always in a process of re-emergence: 
[Collective belief] has a compensation value of consolidation, of provisional 
reparation rather than a relatively fundamental meaning for the genesis of the 
group and the mode of existence in the group (Simondon, quoted in Scott, 
2014, p. 147) 
Beliefs like the Irish slaves myth, then, we can understand as a belief that emerges out of 
the collective rather than out of the bodily-being, though constantly feeding back between 
the two in movements of reconstitution. As Scott, reading Simondon, suggests:  
[Collective belief] exists when some force or obstacle obliges the individual 
to define and structure its membership in the group, in an intelligible and 
expressible form, to those who are not group members … The instant the 




associates with a way to cement their inter-individual relationships. (Scott, 
2014, p. 143) 
Indeed, it is through the re-assertion of group identity that the sense of the individual may 
relationally emerge. From this perspective, then, we might understand belief in the false 
history of the Irish slaves as less to do with explaining events of the past, less to do with 
forming a sense of collective or meaning through the realisation of genuine shared 
personal beliefs, and more a creation of a belief as an attempt by the already-existing 
collectively-individuating sociality to reaffirm itself, and in turn its members relationally 
reaffirm their sense of grouped individuality, in relation to a threat of otherness. In the 
case of the Irish slaves myth, we might understand it as an active attempt by those who 
perceive themselves to be alienated by the somewhat progressive politics of the early-
twenty-first-century USA to cement a collectivised sense of racially-charged national 
identity. Indeed, in thinking around conspiracy theories more generally, might it be useful 
to consider them from a perspective of ‘counter cultures’ actively re-affirming their sense 
of desired hegemonic identity in opposition to a supposed (perhaps actually hegemonic) 
threat?  
Sharing beliefs like the Irish slave myth, then, may be not so much about believing that a 
past happened, as cementing through the formation of a belief an existing sense of 
collective. Again, though, it is important to emphasise that the collective promotion of 
and belief in false remembrances that challenge more historically accurate narratives are 
not unique to new, online technologies. In his book The Order Has Been Carried Out, for 
example, pioneering Italian oral historian Alessandro Portelli demonstrates the stark 
differences between certain aspects of a Nazi-led massacre in the occupied city of Rome 
and the dominant ways in which they were subsequently remembered by its citizens 
(Portelli, 2003). The order to massacre 335 civilians was carried out systematically in 
retaliation against a resistance bomb attack that killed 22 German soldiers, as confirmed 
by the Germans’ own announcement of it: ‘the order has been carried out’. However, 
citizens of Rome by the late twentieth century (and indeed earlier) falsely remembered a 
counter-narrative that the German army had issued an ultimatum to the bombers, 
threatening the massacre if they did not turn themselves in.  In effect, there exists a 
misremembering in Roman ‘historical consciousness’, casting prospective guilt to some 
degree away from the Nazi executors and onto the Italian resistance fighters. Portelli 
sensitively suggests, somewhat in accordance with our anarchival perspective, that this 




reported at the time, as well as the repeated fluctuations in affirming a sense of Italian 
national and political identity over the later twentieth century.  
Yet what we do again see is different in the contemporary example of the Irish slaves 
myth is the technologically-augmented connectivity and reach of this ‘memory’ through 
new, online media – informing the everyday, collective individuation of socialities that 
span far beyond typical socio-geographic boundaries of previous communication 
technologies. Through new, online media, ‘memes’ such as this myth, or other 
fictionalised or more accurate beliefs in the past, may be used as a vehicle to unite hitherto 
unimaginable numbers of like-minded people together in collective individuation, 
cementing their ‘inter-individual relationships’.   
 
 
Figure 3 – Popular meme version of the 'Irish slaves' myth 
 
Connected Coalescence 
We can see through these examples two distinct kinds of belief in false memory 
manifested in contemporary online life. Firstly, in a re-imagining of lived experience that 
is in contradiction to the evidenced or evidencable historical facts. Secondly, in a 
fabrication, misrepresentation or misinterpretation of historical events that is not borne 
out of lived experience. In both cases, we might tentatively say that these represent more 
of a wanting to believe than a strictly ‘lived belief’. And for each it is not the ‘truth’ of 




in the present. Put simply, its viability is not necessarily a factor in its believability. Yet 
these types of belief do not represent a simple difference in degree, moving from 
individual, to grouping, to wider socialities. Rather they represent a difference in kind. 
The former belief – in a false sense of lived experience – offers opportunities for the 
genesis of the individual, individuated psychically out of memory-potential, and perhaps 
co-individuated in the formation of groups, augmented through the connectivity of online 
media technologies. The latter – a shared belief in non-lived experience – does not offer 
opportunities for genesis of the individual. Instead, it acts to cement the relations in 
existing collectively-individuating senses of sociality – defining group-members in 
relation to each other, and against the idea of the ‘other’. Thus, collectively-shared false 
beliefs in turn (re)define the individual, and their impending actions, as a part of that 
sociality. The potential size, spread and relations of these individuating socialities are 
increased dramatically in the online era through the connectivity of socially-networked 
technologies such as forums and social media platforms.  
In the next section, it is this second kind of false belief that we consider in terms of the 
instantaneity of new, social technologies. More than its reach through increased 
connectivity, the chapter considers how and why these beliefs may spread through 
particular socialities in the internet age.  
--o0o-- 
3. The Spread of False Memory 
The previous section explored the ways in which increased connectivity may be changing 
the ways we collectively remember false pasts though online-networked technologies. In 
this section, the chapter seeks to examine changes to the ways in which false memory 
may ‘spread’ through new, pervasive technologies. It considers three different kinds of 
example of fake content about recent pasts ‘going viral’, examining the ways in which 
they were spread online. Drawing on Bergson’s thinking in The Two Sources of Morality 
and Religion (1935), it then seeks to novelly conceptually position the viral sharing of 
online media content as an act of ‘moral obligation’ within individuating socialities. In 
doing so, it argues that we might understand the phenomenon of fake news as a kind of 
‘moral lure’, through whose spread - de-coupled to some extent from hesitation by 
technologically-facilitated instantaneous communication – memory-image-informed 





Here, the chapter outlines three recent examples of false media content about recent pasts 
(indeed ideas of the past) that have gone viral: miscaptioned images of police officers 
allegedly ‘brutalised’ by a Central American migrant caravan; an online rumour or hoax 
known as the ‘Momo challenge’; and a faked video of a person surviving a close-call with 
a lightning strike. The section first aims to succinctly explore the examples in terms of 
their content, the ways in which the content was spread online, and the potential purposes 
for their creation. This established, the remainder of the section will focus more critically 
on the reasons why such content might spread so prevalently, from our anarchival 
perspective on remembering.  
Migrant Caravan Brutalises Mexican Police Officers (2018) 
In October 2018, a set of photographs began circulating on social media, including 
Facebook and Twitter, depicting Mexican police officers allegedly attacked by members 
of a Honduran migrant caravan that was making its way through Mexico, toward the US 
border, seeking refugee status. In the preceding weeks, much attention was drawn by US 
media outlets and the public to the migrants, who claimed to be fleeing violence and 
economic hardship in their home country. The images of injured police officers appear to 
have gone viral following being posted to a number of US right-wing Facebook groups 
(Roose, 2018). As well as posts being then shared or retweeted through social media, 
many users created new posts that used the same and additional images and near-identical, 
if sometimes embellished text (see Figure 4):  
Mexican police are being brutalized by members of this caravan as they 
attempt to FORCE their way into Mexico – and WE are supposed to believe 
these are just poor helpless refugees seeking asylum??? (quoted in Evon, 
2018) 
In fact, there had been some genuine reports of altercations between members of the 
caravan and the Mexican police force at the border (BBC News, 2018). However, the 
photographs and descriptions of brutality that were circulating online appear ostensibly 
bogus. The images were shown to have been lifted from entirely different events – the 
main photograph reportedly coming from a 2012 altercation between Mexican police and 
student protesters, not migrants – and the allegations of brutal violence unproven (Evon, 




While further below we will explore the potential reasons why this media content spread 
so vigorously online, it seems fair to speculate that it was in its creation intended to 
promote a negative view of the migrant caravan, as it more closely approached the USA. 
Indeed, it is important to contextualise the example within a wider alleged campaign, or 
at least collective attempts, to villainise the group. These have been reported to include: 
widely-spread, miscaptioned photographs, claiming to show members of the caravan 
burning U.S. flags (Evon, 2018); a claim, accompanied by a misappropriated video, by 
US congressman Matt Gaetz that migrants were being paid to join the caravan, perhaps 
by Jewish billionaire and philanthropist George Soros (Gaetz, 2018); and an unevidenced 
claim by Donald Trump that “[c]riminals and unknown Middle Easterners” were “mixed 
in” with the caravan (Trump, 2018).  
Within our anarchival perspective on remembering, then, we might consider the sharing 
of this fake news as an attempt by some more nationalist-leaning members of the U.S. 
population to re-assert their identity to both ‘themselves’ and perceived ‘others’. Through 
creating a collectively shared belief in the migrants as violent and dangerous, and 
coalescing around it through interactively sharing it to others online, instantly, socialities 
are able to on a large-scale and in real-time cement relations between members, and 






Figure 4 – Multiple tweets about the supposed migrant caravan brutality, using the same 
miscaptioned image and near-identical text 
 
Lightning Strike Reaction (2016) 
Since it was uploaded by YouTube user Frank DeMayo in February 2016, the 41-second 
video clip Lightning almost strikes girl in Sydney!!! Boyfriend's reaction is priceless!!!! 
has been watched more than 4.3 million times (at the time of writing) (DeMayo, 2016 – 
see Figure 5). The video, shot by the supposed boyfriend, follows a young woman in 
somewhat revealing swimwear, from behind, as she makes her way to the beach. In a 




being struck by a lightning bolt as she stands near the water’s edge. In the aftermath of 
the strike, and out of echoes of thunder, both subject and filmmaker run back to the 
mainland – the focus of the video, the filming seemingly somewhat forgotten about, now 
on the boyfriend’s almost-comical verbal and strongly regionally-accented Australian 
reaction to the high-impact near-miss. Of the nearly two-and-a-half-thousand comments 
under the video, a few suggest that the video is fake, others seemingly do not realise, and 
others claim they just don’t care.  
Fake, however, the video was, created by Australian media production advertising 
company The Woolshed Company – now Riot Content. The clip formed part of a two-
year, eight-video-strong campaign, The Viral Experiment (The Woolshed Company, 
2016; Riot Content, no date), to demonstrate the company’s ability to create short, 
“snackable” online viral content (The Woolshed Company, 2016, p. 2), allowing 
companies to have advertise “without aid of any paid media, promotion, publicity, 
established channels or distribution networks” (The Woolshed Company, 2016, p. 1). 
Indeed, if their no-longer-available-online press release is to be believed, the lightning 
strike video had amassed far more than a few million views, even within the five months 
since being published. Once data from tracking the content across posts and reposts in 
media platforms beyond YouTube are factored in, the company claims, the clip had been 
watched more than 58.9 million times by early July 2016. In fact, the possibility these 
videos were fake was the apparent secret to their viral success, the company claims – 
bolstered by coverage in TV, print and online news outlets across Australia, North 
America, Europe, Russia and East Asia, before the truth was revealed in July 2016. “[T]he 
world watched, they shared and then they argued like hell over their authenticity. It was 
this debate over authenticity that propelled each videos’ [sic] viral success” (The 
Woolshed Company, 2016).  
There is something twofold about the affective ‘instantaneousness’ of this clip. On the 
one hand, like so many other media clips, it does not recount so much as ‘replay’ the 
event being (supposedly) remembered. Experientially, and similarly to those themes 
discussed in our first Case Study chapter, viewing the clip is less of a recall of the past, 
and more of a kind of re-witnessing, a being-in-the-instant (see Case Study Chapter 1). 
On the other hand, interactively, the pervasiveness, connectivity and speed of new, online 
technologies allows the clip to be shared, its authenticity debated, in an instant and within 
multiple networks. The surprise of the clip – or “surplus-value of being”, as Massumi has 




through the affective, relational processes of viewing, interacting and sharing. The action 
of viewing the video extends into collectively-individuating actions of inter-relation 
through sharing and discussing the clip across multiple fields of relation, informing 
multiple socialities.   
 
 





The Momo Challenge (2019) 
The viral internet hoax of the potentially-lethal ‘Momo challenge’ had been circulating 
across countries around the globe since 2018 before it made its real debut into UK society. 
Previous versions of this urban legend had involved reports of an odd-looking character 
of ‘Momo’ playing a deadly kind of game with users of WhatsApp – commanding them 
to perform a series of tasks, including self-harm, against the threat of (supernatural or 
actual) violence if they do not obey. Reports by news outlets and social media posters 
would blame hacking groups for the phenomenon, and attribute the challenge to multiple 
suicides elsewhere (Chui, 2018; Tahir, 2018) – though with no definitive evidence with 
which to back up the supposed link (Mikkelson, 2019).  
In February 2019, Momo took on a new tactic. The character, it seemed, was now 
targeting young children through ‘hacking into’ children’s videos on YouTube, such as 
Peppa Pig, to convince them to contact it on WhatsApp. While the phenomenon again 
saw activity across several countries, the beginning of this UK online ‘outbreak’ of fear 
appears to have been traced to a single social media post, made on Facebook group ‘Love 
Westhoughton’ on 17 February and warning about the supposed challenge (see Figure 6). 
The attention garnered in this group was subsequently picked up and reported on by a 
reporter for the Manchester Evening News (Gill, 2019). Spreading its tentacles across 
wide across various channels of the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017), over the next 
two days, the story would be picked up by national press online and in print, reporting the 
suicide game as fact. Stories would often incorporate the same dubious examples of its 
connection with previous outbreaks and suicides in other countries, or suggesting that it 
was a plot by hackers to steal users’ personal data (Evans, 2019; Hughes, 2019; O’Malley 
2019; Williams, 2019). Soon, schools were sending home letters about the challenge 
(Waterson, 2019a), and advocacy groups (National Online Safety, 2019 – see Figure 7) 
and even police (Police Service of Northern Ireland, 2019) were issuing safety warnings 
about how to prevent children being snared by it. All the while these, reports, letters and 
warnings were being recirculated on social media through digitised letters, sharing posts, 
and linking to news reports – all fuelling each other in a kind of affective feedback loop. 
Meanwhile, YouTube had consistently claimed that neither did such videos existed nor 
could people ‘hack into’ videos already online, and no evidence of associated harm 
coming to a child could be found (Lorenz, 2019; Waterson, 2019a). The past was haunting 




In terms of connectivity and instantaneity, we can see in the Momo challenge how 
opportunities for the formation of so-called ‘rumour mills’ have been amplified by new, 
networked media, leading to increased possibilities for viral spread of rumour and fake 
news. The construction of a false belief in either Momo or the faceless hackers operating 
it thus acts as a way of both constituting and preserving the perceived group. Yet in 
socially constructing and sharing the belief in the Momo challenge something more seems 
to be going on than merely cementing the affective, relational bonds of inter-mingling, 
collectively-individuating socialities. Rather, it illuminates a more nuanced aspect of the 
virality of spreading fake news – a moral duty, or an instinctive feeling to be acted on, for 
the protection and preservation of one’s perceives sociality or socialities. Here, then, we 
move into our next section.    
   
 
Figures 6 - Screenshots of the original post on the 'Love Westhoughton' Facebook group (left) 






Open and Closed Societies: Virality as Moral Obligation  
Above, we have considered how the instantaneity, along with connectivity, of new, online 
technologies may serve to augment the reach and spread collectively-individuating false 
remembering online. Yet why is it that these media go viral, whereas others (perhaps 
thinking back on examples of the Mandella effect or the Irish slaves myth) do not? What, 
if anything, drives the seeming sense of urgency with which viral content seems to spread 
itself online? 
To seek to understand this, the chapter now returns theoretically to Bergsonian-
Simondonian thinking on the nature of ‘society’ and moral obligation. We saw in the 
Theory Chapter how Simondon’s thinking on individuation, while discrete, can be seen 
as a kind of “negotiation” (Scott, 2014, p. 128) with Bergson’s theorising on The Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion (1935). Here, the chapter seeks to situate the examples 
above within a succinct reading of Bergson’s theorising on ‘open’ and ‘closed’ societies 
in this original text, an in relation to the synthesis on collective remembering developed 
in the previous chapter. In doing so, it argues for a novel conceptualisation of the virality 
of fake news as a kind of ‘moral lure’, exploiting the processes of collectively-
individuating interaction.  
Bergson begins The Two Sources of Morality and Religion with a stark question on 
morality. Considering the idea of childhood and ‘forbidden fruit’, he writes: 
What a childhood we should have had if only we had been left to do as we 
pleased! We should have flitted from pleasure to pleasure. But all of a sudden 
an obstacle arose, neither visible nor tangible: a prohibition. Why did we obey? 
(Bergson, 1935, p. 1 – emphasis my own)  
The “habit” of obedience (Bergson, 1935, p. 1), we might think, is formed by our deferral 
to the authority of parents and teachers. Yet behind such figures, Bergson suggests, “we 
had an inkling of some enormous, or rather some shadowy, thing that exerted pressure on 
us through them. Later we would say it was society” (Bergson, 1935, p. 1). For Bergson, 
societies are informed by two distinct tendencies of morality, which differ in kind: 
‘closed’, which is the tendency “to preserve and protect the group exclusively” (Lefebvre 
& White, 2012, p. 6); and ‘open’, which is the tendency “to love, respect, and care for all 
human beings as such” (Lefebvre & White, 2012, pp. 6-7). These co-existing tendencies 
lead to two kinds of sense of society – or what we might think of as two kinds of 




instinct” toward social cohesion (Bergson, 1935, p. 21) – a closed ‘in-group’ in relation 
to the ‘other’. It is the natural instinct of humanity: “the basis of social obligation always 
has in view … a closed society, however large” (Bergson, 1935, p. 21). Thus, the closed 
society is one “whose members hold together, caring nothing for the rest of humanity, on 
the alert for attack or defence, bound, in fact, to a perpetual readiness for battle” (Bergson, 
1935, p. 229). In contrast, an open society, Bergson claims, is a perhaps aspirational one 
“represented by all mankind” (Bergson, 1935, p. 20) – in which, through “variability and 
intelligence”, the ‘in-group’ encompasses all humanity (Bergson, 1935, p. 18). By way 
of illustration, then, if we are to think back on the Irish slaves myth of the previous section, 
we might in simplistic terms understand the ‘spread’ of this belief through media as an 
example of a closed society exercising a moral obligation to re-assert itself in relation to 
the perceived other.  
Tendencies toward being open or closed do not differ in degree, but in kind (Bergson, 
1935, p. 22) – no matter how ‘open’ a closed society may be, it is still closed so long as 
it tends to define itself in opposition to a sense of ‘other’. Thus, for Bergson, we might 
view societies in terms of a mixture of tendencies toward inclusion against exclusion, or 
shared affinity against opposition. And, through the theoretical position set out through 
Simondon in the previous chapter, we might consider a more nuanced understanding of 
this distinction, thinking the tendencies in terms of multiplicities of always-individuating 
socialities through transduced cultural value – an always-emergent collective belonging 
to humanity as a whole, as well as belonging to myriad other socio-cultural groups.  
How, then, might we conceptualise the spread of fake news within this moral context?  
As with the Irish slaves myth, we might consider the construction and sharing of fake 
news about the Central-American migrant caravan as a morally-informed action, a 
communication of cultural value to recognise, unite and protect the collectively-
individuating closed society. Multiplicities of collectively-individuating socialities ‘act 
out’ shared national identity through the online, networked sharing of anti-migrant 
sentiment, in an urgent, morally-felt act of preservation. In doing so, they reconstitute 
their own sense of ‘more than individual’ belonging to the collective in the face of an 
approaching ‘other’.  
Equally, while sharing fake news about the Momo challenge might on the face of it appear 
morally a more ‘open’ tendency, it may be better understood as the protection of a large-




preservation of ‘all humanity’ that is a concern here – rather the preservation of ‘most’ in 
society against a threat from ‘some’. There is an unknown enemy that is out to attack ‘us’, 
and the moral action of techno-culturally networked sharing content around the Momo 
challenge – literally warning others – serves to both reconstitute the perceived sociality 
and urgently defend it from its perceived threat.  
Conversely, and perhaps most interestingly, it is tempting to think of the virality of the 
lighting strike video more in terms of an open society, in that sharing the content may 
seem a collectivising appreciation for humanity in its (more than) totality. The charge, or 
cultural value that is being passed on here, we might think, is one of surprise, of ‘surplus 
value’ – the felt, moral imperative being one of pure participation with the other, toward 
open-ness. The virality of the content draws on the readiness of the transindividual being, 
as an affective centre of action, toward interaction. We might think of this in terms of 
Massumi’s thinking of affect as “pure sociality … the openness of being affected … an 
active pressure towards taking-form … the ongoing force of the social taking evolving 
form” (2015, p. 205). The ‘surplus value’ being shared, and through which collective 
individuation takes place, is one of surprise – thus, the urgency of sharing arises from 
being able to convey that surprise to others in one’s collective while it remains novel. 
Furthermore, we can see the mediated sharing of the human ‘surviving’ the strike as one 
of progressing extension of humanity, against the odds, out of the past and into the future, 
as one of collectively individuation. Nevertheless, there is a certain moral duality or 
tension to this affective apparent openness, since the ‘surprise’ in the clip comes from the 
instinctive and closed opposition of ‘human’ to ‘nature’. Indeed, it is interesting to note 
that, of the eight clips created through The Viral Experiment, the three most successful 
each involved a ‘near-miss’ with a non-human (indeed non-technological) event. Indeed, 
while the lightning strike reaction clip had garnered most impressions at the time of going 
public about the ‘experiment’, the other two respective clips have since long surpassed it 
in terms of YouTube views. Snowboarder Girl Chased By Bear - I Was Singing Rihanna 
Work And Didn't Know It Was Behind Me! (Murphy, 2016) has been viewed more than 
10.9 million times at the time of writing, and GoPro: Man Fights Off Great White Shark 
In Sydney Harbour (Tufferson, 2014) more than 38.2 million times.  
Fake News as Moral Lure 
With each example above, then, we might consider the sharing of fake content as acting 
on a moral obligation toward (re)constituting a sense of collective identity, of ‘more than’, 




‘grouped individual’. As we have seen, this drive is not in itself new – on the contrary, it 
is evolutionarily informed. Yet what is new is the reach and speed of such media’s spread 
across affective fields, driven by moral obligation and enabled through the connectivity 
and instantaneity of new, online media communication. The possibilities for interaction 
afforded by high-speed, inter-networked media platforms greatly augment the ability for 
the reconstitution of socialities.  
Yet what might the implications of such a shift be? Indeed, if remembering serves to 
inform useful action, just who benefits from this action? If we are to consider the 
individual as an always-relational being, coupled through technology and interacting 
across multiplicities of affective fields, how do we consider the agency within such 
relations?  
In the case of the migrant caravan, the solidifying of anti-immigrant sentiment serves to 
reconstitute an existing sociality. Yet the harnessing of processes of individuation may 
also serve a higher political purpose in maintaining the perceived dominance of a 
particular political viewpoint – and perhaps the power of their proponents. The virality of 
the lightning strike reaction video demonstrated the propensity of the individuating being 
toward ‘the openness of being affected’, but at what cost? The video itself was part of a 
retrospectively-celebrated advertising exercise by a marketing company, attempting to 
manipulate users into sharing the content, shifting the burden of labour from producer to 
consumer. Perhaps the belief in, and spread of, the Momo challenge presents the starkest 
example of what is at stake for the agency of the individuating individual in the online 
era. The rumour hijacked those instincts of moral obligation to protect a perceived 
sociality, in a sense turning members of that group against each other to potentially, 
impulsively, and at a lesser degree of consciousness, harmfully spread fear and panic. 
Furthermore, the examples serve as an important reminder that the affectations of online 
technological interaction bleed into life beyond the mobile phone screen. Beyond 
affective “leaky” bodies (Tucker, 2018, p. 40; Massumi, 2002, p. 203), it is worth re-
emphasising, we are leaky societies.   
Why did we obey?, Bergson asks about moral obedience in childhood. Why, when 
instructed, did we act?  
Why do people so readily and rapidly share fake news?, we might equally ask about moral 





On one level, as we saw above, we might think of the sharing of false memory online as 
inter-acting on a kind of moral obligation of a closed society, to re-affirm or reconstitute 
a collectively-individuating sociality and one’s belonging to it – and increased 
connectivity has enlarged the scope of a potential sociality far beyond geographical limits 
in what can constitute a sociality. Yet what is different about new social media 
technologies is not just their connectivity, but the instantaneity of communication – the 
removal of barriers for delay and thought – allowing such affective interactions to form 
across vast distances and networks in real time. On another level, then, this section now 
argues that we might see the sharing of fake news as a shift away from conscious choice, 
and toward more impulsive, lesser-conscious – and therefore often ‘closed’ – tendencies.  
Impulse, Bergson argues, drives humans naturally toward closed-tendency societies, with 
intelligence and conscious choice of action driving them toward more open-tendency 
societies: “obligation as a whole would have been instinct if human societies were not, so 
to speak, ballasted with variability and intelligence”, Bergson suggests (1935, p. 18). We 
speculated in the Theory Chapter that it is through the force of hesitation, informed 
through the realisation of memory-potential into a discernible memory-image, in relation 
to perception of the world, that we are able to make voluntary – i.e. conscious – choice. 
Indeed, for Simondon, memory informs doubt, allowing the being “an operation of 
distance and reattachment” (Scott, 2014, p. 118). It is, for Simondon, through this sense 
of distance that the sense of individual can emerge, aware of its (semi)separation from, 
or rather individualised belonging to, the collective: 
Memory is the realization of distance, gaining of objectivity without 
alienation. It is an extension of the limits of the subjective system, which gains 
an internal duality without cutting or separation: it is alterity and identity 
progressing together, forming themselves, and distinguishing themselves in 
the same movement. The memory’s content becomes symbol of the present 
“I”; it is the other part; the progress of memory is an asymmetrical splitting of 
the subject being, an individualization of the subject being. (Simondon, quoted 
in Scott, 2014, pp. 118-119) 
Yet in the experience of remembering through new, social-media technologies, barriers 
that inform hesitation – the realisation of memory-potential into a memory-image – we 
might think are almost entirely removed. The subject exits the concept of ‘time’ and exists 
in the world of duration, ‘in the moment’, prompted to respond quickly, unthinkingly – 




similar), ‘comment’ or ‘share’. Reduced to impulse, we may exist in a world of instinct, 
memory-potential seldom formed into consciously-discernible memory-images, instead 
operating at a level of recognition and impulse action. Such an existence Massumi calls 
the “non-conscious memory of the present, which is the past actively contracted into the 
cut of the present instant” (2015, p. 62). And with each action the chances are increased 
of the content in turn being seen, and interacted with, by others in their network through 
algorithmically-informed filter bubbles.  
The subject is in a sense reduced to action – action informed not through conscious choice 
but through more instinctive impulse-responses to recognition, and action serving the 
usefulness not necessarily of the individuating being itself. The agency of the human in 
the man-machine coupling is at significantly compromised. In a very real way, we lose 
our ability to consciously individualise ourselves within a collective. We shift away from 
tendencies toward open societies, and instead toward a more docile submission to the 
needs of the perceived hegemonic yet closed collective.  
The phenomenon of fake news thus lives through a kind of lesser-conscious ‘moral lure’ 
through the connectivity and instantaneity of social media technologies – thriving through 
the platforms’ reduction of the thinking, individual user to impulse-driven actor. Fake 
photographs of migrants are shared out of instinctive anxiety in the face of ‘the other’ and 
a felt need to defend ‘one’s own’. False rumours are spread out of instinctive fear and a 
felt need to protect the vulnerable in the group. Videos of fake events circulate out of an 
instinctive pride in the dominance of humanity over nature, or perhaps unthinking awe in 
the surprise at surviving its wrath.  
Yet, more than this, these behaviours are caught up in a kind of semi-ordered, affective 
flux. Acts of remembrance flow across relational fields through digital, technological 
networks of various, organised, media and communications systems. We live with and 
through ‘leaky societies’, and the affective movements of false remembering move 
through multiple more social, more organised and more economically-motivated arenas. 
The surges of affective interaction that constitute the spread of fake news seemingly are 
morally-induced as much by the economic strategy of news outlets and advertisers – 
seeking revenue, visibility and increased search-engine optimisation (SEO) – as by those 
users and their on- and off-line networks caught up in the drive toward individuation. 
And, beyond this, as we have seen in the previous chapter, contemporary socially-




lack the capacity to properly limit access to content containing misinformation, fake news 
or hate speech. 
It is not enough, then, to consider fake news in relation the connectivity and instantaneity 
of new technologies. Remembering online, as we have seen through previous chapters, 
represents a complex socio-economic ecology of ‘flows’ of remembering, of ‘memory-
as-action’ – a struggle for the constitution and the value of movements of content from 
one place, platform and time to another, and the agencies that underpin this. Thus, to truly 
understand what is at stake for remembering in the online era, we must once more 
examine the materiality of false remembering through these prominent ‘sites’ of memory. 
The next section aims to tackle this through looking at the experience of remembering 
fake news through prominent socially-networked technologies, the agencies inherent in 
such experiences, and the implications of these. How and why may inherently false 
perceptions be informed through perception portals such as Facebook and Twitter? What 
kinds of actions are informed? And for whose benefit?  
--o0o-- 
4. Impulse, Agency and Affect Capitalism 
This chapter has thus far placed a focus on the personal and social aspects and 
implications of collective (false) remembering in the online era, examining the ways in 
which affective, identity-informing interaction may spread across various changing fields 
of connective and temporal affectivity, reconstituting multiplicities of collectively-
individuating socialities through various socio-technological networks – on- and off-line. 
Armed now with a working philosophical understanding of how changes to connectivity 
and instantaneity in new technologies are affecting the ways in which false memory may 
be spread online, this final section seeks to once more refocus on the materiality of online 
experience of remembering through prominent social-media models like Facebook or 
Twitter – examining their socio-economic underpinnings and the resulting implications. 
In what ways are the experiences of false remembering, and thus senses of sociality and 
identity, co-constructed, reconstituted or guided by prevalent platform architectures as 
perception portals in duration? What inter-related agencies are at play and in what ways? 
What kind of actions are informed by these guided perceptions, and who truly benefits 




Perception, Participation, Exploitation  
In previous chapters we saw how relational senses of collective and individual identity 
may be artificially reconstituted through the perception portals of contemporary 
surveillance technologies, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Google. Perceptions 
experienced on these platforms may be algorithmically-facilitated through automated 
‘recommendations’ of content with which the platform anticipates the user will likely 
engage, understood as so-called “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 2011). These content-feeds, 
architected through feeding forward analysed personal-user-data from the past to connect 
users with ‘relevant’ content in the present, are designed not primarily to ‘organise 
content’ per se but to stir up affective, collectively-individuating connections that ensure 
continued, monetisable user-engagement. In a sense, such platforms use data-records of 
users’ own pasts to ‘predict’ what connections will excite them in the present, to keep 
them monetisably engaged in the app. Cultural theorist Rebecca Coleman thus observes 
that “the aim of big data is not only to care about what ‘you’ have done, so much as what 
you are doing and may do … In this sense, it is future-oriented” (Coleman, 2018, pp. 71-
72). 
Yet, more than this, for platforms such as Facebook the currency of value we can 
understand as not the message itself, but the messaging. The subject is reduced to action. 
While, as media theorist Tero Karppi observes, it is “infra-individual” engagement, or a 
sense of connection, that informs Facebook’s business model - that “attunes us together 
toward a state where leaving Facebook becomes impossible both physically and mentally, 
individually and collectively” (2018, p. 46) – it is nevertheless the interactions or 
movements of these connected engagements that fuel the platform. Our interactions 
become:  
[M]onetized with mechanisms such as targeted Facebook ads and frictionless 
sharing, which entices us to share both voluntarily and involuntarily. We are 
taken into circulation; we become part of Facebook as streams and flows of 
content. (Karppi, 2018, p. 46) 
Actions – limited to ‘datafiable’, analysable options of viewing, sharing, ‘reacting’, 
commenting – are collated, packaged, commodified and sold to advertisers, and 
promoters. Furthermore, they are sold back to us through being used to ‘rank’ further 
content with which the platform anticipates we will engage. Seemingly like bottom-
feeders, external actors seek, too, to capitalise on the social-media model – with each 




potential revenue. Thus, viral cycles, not necessarily useful to the transindividual, operate 
this way because – as discussed in the previous chapter – they are designed to operate this 
way. It is not content that is harnessed but the drives toward interaction out of memory-
potential, to accrue value in the attention economy. Limited in both perception and choice 
of action, we exist through the perceptual lens of YouTube recommendations, the 
Facebook News Feed, Twitter timeline, Instagram feed, at a lesser degree of 
consciousness – docile, reflexive, primed to be shown, and to impulsively respond 
accordingly.  
Let us emphasise once again that the body is “a centre of action; it receives and returns 
movements” (Bergson, 2004, p. 4). Remembering, the perception-informed, affective 
stirring of memory-potential into action, is at an instinctive level reflex-like – a feeling 
that commands an action. Conscious remembering involves imagination, in combination 
with perception and memory-potential, to realise or abstract this non-representational 
feeling into a memory-image that can be used to inform a choice of action. Perception 
informs remembering, informs drives toward individuating action, informs society and, 
thus, identity.  
We have discussed across previous chapters that consciousness, for Bergson, has its core 
in the choice of what to perceive. Of course, social media technologies allow us far greater 
connectivity, apparently increasing opportunities for perception. Yet, it is important to 
remind ourselves that a greater perception does equate to increased sense of 
consciousness. Rather, the converse is true:  
[T]he perception of any unconscious material point whatever … is infinitely 
greater and more complete than ours, since this point gathers and transmits the 
influences of all the points of the material universe, whereas our 
consciousness only attains to certain parts and to certain aspects of those parts. 
Consciousness … lies in just this choice. (Bergson, 2004, pp. 30-31) 
The crucial importance of Bergson’s observation is in how the choice of perception leads 
to the choice of how to voluntarily act. Simply put, base consciousness lies in the ability 
to pick and choose how we perceive and, accordingly, how we act – to relationally choose 
to limit our own sense of perception, in tandem with the realisation of memory-potential, 
informing our own choice of useful action. These choices of action are expanded, through 




Within the likes of the Facebook News Feed, YouTube’s auto-play recommendations and 
the ‘Twittersphere’, choice of both perception and action are in many ways decided for 
us, or at least limited by automated systems whose purpose is to keep us engaged – 
capitalising on the charges that propel individuation, and keeping the business moving. 
Thus, while it is true that the increased connectivity and instantaneity of new 
communications technologies play a role in fuelling the virality of fake news, this chapter 
argues that once more the more significant factor is in the surrender of choice. It is in 
encouraging such kinds of lesser-conscious, instinctive, recognition-impulse-
(inter)action that social-media platforms draw in their revenue. As Karppi observes, in 
remembering through these platforms, we surrender ourselves to “mechanisms of control 
that modulate and condition the user for the needs of the platform and social media 
business models in particular ways” (2018, p. 23). With action, as with perception, we 
deprive ourselves of agency within the man-machine coupling. And, in doing so, we 
reduce our very sense of conscious being, both in terms of our sense of social identity out 
of what is presented as the social now, and in terms of conscious choice of action that 
allows for such always-emergent identities to be constantly reconstituted through acting 
on that social now.  
What is significant from our anarchival perspective on remembering, then, is twofold. 
Firstly, that surveillance platforms do not only guide our perceptions, but also our actions, 
reduced often to impulse. And secondly, that these actions are (re)encouraged for 
usefulness not primarily to the user, and its perceived sociality, but to keep them 
(monetisably) participating in the platform. Thus, processes of transindividual 
consciousness are reduced, identity, society and action tamed for principally the needs of 
the platform.  
Yet, as the examples of hate-speech and scaremongering exampled in this and the 
previous chapter demonstrate, while profiting from phenomenon, platforms can operate 
often little control over what and how media-content may spread virally through their 
own sites. In interdependent techno-cultural couplings, parties distinct from the platform 
not only populate its personalised feeds but operate their own agencies in doing so. 
Through platforms’ reduction of perception and action to limitedly-conscious, impulse-
driven behaviour in duration, third parties – organised or more spontaneous – may take 
advantage of the platform-architected encouragement of what we may now think of as 
moral-imperative-drives toward collectively-individuated reconstitution of a sense of 




employing or taking advantage of surveillance technologies, may extend beyond 
individual platforms and into the wider sociality-informing, affective atmospheres of the 
hybrid media system.  
Here we might consider a number of examples, to which we will return later in the 
chapter.  
The operations of data analytics firm Cambridge Analytica, for instance, internationally 
provided targeted, political, social-media advertising, based on ‘personality models’, 
themselves drawn out of trawled and collated personal user-data (Cadwalladr, 2017a). 
The company folded in the wake of a 2018 controversy, when it was discovered that it 
had illegally (though straightforwardly through Facebook’s own systems) used the 
harvested personal data of at least 50 million Facebook profiles (Cadwalladr & Graham-
Harrison, 2018) – but not before it had been implicated in both the Trump 2016 US-
presidential-election campaign (Cadwalladr & Graham-Harrison, 2018) and the alleged 
illegal co-ordination of multiple UK EU-Referendum ‘Leave’ campaigns (Cadwalladr, 
2017a).  
Such influences need not come in the form of ‘paid-for’ adverts or sponsored content. 
Journalist and academic Peter Pomerantsev, in his 2019 book This is Not Propaganda 
equally draws our attention to organised so-called ‘farms’ of “trolls, bots and cyborgs [a 
combination of the human troll and technical bot]” who are able, through calculated 
postings across multiple sites, to “create the simulation of a climate of opinion, of support 
or hate, which was more insidious, more all-enveloping than the old broadcast media” 
(2019, p. 81).  
In August 2019 (on the very day of publication of Pomerantsev’s book) an investigation 
by British newspaper The Guardian revealed that lobbying firm CTF – run by Lynton 
Crosby, long associated with UK Conservative Party election campaigns – had 
constructed secret disinformation networks of seemingly-independent, unbranded ‘news’ 
websites and Facebook pages to promote targeted political campaigning for corporate and 
governmental business clients (Waterson, 2019b). The pages, reaching tens of millions 
of people through targeted Facebook advertising, reportedly spread selective 
disinformation to users across the UK and internationally (see Figure 8), seemingly as 
independent organisations, while working at the behest of clients such as the Saudi 
government or anti-environmental lobbies (Waterson, 2019b). What is of particular 




interest in a political message, but that the artificially-induced user-participation in those 
pages could then be used more widely and compoundedly to indicate supposed 
‘grassroots’ swelling of public opinion (Waterson, 2019b).  
Given the extent to which we have through this thesis seen identities may be today 
informed through uncritical online perception and interaction, the potential implications 
of such clandestine controlling over what may be perceived to be ‘the social’ are, from 
our anarchival perspective, quite staggering. As Scott contends, from a point of view of 
the sense of individuality emerging out of collective individuation:  
We are obliged to think of the group as anterior to the individual, instead of 
the individual as anterior to the group … And because the group is nothing 
more than pure relationality … we are left to grasp the individual’s fragility 
within the psycho-sociological domain (Scott, 2014, p. 136) 
The sense of the individual, reliant as it is on the perceivable bodily and social relation 
to others in a perceived collective, is fragile, constantly re-informed by the its own sense 
of re-emergence out of the group.  
Postmodern and posthuman theorist N. Katherine Hayles notes that “[c]orrelation, 
databases’ modus operandi, implies that many single data entries, innocuous in 
themselves, can become potent invasions of privacy when concatenated together” (2016, 
p. xi). Yet, such correlations may do more than simply identify the kind of person you 
are. Once these concatenations are fed-forward through perception portals, manipulating 
one’s sense of sociality, it is the very sense of individual, private or otherwise, that 
becomes what is crucially at stake – mouldable, modifiable through its potential surrogate 
sociality. Shortly before the large-scale emergence of Web-2.0, Massumi famously 
claims, “Capitalism is the global usurpation of belonging” (2002, p. 88). Indeed, with 
contemporary networked, surveillance technologies, it seems the very sense one’s 
sociality and thus individuality, one’s sense of belonging – or at least its manipulation – 
may be up for sale. Artificial senses of ‘the social’ and of identity, and thus artificial 
manipulation of resulting behaviour, may through the tools and affective user-experience 
of surveillance technologies be constructed for the right price, with varying degrees of 
intensity. As philosopher Tamsin Shaw argues, reflecting on the Cambridge-Analytics-
style data analytics industry, “To have so much data in the hands of a bunch of 
international plutocrats to do with it what they will is absolutely chilling” (quoted in 




It is clear that online perceptions of the social now (more consciously or less consciously 
perceived) may be encouraged and guided by numerous agencies beyond the embodied 
user, and indeed beyond the economic drives of the platform – themselves not concerned 
with content but monetisable engagement. Yet, since consciousness lies in the ability to 
voluntarily choose what to perceive and how to act, we must here refocus the 
investigation not only on what kind of perceptions may be guided and why, but also on 
what kind of actions may be informed through those perceptions, and for whose benefit.  
 
 
Figure 8 – Graphic from The Guardian newspaper, illustrating the CTF disinformation campaign 
 
Remembering, The ‘Nudge’ and Manufactured Consensus  
We have seen above that perceptions may be manipulated through online perception-
portal technologies like social media, through the algorithmic feeding forward of users’ 
past data and personal information into connections with media-content – often for 
perhaps more ulterior purposes, “without our awareness, to manipulate us subliminally 
and outside of our control” (Hansen, 2015, p.71). N. Katherine Hayles rightly notes in her 




Like biological memory which has been shown to be essential in planning and 
anticipating the future … data derivatives are also aimed at anticipating future 
events which have not been – and may never be – predictable using causal 
connections. (2016, p. xi) 
Indeed, in attempting to predict the future, it might be tempting to loosely liken data-
processes – when it comes to social media – to the imaginative notion of pluripotentiality. 
Yet, rather than imagine, data – at least presently – we might think works to define. 
Through recognising correlation, data seeks to define likelihood rather than imagine its 
possibility. It strives toward not pluripotentiality but in reducing pluralities toward the 
singular, toward certainty. Social-media platforms – swathes of personal data at their 
disposal – strive equally toward certainty of engagement, of interaction – not what might 
engage, but moving from what should engage to what shall engage.  
This thesis asks, then, whether we might think of purposely-manipulated, engagement-
encouraging, ‘artificial’ socialities like those experienced through the algorithmic data 
derivatives of social media platforms as not just trying to predict user behaviour but to 
produce user behaviour. Speculating on the future trajectory of surveillance technologies, 
digital theorist Shoshana Zuboff suggests:  
Even when knowledge derived from your behaviour is fed back to you in the 
first text as a quid pro quo for participation, the parallel secret operations of 
the shadow text capture surplus for crafting into prediction products destined 
for other marketplaces that are about you rather than for you. (Zuboff, 2019, 
p. 328)  
“This is the potential nightmare of the new media”, Pomerantsev similarly argues, “[T]he 
idea that our data might know more about us than we do, and that this is then being used 
to influence us without our knowledge” (2019, p. 234). 
Indeed, a steady trickle of dissenting media voices have begun to highlight perceived 
problems with Facebook’s approach to connecting people. “Facebook will market you 
your future before you’ve even gotten there”, media critic Douglas Rushkoff argues:  
[T]hey’ll use predictive algorithms to figure out what’s your likely future and 
then try to make that even more likely. They’ll get better at programming you 




Computer scientist and pioneer of virtual reality Jaron Lanier argues that the virtual 
manipulation of perceptions, behaviours and interactions through Facebook’s 
architecture, especially negatively, “tears society apart” (quoted in Whitworth, 2017). 
Looking to the future, he suggests:  
We already know from laboratory experiments that putting people into virtual 
worlds can be incredibly effective at changing their behaviour, and those 
changes can happen without the person’s awareness. So a combination of 
something like what Facebook is today with where virtual reality might go in 
the future could be so destructive of a sense of truth, a sense of free will, the 
sense of the civil project. It could be really the destruction of us all. (Quoted 
in Whitworth, 2017) 
Perhaps eerily similarly, Chamath Palihapitiya, a former vice-president for ‘user 
growth’ at Facebook, claims that its approach is “ripping apart the social fabric of 
how society works” (quoted in Wong, 2017). “The short-term, dopamine-driven 
feedback loops that we have created are destroying how society works”, he argues, 
“No civil discourse, no cooperation, misinformation, mistruth” (quoted in Wong, 
2017).  
These kinds of anxiety about the future we can read as positively Simondonian alienation, 
and our anarchival perspective toward remembering helps us to conceptually ground their 
sense of criticality. Transindividual potential is realised into action, but, reduced to guided 
and predicted impulse, for the purpose of generating profit, interaction loses the thrust of 
its creativity, its surplus-value. We are alienated from our own cultural processes. We 
become workers.  
Yet, through the likes of the political sociality-interventions exampled above, we might 
consider that such influencing of behaviour is already taking place. And while the 
platform, concerned not with content but engagement, seeks limited kinds of impulse-
driven behaviour on-platform – engagement, interaction – wider actors, capitalising on 
the affect-oriented digital infrastructures of social-media surveillance technologies, may 
seek to coerce more diverse action.  
Choice Architecture: Manufacturing Behaviour 
We have seen above how suggestibility – or one’s affective relation to the perceived 
present environment – may lead to so-called false personal memories, Equally, we have 




to false collective beliefs. Here we must think one step further: about what action is 
informed by such perceptions.  
It is helpful here to reflect on so-called ‘nudge theory’ – theorising in behavioural science 
around how suggestion and reinforcement may indirectly influence people’s behaviours 
(Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). Central to this thinking – popularised in 2008 by economist 
and legal academic respectively, Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein – are  the related 
notions that “there is no such thing as a ‘neutral’ design” (2009, p. 3) and, thus, that all 
designed environments or interfaces through which choices are made involve an element 
of “choice architecture” (2009, p. 3), influencing – purposely or otherwise – the decisions 
people make. The governing function of the ‘nudge’ is therefore to encourage compliance 
with one particular choice of action, or set of choices, over another – “as judged by 
themselves” (2009, p. 5) without undermining a conscious sense of ‘free will’. Through 
the purpose-led design of perceivable options, Thaler and Sunstein argue that:   
choice architects are not merely trying to track or to implement people’s 
anticipated choices. Rather, they are self-consciously attempting to move 
people in directions that will make their lives better. They nudge. (2009, p. 6) 
Ex-Google Design Ethicist Tristan Harris notes that we can recognise this kind of choice 
architecture in the design of surveillance technologies: “If You Control the Menu, You 
Control the Choices […] By shaping the menus we pick from, technology hijacks the way 
we perceive our choices and replaces them with new ones” (2016). In controlling menu 
options, Harris argues, the platform may “give people the illusion of free choice while 
architecting the menu so that they win, no matter what you choose” (2016. ‘Winning’ 
here, it should be emphasised, is not to engage the user with a particular kind of content, 
but rather to engage the user and keep them engaged. 
For Thaler and Sunstein, though, employment of the nudge should be thought of as 
allowing people to “make wiser choices without restricting any options” (Thaler, 2018, 
p. 431). Their thinking has undoubtedly influenced political governance in the USA and 
beyond – leading to the development of internationally-operating, part-UK-government-
owned company, the Behavioural Insights Team, or ‘Nudge Unit’ (Halpern, 2015).  
Yet if we are to think the likes of Cambridge Analytica, CTF or anonymous bot- and troll-
farms as ‘choice architects’ in crafting manipulated perceptions of ‘the social’, we can 
hardly think these attempts to make others’ ‘lives better’. Rather, once more, we may see 




appear to content manage, yet clandestinely to connect users with targeted paid-content, 
and to keep them engaged – does not operate primarily for usefulness to the user, but 
usefulness to the platform and its economic inter-dependents. While Facebook’s 
infrastructure itself can be considered choice architecture – designed to encourage 
particular kinds of platform-interaction – the actions desired by these actors lie beyond 
the platform. Cambridge Analytica, for example, is reported to have claimed to have “won 
the White House for Donald Trump” by, through perfectly legal platform processes, 
micro-targeting potential voters on Google, Snapchat, Twitter, Facebook and YouTube, 
influencing them in their vote (Lewis & Hilder, 2018). Likewise, despite Facebook’s 
transparency laws – intended to make clear who is paying for political adverts on the 
platform (Allan, 2018) – CTF were able, with appropriate funding, to create and advertise 
a sociality-manipulating network of fake sites and Facebook pages with the aim of 
influencing political opinion on the likes of Middle-Eastern politics and environmental 
issues for usefulness to the client.  
Reflecting in the supposed ‘post-truth’ era of 2018 on the possibility ‘nudging’ people 
into choices useful perhaps not for themselves, Thaler shifts from earlier notions of a 
‘bad’ or ‘evil’ nudge (2009, p. 239) to coining the alternate term “sludge”, describing 
choice architecture that is designed to either “discourage behavior that is in a person’s 
best interest … [or] encourage self-defeating behaviour” (2018, p. 431). Yet the original 
terms Thaler and Sunstein rightly bind up in the notion that “choice architects in all walks 
of life have incentives to nudge people in directions that benefit the architects (or their 
employers) rather than the users” (2009, p. 239). To be sure, particularly through the 
perception portals of the social media platform, must we not consider that ‘sludge’ might 
include choice architecture designed neither for the best interest nor self-defeating 
behaviour of the user, but rather for the best interests of the ‘nudger’? Indeed, this we 
might see is the true basis of the designed nudge: not to encourage people to make choices, 
good or bad, but to encourage them to make the choices I want them to make.  
The behavioural foundation of nudge theory is supported by ample historical and more 
recent psychological studies (Thaler & Sunstein, 2009), yet a key distinction ought to be 
drawn between our own conceptual thinking on consciousness, choice and individuality 
and the cognitive psychological thinking Thaler and Sunstein use to interpret the work. 
For them, there are two ‘kinds’ of thinking: the “Automatic System” (or the so-called 
‘lizard brain’) and the “Reflexive System” – the former being “Unconscious” and the 




influencing the automatic system, claiming as a governmental-adoption incentive, “If 
people can rely on their Automatic Systems without getting into terrible trouble, their 
lives should be easier, better, and longer” (2009, p. 22). For Thaler and Sunstein, then – 
yes – the nudge may influence the individual’s behaviour, perhaps non-consciously, but 
they still make the choice. A subject-individual holds the agency in making the choice – 
the nudge serves only to encourage the automatic system toward what that choice is.  
However, let us re-evaluate this assessment within our anarchival conceptualisation of 
consciousness.  
All lived action is, within our approach, affective and reflexive – perception’s function 
across all organisms being “to receive stimulation, to provide motor apparatus and to 
present the largest possible number of these apparatuses to a given stimulus” (Bergson, 
2004, pp. 20-21). Consciousness emerges as a matter of degree across lower and higher 
organisms, out of the increasing abilities to make voluntary choice of limitation in what 
to perceive and how to act: “the nervous system thus constructed, from one end of the 
animal series to the other, in view of an action which is less and less necessary” (Bergson, 
2004, p. 21). From our perspective, then, there is no binary distinction in kind between 
‘automatic’ and ‘reflexive’ modes of thinking. Rather, the difference lies in a matter of 
degree – with higher conscious action involving a greater ability to limit one’s own 
perception and choice of action. 48 Moreover, in developing this sense of consciousness 
through Simondon’s theorising on individuation, we can recognise that neither is the 
subject-environment binary relationship quite as straightforward as conceptions of 
‘individual’ cognitive systems allow for. Rather, “We are obliged to think of the group as 
anterior to the individual, instead of the individual as anterior to the group” (Scott, 2014, 
p. 136) – we are leaky bodies, and there is no true binary between the individual and its 
environment. Indeed, the individual can be understood as emergent out of a relation 
between the body, other bodies and the wider environment.  
As established in previous chapters, we act on the group, and the group on us, in constant 
and always-emergent acts of recognition and reconstitution, themselves informed through 
higher- and lesser-consciously realisations of memory-potential into action. So, while ‘a 
nudge’ might for Thaler and Sunstein represent a way in which to guide the behaviour of 
an existing individual, thus changing society, from our anarchival, process-based 
 
48 Indeed, all of the binary terms that come under Automatic System versus the Reflexive system may 
equally be regarded from a Bergsonian perspective as erroneously mistaking a difference in degree for a 
difference in kind: Uncontrolled versus Controlled; Effortless versus Effortful; Associative versus 




perspective this is flipped on its head – or at least radically differently conceptualised. 
Rather than better-informed individuals informing society, we can see multiplicities of 
nudges informing social actions, interactions and movements, out of which this very sense 
of individuality may emerge. The key distinction here, is that it is primarily one’s sense 
of sociality and relationality that informs one’s sense of individuality, not the other way 
around.  
 
Figure 9 – Thaler and Sunstein’s ‘Two cognitive systems’ 
 
Reality, Morality and Brexit Dark Ads: Manufacturing Identity 
What, then, does this mean when we think about social interaction and false remembering 
online?  
Collectively-individuating acts or significations of cultural value, informing our sense of 
the social now, we have seen are necessarily technologically mediated, and, out of these 
– and in relation to these – a sense of the individual emerges. And, while the animal of 
‘fake news’ may have existed long before the internet – for example, in rumour, hoax, 
propaganda – the connectivity and instantaneity of online communication has led to 
greater opportunities for its spread, both in terms of reach and speed.  
Furthermore, the economic models of mainstream, surveillance-technology and social-
media platforms have introduced at least three crucial, interconnected factors into how 
we approach the question, each with implications for the agency of the body-as-user in 
the man-machine coupling, in terms of perceiving and acting in the world. Firstly, 
surveillance technologies’ chief function lies in being able to target specific users, based 




oriented, engagement-led media facilitate a reduction to impulse-driven action, 
encouraging lesser-conscious responses to stimuli, amplifying the reach of behavioural 
lures of moral imperative to act. And, thirdly, senses of sociality may be highly-structured 
or manipulated, not only in terms of platforms connecting the user with “you are likely to 
care about most” (Twitter, no date b), but in terms of that model’s gerrymandering (or 
perhaps simply ‘use’) by external actors to create perhaps misleading impressions of ‘the 
social’ to which the user belongs, both within the platform and spread across the affective 
atmospheres of the wider hybrid media system.  
Through perceiving and acting uncritically (or unaware) through and with these affective 
technological mechanisms, this thesis argues, we risk surrendering agency of our actions 
(‘individually’ and as movements of whole societies) and thus our resultant social and 
individual sense of identity to more corporate or political agents.  
A perhaps modest – non-targeted – example, here, of how our sense of ‘the social’ may 
be modified online beyond the platform’s agency is through user reviews on the likes of 
Amazon or Google Maps – or, more pertinently, through fake reviews on these platforms. 
While reviews are, according to Amazon “meant to provide genuine product feedback” 
that can “help other customers” (Amazon, no date) it is widely known and indeed 
experienced that such reviews may be fake. Through posting false reviews, businesses 
may create a sense of social reality for the user that encourages the action of, say, 
purchasing a product or visiting a restaurant, venue or attraction. Fake posts might also 
be used by competitors to attack a product or business, challenging or destabilising 
existing apparently overarching social views. These may be produced by the businesses 
themselves, by paid fake reviewers,49 or even by bots (Vincent, 2017).  
Yet sociality-amending interventions may also be more wide-reaching or sinister. As part 
of a wider covert media campaign of apparent disinformation, global agricultural firm 
Monsato, for example, is alleged to have propagated negative Amazon reviews for a 
journalist’s book, covering themes of corporate power and the links between weed-killer 
and cancer (Levin, 2019). Furthermore, internal documents released through court cases 
against the corporation illustrated its engagement in forcing apparently false or 
misleading narratives more widely in the hybrid media system: paying Google to display 
search results critical of the journalist’s work when searching for her name and the words 
‘Monsanto Glyphosate’ (Levin, 2019); allegedly ‘ghost writing’ academics’ scientific 
 
49 At the time of writing, Facebook and eBay had both been under fire for failing to act on numerous 




articles (Hakim, 2017); paying for favourable articles in news outlets (Gillam, 2019); and 
funding front-groups to present pro-Monsato attitudes on social media (Gillam, 2019).  
While this perhaps aptly demonstrates how public images and appearances of social 
consensus may be manipulated online through hybrid media systems, of more crucial 
concern to us are the ways in which targeted, surveillance-technology models may, out 
of such senses of sociality, engender wider action and reconstitute social-individual 
identity.  
Let us here take the example of political so-called ‘dark ads’ during the UK’s ‘Brexit’ 
campaign period.   
In May 2016, Vote Leave – the official Leave campaign during the UK’s referendum on 
leaving the EU – launched a competition promising £50 million to anyone who could 
correctly guess the results of all fifty-one matches in the June-July Euro 2016 football 
championship (BBC News, 2016). During the referendum campaigning period, Vote 
Leave would promote the competition – with no branded affiliation to the political 
campaign funding it – through Facebook adverts (See Figure 10), in what would 
afterwards be revealed to be a mass exercise in data-harvesting of personal profiles, from 
“people who usually ignore politics” (Cummings, 2016). The data could now be used to 
micro-target users with adverts supporting the Vote Leave campaign – mostly, again, 
unbranded. “In the official 10 week campaign”, campaign director Dominic Cummings 
would later disclose, “we served about one billion targeted digital adverts, mostly via 
Facebook” (Cummings, 2016).  
The campaign itself – described by Channel 4’s FactCheck, among countless others, to 
be “dominated by false statements and half-truths” (Worrall, 2018) – was waged through 
micro-targeted social media adverts, and was delivered with Canadian firm Aggregate 
IQ, who would later be suspended from Facebook for alleged association with Cambridge 
Analytica and its data scandal. Many adverts used by the campaign, showing no political 
branding for Vote Leave, seem (at first) to have little to do with the EU referendum. 
Rather, related to a range of socio-political issues, they were targeted to particular kinds 
of user – or ‘psychographically targeted’, as researchers into the phenomenon have 
labelled the practice (Online Privacy Foundation, no date) – to excite their sense of moral 
imperative, thus facilitating engagement. Several unbranded adverts, for example, 
capitalised on animal cruelty (see Figure 11). “HUNTING WHALES is unnecessary and 




claimed, over an image of a whale being gutted: “CLICK HERE IF YOU AGREE”. 
Another featured an image of a bull and bull fighter, with the text, “THESE ARE 
ANIMALS. NOT ENTERTAINMENT.” and a click-button image reading, “STOP 
ANIMAL ABUSE”. Other adverts, also unbranded, referred to a supposed potential 
collapse of the British steel industry, asking users to “CLICK TO HELP” (see Figure 12). 
And others, yet still unbranded, famously clamoured to users’ fears about immigration or 
fears or prejudices about migration from the Middle East (see Figure 13). In all cases, of 
course, once the user has clicked on the advert, they are taken to Vote Leave campaign 
material. And, as more data of various sorts was collected about users, Vote Leave were 
able to feed this back into targeted campaigning, both on- and off-line. And, even without 
being targeted or clicking on the advert, broader engagement may well have been met 
through sponsored posts or shares into one’s News Feed within one’s own network. 
From our anarchival perspective, we may see our three-fold process at work in this 
Facebook advertising campaign: firstly, using surveillance technologies to target specific 
kinds of user; secondly, harnessing transindividual moral imperative within the 
platform’s climate of impulse-action to ‘nudge’ the user into clicking on the advert; and, 
thirdly, instilling a sense of sociality-reconstitution, in affirming that to hold these beliefs 
is to be in one’s social and individual identity a ‘leave voter’ – you belong. Of course, this 
was a political campaign, with the desired action as the end-result that targeted users 
would vote to for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. Thus, the period in 
which such sense of sociality needed to be strongly encouraged through the targeting of 
adverts was when people needed to make the choice to vote, “weighted to the period 
around postal voting and the last 10 days of the campaign” (Cummings, 2016).  
It is important to recognise that the adverts above are targeted at specific kinds of user 
firstly to stir up drives of moral imperative toward open society – relating to caring and 
wanting to help others – to ‘nudge’ the user to click. Then, the sense of sociality informed 
through campaign material contextualises the matter into one that stirs up moral 
imperative toward closed society: the EU, as threatening ‘other’, will allow these things 
to happen, and you must act to close our society to protect it – by voting to leave the EU. 
What is interesting is that, while the facts of the matter were that at the time the UK was 
a part of the EU (and at the time of writing remains so), a social reality was constructed 
(or existing narrative re-enforced) in which the UK is not a part of the EU, but apart from 
it. In creating a sense of ‘us versus them’, the campaign, we might think, was able to 




leave the EU. The social reality becomes one in which one must take the action to leave 
the EU if you are to protect your own perceived social group(s).  
The (s) here is important. Further unbranded Vote Leave adverts straightforwardly 
excited moral-imperative drives toward closed society from the outset. Multiple adverts, 
setting out crude false moral dilemmas in which the UK is pitted against the EU, were 
micro-targeted at users, based on Facebook’s personality profiling, in presumable 
combination with Vote Leave’s own data collation. And, of course, the way to protect the 
UK – one’s sociality, the in-group – in this regard would be by voting to leave the EU. 
Through such perceptions of society, the wider action of voting to leave becomes a moral 
imperative in itself.  
Examples of these false moral dilemmas include: either be in the EU or save maternity 
clinics, indeed the wider NHS (see Figure 14); either be in the EU or pay for regional 
flood defences (see Figure 15); either be in the EU or save our schools (see Figure 16). 
Micro-targeted as they were, vote Leave created a large number of adverts from different 
angles to excite various kinds of moral attention – “We ran many different versions of 
ads”, Cummings claims, “tested them, dropped the less effective and reinforced the most 
effective in a constant iterative process” (2016). Indeed, the collected adverts Vote Leave 
released by Facebook to a parliamentary committee investigating fake news ran to over 
one hundred pages (UK Parliament, no date).50   
It is worth noting that this thesis is neither attempting nor willing to take a political stance 
on whether the UK ought or ought not to remain a member of the European Union. Rather, 
it seeks to recognise the value of Vote Leave’s ‘dark ads’ campaign in exampling the 
ways in which economically-informed, affective and potential-exciting platform 
architectures of social media sites may be used by other parties to engender artificial 
sociality-construction and encourage significant action in the wider social and political 
world.  
 
50 This perhaps goes some way to explaining the political purgatory the UK has suffered socially and 
parliamentarily in the years after the UK voted to leave the EU, in terms of what ‘Brexit’ ought to look 
like. While the action to leave the EU was engendered through voting in the referendum, the usefulness 
of the action and to whom is seemingly far from clear. The choice architecture was geared toward 
morally-inducing the maximum number of users to vote against the EU, but such consensus did not exist 
in terms of voting for anything else. Did people vote to save schools? To increase flood-defence 
spending? To protect the NHS? To decrease immigration? To support animal rights? The framing of 
leaving the EU as a moral identity issue may equally go some way sociologically understanding toward 
the apparent groundswell at the time of writing in ‘leaving at all costs’, even with no Withdrawal 
Agreement, and the popularity in electing newly-founded The Brexit Party MEPs to the European 







































Figure 16 – Vote Leave unbranded ‘us vs them’ adverts: schools 
Cultivating Consensus: Manufacturing Societies 
In the case of the Vote Leave, with a firm public image and message to promote, once the 
user had been nudged into clicking through to their campaign material via the advert, they 
would at least become aware that the material was related to the EU referendum. Yet it 
requires little exercising of imagination to consider how the same approach and 
techniques could be used for more subversive, furtive, political persuasion. Thus, under 
the political pressure of governments and of course the economic pressure to retain its 
now perhaps more-wary public usership, Facebook began in the wake of ‘dark ads’ 
controversies to introduce new transparency rules for political advertisers, internationally 
and in the UK (Allan, 2018; Goldman, 2017), saying that “people should be able to tell 
who the advertiser is and see the ads they’re running, especially for political ads” 
(Goldman, 2017).  
The changes, broadly-speaking and varying in different countries, require that adverts 
relating to “social issues, elections or politics” include a disclaimer, displaying who paid 
for the advert (Facebook Business, no date). These rules may relate both to adverts 
directing to beyond the site and to adverts promoting pages on Facebook itself. 
Furthermore, these adverts, their registration details and limited information about their 
views or interactions will be stored in country-specific ‘Ad Libraries’ for up to seven 
years (Facebook Business, no date).  
Yet, as has been demonstrated through the exposing of CTF’s network of websites and 
web pages, these rules have already been shown ineffective, or ‘work-around-able’. As 
the article that broke the story describes: 
they created websites and Facebook pages which appeared to be independent 
online news sources with names such as Why Electricity Matters, Reporting 




highly selective information which reached tens of millions of readers. 
Multiple supposedly independent pages on behalf of different clients could 
then be managed by Crosby employees through a single high-level “business 
manager” account, which sidesteps Facebook’s transparency tools. The 
connection between the pages is not visible to normal Facebook users. 
(Waterson, 2019b) 
CTF’s conceptual approach remains at its core similar to that of Vote Leave: excite user-
engagement through promotion of a page or topic to psychographically targeted users; 
once users are engaged, feed selective information from apparently independent sources 
into this sense of ‘the social’ to normalise, promote or enforce a desired message or 
attitude.51 For example, one former employee alleged: 
It would all be anonymised and made to look as though they are a news 
aggregator with a specialist angle … For instance, if we were working to 
promote the use of coal, it would be an anti-environmental page. You might 
make a page designed to attract pro-Trump types and get them revved up about 
green subsidies. (Quoted in Waterson, 2019b) 
The apparent operations of CTF, then, we can see as a nuanced and sustained 
development of the kind identity- and action-informing sociality construction we saw in 
the Vote Leave dark ads. While Vote Leave’s approach to choice architecture draws on 
moral imperative to encourage targeted, individual users into associating with their 
‘brand’, CTF take a more secretive approach. For them, the intention is not to encourage 
individuals to associate with a public political platform, for a one-off choice of user-
action. Rather, through the artificial construction of perceived socialities, across multiple 
media platforms, and the sustained, strategic drip-feeding of selective (dis)information 
through these platforms, CTF aims to cultivate social interactions that stimulate an 
apparently ‘organic’ or ‘grassroots’ groundswell of opinion. Through this kind of 
sophisticated, hybrid-media, perception-manipulating choice architecture, CTF’s clients 
can hope to not only promote social-political attitudes in swaying public opinions, but 
 
51 In a way, this might be considered a more sophisticated political development of the simple kind of 
tactic social-media researcher Lisbeth Klastrup has called “grief squatting” (Klastrup, 2014). When R.I.P. 
pages were a popular form of mourning, users might create a page following a sensational or celebrity 
death, which could amass significant numbers of ‘likes’. While some page authors might do this for the 
apparent connective thrill of ‘like hunting’, others were reported to have, once the attention was no 
longer on the death, completely rebranded the page and make use of the exiting free ‘likes’ by posting, 




effect their own specific, desired legislative change through propagating and highlighting 
an apparent public desire for their preferred policy positions.  
The tactic of ‘astroturfing’ – “where political campaigners attempt to create the 
perception of an upswell of grassroots support for a cause” (Waterson 2019b) – is not 
new. Yet the difference with the manipulation of new, networked and targeted 
surveillance technologies is that, more than creating a perception of grassroots support to 
win political favour, political actors with appropriate financial and technological clout at 
their disposal may engage in these propaganda techniques to in a very real sense more 
efficiently, artificially create such a groundswell, much more quickly and more 
widespread. Earlier in the chapter we discussed the apparent difference between having 
‘evidencable trust’ in records of the past, and in taking a leap of faith in believing in false 
pasts. Through twenty-first-century surveillance technologies, the waters become more 
muddied in terms of ‘evidencable trust’. This in turn grants an advantage to those who 
might manipulate the sense of ‘the social’, of grouped-individual, and morally influence 
users toward action useful not necessarily for the users themselves but rather the special 
interests of those who attempt to control the content experienced through perception-
portals.  
There is no reason that wider perception-manipulating such as bots or troll-farms, or 
falsified digital images or emerging technologies of ‘deep fakes’ may not be used in such 
sophisticated propaganda operations, nor why these should be limited to the private, 
commercial socio-political actors and agencies.  Through the infrastructure of Twitter, 
for example – hashtags, retweets, tagging, the ‘trending’ filter – cultural-political ‘Twitter 
storms’ (orchestrated or more ‘genuine’) may harness drives toward moral imperative 
toward protecting one’s perceived collective, attempting to create the controlled 
perception of one view being dominant. The notorious Russian company, the ‘Internet 
Research Agency’, allegedly a Russian-state-operated outfit combining troll farms and 
more CTF-style practices, has been linked among other things to an “influence campaign” 
to promote Donald Trump as the preferred candidate for the 2016 U.S.-presidential 
elections (National Intelligence Council, 2017). Through thousands of Facebook adverts 
targeted at millions of US residents, across hundreds of Facebook pages, U.S. 
Representative Adam Schiff alleges:  
[The Russian] social media campaign was designed to further a broader 
Kremlin objective: sowing discord in the U.S. by inflaming passions on a 




accounts, pages, and communities to push politicized content and videos, and 
to mobilize real Americans to sign online petitions and join rallies and 
protests. (Quoted in U.S. House of Representatives, no date) 
In response to revelations about the Internet Research Agency, the USA engaged in “the 
first muscle-flexing” of its 2009-established ‘U.S. Cyber Command’ to prevent Russian-
state interference in the 2018 midterm elections, disrupting the network capacities of the 
Internet Research Agency during the days around the election. In the UK, the British 
Army announced in July 2019 that it would be forming a new, ‘hybrid warfare unit’, 
focusing on “intelligence gathering, cyber, counter-propaganda and electronic warfare” 
(Sengupta, 2019) to, in part, tackle disinformation from Russia and elsewhere. The unit, 
tellingly, would undertake defensive and offensive operations, bringing hackers and 
(counter)propagandists into the same group (Sabbagh, 2019). Existing alleged reports of 
operations of British cyber propaganda units involved the countering of local, mediatised 
rumours about misconduct of British soldiers in an exercise in Croatia, and deliberate 
campaigns of disinformation to destabilise the Islamic State in Iraq (Sabbagh, 2019).  
Here, then, we may once more emphasise the tensions between the social-cultural, techno-
economic and more political and governmental agencies in the man-(hybrid-media-
)machine couplings, in terms of how perceptions and actions may be encouraged through 
new, online and pervasive technologies.   
Affect Capitalism: Interaction as Work 
In relation to online propaganda campaigns, Pomerantsev draws attention to a nine-month 
Oxford Internet Institute research project, analysing the design and uses of bots during 
2016 U.S.-presidential election (Woolley & Guilbeaut, 2017). In their working paper, 
doctoral researchers Samuel C. Woolley and Douglas R. Guilbeault describe a now-
perhaps-familiar scenario, in which bots are understood to be:  
artificially amplifying traffic around a political candidate or issue. Armies of 
bots built to follow, retweet, or like a candidate’s content make that candidate 
seem more legitimate, more widely supported, than they actually are. This 
theoretically has the effect of galvanizing political support where this might 
not previously have happened. (Woolley & Guilbeault, 2017, p. 8) 
They conceptualise these kinds of processes of sociality-manipulation as “manufacturing 
consensus”, arguing that “the illusion of online support for a candidate can spur actual 




describes the process as constructing a “simulation” of the what we might think of as the 
social now, which “would then be reinforced as people modified their behaviour to fall in 
line with what they thought was reality” (2017, p. 81). 
In May 2017, a multi-university research project published its impressive report on 
research conducted across six European nations plus the USA into “whether those who 
use search engines and social media are being fed inaccurate, false, or politically targeted 
information that distorts public opinion” (Dutton et al, 2017, p. 5). Through analysing 
surveys into user attitudes, the researchers conclude that concerns over ‘filter bubbles’, 
‘echo chambers’ and ‘fake news’ are “overstated” (2017, p. 5) – arguing that, while 
“search plays a major role in shaping opinion … it is not deterministic” (2017, p. 8), since 
“users expose themselves to a variety of opinions and viewpoints online and through a 
diversity of media” (2017, p. 5). Indeed, they draw attention to the numerous sources of 
information that users may draw on, as well as emphasising Chadwick’s conception of 
the hybrid media system (Dutton et al, 2017, p. 12) – citing the prevalence of scepticism 
and propensity toward using fact checkers as factors that might mitigate the perceived 
problems posed by fake news.  
Dutton et al rightly suggest that a tendency toward technological determinism may have 
led to “panic” (2017, p. 7) over the likes of misinformation and fake news, engendering 
a neglection of the agencies of the user. Yet, while they acknowledge that that the ways 
social technologies are used are “not determined by technical designs and affordances, 
but are shaped by an array of factors, including economic, psychological, cultural, law 
and policy, technical, and other social factors” (2017, p. 19), this thesis argues that their 
focus of analysis leads their conclusions to be equally neglectful of other agencies 
inherent in the wider ecologies of online remembering and the hybrid media system. In 
focusing solely on user-reported attitudes to using search engines and social media as 
objects, the study neglects completely the agencies of those platforms through which 
these behaviours take place, as well as paying only limited lip service to the agencies of 
those wider actors who might produce and promote misinformation for their own gain. 
Furthermore, while it is encouraging to consider the plurality of media-platforms and 
media-systems through which users may access their information, we cannot ignore that 
ever-increasingly sophisticated methods of perception manipulation have, as we have 
seen, been employed across multiple components of the hybrid media system, in attempts 
to popularise or normalise the political positions of financially or corporately powerful 




that less than ten percent of those surveyed self-reported “often” finding information 
online “that leads them to change their mind about a political issue” (2017, p. 81), the 
behaviours of just a small proportion of democratic-nation populations may deliver large-
scale political and legislative impact. The decision for the United Kingdom to leave the 
European Union, for example, was won by the leave campaign with a majority of less 
than a four-per-cent of the vote, representing less than three-per-cent of the total electorate 
(The Electoral Commission, 2019). Similarly, although Donald Trump lost the popular 
vote for the U.S. presidency (National Archives and Records Administration, no date), 
close wins in weighted and swing states helped to secure his claim to the White House.   
While it is important to avoid techno-determinism when considering the topic of fake 
news, then, it is equally important to recognise that there exist wider agencies that might 
make use of surveillance-technology infrastructures to engender social and political 
change. Moreover, we must recognise that it is precisely the affective, targeted, data-
informed, connection-exciting techno-economic models of surveillance technologies that 
allow such use-making to take place. As Karppi notes, “The problem of fake news is not 
so much what is seen as how things become visible on the platform in the first place” 
(2018, p. 15). All pull their own ways in our transindividual ‘struggle’ to remember. 
Returning to the initial theme of the chapter, then, how might we now understand the 
spread, indeed apparent virality, of fake news in relation to our wider anarchival 
perspective on remembering in the online era, expounded through the last three chapters?  
Before addressing this question, it is perhaps worth briefly revisiting the term ‘viral’ – for 
to conceptualise the spread of fake news in such a way is to give the impression that the 
content itself is the ‘disease’. Rather, we might better see fake news as a symptom: a by-
product of the wider problem that is the commercial and global commodification of the 
anarchival processes of remembering. And it is this that we find has become the object of 
our analysis.  
We have seen that platform architectures such as the Facebook News Feed are designed 
to manipulate perceptions, content displayed to the user not to inform action useful to that 
trans-individuating being, but to generate further monetisable engagement and 
participation with the platform itself. One’s past in the form of data-profile is, as with all 
surveillance technologies, fed back into one’s present perceptions to not only predict but 
produce behaviour. Choice of perception and action limited and guided by the platform, 




instinctive impulse-action, of moral imperative, reducing the user to a datafiable and 
analysable assemblage of actions and behaviours. Docile and awash in a sea of duration, 
we risk no longer being more than, no longer user-individuals. Rather, placated or 
provoked, we are reduced to semi-automated impulse-actions, themselves reduced to ones 
and zeros, and algorithmically fed back to us. We are alienated from our transindividual 
potential. We become user-workers within affect capitalism. As Zuboff speculates on the 
future of what she calls surveillance capitalism:  
These markets do not depend on you except first as a source of raw material 
from which surplus may is derived, and then as target for guaranteed 
outcomes. We have no formal control because we are not essential to the 
market action. In this future we are exiles from our own behaviour, denied 
access to or control over knowledge derived from our own experience. 
Knowledge, authority, and power rest with surveillance capital, for which we 
are merely “human natural resources”.” (Zuboff, 2019, p. 328) 
Beyond the mere commodification of affective relations, these platform infrastructures 
may in turn be co-opted by wider cultural economic and political forces and interests. 
Through combinations of ‘astroturfing’ and personal-targeted, multi-platform content, 
agents may manufacture consensus and resulting actions. However small or widespread, 
such approaches may artificially simulate a sense of sociality, harnessing moral-
imperative drives toward collective individuation to guide wider, perhaps legislatively 
significant, socio-political attitudes and behaviours.  
Nevertheless, for the surveillance platform, informed through its affect-capitalist business 
model, the content of supposed fake news, false memory, and indeed any media from 
remains somewhat inconsequential – beliefs become obsolete. Whatever governmental 
and social pressures under which such platforms-as-corporations may come to ‘tackle’ 
fake news and misinformation, they may not escape their core economic functions and 
drives. What has value here are simply the monetisable interactions of user-workers, 
themselves directed by the platform. Affective movements of impulse become the capital, 
laboured uncreatively out of memory-potential from one user to the next across 
algorithmically-gated communities. The event is commodified in cyber-time. Like the 








Conclusion and Discussion 
 
 
This research project set out to explore the role new, online and pervasive technologies 
play in changing individual and collective memory processes, and to attempt to find what 
problem may exist for memory in the online era. In exploring existing academic and 
popular debates, it argued that many, more prevailing, supposedly-identified problems or 
questions for memory in the online era rely uncritically on quantified notions of whether 
we risk remembering ‘too much’ or ‘too little’. This, it reasoned from a Bergsonian 
perspective, can be understood as a false problem, in that it is badly stated – pre-supposing 
that memory can be quantified. Through cross-disciplinary critique, the thesis challenged 
tendencies of thought around remembering as a function of the individual, as quantifiable 
and as recall of the past. It took an archaeological approach to interrogating these modes 
of thinking, arguing that such tendencies could be traced back from the present to a 
European-historical assumption that memory works like an archive, like a kind of 
‘storehouse in the mind’, or, more recently, like a computer hard drive and processor. 
Furthermore, it suggested such an assumption of memory as knowledge or information 
has leant itself to erroneous ideas that biological memories may be extended or even 
replaced by media- or data-artefacts.  
The thesis then made two interventions, following the philosophical method of intuition. 
Firstly, it proposed a methodological reformulation of the question, to be one not of how 
much we are remembering through and with new technologies, but how we are 
remembering differently. Secondly, conceptually, it argued for a re-orienting of the 
approach toward empirical analysis to be once concerned not with memories as things in 
space but as processes in time – introducing Bergson’s notion of duration as the 
continuous flow of the present, through which life is experienced.  
Through the Theory Chapter, the thesis explored Bergson’s philosophical thinking on 
perception and memory. Perception, it characterised within Bergson’s thinking on images 




2004, pp. vii-viii). Memory-potential is realised – relationally with perception – into 
memory-images, to inform useful action for the body, in duration. Conducting a reading 
of Gilbert Simondon’s theorising on individuation and technology – itself understood to 
be developed through a negotiation with Bergson’s work – it established the combined 
philosophical foundation for a synthesis of affective, biological and cultural modes of 
transindividual remembering. In such a synthesis, we may see remembering as a 
biological drive to excite memory-potential out of previous experience, in the present, 
realised into psychic memory-images to inform useful action for the being. The greater a 
degree of voluntary choice such a function may offer, the greater a conscious sense of 
selfhood may emerge.  
Through Simondon, we understood this emergence of selfhood to be a process of psychic 
individuation – the feeling of temporally and relationally recognising oneself as a stable 
being, in the present yet relational to its own past and future. And, through Bergson’s 
thinking on the extension of body and intelligence through technology, and Simondon’s 
thinking on technics, we developed an understanding of the relationship between human 
and more complex technologies to be a form of ‘man-machine’ coupling, performing 
functions neither human nor machine could accomplish alone. Furthermore, the thesis 
conceptualised collective remembering as the technological use of artefacts as signifiers 
of cultural value, through which a stabilised sense of sociality may emerge, with its own 
past and future perceivable by group-members in the present. Artefacts, whether 
psychically, bodily, socially or artificially reproduced, it argued, can be understood not 
so much as memory, but as habit memory – repetitions, re-engagements, that stabilise an 
image, re-enacting it from the past and into the future. Thus, just as knowledge of the 
body – learning how – may be considered habit memory in the repetition of action, 
knowledge of the mind may be considered habit memory in the repetition of conceptual 
movements – learning what. Both bodily- and psychically-constituted habit memory, the 
chapter argued, may in this way be more properly considered as artefacts. Likewise, the 
physical re-presenting of information in artefactual objects and the performative re-
enacting of cultural, artefactual tradition we might consider forms of variously personal 
and more collective externalised or social habit – repeated to stabilise a sense of the social 
across time.  
Theoretical position broadly established, the thesis then engaged with recent academic 
notions of the anarchive as a process-oriented rethinking of the traditional, seemingly-




own position on artefactual remembering. In this way, objects are not seen as possessing 
potential themselves, but as carriers of potential – facilitating, through their significations 
and engagements, opportunities for the transindividual realisation of memory-potential, 
with perception and into action. Furthermore, the thesis argued that the embrace of the 
anti-metaphor of the anarchive as conceptual tool for thinking this kind of remembering 
may be intuitively useful – on the one hand consciously disrupting culturally-informed 
tendencies to conceptualise memory archivally, and on the other reminding us to think in 
terms of action-oriented processes in duration, bringing us perhaps closer to an 
appreciation of direct experience.  
Through the ensuing Case-Study Chapters, the thesis now applied this theoretical 
anarchival approach to more nuanced examples of how we may be remembering 
differently in the online era through new technologies – training its focus on changes to 
connectivity, temporality or instantaneity, and materiality. Exploring processes of 
personal, private, public and social acts of digital-artefact-enabled remembering through 
the likes of Goole Maps, Google Photos, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, it developed 
an understanding of new, networked and ‘feed-forward’ (Hansen, 2015) technologies as 
affording artefact-facilitated, man-machine expansions of perception, remembering and 
action in the psychically- and collectively-individuated sense of the now. Yet, through 
more socio-economic-political explorations of the relationships of these man-machine 
couplings, it argued that significant agential implications may be raised around what 
perceptions, remembrances and actions take place through these ‘perception portals’, and 
their complex, on- and off-line inter-relations between connections in the wider ‘hybrid 
media system’ (Chadwick, 2017). Memory and perception serve action, it reminded us. 
And a sense of consciousness lies in the choice of selection and limitation of what to 
perceive, in tandem with the relational-realisation of memory-potential, to inform choice 
of useful action. Thus, if we were to find the problem for memory, it became necessary 
not only to examine the different ways in which processes of perception, remembrance 
and action may be facilitated through new, online, networked technologies, but also to 
consider the wider social and economic reasons these processes may occur in such ways. 
In ‘Me, Myself and iPhones’ the thesis explored how remembrances of personal pasts 
may voluntarily or more involuntarily take place, indeed be extended, through new, 
online-connected technologies - engaging mainly with Google Maps and Facebook as 
vehicles for empirical analysis. From our anarchival perspective, the chapter 




database-archive informed expansion of perception in the present – artefacts of the past 
and present (re)presented through the apps to produce a digital-virtual, man-machine-
enabled sense of spatio-temporal now. In doing so, it argued, the apps offer opportunities, 
in their various ways, for individuation – informing a sense of the personal self and its 
relation to a wider social. Data collected from users’ own and others’ private and more 
public activity may be repurposed in the present into artefacts explicitly signifying the 
past – for example, On This Day style features in social media, or public reviews from 
previous visitors in Google Maps – or into artefacts more implicitly feeding-forward 
one’s past into the perceived present – for example, in in the algorithmically-informed 
curation of the Facebook News Feed, or predictive ‘matches’ locations in Google Maps. 
As an avenue into further exploration in subsequent chapters, the chapter then considered 
how artefacts signifying one’s personal past might be used by others in wider acts of more 
social or collective remembrance – using the ‘Memorialization’ of Facebook profiles as 
a useful vehicle for discussion of how artefacts may continue to be used, even when 
(indeed especially when) the author or subject ceases to exist.  
Having explored the experiences and processes of remembering personal pasts through 
each of these case-study examples, the chapter moved to examine more socio-economic 
considerations around the functioning of the platforms – raising questions around the 
agencies involved in such consciousness-informing, inter-related processes of perceiving, 
remembering and acting. It contextualised the explored experiences within business 
models of surveillance capitalism, in which platforms use often covert collection and 
analysis of data from behavioural surplus, largely to facilitate the sale of targeted 
advertisements. Within such a model, it established, the primary goal is to secure and 
retain user-engagement – both to ensure advert-impressions and to collect further data, in 
turn informing further engagements. Because of the principally clandestine nature of 
these operations, the chapter argued, a pharmacological tension may be seen to emerge – 
in terms of what the user perceives to be the service-transaction, versus the service in 
which they are actually engaged. Indeed, given that consciousness lies in the choice over 
what to perceive, and the use of parallel, relationally-realised remembrances to choose 
how to act, it argued that such a limitedly-consensual relationship raises significant 
implications around the balance of agency toward the constitution of the conscious self 
within these kinds of man-machine couplings. In such interactions, processes of 
perceiving and remembering, and their resultant action, may be guided to serve useful 
action not only for the transindividual-as-user but also, perhaps principally, for the 




human-as-body and the platform-as-machine should not be taken as indicative of a binary 
human/technology or worker/corporation dichotomy. Rather, as evidenced by the 
development of memorialised Facebook accounts, we must take into consideration the 
role played by wider social or cultural agencies in changing processes of remembering 
in the online era – thus gesturing toward consideration in the subsequent chapter.  
 In ‘Error 404 – Memory File Not Found’, the thesis moved to consider more social or 
cultural drives within collective remembering – examining ways in which collective acts 
of remembrance may be changing in the twenty-first century, through engagement with 
various prevalent, instantaneous and connective media-technologies, such as social 
networking sites, forums and search engines. The chapter used three case-study examples 
as vehicles to explore the engagement with, and spread of, media-artefacts-of-
remembrance from our anarchival approach: the 2013 memefication of ‘unflattering’ 
photos of US popular music artist, Beyoncé; the 2016 events around Facebook’s apparent 
censorship of Vietnam War photograph, The Terror of War; and the contemporary on- 
and off-line political campaign, Led by Donkeys, that re-presents past statements, often 
contradictory, of UK politicians.  
From our anarchival perspective, it conceptualised these artefactually-facilitated acts of 
collective remembering not only as the re-presenting of media objects from the past, but 
as the repurposing and re-versioning of media artefacts to cement social bonds in the 
present – their being shared and interacted with understood as highly-networked 
manifestations of drives toward collective individuation, reconstituting an expanded 
sense of always-emergent sociality, of belonging, out of which a conscious sense of the 
individual may emerge. In such a conceptualisation, media-artefacts are not seen as 
objects in cyber space, but as markers of relationships, or anarchival carriers of cultural 
value – carriers of transindividual potential – through an expanded, digital-virtual sense 
of the social in duration, in cyber time. And the significations of the past afforded by such 
artefactual interactions need not represent a fully-historically-accurate past, but rather an 
idea of shared social past around which bodies may socially coalesce, to usefully 
reconstitute a sense of identity in the present. Furthermore, through the re-versioned, re-
presentation of these artefacts for useful action in the present, members of perceived 
socialities may experience a stabilised sense of that sociality’s extension, in the present, 
out of its historical past and into its anticipated future – engendering an expanded sense 




Once more, the thesis here turned its attention to the more socio-economic factors 
inherent in platforms’ designs to consider those agencies informing these changing 
processes of remembering, beyond the biological and in-group social. While 
artefactually-expanded senses of perception and remembrance such as those examined 
through the case studies might for the human involve exchanges of signified cultural 
value, through their content and context, the chapter emphasised that for the platform 
what is prioritised is not content but connection. Monetisable engagement and interaction 
is in the platform’s essential design prioritised over ethical considerations of publication. 
Therefore, it argued, platforms might in their essence be seen to not control perceptions 
so much as control connections – harnessing cultural drives toward collective 
individuation. Such an approach, it suggested, has led to various platforms’ weaknesses 
in fulfilling legislative and perhaps more ethical obligations in controlling content’s 
spreadability, and thus visibility and affectability – as demonstrated through the 
apparently impulsive spread of, and difficulty in censoring, the likes of copyrighted or 
culturally or legally inappropriate material, hate speech and misinformation. Through 
discussion, the platform put forward the argument that we might recognise peculiar, 
contemporary, cultural struggles in platform-facilitated remembering – between the 
competing agencies and drives of, for example, the economic-technological, the in-group 
and broader social, and the more legislative.  
The final Case-Study Chapter, ‘Facts, Fakes and Filter Bubbles’, picked up from the 
observation that, in serving primarily not to inform but to create monetisable connections, 
platforms may engender widespread communication and action not necessarily useful for 
the transindividual-as-user – either through more ‘organic’, culturally-driven spread of 
media-artefact-significations, or through various, more ‘organised’ exploitations of such 
drives. Furthermore, argued that ‘ideas of the past’ – whose mediation and remembrance 
we may understand as informing sociality-constituting acts of collective individuation in 
the present – need not be truthful to the ‘facts’ of the past at all. The chapter began by 
attempting to conceptualise belief in false pasts from our anarchival position on 
remembering. Through case-study examples of contemporary online ‘false 
remembering’, it on the one hand developed an understanding of belief in false personal, 
experienced pasts as a creative process of sense-making in the present, through relational 
movements of psychic individuation. On the other hand, it conceptualised belief in 
collective, non-experienced pasts (historical and more contemporary) as processes of 
collective individuation – reconstituting an ongoing sense of the always-emergent 




idea or perceived threat of the other. This established, it moved to consider in what new 
ways these processes may take place through online, networked technologies such as 
social media.  
Through an examination of three recent examples of content that has ‘gone viral’ through 
online platforms, and a reading of Bergson’s thinking on the social sources of morality 
(1935), it conceptualised the spread of collective false remembering as driven by a kind 
of moral imperative, functioning to conserve the perceived sociality and its in-group 
members in response to perceived threat. Thus, it argued that we may see the apparent 
phenomenon of fake news as a kind of moral lure – unintentionally or more intentionally 
exploiting drives toward preservation of the social, across near-instantaneous, more 
impulsive movements of social-media interaction. Using the so-called Facebook ‘dark 
ads’ of the Leave campaign in the UK’s referendum on EU membership, the chapter 
argued that the micro-targeted model of surveillance media risks platforms being 
experienced as socially-artificial ‘perception portals’, through which more unscrupulous 
agents may exploit users’ predicted ‘vulnerabilities’. Moreover, in the targeted, affective 
exciting of users’ drives toward actions of moral-imperative, through tailored media 
content, it suggested, such agents might affectively effect apparent conscious action – 
useful not necessarily for the transindividual-as-user, as for their own special interests.  
Furthermore, in exploring recent news exposés of hybridised online propaganda 
networks, the chapter argued that platforms’ models of prioritising micro-targeted, 
engagement-inducing connections over usefulness of content risked exploitation in 
tailoring an experience of manufactured consensus. In such situations, sophisticated 
encouragement of engagement with various, seemingly-independent – yet inter-
connected and centrally-governed – news sources and other users leads the 
transindividual-as-user to experience an artificial sense of the social. In the en masse, 
surveillance-capitalist, micro-targeted manipulation of perceptions of society, the chapter 
argued, agents with the financial means may encourage sociality-informing senses of 
identity. Through this, they may manipulate beliefs and actions that once more afford 
seemingly-conscious, long-term social and political consensus and action not necessarily 
useful to the user, but to the special interests of the agents themselves.  
Yet, such operations, the chapter ultimately reminded us, are accomplished not only 
through means, but opportunity – their influence made possible through the feed-forward, 
surveillance-capitalist business model of the platforms through which consciousness-




the chapter argued, through uncritical engagement with surveillance technologies, we risk 
non-consensually and unwittingly surrendering personal control over our own conscious 
sense of identity and action to the interests of various other interests. 
Struggling to Remember  
Through applying our anarchival approach to an empirical analysis of acts of 
contemporary online remembering, the thesis has arrived, then, at a found problem for 
memory in the twenty-first century. And, while we began this research problem in 
considering the struggles for studying memory – recognising tensions between 
linguistically- and metaphorically-informed conceptualisations of remembering – we 
have found a problem for memory that lies in the struggles for processes of remembering, 
themselves.  
Through case-study analysis, we have identified a series of ongoing tensions between the 
various always-emergent and always-competing, more biological, cultural and 
technological consciousness-informing drives of remembering, perceiving and acting. 
And we have examined how these struggles between competing drives may be 
experienced differently in the twenty-first century through various prevalent forms of 
pervasive, online and networked media. Yet, beyond, or indeed underpinning these 
tensions between, for example, the personal, the social, the legislative and the political, 
we have found a more fundamental struggle. Through the clandestine nature of the 
economic model of platforms in which these inter-affective interactions take place, we 
risk a significant struggle for voluntary control over how we perceive, remember and act 
in the world, and thus a struggle for relationally-informed consciousness itself – in terms 
both of selfhood and grouped individuality.  
While surveillance technologies like Google search engine, Facebook or YouTube may 
offer opportunity for expanded senses of perception, remembering and acting in the 
digital-virtual-world-made-actual, the extension of processes of consciousness with such 
technologies is afforded through an only semi-consensual, ethically-questionable 
exchange or transaction. Perceptions, remembrances and actions are guided not in terms 
of usefulness for ourselves, but principally to encourage connections that secure and 
retain user-engagement. Thus, the consciousness- and society-informing significations 
inherent in these perhaps-addictive mediated connections need not be useful for the user, 
but for whichever more organic or manufactured drives might better exploit surveillance-




As we move further into the era of Web 3.0 – or ‘the internet of things’ – processes of 
surveillance capitalism are becoming more deeply, and perhaps more clandestinely, 
engrained in the affective movements of contemporary life. While we have here focused 
largely on the pervasiveness of surveillance technologies through ubiquitous smartphone 
use, since this research project began, surveillance technologies have begun to popularly 
move off-screen, embedding themselves at once more intrinsically yet more ethereally 
into domestic life. Wearable tech such as fitness trackers, for example, allow platforms 
to log and analyse bodily data as intimate as exercise, sleep and heartrate (as well as 
location) – and they and synced parties can use such analysis to, for example, make 
tailored recommendations on (or nudge) activity. And Google’s AI assistant now operates 
in many households through Google Hub – a speaker and voice-interface, through which 
users may interact with Google’s portfolio of own-brand and third-party synced services, 
as well as myriad compatible ‘smart home’ devices. Indeed, smart home products – or 
“everyware” (Greenfield, 2006) – are fast becoming ubiquitous in themselves – for 
example, computer-controlled ‘smart’ light bulbs, media systems, thermostats, door 
locks, door bells and fridges. As such, Google’s data-collection and -analysis operations 
may now encompass user-behaviours just a few years ago unimaginable. And, while 
convenience and usefulness of wearables and smart-home devices may enjoy popular 
reception, they may be significant implications for privacy and human agency in the man-
machine coupling. As post-modern theorist N. Katherine Hayles reminds us:  
We are now in a period when the interests of individuals are in dynamic 
interplay with the vested interests of large corporations, sometimes working 
together to create win-win situations, other times in sharp conflict over whose 
interests will prevail. (2013, p. 18)  
“Consciousness is the note of the present”, Bergson claims. Yet, when this note is played 
through an instrument composed of myriad more surreptitious and manipulative 
processes, consciousness risks becoming synthesised on terms dictated not by the needs 
of the body-as-transindividual, but those of the special interests able to exploit such a 
synthesis. As with a lack of critical awareness of the ‘framing power’ of the archive 
metaphor in conceptualising and thinking memory, in a lack of critical awareness of the 
increasingly-pervasive, clandestine framing power of the surveillance capitalist interface, 
and its implications, we may find ourselves inadvertently surrendering consciousness-
informing agency in how we perceive, remember and act in the world. We find ourselves 




Toward New Struggles  
We might comment here on the limitations of this research project, perhaps the most 
significant two of which are here identified.  
In one sense, the thesis must firstly accept that, in seeking to find what is at stake for 
remembering in the online era, its synthesis serves only to identify a problem, and not on 
face-value to offer up a solution. To be sure, this philosophical contribution does not seek 
to assume authority nor expertise on appropriate solutions, going forward – nor would 
word-count permit such an extension of the research project. However, we might suggest 
that the thesis does offer at least something to the pursuit of solutions. To return to our 
initial thinking on intuition, it is worth remembering that, for Bergson, “The stating and 
solving of the problem are here very close to being equivalent” (1946, p. 59). And we 
might argue that, in finding a problem in lack of critical awareness around the more 
clandestine interests inherent in remembering through surveillance technologies, the 
study points somewhat straightforwardly toward increasing awareness as potential 
ground for finding solutions.  
“[T]he machine is a slave whose purpose is to make other slaves”, Simondon claims 
(2017, p. 141) – and, in this respect, through the user’s seeming critical detachment from 
the wider model and implications of surveillance capitalism, it might be tempting to think 
ourselves risking becoming such slaves. Yet, the struggles we have explored above do 
not lend themselves easily to a binary slave/master, worker/corporation, man/machine 
dichotomy, but a complex inter-negotiation between various drives of the biological, the 
cultural and the technological. “What Simondon offers”, philosopher and feminist theorist 
Elizabeth Grosz notes, “is a new way of understanding a world that is not ultimately 
controlled or ordered through a central apparatus or system, that has no inherent or 
necessary hierarchies” (2013, p. 53). “[T]he machine is only a means … the domestication 
of natural forces by means of a first act of enslavement” (Simondon, 2017, p. 141). And 
this ‘first act of enslavement’ is subject to its own set of affective, external forces: “[I]t is 
culture that governs man, even if this man in turn governs other men and machines”, 
Simondon argues (2017, p. 161). Moreover, it is those very creative shifts and movements 
of culture out transindividual drives toward individuation – toward the future, through 
action in the present – that enable and fuel surveillance technologies’ model. The world 
“does not require animation or coordination by culture but instead enables and makes 




Here, then, we may consider a second limitation of the research – albeit one that perhaps 
equally fortunately gestures as much toward potential for solution as restriction of 
analysis. The functions, features and uses of technologies of remembering are changing 
all of the time through human engagement – bodily and cultural. Indeed, it is not only 
possible but likely that, by the time of its reading, following submission, some of the 
platform-specific observations made in this thesis may be ‘out of date’. Thus, this research 
project can offer only a snapshot of what appears to be the pressing issue for remembering 
at its time – it is of its time.  
Nevertheless, such a limitation again offers up something toward solutions for the 
problem the research project has found. Business and sociology scholar Shoshana Zuboff 
notes that “surveillance capitalists discovered that the most-predictive behavioral data 
come from intervening in the state of play … to nudge, coax, tune and herd behavior 
toward profitable outcomes” (2019, p. 8), suggesting that “it is no longer enough to 
automate information flows about us; the goal is now to automate us.” (2019, p. 8). 
Indeed, our final case-study chapter argued its case through similar observations. Yet, 
platform-infrastructure hierarchies or apparent ‘systems’ of remembering are not fixed, 
but fluid – affected by human biological and cultural behaviours and demand. Platforms’ 
features attempt to harness and encourage transindividual drives toward individuation, 
through cultural expression – but, when unable to simply automate users’ actions, 
corporations must adapt their offer around changing and user-expected techno-cultural 
practices to survive. We might think, for example, of Facebook’s emulation of Snapchat’s 
‘Stories’ feature on its Facebook and Instagram platforms, as it sought to offer popular 
experiences offered to users by rival platforms. Or we might think of its delicate treatment 
of ‘Memorialized accounts’ in response to users’ feedback – ensuring users do not 
disconnect from the platform due to upsetting experiences.  
Users are surveillance-capitalist technologies’ resource, without whom the corporation 
would cease to be able to operate. Thus, as media theorist Tero Karppi observes, “If 
disconnection is a solution for some social media users, for the social media platforms 
and their shareholders, it becomes an existential crisis. Social media live and breathe their 
users” (2018, p. 7).  
We explored in the Case-Study Chapters how an awareness of surveillance may affect 
users’ behaviours in various ways. Here, then, we might speculatively ask: In placing a 
greater, popular, ethical focus on the mechanisms within the platform-as-audience, might 




drives toward monetisation of engagement and interaction, against a mainstream, 
informed cultural resistance?  
Education, we might suggest, offers overt opportunities for raising awareness. For 
example, in finding in 2011 that, among other things, one in four British schoolchildren 
did not apply any checks on the veracity of information encountered on line – and that 
less than one in ten questioned who made the website and for what reasons – think tank 
Demos recommended that “[d]igital judgement must become a core part of the National 
Curriculum and teacher training” (Bartlett & Miller, 2011, p. 7). As well as encouraging 
critical thinking, the teaching of “[d]igital fluency” (2011, p. 7), it argued, should be a “a 
foundational, core skill that … underlie[s] teaching and learning across all subjects, and 
is not confined to a single subject”.  Under various pressures, the UK Department for 
Education in 2015 introduced the “Essential digital skills framework” – designed to 
ensure that all children will have foundational digital skills by adulthood (HM 
Government, 2019a).  
Yet, might an increase in awareness around the connection-over-content model of 
surveillance technologies lead to changes in the wider hybrid media system?  
Journalist and academic Peter Pomerantsev draws attention to the example of 
“constructive news” (2019, p. 239) – or “solutions journalism” (Curry & Hammonds, 
2014) – which aims to report objectively not only on contemporary issues, but on their 
potential solutions. Researchers at the University-of-Texas-based Center for Media 
Engagement tentatively claim that solutions-based articles improve readers’ experience 
by “heightening audiences’ perceived knowledge and sense of efficacy, strengthening the 
connection between audiences and news organizations, and catalyzing potential 
engagement on an issue” (Curry & Hammonds, 2014, p. 1) – representing, perhaps, a shift 
toward media distribution as principally useful to the user. For Pomerantsev, constructive 
news “could help reinspire trust in journalism, because we trust those who work together 
with us for some greater goal” (2019, p. 239). Moreover, he opines, “[I]t can overcome 
the sense of helplessness which conspiracy-peddling politicians so like to push to make 
you feel that only they can guide you” (2019, p. 239). Furthermore, the Center for Media 
Engagement argues that such articles lead to longer times spent on the page, and similar 
rates for sharing and commenting, compared to more traditional articles (Curry, Stroud 





Beyond approaches to improving access to and engagement with higher-quality media 
content, others argue closer to an overhaul of the surveillance-capitalist model itself. 
Might greater awareness of the mechanisms of surveillance technologies lead to increased 
industry competition from alternative, perhaps more ethical, techno-economic models?  
Ex-Google Design Ethicist Tristan Harris – described by The Atlantic as “the closest thing 
Silicon Valley has to a conscience” (Bosker, 2016) – argues for a wider shift toward 
ethical design across technologies. Arguing that “[w]e need our smartphones, 
notifications screens and web browsers to be exoskeletons for our minds and interpersonal 
relationships that put our values, not our impulses, first” (Harris, 2016), Harris established 
non-profit organisation the Center for Humane Technology – who employ “a combination 
of thought leadership, pressure, and inspiration to create market demand and momentum 
for products and services based on Humane Technology principles” (Center for Humane 
Technology, no date). Similarly, the very inventor of the worldwide web and founder of 
the non-profit World Wide Web Foundation, Tim Berners-Lee, argues for creative 
changes to help “[m]ake the web work for people … [rather than] a few dominant 
platforms” (2018). This, he suggests, may be possible through moving away from the 
advertising model of surveillance technology all together: 
Two myths currently limit our collective imagination: the myth that 
advertising is the only possible business model for online companies, and the 
myth that it’s too late to change the way platforms operate. On both points, 
we need to be a little more creative. (Berners-Lee, 2018) 
And might an increase in awareness equally lead to more legislative interventions in the 
surveillance capitalist model?  
Berners-Lee argues for a “legal or regulatory framework that accounts for social 
objectives” (2018) – around, for example, competition law in corporations acquiring rival 
startup companies, or regulation around personal data. And, as suggested in ‘Error 404 – 
Memory File Not Found’, struggles between more legislative and techno-economic 
cultural drives may already play a significant part in overcoming our struggle to 
remember. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), for example, became 
enforceable in Europe in May 2018. As well as guaranteeing various “Data Subject 
Rights”, GDPR requires, among other things, that websites secure explicit, ‘opt-in’ user-
consent for the collection of data – for example, through cookies. Furthermore, the 




GDPR.ORG, no date), perhaps affording some protection from the force of convenience 
over critical choice. Equally, while it has gained little traction at the time of writing, a 
2019 proposed US-Senate bill has suggested similar controls over companies that 
“manipulate people into consenting by making it difficult to decline consent” (Hawley, 
2019). The Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology (SMART) Act, if passed, 
would “ban certain features that are designed to be addictive, would require choice parity 
for consent, and would give users the power to monitor their time spent on social media” 
(Hawley, 2019). Likewise, the UK government’s 2019 white paper on Online Harms sets 
out aims to regulate “[d]esigned addiction” (HM Government, 2019, p. 26), through 
anticipated transparency around design-practices – as well as aiming to tackle issues 
around the ways in which “the internet, social media and AI provide ever more effective 
ways to manipulate opinion” (HM Government, 2019, p. 24).  
Perhaps most radically of all, media theorist Mark Hansen proposes a “principle of data 
neutrality” (2015, p. 74), in which the potential out of collected and analysed data-as-
behavioural-surplus “is a potential that is, and must be made to remain, fundamentally 
common to all, publicly accessible and open to multiple uses” (2015, p. 74).  
-- 
The examples outlined above are not intended as academic or comprehensive 
anticipations of solutions, but rather as an illustrative gesture, in coming to the end of this 
thesis, toward the forms potential solutions might take.  
This research project set out to consider the role new, networked and pervasive 
technologies play in changing individual and collective memory processes. It argued that 
many popularly-framed problems of whether we are today remembering ‘more’ or ‘less’ 
may be philosophically underpinned by the conceptualisation of memories as things in 
space – characterised perhaps most strongly by the metaphor of the archive. 
Acknowledging some key failings of the archive as a creative metaphor for thinking 
memory, three aims emerged for the project, which have now been accomplished. Firstly, 
to develop a non-archival philosophical understanding of memory. Secondly, to conceive 
a useful empirical method for considering the research question. And, thirdly, to then 
employ this method to contribute new knowledge to the field. Firstly, then, drawing on 
the thinking of Bergson and Simondon, it progressed an understanding of memory that 
focused on affective process and action in duration, blurring the supposed boundaries 




technological. In doing so, it hopes to offer a philosophical platform for more ‘joined-
up’, multi-disciplinary approaches to considering memory across its fractured 
contemporary areas of study. This philosophical understanding established, the thesis 
secondly developed the ‘anarchival approach’ as a novel method for considering the 
research question. Using the conceptual tool of the anarchive anti-metaphor, it 
reformulated the research question in order to find what ‘problem’, if any, may exist for 
memory in the online era. Thus, it argued for a question not spatially informed in 
considering how much we are remembering today, but experientially informed in 
considering how we are remembering differently. It proposed case studies as a way to 
examine the relational processes and experience of remembering through new 
technologies, and it argued that these changes should be analysed and made sense of 
within a wider socio-political context, toward considering a political economy of 
remembering. Thirdly, it employed this method to produce new embodied data on how 
we may be remembering differently through and with new technologies, analysed through 
a wider socio-economic lens. In doing so, it has contributed new academic knowledge to 
the field of studying memory, and it has found a novel problem around ‘struggling to 
remember’ in the online era – struggles of power and control between complex, 
distributed and overlapping processes and tensions of the biological, the technological 
and the cultural. It is perhaps fitting, then, that the thesis should end with an unassuming 
hope that, in finding such a problem, the research project might contribute to finding more 
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